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hat is the nature of transformation in Europe after communism? Until 
recently, the end of communism in Eastern Europe has been understood 
mainly as the opportunity for these countries to ‘return to Europe’1. Two 
main assumptions have guided the bulk of literature on integration in Eastern Europe: 
on the one hand, the singularity of the integration model associated with the 
European Union (EU) and its institutions. On the other hand, the idea of convergence 
of the Eastern European countries towards the West. This idea of ‘transition’ has 
strongly informed the debate on European integration. Appliance of the existing 
institutional framework has been seen as the only feasible way to construct 
democratic societies and market economies, and theoretical approaches have often 
suggested a direct and predestined convergence of the ‘East’ toward the ‘West’. From 
this perspective, the process of European integration becomes a linear transformation 
from socially, economically, and politically backward Eastern European societies into 
advanced western European societies. Moreover, theorizing on the theme of 
integration in the context of an enlarged EU has for the most part been concerned 
with conceptualizing a state-centrist European order and the role of the EU 
institutions herein. By assuming this linearity and adopting unconditionally many 
principles of the conventional approaches to European integration and 
Europeanization, much research has avoided addressing the possible – and indeed 
observable - diversity of outcomes in the process of transformation.  
Recent developments in the study of European integration have taken a 
step away from the dominant interest in the socio-economic convergence of Eastern 
European societies. Lately, some approaches (sociology of culture and cultural 
politics) have added a cultural dimension to European integration and thereby 
become more sensitive to the linkages between the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’ of 
                                           
1 I use the term ‘Eastern Europe’ to denominate on the one hand the geographical region; on the 
other hand, I treat this part of Europe as “a fundamental historical difference in European 
development which is associated with the historical development of what we have come to 
understand as modernity” (Wagner, 2002: 219). 
W 
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transformation, i.e. the dynamics within a given country and the dynamics of Europe. 
In doing so, some have indicated ‘the end of the transition paradigm’ (Pickel, 2002; 
Bönker et al., 2002; Carothers, 2002), while others have resisted this tendency (Linz 
and Stepan, 1996; Mason, 1996). The general message is clear, however. As 
expressed by Delanty, enlargement “is crucially a matter of cultural transformation 
and therefore it differs from all previous dynamics of Europeanization” (Delanty, 
2003c: 8).  
Against this background, the critical argument of this thesis is that in most 
analyses of Eastern European transformation, integration and its role and nature have 
been too narrowly understood. The possibility of seeing integration in terms of 
culture has not been considered. Another critical argument derives from the fact that 
so far many researchers have seen the Eastern enlargement only “as a routine 
institutional operation that is unlikely to change the course and nature of European 
integration” (Zielonka, 2006: 2). One may add that the eastward enlargement expands 
the EU’s diversity of cultures considerably, and that this in itself supports the 
arguments for looking closer at the cultural dimension of integration. Although the 
cultural dimension of European integration has not (as yet) produced an obvious 
crystallization of a theoretical approach, recent sociological theorizing (Delanty, 
2003c, 2006a; Soysal, 2004; Delanty and Rumford, 2005; Rumford, 2006a; Therborn, 
2006) on the idea of Europe becoming increasingly postwestern and postnational 
offer, in my opinion, promising guidance for a more critical analysis of European 
integration.  
In this thesis, I concur with the above-cited critique of the traditional 
approaches to European integration and move away from the ‘transition paradigm’. 
As indicated, I find the wider sociological debate on postwesternization and 
postnationalism to be a more efficient point of departure for studying and analysing 
the current transformations in Eastern Europe. I argue therefore that analyzing 
Eastern Europe properly requires four actions: first, a reassessment of the meaning of 
‘European integration’ as wider than the EU integration; second, a move from a 
systemic understanding of integration towards a focus on the way Europe has 
reorganized itself to integrate the ‘East’; third, an understanding of culture as a 
socially constructed reality based on social imaginaries, i.e. socio-cognitive 
frameworks by which individuals imagine their social environment; and fourth, a 
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reassertion of Eastern Europe beyond postcommunism, transition, and the EU 
enlargement. 
1.1. Main objectives of the thesis 
There are mainly two aims of this thesis. One is to provide insights into the process of 
cultural integration from a social theory perspective. In this study I define cultural 
integration as the process of reorganization caused by social agents who seek to 
reconstruct an existing societal order on the basis of their specific understandings. For 
this purpose a theoretical and conceptual framework is constructed. The second aim 
is to develop a cultural integration model and apply it with a view to highlight and 
better understand developments in post-1989 Romania. The following overall 
research question will guide the thesis: How to analyse the transformation of Eastern 
Europe in the context of the wider transformations taking place in Europe? Working 
with a set of assumptions concerning the nature of transformations in Eastern Europe 
and the need to understand integration sociologically, this thesis proposes to construct 
a model which links ideas about integration as a process (and in particular the cultural 
dimension of that process), with postwesternization and postnationalism that connect 
internal developments of Eastern European countries to the wider context of 
transformations in Europe. 
My immediate documentation and examples refer to Romania, which is 
my main subject of study. Yet, it is my modest hope that the applicability may be 
more general, touching other countries undergoing integration. What I hope to 
contribute with the case-study is an analysis of the way in which the on-going process 
of cultural integration influences the present day Romanian society. The study will 
not take into consideration every aspect of cultural integration, but focus on 
postwestern and postnational aspects that concern the societal transformation and the 
reconstruction of Romanian societal identities. I make the case that post-1989 
transformation is the co-product of internal and external forces of cultural integration, 
namely postwesternization and postnationalism.  
My analysis will not try to propose a new theory of integration or to 
incorporate the entire agenda set by the various contributors to the debate on 
European transformation (see for instance Delanty’s formulation of a ‘civilizational 
approach’). Nor will it deal with EU cultural policy as such. The purpose is to shed 
light on selected aspects of wider dynamics of transformation in Europe in order to 
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outline an alternative dimension of Europeanization. The most important shift is from 
a systemic understanding of integration (i.e. from forms of integration with a 
functional role2) to a focus on more complex socio-cultural forms of integration. This 
also reveals that societies should be seen distinct from one another. The realities after 
the end of communism fail to support the assumption that societies are converging. In 
order to show that the above argument is grounded, I will refer below to the different 
core assumptions that constitute the foundation of my cultural integration model. 
1.2. Basic Framework and Core Assumptions  
A qualitatively different theoretical explanation of integration has to start from a new 
set of basic assumptions. As Zielonka notes, “[w]ithout a change of paradigm we will 
be unable to comprehend the on-going developments, assess their implications, and 
identify proper solutions for addressing these implications” (Zielonka, 2006: 19). The 
overall assumption in this thesis is that cultural integration in Eastern Europe does not 
follow a predetermined path or process (a uniform progress towards final 
integration), but rather that cultural integration can best be understood as an open-
ended transformation. This assumption induces a different dynamic to the 
relationship between Romania and the rest of Europe than when looking more 
narrowly at how Romania is becoming a member of the ‘West’ and what Romania 
needs to do along this path. At least five hypotheses can be derived from this 
assumption which will inform my approach to cultural integration: (a) cultural 
integration cannot be equated with EU integration or transition. Cultural integration 
goes beyond the EU integration and transition, and is not a form of systemic 
integration; (b) cultural integration is not a process which eventually leads to an 
integrated European society, but an open-ended process that works to reconstruct 
society and societal identities; (c) by looking at cultural integration in Eastern 
Europe, the emphasis comes on external discourses that influence and ‘empower’ the 
local understandings (i.e. diffusion) and the ‘double synchronicity’ of transformation; 
(e) last, but not least, cultural integration does not lead to uniformity of cultures.   
Cultural integration concerns the transformative dimension of the Eastern 
European countries. This represents a break with mainstream integration theory 
which emphasises “the emergence and development of the institutions of economic 
                                           
2 Delanty and Rumford, 2005: 10. 
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integration in western Europe after the Second World War” (Rosamond, 2000: 1). 
Cultural integration should not be understood as solely linked to EU integration but 
as related to wider processes of transformation in Europe. Cultural integration – as an 
approach - uses social constructivism as terminology and notations to create a 
vocabulary for grasping the transformation of Eastern Europe. Cultural integration 
should be viewed as open to new interpretations and definitions.  
1.3. Theoretical Sources of the Cultural Integration Model 
Most literature dedicated to Eastern Europe’s 1989-development has examined how 
these societies integrate into Europe (i.e. EU enlargement). This has been done by 
applying the so-called political science approaches to European integration, e.g. 
intergovernmentalism. However, referring to Eastern Europe in a postwestern and 
postnational context, as done in this thesis, suggests that the rest of Europe – and not 
only Eastern Europe - is also undergoing changes. And that these changes are much 
more fundamental that the idea of ‘a moving target’. Therefore, as Borinski and 
Wagner argue, there is “a need to move away from the issue of ‘catching-up’ with a 
Western model of development in the study of the countries of the former Eastern 
Europe” (Borinski and Wagner, 2002: 372).  
The analytical concept of cultural integration, I suggest, contributes to the 
existing literature on integration, in that it addresses the Eastern European 
transformation in the context of overall transformations in Europe. Moreover, the 
rethinking of the relationship between Eastern European countries and Europe, in 
terms of postwesternization and postnationalism, goes beyond the idea of transition 
and postcommunism and adds a new dimension to integration. My understanding of 
cultural integration takes as point of departure the work of Delanty and Rumford 
(2005), F. Peter Wagner (2004), and Habermas (1998, 2003).  
Delanty and Rumford (2005) have recently formulated a theory of 
European society that understands social reality within the context of globalization. 
The authors define Europeanization as a theory of society beyond national societies. 
Two major transformations that require a new theory of the social are identified. 
First, a displacement of modernity as centred on the nation-state and reducible to 
class, rationalism, and technology by a much less certain and much less utopian 
modernity that exists with risk and relies on other symbols of belonging. “The 
pluralization of modernity can be equated to the decentring of Europe in the world” 
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(Delanty and Rumford, 2005: 187). As a consequence, political imaginary became 
fragmented and connected to the rise of multiple narratives of belief and loyalty 
based on ethnicity, religion, neo-liberalism, social movements, environmental 
awareness, human rights, ethno-nationalism, and a general mistrust of politics. 
Second, the displacement of the social imaginary of collective utopia, autonomy, and 
emancipation by an imaginary increasingly structured around diffuse politics of 
identity based on the rights, capacities and responsibilities of the individual. The 
second major transformation noted by Delanty and Rumford relates to the 
reorientation of Europe as a spatial entity no longer reducible to itself or to notions of 
the local, as a result of globalization. The rise of new spaces that transcend territorial 
boundaries across all areas of social life has diminished the distinction between the 
inside and the outside. This is not the same as saying that borders have disappeared. 
On the contrary, “they will continue to be important but will take a variety of forms” 
(Delanty and Rumford, 2005: 188).  
While I concur with Delanty and Rumford’s formulation of 
Europeanization, my social theory approach to cultural integration does not 
emphasise the role of globalization and cosmopolitan Europe in shaping the 
transformation of Romania. Instead I look at the impact of postwesternization and 
postnationalism on internal developments in Romania, and place them within the 
broader framework of transformations in Europe. This choice has mainly been 
affected by the selection of Romania as my empirical study. Cultural integration has 
to be seen as a thorough rethinking of how Europe has reorganized itself in the 
aftermath of communism to integrate the East. Whereas Delanty and Rumford define 
Europeanization as a cosmopolitan reaction to globalization, my approach conceives 
cultural integration as a postwestern and postnational reply to Europeanization.  
  The theoretical framework underpinning cultural integration may be 
traced back to the general thesis of the ‘double synchronicity’ of the Eastern 
transformation, announced by F. Peter Wagner in ‘Sonderweg Romania’ (2004). 
According to Wagner, after the end of communism there has been “a reinvigoration 
of the historical ‘East/West’ borderline of development” (Wagner, 2004: 57). Based 
on a reassessment of the notion of transition, Wagner calls for an integrative 
approach in order to analyse Romania’s transformation. For Wagner, the theoretical 
value of the modernization perspective that has governed the debate on Eastern 
Europe, including Romania, has become highly questionable. In his own words, “the 
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very model that they are being asked to emulate in their reform course is something 
of an anachronism and cannot help but remain a rather elusive goal” (Wagner, 2004: 
59). In particular, Wagner rejects the idea of linear transition used to make sense of 
transformation in Eastern European societies from dictatorship to democratic market 
economies. Wagner calls for an alternative transitional framework based on the 
central concept of ‘double synchronicity’, meaning the integration of Eastern 
European societies into a ‘Western’ order which itself is undergoing transformation. 
I will base my own cultural integration model on the idea of ‘double 
synchronicity’. Looking at the shortcomings of the transition paradigm, Wagner 
argues for a rethinking of the East European process of transformation in terms of 
Eigendynamik. My approach concurs with Wagner that Romania’s ‘exceptionalism’ 
calls for a reassessment of the transition paradigm. Hence, my study expands 
Wagner’s thesis of ‘double synchronicity’ into a theoretical framework that places 
Romania in a postwestern and postnational Europe. 
Habermas’s theoretical work on postnationalism is equally important to 
my study. In Habermasian terms cultural integration is about the postnational society. 
The making of a postnational society means identification with normative principles. 
Habermas emphasised that “the initial impetus to integration in the direction of a 
postnational society is provided by the substrate of a European-wide political public 
sphere embedded in a shared political culture” (Habermas, 1998: 153). To Habermas, 
postnational Europe refers to a shared identity that is not exclusively defined by the 
nation-state. In the sense that I will use in this thesis, postnational refers to a 
transformation of the existing forms of loyalty and identification beyond the nation-
state.  
According to Habermas, ‘constitutional patriotism’ is a deliberately 
shared sentiment among individuals according to which the country convincingly 
follows a certain regulative political ideal embedded in the national constitution. As 
he writes, “peoples emerge only with the constitution of their states. Democracy itself 
is a legally mediated form of political integration. It is a form that depends, to be 
sure, on a political culture shared by all citizens” (Habermas, 2003: 97-98). This 
identity is postnational in the sense that it is freed from all cultural attachments (and 
traditions) and based instead on shared principles informed by a universal 
constitutional-legal framework (Habermas, 1998). What is interesting about his 
position is that he places postnationalism both at national and global level. In my 
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view, there is a potential here for expanding postnationalism to Eastern European 
transformation. The increasing importance of international legal norms and the 
decreasing importance of national sovereignity give rise to new forms of 
identification beyond the nation state.  
1.4. Description of the Cultural Integration Model 
As it should be clear by now, the countries from Eastern Europe are in the middle of 
profound and, in many respects, unprecedented social and cultural transformations. It 
is suggested that existing models – especially the traditional rational approaches to 
European integration – are unable to account for more fundamental developments 
such as the reorganization of Europe to integrate the former ‘East’.  
My cultural integration model is based on a social constructivist 
approach, drawing on Delanty and Rumford (2005). When related to cultural 
integration in Eastern Europe, the social constructivist account identifies the 
following as key dynamics: change based of continuity; cultural integration as 
postwestern and postnational transformation; and cultural integration as 
reconstruction of societal identities. One of the major claims made in this thesis is 
that a social constructivist approach is particularly pertinent to the conception of 
cultural integration, defined below.  
Cultural integration is seen as the outcome of the following factors: 
institutions (the political field of the social agents), tradition (the influence of the 
past), and diffusion (the encounter with external models and ideas that are taken on, 
adapted and/or reproduced). By relating institutions and diffusion to tradition (socio-
cultural aspects of integration), I try to transform a static model of (systemic) 
integration into a dynamic model of cultural integration. This further implies a shift 
towards a transnational societal perspective that allows for seeing Romania’s 
transformation less separate from European transformation(s).   
I believe such a model of cultural integration retains its analytical value 
for three reasons: first, it provides a framework for rethinking the nature of Eastern 
transformation beyond the idea of transition and postcommunism. Second, a model 
based on the postwestern and postnational theoretical framework enables the 
researcher to see that Romania is changing at the same time Europe is changing. 
Furthermore, this model allows for an interpretation of both internal and external 
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dynamics of cultural integration. However, like all ideal types, mine depicts no 
society perfectly.   
1.5. The Elements of the Cultural Integration Model 
As mentioned in section 1.1., I define cultural integration as the process of 
reorganization caused by social agents who seek to reconstruct an existing societal 
order on the basis of their specific understandings. Cultural integration recasts the 
debate on Europe in terms of postwestern and postnational forms emerging from the 
new relation between former communist countries and Europe.     
A substantial literature has appeared which reflects on the emergence of a 
so-called postwestern and postnational order (Eder, 2001; Habermas, 2002; Delanty, 
2003c, 2006a; Delanty and Rumford, 2005; Rumford, 2006a; Therborn, 2006). 
However, the two dynamics are not often studied together. The basic idea behind 
these writings is that a postwestern Europe is taking shape and that this order “will be 
dominated less and less by the centre and for the first time the periphery will impose 
itself on the centre” (Delanty, 2003c: 14). From the viewpoint of these authors the 
focus on enlargement as a singular moment of change or crisis and the tendency to 
portray the dynamics of transformation as relying on the antagonism between nation-
state and ‘super-state’ should be avoided. How are we then to theorise these 
dynamics? As we have seen above, we need a more comprehensive conceptualization 
of integration for the analysis of transformation in Eastern Europe. As Delanty 
argues, “enlargement is not just about getting bigger but is crucially a matter of 
cultural transformation and therefore differs from all previous dynamics of 
Europeanization that began with the Treaty of Rome in 1957” (Delanty, 2003c: 10). 
Cultural integration is an attempt to depict the complex nature of transformation as 
the main feature of an emergent order. 
The notions of ‘postwestern’ and ‘postnational’ are neither fixed nor 
clearly defined concepts within the current research, nor certain or easy to observe 
empirically. For the purpose of this thesis these notions will be used to express the 
dynamic and sui generic elements of cultural integration. It is precisely these 
elements that can depict the complexity of integration: how Eastern European 
countries in the aftermath of communism are responding to the transformations of 
Europe while at the same time dealing with their own transformations.  
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Defenders of the idea of a postwestern Europe, to which the present 
author belongs, maintain that the enlargement of the EU with former communist 
countries has fundamental implications for our existing interpretations of what 
Europe is in terms of geopolitical, social and cultural space. This development also 
challenges notions of what is driving the processes of national and European identity 
formation; whether it is systemic or socio-cultural forces. Not only is the western part 
of Europe influencing the former communist East, including through ‘systemic’ 
integration. The enlargement - and the process that preceded and follows it - also 
imposes changes on the entire Europe, thus on the western part. The West is 
becoming less Western, as the East is becoming less Eastern. Furthermore, at the 
same time as Europe becomes more integrated, it also develops to be increasingly 
diverse. As a consequence, the East/West distinction – which indeed preceded the 
antagonism of the Cold War, even if enforced by it – gradually looses relevance. One 
implication of this is that Westernization and modernity are no longer synonymous. 
In this respect, the idea of ‘multiple modernities’ argues that individual societies are 
not converging into a single, universal modernity, but that they represent plural, 
cultural, and political projects. The ultimate test to the idea of postwesternization in 
the longer term is obviously the willingness and capacity of the EU to enlarge with 
Turkey and even beyond. One observable implication of a postwestern Europe, 
advanced by this thesis, may be that governments and individuals increasingly 
identify with objectives and values which exceed the European order.  
The second term, ‘postnational’, refers to a transformation of the existing 
forms of loyalty beyond the nation-state which has accelerated in later years due to 
influences from globalisation and European integration. According to this concept, 
the Westphalian state-system, where jurisdiction and borders were largely congruent, 
has over the last decades gradually been giving way to a system of multilevel 
governance, including a European super-state. Not at all in the form of an 
omnipotent, Hobbesian Leviathan, but rather as a transnational, multi-centred 
regulator, which acts within confined policy-areas and remains highly dependent on 
decentred actors with regard to implementation. But the idea of postnational goes 
beyond mere legal affairs, and also relates to the development of a pan-European 
identity. An important implication, as described by this thesis, is a logic by which 
nation states increasingly act in accordance with norms that exceed the national order, 
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also when it comes to matters which have traditionally been regarded as ‘heart blood’ 
of the nation-state (e.g. border control).  
1.6. Delimitation from the Existing Approaches to European 
Integration 
The definition of cultural integration used in this study distinguishes this approach 
from the traditional integration theories, as well as from Europeanization, social 
change (the current-day ‘transitology’), and nationalist approaches to European 
integration. In the following, I will briefly delimit cultural integration from these four 
approaches.  
Firstly, by conceiving Romania’s transformation in the setting context of 
transformations in Europe, cultural integration distinguishes itself from the traditional 
integration theories. Conventional theorising on integration, by contrast, has treated 
these transformations as framed by the enlargement and EU economic and political 
integration (Moravcsik, 1991; Molle, 1997; Putnam, 1988; Rosamond, 2000; Hooghe 
and Marks, 2001). Cultural integration is neither seen as the outcome of the EU 
project nor does it refer to a harmonization of cultures or cultural rights through 
technocratic support or through addressing cultural policy issues. Cultural integration 
is not just another form of EU integration, and cannot be reduced to only economic, 
institutional, or political transformations.  
There are mainly four limitations of the traditional theories of integration: 
first, the inadequacy of these theories in explaining cultural change in pluralistic 
societies. Second, these integration theories seem affected by the ‘path dependency’ 
logic. Third, they propose a rather confuse notion of “the terminal condition of 
integration” (Rosamond, 2000: 87). Fourth, these theories based on the state-centred 
and multi-governance models were constructed to explain the economic and political 
dynamics of EU integration. As Rosamond admits, “the problem for integration 
theorists was that while terminal conditions had been advanced, they could at best be 
speculative ideal-types” (Rosamond, 2000: 87). Consequently, I find that ‘integration 
theory’ is not capable in dealing with important aspects of cultural transformation. I 
am not saying that the study of integration has ceased to be applicable. Only I am 
sceptical of the one-dimensional utilitarian concept of integration based on the 
assumptions of spontaneous reorganization and the transfer of democracy and 
institutions that dominates the analysis of transformation in Eastern Europe. Thus, 
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even if many of the concepts of the classical theories of integration have acquired 
significant descriptive power, I argue that they are no longer sufficient.  
The second existing approach that I will differentiate cultural integration 
from is the political science approach to ‘Europeanization’ understood as 
domestication of the EU (not to confuse with ‘Europeanization’ as the ‘process of 
becoming European’, as I will return to further down). This approach emphasizes the 
political pressures and challenges for adaptation caused by European integration and 
often describes Europeanization along three alleys: institutions, political dynamics, 
and policies. Although both positions - cultural integration and ‘Europeanization’ in 
its political science form - consider wider fields than EU and European integration, 
when it comes to explaining transformation in Eastern Europe, Europeanization tends 
to neglect internal factors or treats them as a constant and unchanging background 
condition (see Diamond, 1993). In terms of its treatment of internal factors at least, I 
suggest that cultural integration offers a promising direction for a more unified or 
holistic analysis of Eastern Europe. In a minimalist understanding of 
Europeanization, it is argued that the consolidation of new societies is the result of 
Europeanization.  
Based on a second dimension of the Europeanization concept - as the 
process of ‘becoming European’ - a cultural integration perspective understands 
Europeanization as a ‘two-ways’ traffic. In other words, Eastern European countries 
also have an impact on the West (Delanty, 2003c). This idea offers a more dynamic 
view on Europe after communism. Eastern Europe is being re-shaped in a 
postwestern and postnational direction, beyond mere convergence. A new definition 
of Europe cannot be based alone with reference to the West as well as one cannot 
define the East as a ‘residual’ (i.e. as the sum of those deviant elements which have 
not as yet transformed to become the western). The addition of Eastern European 
countries to wider Europe involves the process of cultural integration beyond 
Europeanization.  
According to Borinski and Wagner, the end of the East-West division 
“can not help but to provide its own internal dynamic and momentum of 
development” (Borinski and Wagner, 2002: 376). All in all, when applied to Eastern 
Europe, the Europeanization approach reflects a limited interest in the historical 
legacies outside the Western heartland. I concur with Borinski and Wagner who 
acknowledge that “such a research effort necessitates transgressing disciplinary lines 
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as borders can be ‘internal’ and ‘external’, political and economic, based on a 
recourse to ‘history’ or some ‘ideal’, or proclaimed to be purely based on ‘interest’” 
(Borinski and Wagner, 2002: 376).  
Thirdly, I distance myself from ‘social change approaches’ (what has also 
been termed ‘transitology’) which have dominated the debate on changes in Eastern 
Europe. Transition studies presume that postcommunist societies where political 
elites pursue a transition towards market economy and democracy encounter the same 
challenges and problems regardless of their distinctive character (see also van Zon, 
1994: 6). This way to precede, I find, has resulted in too much emphasis on the 
affirmation of the Western model (i.e. the EU) on the emerging democratic 
institutions and developing markets - at the sacrifice of attention to both internal and 
external dimensions of transformation. Accordint to Steven Fish, “the experience of 
the first decade of post-communism subverts – or at least fails to support – most of 
the prevailing ideas and paradigms in the analysis of democratization and 
democracy” (Fish, 1999: 795). 
The main critique of ‘transitology’ concerns its primary theoretical 
assumptions, in particular teleology and singularity. First, the study of transition can 
be criticised for reading history in a teleological way, as communism is seen as ‘a 
deviant period’ rather than a continuity in their past. Moreover, communism is widely 
assumed as an alien component, imposed on society. Hence, the build-in lack of 
interest in the communist past and the idea that the construction of a new society can 
start from scratch. A specifically weak point of transitology, I hold to be its reading 
history as “the evolving approximation towards an already known end-state, 
constituted by a single path or ‘one best way’”3. As such, these theories have 
approached Eastern Europe after 1989 disregarding long-term social processes and 
that the revolution itself was the result of a transformation process (i.e. the 
aggravating crisis of communism). The second rather simplistic assumption of 
transitology is the singularity prescribed to the Western model as ‘blueprints for 
desired change’ (van Zon, 1994: 8) for Eastern European countries. By emphasising 
the Western model as the only applicable model, little attention has been paid to 
historical diversity and the diverging ways and different interpretations of 
reconstruction.  
                                           
3 Blokker, 2004: 39. 
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A cornerstone of this thesis is the suggestion that transformations in 
Eastern Europe are more complex than can be explained by transitology. Moreover, 
this transformation is not necessarily restricted to changes in a particular 
‘prospective’ direction - from state socialism to market economy - similar to earlier 
occurrence elsewhere (e. g. Southern Europe). Understanding the transformation of 
Eastern Europe assumes an understanding of the whole process, i.e. including the 
peculiarities and history of the countries involved as well as the external dynamics of 
transformation (wider social, political, and economic context). What is at stake in 
Eastern Europe is not merely a process of ‘transition’, but a profound reconstruction 
of societies and societal identities. Transition studies are found insufficient to explain 
such transformations. Instead, a cultural integration approach takes into account the 
historical context of current change, the diversity, and the continuity with the past in 
order to explain and understand contemporary transformations in Eastern Europe.  
Fourthly, this study delimits itself from the so-called ‘nationalist 
approaches to European integration’. These approaches reject the idea of the rise of a 
supranational polity and the decline of nation-state, arguing that the process of 
European integration has been staged for the rescue of the nation-state (Milward, 
1992). According to this theory, nation-states created a Community after the World 
War II in order to safeguard the concept of nation-statehood and to evade any threat 
to the nation-state. This implies that nation-states have remained distinctive and 
secure, in that most initiatives towards European integration have served the interests 
of the nation-states (Milward, 1992: 443). Thus, Milward’s model of ‘Europe of 
nation-states’ sees European integration as strengthening the nation-state, rather than 
replacing or transforming it. ‘Nationalism’ in this sense - linked to 
intergovernmentalism – should not be confused with the populist, often xenophobe 
political platform of nationalism. Rather than seeing integration as another version of 
Europe of nation-states in which they can maintain their distinct existence, a cultural 
integration perspective discloses a more fluid postwestern and postnational Europe 
that reduces the importance of national boundaries.  
1.7. Placing the Study in the Landscape of Existing Empirical 
Research 
Above, I have briefly placed cultural integration among a number of important 
theoretical counter-positions. I will now turn the question of what a cultural 
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integration perspective signifies in terms of empirical research. In order to 
substantiate my theoretical approach, I will apply the framework of cultural 
integration to the case-study of a single (less researched) Eastern European country, 
namely Romania.  
I first realized the need to think about European integration in a new way, 
when I was trying to understand the nature of Romania’s transformation after the end 
of communism. Most research on Romania has little to say about the interpretations 
of integration from a cultural perspective. Even those approaches that look at the 
Eastern European transition as a rather unique phenomenon (i.e. path dependency and 
neo-classical sociology4) are inclined to move within the idea of ‘transitional culture’. 
For instance, Michael D. Kennedy (2002) uses the concept of ‘cultural formations’ in 
order to explain the different outcomes of transition, without leaving the fundamental 
idea of convergence.  
Likewise, discussions of Romania’s relations with the EU have 
concentrated on Romania’s compliance with EU membership commitments (Grupas, 
2006). Romania constitutes for many researchers a rather ‘exceptional’ or ‘negative’ 
case. According to F. Peter Wagner, it is exactly this special statute as ‘problem case’ 
that “challenges some fundamental assumptions in the field of transition studies” and 
is “indicative of problems in theory building” (Wagner, 2004: 51-52). Yet, the 
empirical observations have not led adherents to transitology to essentially rethink 
their model as suggested by Wagner. Romania has almost acquired the privileged 
statute of ‘the exception that confirms the rule’. In opposition, my study argues the 
need to fully break away with the ‘transition’ terminology in order to appreciate the 
nature of Eastern European transformations.  
The existing literature and debates approach Romania in several ways. 
Similar to F. Peter Wagner’s typology (2004), I will divide earlier research on 
Romania into three groups depending on its main focus point: the historical legacy of 
communism, the December 1989 revolution, and the postcommunist transition.  
The first approach examines the historical legacy of communism, 
considered as partly responsible for Romania’s problems along the transition path of 
development and consolidation of democracy (Deletant, 1989, 1998b, 1999; Gilberg, 
1990; Tismăneanu, 1989b, 1990). For Gilberg, Ceauşescuism - defined as a blend of 
nationalism, chauvinism and Marxist-Leninism - has had a great impact on 
                                           
4 Blokker, 2005. 
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Romania’s modernization. Aside from the Securitate and the general fear, other 
legacies of the Ceauşescu regime include: mass depoliticization, corrupt bureaucracy, 
authoritarianism, an outdated industry, and the unsolved issue of minorities. These 
peculiarities are considered decisive for Romania’s future development. To Deletant 
(1989), Ceauşescu’s brutal regime (named ‘dynastic communism’) and its impact on 
the Romanian society represent the explanatory factors for Romania’s lagging behind 
its neighbours in starting off the transition process.  
The second empirical approach is centred around the overthrow of 
Nicolae Ceauşescu in December 1989 (Dahrendorf, 1990, 1997; Gilberg, 1990; Hall, 
2000; Roper, 2000) and the economic, political, and moral causes of the revolution 
(Chirot, 1991, 1994; Tismăneanu, 1999; Eisenstadt, 1999). Gilberg perceived the 
violent overthrown of the Ceauşescus as an act “against the traditions of the 
Romanian nation. For this to happen the political and socio-economic situation must 
have become truly desperate” (Gilberg, 1990: 204). According to S. N. Eisenstadt 
(1999), in contrast to the 1848 revolution, the 1989 revolution did not have any 
ideology or contained any utopian visions of a new society. Rather the goal was to 
‘return to Europe’. By using Romania as an example, Hall (2000) examines the role 
played by mass mobilization in the collapse of communist regimes. Hall attempts to 
explore in detail the dynamic interaction between societal protest and regime 
response in the Romanian revolution.  
The third approach that can be identified in existing research investigates 
Romania’s attempts to ‘Europeanize’ (democratization and implementation of 
economic reforms). This approach often maintains Romania to be a laggard case of 
EU integration (Ionescu, 1992; Stan, 1997; Tismăneanu, 1998; Negrescu, 2000; 
Tang, 2000; Jackson, 2001; Light and Phinnemore, 2001; Kelemen, 2002; Cernat, 
2002). In analysing Romania, Tismăneanu (1998) takes a closer look at the role of 
nationalism (‘ethnocracy’), which remains present in the process of reinventing 
politics in Romania and addresses the difficulties encountered by Romania on the 
path of transition. Compared to other countries, Romania is underperforming in the 
transition to democracy and market economy. Before launching a critique of the 
before-mentioned approaches to the study of Romania, let me underline that the 
present contribution does not claim to replace any of the existing body of theory. The 
ambition is to complement the understanding of particular aspects of the current 
developments, which I find to be not sufficiently well covered by existing 
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approaches. In other words, I observe that the existing literature on Romania leaves 
some problems unaddressed. 
A first critique concerns that many of the studies on the communist 
legacy and the 1989 events leave out of the analysis Romania’s pre-communist 
history, and thereby regard the communist era only as a deviant epoch, and not as a 
period with certain continuities from the past carried on into the future. Likewise, the 
events of 1989 (most known for their violent character) have been quite well covered 
when compared to the post-revolutionary developments in the country. But the 
analysis of these events alone cannot convey the complex picture of the country as a 
whole or of the wide-ranging societal changes that have been taken place since the 
collapse of the Ceauşescu regime.  
The second caveat relates to the rather instrumental understanding of 
change when examining Romania’s transformation. Often built on some fundamental 
commonalities, transition studies do not offer alternative positions to those countries 
that do not follow this ‘common ground’ and thus get marginalized. While there is no 
doubt that in the case of Romania, for instance, the EU membership does frame the 
debate, there are in fact several competing conceptualizations of what integrating into 
Europe means. Furthermore, the EU enlargement is not the only factor generating 
changes in the Romanian society. The discussion of Romania’s relation to the EU is 
often reduced to how Romania has proceeded on the ‘road’ to the EU, unless the 
debate has not already focused on the problems of offering membership to a country 
in which corruption, child adoption, and the situation of the Roma, are still perceived 
as unsolved. Analysing how Romania is being incorporated into the EU’s 
institutional architecture is not the most prolific way of framing Romania’s relation 
with Europe. The dynamics of transformation in Romania should be understood in 
broader historical, political, and cultural terms.  
A key shift not addressed by the above approaches concerns the changing 
nature of transformation in Romania. And more importantly, what is missing in the 
current research on Romania is an analysis of the way in which the on-going process 
of cultural integration influences present-day Romanian society. No longer simply 
Romania is changing along a predictable trajectory (dictated by its communist past), 
but rather the dynamics of postwesternization and postnationalism need to be taken 
into consideration. To assess Romania’s transformation it is necessary to move away 
from a specific trajectory of development suggested by the notions of ‘enlargement’, 
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‘postcommunism’ or ‘transition’ and consider the ‘double synchronicity’ of the 
process of transformation (Wagner, 2004). Additionally, these approaches emphasise 
the economic and institutional aspects of change.  
These critical points in the existing literature on Romania give further 
impetus to a shift away from the transition paradigm in favour of a postwestern and 
postnational theoretically informed analysis. In order to overcome these 
shortcomings, or to go beyond this type of analysis, and understand more fully the 
place of Romania in contemporary Europe, I suggest a cultural integration model. 
Such a model is in line with the constructivist reading of transformation. Its 
consequence is a focus less on a certain path of development or on the institutional 
and economic spheres than on the openness and the ‘double synchronicity’ of 
transformation. A cultural integration perspective has many advantages. First of all, it 
goes beyond the EU enlargement when studying transformation. Second, 
postwesternization and postnationalism can help us understand Romania’s relation to 
Europe in ways which are not limited to the idea of transition or postcommunism; or 
to a particular path of development.  
1.8. The Structure of the Thesis 
In the attempt to improve the understanding of transformations of Eastern Europe - in 
particular Romania - through the framework of cultural integration, the thesis 
proceeds in the following overall parts. Immediately after these introductory notes, 
the first main part deals with different theoretical approaches to cultural integration. 
By giving attention to the more critical positions within Europeanization theory, I 
briefly start laying the groundwork for an alternative approach to integration that 
goes beyond Europeanization. This first part ends up with an outline of a social 
constructivist perspective on transformation. The second main part presents the 
elements of my cultural integration model. The purpose is to develop a conceptual 
map, based on the key notions of state, society, societal identity, recognition, and 
social agents. In the third part, the thesis analyses the process and consequences of 
cultural integration by examining the case of Romania. Initially this chapter deals 
with the historical background to Romania’s transformation. The chapter then turns 
to the post-1989 development and here emphasis is given to the postwestern and 
postnational context of Romania’s transformation. The fourth and final part draws up 
the overall conclusion and points out directions for further research.  
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2. Theoretical level: Integration through Culture 
Outline of a General Theory of Cultural Integration from a 
Social Constructivist Perspective 
 
his chapter lays out the theoretical framework of the thesis. The framework 
which aims to analyse the Eastern European societies and their socio-cultural 
dynamics will be applied in chapter three, The Cultural Integration Model. 
The idea is to indicate some general trends that apply to all societies from Eastern 
Europe. Despite differences, these societies are shaped not only by the impact of EU 
at the national level, but also by wider processes of transformation occurring in 
Europe.  
 The complexities and challenges of this chapter stem from the very 
nature of the post-Cold War European transformation and the particular 
conceptualisation needed to study it. In the approaches on transformation in Eastern 
Europe, the integration model related to the EU and its institutional structures has 
roughly been unproblematized. The different views granted by many current 
mainstream theories do not necessarily offer a profound understanding of the process 
of transformation and the particularities and separate histories of the societies 
concerned. Until recently, the discussion on transformation has been led by 
approaches that shared various primary assumptions on the general nature of 
transformation in Eastern Europe: the linear convergence of the East through 
transition and the EU enlargement; a teleological view on the process of 
transformation (towards democracy and market economy); a negative assessment of 
the past in general and communism in particular; a focus on systemic integration to 
the exclusion of issues related to society and societal identities. 
In recent years some approaches (sociology of culture and cultural 
politics) have developed more interest in the cultural dimension of European 
integration and in the internal and external dynamics of transformation. Two key 
themes have emerged from this reassessment: the idea that Europe in parallel is 
becoming increasingly postwestern and postnational. A more profound understanding 
of the standing ‘inaccuracies’ embedded in the concept of integration thus is needed 
T 
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for the eventual rehabilitation of the concept and for the establishment of a more 
critical analysis of European integration. This chapter develops these critical 
approaches towards the traditional theories of European integration with regard to the 
contemporary process of transformations in Eastern Europe.          
Delanty (1998, 2000a) and Eder (2001) have argued that now we start 
adding to political, economic and social European integration, a cultural dimension. 
Delanty refers to the “culturally deficit project of integration” (Delanty, 1998: 3.2). In 
particular, “it is not surprising therefore that the concept of culture in European 
integration has remained extremely obscure and has frequently been seen as a 
spiritual idea, as it is suggested by works on the ‘spirit of Europe’, for instance, 
Jaspers (1947), Husserl (1965), Patoka (1973) and Kundera (1984)”5.  
The chapter proceeds with the following steps. Firstly, an evaluation of 
the notions of integration and culture in the study of European integration. This will 
lead me to a reassessment of the meaning of both integration and culture. I then 
proceed with discussing some of the cultural perspectives in theories and other 
approaches to European integration including discursive approaches. Thirdly, I 
introduce ‘Europeanization’ as an alternative approach to understanding European 
integration. After discussing some recent approaches to Europeanization, I present 
some theoretical tools for a critical analysis of European integration from a cultural 
perspective. Finally I move on to my interpretation of cultural integration through a 
discussion of Europeanization theory and social-constructivism. The chapter will end 
up with a definition of ‘cultural integration’ as the basis for my model constructed in 
Chapter 3. 
The use of Europeanization approach has the advantage that it places 
culture much more centrally than the traditional theories of integration appear to do. 
A constructivist conceptual framework will be developed which allows for a more 
sociological analysis of cultural integration as a trend towards the construction of an 
‘imagined’ community. The social constructivist framework will also assist me in 
examining the social construction of reality6.  
                                           
5 Delanty, 1998: 3.2. 
6 The chapter avoids an exclusive emphasis on one specific country from Eastern Europe trying to 
focus widely on those societies found in the middle of the process of European integration. 
Nonetheless, I recognize that there are many differences among Eastern European countries 
themselves from a cultural, political, economic, and social point of view. One should look at each 
society in order to get a deep understanding of cultural integration. 
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2.1. The European Integration Process and Culture 
Culture is usually not associated with integration. Castells (1998) and Delanty 
(2000a) distinguish three main historical phases in the European integration process, 
or as Castells put it, “three outbursts of political initiatives and institution-building” 
(Castells, 1998: 332): the 1950s, the 1980s and the 1990s. In all of these three phases, 
“the goal was primarily political, and the means to reach this goal were, mainly, 
economic measures” (Castells, 1998: 332).  
According to Delanty, the first phase is the “the project of rescuing the 
nation-state”7. Or as Milward sustains, after the Second World War the European 
nation-states rescued themselves from collapse by promoting the European 
integration process through a new political consensus that actually strengthened their 
existence as nation-states (Milward, 1992). Originally European integration aimed to 
bring European states together with a view to prevent war and conflicts. This was a 
peacekeeping and an economic phase where nation-states were mainly concerned 
with pragmatic cooperation, i.e. finding practical solutions to common problems. 
European integration was born out of the Franco-German reconciliation after the 
Second World War and had its ancestry in the ideas of Robert Schuman and Jean 
Monnet. While preventing great powers from getting into armed conflict, the process 
was also meant to offer smaller states a democratic balance of power system.  
The second phase started in the 1980s when “in place of the exclusive 
priority of economic links and political cooperation, political steering now moved to 
centre stage” (Delanty, 2000a: 109). This stage increases legal and administrative 
integration. In other words, the question of interdependence based on legal and 
administrative integration took over the question of cooperation from the previous 
stage of integration. “Despite the growing influence of federalist ideas, integration 
was rarely seen as leading towards unification” (Delanty, 2000a: 109-110). Yet, this 
is also an integration phase where EU documents identify culture and identity as key 
dimensions of European integration8. Questions of culture such as shared history, 
common language, and religion came to the fore. During this stage of optimism, the 
globalisation of culture becomes a justification for the cultural integration of national 
societies. Societies experience a process of homogenisation but also differentiation 
                                           
7 Delanty, 2000a: 109. 
8 See Shore (2000) for a review of the EU efforts towards the construction of a European culture 
and identity since the 1970s. 
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within their national cultures which are subject to globalisation and European 
integration. To follow on Beck (2002), the local and the global became mutually 
constitutive. 
The early 1990s brought a new stage of European integration. Formally, 
this phase emerged under the auspices of the European Union (agreed in 1992 under 
this name). The process now expanded from the spheres of economics and politics 
into social integration. “As a result of the increased volume of EU law and regulatory 
policy, a real social impact is now evident. With full monetary union and market 
integration, the social integration of the EU countries becomes even more 
pronounced”9. According to Delanty, currently the EU is somewhere between 
regulatory policy making and social integration. This is not the same as saying that 
the EU has reached a level of social inclusion as in a well-integrated state (even if an 
integrated social security system for migrants has been emergent). Social integration 
is still an incipient phenomenon. Social systems (e.g. welfare state, lineation of 
poverty, and employment) are far from being integrated at the same pace of 
development as economic integration. For instance, after the latest EU enlargement 
the single labour market and the free movement of workers (one of the four basic 
freedoms of the Treaty of Rome) has met the implementation of the so-called 
transitional arrangements which limit the movements of workers from the new 
Member States for a period of up to seven years.  
Vis-à-vis this framework, Eastern European countries have existed in the 
shadow of the Cold War. Europe was mainly understood in economic and political 
terms by Eastern Europe. Yet, Europe remains even so characterised by cultural 
diversity. This cultural diversity is formed by a complex mix of identity and 
integration, transition, past and reconciliation with the present. With this historic 
outline in mind we can now concentrate on the role culture plays in the European 
integration process by reviewing the meanings of integration and culture and the 
ways in which they have mostly been associated.  
2.1.1. The Meaning of Integration: Some Theoretical Approaches  
Writing about what culture contributes to the study of European integration is a 
difficult task. Partly because the meanings of ‘integration’ and ‘culture’ remain 
unclear. Partly because integration is often used only in relation with the EU and its 
                                           
9 Delanty, 2000a: 110. 
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formal institutions and treaties. In the following, however, I use the term of 
‘integration’ in wider sense than EU integration. Diez (2001a) indicates that there are 
a number of competing meanings of integration, due to the “proliferation of names, 
and conceptualisations of what the name ‘EU’ means”10. These oppositions have led 
to the main debates between federalism and intergovernmentalism and between pro- 
and anti-Europeans. The competing visions of integration are attached to national 
contexts, and so far attitudes towards integration have been reliant on whether it 
serves the nation’s interests or not. According to Vogt, “different conceptualisations 
of European integration find support only through the national domain of discourse. 
Support for the integration process is formulated in terms of advancing the national 
interest and not in European categories of thought” (Vogt, 2003: 13). 
Often associated with EU integration, the term ‘integration’ is mostly 
known as the concept of the 1950s and 1960s, used in the Cold War period to invoke 
images of European unity and for converting Europe into a political project (‘EU as a 
liberal bulwark against communism’). Paul Hoffmann, the director for the Marshall 
Plan, used for the first time the term integration to describe the process whereby 
states transfer their sovereignties to a supranational centre. Scholars have also defined 
integration in terms of international order and structures of governance. Karl Deutsch 
back in 1957 defined integration as the creation of peace zones and “the attainment, 
within a territory, of a ‘sense of community’ and of institutions and practices strong 
enough and widespread enough to assure, for a ‘long’ time, dependable expectations 
of ‘peaceful change’ among its population”11.  
Another theorist of integration, Ernst B. Haas (1958), defined integration 
as a process “whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are 
persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new 
centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing 
national states”12. According to Haas, integration is “the voluntary creation of larger 
political units involving the self-conscious eschewal of force in relations between 
participating institutions”13. Like Haas, Leon Lindberg defined political integration as 
“the process whereby political actors in several distinct settings are persuaded to shift 
                                           
10 Diez, 2001a: 85. 
11 Deutsch et al., 1957:2. 
12 Haas, 1958: 16. 
13 in Lindberg and Scheingold, 1971: 4. 
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their expectations and political activities to a new centre”14. In the same line of 
thinking, Harrison (1974) referred to the role of institutions in the process of 
integration and therefore defined integration as “the attainment within an area of the 
bonds of political community, of central institutions with binding decision-making 
powers and methods of control determining the allocation of values at the regional 
level and also of adequate consensus-formation mechanisms”15.  
A rather broad definition of integration is offered by William Wallace 
(1990). For him, integration is “the creation and maintenance of intense and 
diversified patterns of interaction among autonomous units”16. He does not specify 
these patterns as being cultural but rather “partly economic in character, partly social, 
partly political”. To him, the term ‘political integration’ implies “accompanying high 
levels of economic and social interaction”17. But Wallace excludes the cultural 
dimension of European integration: “Values, loyalties, shared identities are the stuff 
of political rhetoric and of intellectual and cultural history”18. However, he admits 
that “[they are] most difficult phenomena for social scientists to study. Economists 
prefer to exclude them altogether, substituting a model of rational man entirely 
motivated by calculations of interest. Political scientists and sociologists cannot take 
this conveniently reductionist way out”19. Further Wallace distinguishes between 
formal and informal integration. Formal integration is a discontinuous process 
consisting of changes in outcomes, institutions, policies, legislation and rules, 
perceived with every treaty, intergovernmental conference and regulation. The latter 
is a continuous process that refers to patterns of interaction without formal political 
intervention such as social change, communication networks, and private business. 
Ben Rosamond connects this distinction to Richard Higgott’s differentiation between 
de facto structural regionalization and de jure institutional economic cooperation 
(Higgott 1997). Michael Hodges (1972) defined very clearly integration as “the 
formation of new political systems out of hitherto separate political systems”20.  
                                           
14 Wallace, 1990: 19. 
15 Harrison, 1974: 14. 
16 Wallace, 1990: 9. 
17 Wallace 1990: 9. 
18 Wallace 1990: 16. 
19 Wallace 1990: 16. 
20 Hodges 1972: 13. 
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From the above definitions one can easily deduct that the classical 
understanding of ‘integration’ is mainly economic and political integration. These 
definitions reflect mostly the existing realities of the EU institutions. Yet, in recent 
debates complex socio-cultural forms of integration have taken up a more prominent 
place. This must be seen against the background of the EU enlargement and the 
(though failed) Constitutional Treaty by which the EU becomes more and more 
diversified (Herslund and Samson, 2005). In view of all this, the critical argument is 
that in most analyses of European integration the concept of integration and its role 
and nature have been too narrowly understood. The possibility of seeing integration 
from a postwestern and postnational perspective has not (as yet) been considered.  
2.1.2. Critique of the Traditional Approach to Integration 
According to Erskine (2002), the crisis of meaning of integration is about defining a 
vision of European integration that is well-matched with ‘morally constitutive 
communities’. My understanding of integration is better deduced from wider 
processes of transformation currently taking place in Europe, conceptualized by three 
terms, constitutive to this thesis: Europeanization, postwesternization and 
postnationalism. Stricto sensu, I define Europeanization as a process of adaptation 
around conceptions of Europe and what it means to be ‘European’, but also as a 
process whereby national identity is re-defined. As to postwesternization, it refers to 
the transformation of the relations between East and West after the end of the Cold 
War. Briefly, postnationalism is concerned with loyalty towards pan national 
European forms of solidarity and guarantees of security rather than those relying 
upon the nation-state. I will elaborate on the first of these definitions below, whereas 
the last two concepts will be dealt with thoroughly in Chapter 3.  
The concept of cultural integration is likewise central to the following 
analysis that, although it will be more thoroughly explored, a few central points must 
be raised here. As I will develop later, I use the term ‘cultural integration’ to 
distinguish the way Europe has reorganized itself to integrate the ‘East’ from more 
formal or systemic integration (political, economic and legal), that is “achieved 
primarily through states and markets, but also through law and technologies, and 
which have a functional role” (Delanty and Rumford, 2005: 10).  
An obvious form of systemic integration at the European level is the 
convergence of Eastern European societies to the model of political democracy and 
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market economy labelled as ‘Western’. While the process of European integration 
has mainly been studied at system level, the process of cultural integration is related 
to wider processes of transformation currently taking place in Europe. I thus view 
cultural integration as a particular analytic orientation (beyond Europeanization and 
postcommunism) that, in my case, is applied to Eastern Europe. This leads me to 
evaluate Eastern Europe in a certain way: Europe is changing at the same time as 
Eastern European countries are changing and that induces the relationship with a 
different dynamic than when just looking at how Eastern Europe is converging with 
the West. I am less interested in ascertaining whether a specific EU path is followed. 
Rather, I ask how Eastern Europe is answering to the process of transformation of 
Europe and at the same time how Eastern Europe is dealing with its own 
transformation(s). Delanty and Rumford admit that “increasingly social integration is 
playing a greater role in Europeanization, but the nature of this particular form of 
integration is not simply a mapping out of systemic forms of integration” (Delanty 
and Rumford, 2005: 10). Furthermore, as will be shown, there is a lot to benefit from 
studying Eastern Europe from a postwestern and postnational perspective, i.e. a focus 
on the socio-cultural logic of integration21.  
Three types of problems appear so far when looking at the existing body 
of literature on culture and European integration: the first one is that there is no clear 
definition of culture and - related to this - the relationship between culture and 
integration cannot be underpinned without defining the notion of culture. The second 
is that culture is almost never discussed inside traditional approaches to European 
integration. This questions the importance of these approaches in explaining cultural 
change in pluralistic postcommunist societies. Third, these integration theories are 
criticised for the limited insights they provide in the analysis of Eastern European 
societies, considered as deviating cases from the ‘path dependency’ logic.  
Indeed, constructed around the EU, the integration theories are not able to 
deal with cultural transformation. Put in this way, the debate on today’s 
transformation of Europe looks similar to the debate on European integration that 
emerged in the post war era. Whereas conventional integration theories take an 
uncritical stance on the ‘West’ (the EU) model, the processes of transformation in 
Eastern Europe seen with the framework of cultural integration are neither the 
outcome of the EU project or its cultural policies. Cultural integration is not another 
                                           
21 Delanty and Rumford, 2005: 10. 
 27 
form of EU integration in the functionalist sense. Eastern European countries as they 
exist today are neither a reconfiguration nor have they emerged as a response to the 
logic of EU integration. The insufficiency of the traditional theories of integration has 
been expressed as early as in 1972 by Puchala: 
our conventional frameworks have clouded more than they have illuminated our 
understanding of international integration. No model describes the integration 
phenomenon with complete accuracy because all the models present images of 
what integration could be or should be rather than here and now (Puchala, 1972: 
276). 
Partly as a result of important changes in the ‘East’ after 1990s and, 
possibly more importantly, as a result of wider processes of transformation in Europe, 
a shift occurred in the dominant paradigm towards integration (Delanty, 2003b, 
2006a; Delanty and Rumford, 2005; Outhwaite and Ray, 2005; Zielonka, 2006; 
Therborn, 2006) in the direction of postwesternization and postnationalism (aspects 
in Chapter 3 which I will deal with). 
But the EU can also be read in other ways and after the latest enlargement 
two important qualifications have shifted the core issues when dealing with the EU 
which “itself presents in its own development changing strategic commitments to 
ideas and ideals of European development” (Borinski and Wagner, 2002: 376). The 
first is the changing nature of the relationship between Eastern Europe and the ‘old’ 
EU as more complex for example “in the context of western disunity”22 with regard 
to transatlantic relations, e.g. Iraq war. The second is the place of the EU in a 
changing global order. The issues raised by the first point were dealt with by Delanty 
(2003c). According to Delanty, “the EU is thus at the decisive point of moving 
beyond postnationality to an encounter with multiple civilizational forms” (Delanty, 
2003c: 10). That is, the multiplicity of cultural and political projects oriented towards 
self-transformation has become more central to the nature of integration after the last 
enlargement. Thus, the civilizational analytic can offer a more suitable theorization of 
transformation, in contrast with the passive perspective of Europeanization. Delanty’s 
observation is that the enlargement “will involve new processes of social and system 
integration beyond the Western modernist project launched by Jean Monnet” 
(Delanty, 2003c: 10). The changing context of European integration has brought 
about the necessity of addressing cultural integration.  
                                           
22 Rumford, 2006a: 2. 
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This critique of the traditional approaches will serve to further outline an 
alternative approach to cultural integration in the case of Romania. Cultural 
integration is an alternative way of thinking about integration which does not reduce 
integration to the technical process of integration (i.e. systemic integration). This 
dimension of integration allows for a rather more fluid theorizing of European 
integration. An obvious form of systemic integration at the European level is the 
convergence of Eastern European countries to the model of political democracy and 
market economy labelled as Western. While the process of European integration can 
be mainly found at system level, cultural integration is dealing with the societal level. 
Cultural integration is neither an end in itself nor an intentional process.  
Cultural integration is not simply an alternative theory of European 
integration which puts culture at the fore (i.e. EU cultural policy) front rather than 
economics and politics. For example, economic integration theory will emphasise 
that the mutual advantage of nation states is enough to produce integration. Europe is 
according to this theory a purposive action that calls itself in an indirect way a 
‘community’. In this way, cultural integration differentiates from a whole raft of 
theories of integration (Rosamond, 2000). In this thesis, cultural integration is used to 
understand how Eastern European countries, more generally and Romania, in 
particular, re-organize themselves internally, after communism on the basis of a 
process of internalizing social actors’ understandings. Contrary to the classical 
assumption of integration as a closed system based on a rational or functional 
consensus, the starting point of an explanation here is that cultural integration has 
more to do with how Europe has reorganized itself after communism to integrate 
former communist countries. The point of cultural integration is not to develop a 
theory of regional integration, but to explain how integration happens beyond the 
nation state and how affected countries are responding to this integration of Europe 
and to their own transformation.  
As it will be revealed in my model of cultural integration this process 
relates to both the internal integration of individual societies, and these societies with 
wider Europe. The process of cultural integration is not to be understood as an end in 
itself. Cultural integration is neither an explicit process nor an intentional one. 
Cultural integration is an open-ended process that works to reconstruct society and 
societal identities. Cultural integration - as an approach - facilitates the separation 
between systemic forms of integration and more complex socio-cultural forms of 
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integration. The notion of culture obviously plays a central role in defining cultural 
integration, and therefore in the next section I will explore the meaning of culture. 
2.1.3. The Meaning of Culture 
If ‘integration’ is an unclear term, this is even more the case with culture. What is 
culture? This question becomes relevant as a result of the denial of the cultural in the 
mainstream integration theory and in the context of European integration. Culture, it 
has been suggested “is probably the broadest concept of all those used in the 
historical social sciences. It embraces a very large range of connotations, and thereby 
it is the cause perhaps of the most difficulty”23. The concept of culture itself has made 
its way into EU documents since the 1980s as an important dimension to the process 
of European integration: “The cultural dimension is becoming an increasingly crucial 
means of giving effect to policies seeking to fasten a Union of the European peoples 
founded on the consciousness of sharing a common heritage of ideas and values”24. 
One problem with this statement is that common history and cultural traditions are 
often going to be exclusive and incompatible in a definition of culture because parts 
of identity and history evolve in complex terms with neighbours. The result is that we 
often have incommensurable national stories and traditions25.  
Recent debates among scholars of European integration (Rosamond, 
2000; Friis, 1997; Haas, 2001; Hix and Goetz, 2000; Hooghe and Marks, 2001; 
Jachtenfuchs, 2001) suggest that culture and European integration might have little in 
common. The term ‘culture’ often refers to institutions that promote culture 
(museums, libraries, universities, theatres). Much analysis of the cultural dimension 
of integration has therefore focused on the EU cultural policies (i.e. cultural 
industries) and on their dynamics and mechanisms of cultural policy-making 
(Meinhof and Triandafyllidou, 2006; McGuigan, 2004; Flood and Kevin, 2005). 
Culture as contained in the notion of ‘cultural integration’ differs from cultural policy 
                                           
23 Wallerstein, 1990: 31. 
24 Barzanti, 1992. 
25 Recognition of this lies behind e.g. the number of educational projects developed by the EU in 
Central, Eastern and Southern Europe, and the Balkans since the 1990s. “Several such initiatives 
include: the Baltic, Caucasian, and Black Sea history textbook projects; the Southeast European 
history teachers’ education project; and the projects on ‘history teaching in the New Europe’ and on 
‘learning and teaching about the history of Europe in the twentieth century’” (Soysal, 2002: 270). 
These projects’ intention was namely to re-establish a positive collective past, and “bring about a 
rapprochement among former enemies” (Soysal, 2002: 271). 
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regulation, and especially from cultural inclusion. In all areas researchers have 
confronted each other in order to give a proper definition of culture. For a short 
review of different meanings of culture it is preferable to break up the analysis 
according to four meanings of culture: culture as a form of high culture and 
intellectual artefact; culture as a normative model; culture as medium of 
communication and culture as social construction.  
 
Culture as a Form of High Culture and Intellectual Artefact 
The meaning of culture as a form of high culture is close to the etymology of the term 
‘culture’. The term ‘culture’ derives from the Latin word cultura that was applied to 
mean ‘cultivation’. It also included the training and care of the body. “Instruction 
aimed at increasing virtue chastisement, chastening from the evils with which God 
visits men for their amendment”26. Before 1750 human cultivation was expressed in 
French, English and German by the notion of ‘civilization’. Later in the Oxford 
English Dictionary (1805) it means ‘the training, development, and refinement of 
mind, tastes, and manners’27. Today this definition comes to explain what we call 
‘high culture’. This conception restricts culture to dissemination of fine art, opera, 
poetry, theatre and so forth. These are areas where one is supposed to need an 
education in order to be able to enjoy. In other words, high culture is culture 
associated with a learning process and a particular social class/status. A parallel can 
be made with the definition of culture as an intellectual artefact. This meaning 
describes culture as a process of intellectual, spiritual and aesthetic development. It is 
noteworthy in this case to consider the link to civilisation. Close association to 
civilisation and aesthetic attainment adds a sense of elitism to the meaning of culture. 
Matthew Arnold (1883) depicted culture as the study of perfection. In other words 
culture exists at a very abstract level and includes values such as beauty, intelligence, 
and perfection. His definition is confusing from two points of view: firstly, the 
definition does not say much about what kind of ‘perfection’; secondly, the author 
never questioned the social context. He is somehow prisoner of the initial definition 
of culture when he writes, “culture is to know the best that has been said and thought 
in the world” (Arnold 1883). The social anthropologist Edward Burnett Taylor 
                                           




defined culture ‘or civilisation’ back in 1871 as “that complex whole which includes 
knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits 
acquired by man as a member of society”28. It is very likely that Taylor thought of 
culture in terms of social evolution. The focus on culture meant concern with 
symbolic representations (e.g. language) that make us human. In this respect Taylor’s 
definition does not differ from what Melville Herskowitz calls culture back in 1948: 
“a construct describing the total body of belief, behaviour, knowledge, sanctions, 
values, and goals that make up the way of life of a people”29.  
This shift of culture onto groups opens the door to the study of cultural 
integration because, since societies are by definition groups, the culture metaphor can 
also be applied to societies. Although, for some (especially postmodernist) theorists, 
culture preserves its association with the intellectual and artistic, most theorists have 
emphasised the meaning of culture as a particular way of life among people or 
community. Raymond Williams’ essay Culture is ordinary (1958) marked a turn in 
the way culture was conceived. He brought down the high culture concept to a more 
ordinary one, “in every society and in every mind”. Indeed he defines culture as a 
whole way of life, arts and learning, a process of discovery and creative effort. 
Raymond Williams turns upon a more symbolic dimension of culture. In The Long 
Revolution (1961) he examines creativity in relation to our social and cultural 
thinking. The book is a reference when it comes to a theory of culture, where the 
culture considers education and press as cultural institutions and advances the idea of 
a strong relationship between literary forms and social history. Twentieth century is 
in his opinion just part of a long political, economic and cultural revolution.  
 
Culture as a Normative Model 
A second meaning of culture refers not to a national or supranational sphere but has 
to do with universal norms of democracy and rights, freedoms and universal human 
culture. This is a definition of culture as a normative model. “At the end of the 
twentieth century, human rights, democracy, progress, equality are everyone’s, every 
nation’s modernity – even when they organize their modernity differently and even 
when they fail to exercise that modernity.(…) This Europe does not exist against 
others” (Soysal, 2002: 274). This is what makes it difficult to find this definition of 
                                           
28 Taylor, 1958: 1. 
29 Herskowitz, 1948: 625.  
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culture ‘unique’ European. This definition of culture is somehow related to the notion 
of ‘civilization’. 
Delanty (2000a) criticizes a definition of culture based on value 
consensus, arguing that culture is rather conflictual. Culture leads to fragmentation, 
understood as ‘the collapse of unifying ideologies of social order’. Delanty suggests 
an alternative model of culture that he calls cultural pluralization as opposed to 
cultural cohesion. That is a model contrasting to a pre-established set of norms and 
values and to a cultural consensus reflected earlier in many debates on integration. 
Increasingly “culture is becoming the site for new conflicts over identity politics and 
European integration is not leading to greater cohesion but to increased opportunities 
for contentious action” (Delanty, 2000b: 221). In other words, a model which would 
be more sensitive to cultural innovation, more adjusted to social and cultural 
fragmentation, and more attentive to the conflictual dimension to culture30.       
 
Culture as a Medium of Communication 
Culture can also be seen as a medium of communication (Eder, 2001; Brague, 2002; 
Delanty, 2003a, Bauman, 2004), as something uncertain, non-fixed, and that keeps 
questioning. Put another way, culture is what we communicate31 through language 
and symbols whose meanings are learned and inherited from one generation to 
another. But this transmission of culture is not always the same. Culture changes and 
has its own dynamics depending on the society’s dynamics. For Delanty and 
Rumford culture is not “fixed or rooted in immutable principles, and is not defined by 
reference to territory, the state, an elite, a church or a party” (Delanty and Rumford, 
2005: 104). On the contrary, culture is a flexible medium of communication, “rather 
than a form of integration” (Delanty and Rumford, 2005: 104). This is true if one 
looks at the role of the internet and other sources of information. This medium of 
communication is what defines us as cultural human beings. A mode of 
communication is a mode of expressing culture. Communication is a precondition for 
all social interaction. Social links are reproduced through this medium of 
communication.  
Rémi Brague uses the term ‘cultural secondarity’ trying to convince us 
that “Europe has indeed this special feature of having, one might say, immigrated to 
                                           
30 Delanty, 2000b: 234. 
31 http://europa.eu.int/en/record/mt/title1.html 
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itself”32. Culture influences the way people communicate. Yet even within the same 
culture people do not communicate in the same way. More fundamental differences 
are met within larger groups of people: communities, societies, nations, and 
civilisations. A parallel can be drawn with the concept of consensus. ‘Consensus 
transformed into dissensus’ as Eder (2001) noted, assumes a shared knowledge that 
can be contested. This is what Eder calls ‘culture’. This argument is justified. For 
“without dissensus we do not need to construct a shared world”33. A study on social 
consensus does not need to go back to symbols, rituals and beliefs because such a 
cultural system is open to conflicts and inconsistencies. 
 
Culture as Social Construction 
The fourth meaning, culture as social construction is derived from Clifford Geertz’s 
definition of culture considered as the conceptual basis of a symbolic-interpretative 
approach: “man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun, I 
take culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an 
experimental science in search of law but an interpretative one in search of 
meaning”34. These “webs of significance”, the essence of culture, define meanings 
that people bring to their experiences in the outside world and meanings we make 
from experience. Yet, his assumptions are not always clear. What comes first: 
meaning or experience? Geertz claims that culture is a social legacy where the 
individual learns from its own group. Culture is learning and a cultivation process 
common to this group or society. Clifford Geertz sees culture in a societal context 
where values, ideologies and the way people behave differ from individual to 
individual. Society is defined here as any community of people with common 
interests, values and aims. And because this learning process and the society are in 
continuous dynamic, culture is also dynamic. Culture is “an incessant activity of 
drawing the world, fragment by fragment, (…) making the world an object of critical 
inquiry and creative action”35. Like Geertz, Bauman (1973, 2004) argues for culture 
as praxis, but also for another kind of culture, that he calls ‘a silent culture’. This is 
culture “unaware of being a culture, (…) a repair workshop servicing the current web 
of human interaction called ‘society’” (Bauman, 2004: 12). 
                                           
32 Brague, 2002: 122. 
33 Eder, 2001: 224. 
34 Geertz, 1973: 5. 
35 Bauman, 2004: 11. 
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This symbolic-interpretative approach starts from the assumption that 
cultures are socially constructed realities. In the words of Mary Jo Hatch “when 
speaking of culture as shared meaning, understanding, values, belief systems, or 
knowledge, keep in mind that a culture depends upon both community and diversity. 
It allows for similarity, but also supports and relies upon difference”36.  
This is close to Bourdieu’s (1972, 1988) concept of culture. According to 
Bourdieu, culture is constituted by what makes our symbolic universe: institutions, 
artefacts and practices are included. He also emphasizes the point that culture defined 
as both ‘way of life’ and ‘high culture’ is linked to politics without eliminating the 
role of human agents and the actions that shape their social world. Bourdieu (1972) 
refers to culture as a systemic social construction based on a competition between 
ideational, actionable, and material elements within society. Culture relates to the 
individual and is derived through social structures which are influenced by society's 
overlapping sub-systems. The symbolic systems (arts, science, language, religion) 
that we are shaped of influence both our way of communication and the connecting 
process between groups or individuals and their institutions. In his book, Homo 
Academicus (1988), Bourdieu insists on how important hierarchies and academic 
authority are for cultural products’ reception in the academia. Even if Bourdieu did 
not particularly analyse cultural integration, he was concerned with how culture is 
structured between generations. His focus includes cultural consumption patterns and 
their meaning in contemporary societies. That is to say that social interaction and 
cultural integration can exclude or restrict individuals from cultural participation and 
from being cultural recipients of arts, education and ability to understand politics. 
The point made in Bourdieu’s approach is that culture constructs strategies of action. 
On the basis of this hypothesis Bourdieu draws the thesis that culture as a mode of 
using symbols (moral, of taste) is associated with the notion of ‘strategy’. This 
includes implicitly the assumption that is the medium of class-specific strategies of 
connecting with each other. Bourdieu calls these strategies habitus. These habitus 
distinguish between different classes of people.  
It might be enlightening to compare Bourdieu’s definition of culture with 
Shore’s concept of culture. According to Shore, culture is not only a disputed concept 
but a disputed space, central to which are issues of language and power, and ideology 
                                           
36 Jo Hatch, 1997: 206. 
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and consciousness”37. The next chapter will be devoted to a more detailed survey of 
these connections. In this respect Shore’s suggestion for culture is not different from 
Delanty’s perspective on culture38. Delanty’s main assumption is that the idea of 
culture based on a common language and shared European values is wrong. 
Conversely, social integration does not stand for cultural cohesion. The icon of a 
European common cultural heritage at the EU discourse level gives expression to 
divisions rather than to frameworks of cultural unity. In other words, the consequence 
is that European culture becomes a cohesive set of norms, seen as homogeneous, and 
takes on essentialistic, pre-established proportions39.  
A promising approach to culture is the one chosen by Castoriadis (1987). 
Castoriadis takes the ontological status of society seriously looking for answers to the 
following questions: what is a society? what makes it change? His main assumption 
is that society has its own dynamics. Society is instituted, that is it creates its own 
reality. This ‘institution of society’ is personified in institutions made of ‘social 
imaginary’ significations. Since they are shared, these significations are social. Ideas, 
representations, acts are what embrace this social reality. Institutions draw their 
source from the ‘social imaginary’, that is the socio-cognitive frameworks that 
individuals use to imagine their social environment. Continually reconstructed, these 
frameworks play an important role in shaping the social reality. “This imaginary must 
be interwoven with the symbolic, otherwise society could not have ‘come together’; 
and have linked up with the economic-functional component, otherwise it could not 
have survived” (Castoriadis 1987: 131). Within this view of society, Castoriadis 
defines culture as everything in the institution of society that goes beyond its 
identitary dimension and that the individuals of this society positively connect as 
‘value’ in the largest sense of the term: in short, the Greeks' paideia.40 For 
Castoriadis, social imaginary significations “cannot be related to a ‘subject’ 
constructed explicitly in order to ‘carry’ them – whether this is called ‘group 
consciousness’, ‘collective unconscious’ or whatever” (Castoriadis 1987: 365-6).  
Having commented on the four different concepts of culture, a few 
additional remarks must be made regarding the view applied in this thesis. First of all, 
since this thesis is primarily concerned with cultural integration, a clarification of the 
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39 Delanty, 1999: 226-27. 
40 Curtis, 1991: 220.  
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concept of culture and its relationship to cultural integration must be made. Against 
the view of culture as common history and values, or as a normative model, I argue 
for a definition of culture which link to cultural integration is more opened and fluid. 
The concept of culture I propose is partly eclectic, but mainly influenced by the last 
meaning presented above. Hence, I define culture as a socially constructed reality 
based on social imaginary significations. This definition is relevant to my study 
because it indicates the reflexive components of culture. Culture in a societal context 
is not separated from the social; it is a concept which inevitably encloses the content 
of social relations as well as the construction of those relations. This strengthens the 
already mentioned idea of Europe as being culturally constructed. Wagner (1981) 
used this idea earlier when he suggested that “cultures are themselves culturally 
constructed through the very processes that purport to describe and objectify them” 
(quoted in Shore 2000: 23).  
This theoretical framework provides me with a conception of culture that 
is useful when analysing the cultural dimension of Europeanization. Moreover, 
culture is a way of life created and maintained by social agents through shared 
significations. This is a constructivist definition of culture. The social constructivist41 
approach is concerned with describing reality as socially constructed. In this respect, 
culture becomes a context for meaning construction and interpretation. Cultural 
meanings can only be encountered and understood from within the cultural system in 
question. Social meanings accompany social structures and provide them with 
imaginary significations defined by Castoriadis (1987) as the main sources of 
meaning in social reality. It is through social action that such meanings evolve. 
Culture involves the members of a society in a socially constructed reality. Social 
agents engage in constructing a new order on the basis of their own vision of society.  
One needs to investigate the ‘social imaginary’, i.e. the way social agents 
imagine their project of social change, and try to find out their national understanding 
in order to hint its cultural significations. What is looked for is, if at all possible, the 
entire system of significations existing to the members of a society. There are of 
course a multitude of significations that represents the whole society in its full 
complexity. The aim is to put together cultural patterns that are identifiable to social 
agents, or at least to those who have been close to the reconstruction of the new 
societal project. But significations can be ambiguous; social agents can give different 
                                           
41 also called social constructionism. 
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significations to the same idea as well as use different ideas to communicate the same 
significations. Interpretations are therefore socially constructed realities.  
The social constructivist view used in this thesis will be nuanced by a 
fragmentation perspective which looks at the ways in which cultures are 
contradictory, ambiguous, and in a constant state of change. One key implication of 
this ambiguity and multiplicity is that identity becomes fragmented. The model of 
constructivism employed here presumes also that change in these significations is the 
subject of cultural integration. If this approach is linked to cultural integration, what 
becomes obvious is the importance of societal identity to the shape and nature of 
cultural integration. Societal identity provides the context from which societies 
develop towards cultural integration. It thus defines the framework from which 
cultural integration emerges at micro level.  
2.2. Cultural Perspectives in Theories and Discursive Approaches to 
European Integration  
In this section, it is my intention to focus on the extent to which traditional 
integrational and discursive approaches incorporate the notion of ‘culture’. I do not 
intend to give a detailed introduction to all approaches to the study of European 
integration42. Next to the theories, discursive approaches to integration have a lot to 
say about culture (Wæver, 2004). These approaches focus on explaining culture and 
European integration but do not refer specifically to cultural integration as a process 
of change. In the following, I shall outline some developments in the recent European 
integration theories which point to a new conceptualization of the cultural and which 
may be pertinent to my analysis.  
2.2.1. ‘State of the Art’ – Culture in the Study of European Integration 
How should we talk about questions of culture and European integration? To a 
significant extent culture has no clearly defined role in the study of European 
integration. However, the literature lately has started to debate whether we can 
include culture or not when discussing the process of European integration. In 
general, it looks like a fertile domain to research the relationship between culture and 
integration.  
                                           
42 This has been done in Rhodes and Mazey, 1995.  
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In European studies scholars such as Castells (1996) and Melucci (1996) 
have become more aware of the need of association of European integration with 
culture as a matter of respect towards the diversity of European cultures. “European 
integration lacks a cultural dimension comparable to that of nation states”43. 
Castoriadis (1987) argues that the cultural dimension is as important as the economic 
one for understanding and transforming society. This dimension expands to questions 
of identity (Garcia, 1993; Schleslinger, 1994; Smith, 1995; Wintle, 1996). For Soysal, 
“much of the debate on European integration and identity privileges the legitimate 
‘actorhood’ of nation-states or intergovernmental negotiation and decision-making 
structures” (Soysal, 2002: 270).  
In particular the fact that the notion of culture is a contested issue brings 
the question of integration frontward. Bekemans (1990) argues that economic reasons 
to develop the European integration are too narrow aims to put forward the process. 
Smelser and Alexander (1999) seem to suggest that culture is more integrative than 
some might think. Others (Offe, 1996; Ifversen, 2002; Kohli, 2000) have insisted that 
there is a crisis of identity and culture in Europe. This phenomenon comes partly 
from an ill definition of concepts such as Europe and European identity, partly from 
the disproportionate attention given to cultural aspects of European integration. Péter 
Balázs (1997) announces the last enlargement as the one that makes European 
integration step beyond its own cultural and geographical borders. I concur with 
Balázs’s suggestion and furthermore argue in this section that integration studies need 
to face qualitatively new cultural and conceptual challenges. 
No or very limited existing literature and research considers cultural 
integration in terms of theory and empirics. Yet outlines of a debate on cultural 
aspects of integration have become visible in the sociology of culture and cultural 
politics. In international relations, the cultural dimension of integration is connected 
to minority cultures and their rights to cultural autonomy and heritage as stated in UN 
declarations. Generally when these aspects are discussed, they appear a legal 
framework. While many theorists of European integration neglect or ignore the 
cultural dimension (Deutsch et al., 1957; Haas, 1958; Hodges, 1972; Wallace, 1990; 
Rosamond, 2000), sociological concepts of cultural integration can be found in 
debates on the idea of Europe, democratic culture, cultural citizenship and European 
identity (Delanty, 2000a, 2003a, 2004; Shore, 2000; Stevenson, 2001). De Witte 
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(1990) was among the first to plead for no separation between economic and cultural 
spheres of European integration. He argues that “one must recognize that a separation 
of the economic and cultural spheres is becoming increasingly artificial” (De Witte, 
1990: 205). One should therefore try “not to prevent the Community from entering 
the field”, but rather “to steer its policy into the appropriate direction”44. 
Aspects of cultural politics of European integration are covered in 
Building Europe – The Cultural Politics of European Integration written by Cris 
Shore (2000). The author is rather sceptical about the process of European integration 
and the existence of a common European identity among the peoples of Europe. 
According to him a European public hardly exists as a self-recognizing body – except 
maybe from small elites in business, politics and administration. Yet, Cris Shore 
offers a debate on cultural aspects of the integration process. The author concentrates 
mainly on the creation of a European state trying to answer the following central 
questions: what are the actual challenges we face with regard to further European 
integration, what ‘role’ does culture play in the process of integration and what are 
the consequences of creating a European nation-state. Using an anthropological 
approach based on ethnographic research among EU officials and politicians in 
Brussels, Shore deals with cultural aspects of EU integration such as the creation of 
the European nation-state, symbols of Europe, citizenship, single currency, the 
organizational culture of the Commission, and the key actors in promoting the vision 
of a common European consciousness and culture. In the end Shore argues that the 
goal of European federalism based on a shared identity is too far away. Nevertheless 
his perspective is too narrow for the purpose of this study since Shore does not move 
beyond the EU institutions to look at a wider Europe. However, while Shore is 
preoccupied with how the nation is integrated in images of Europe created by the 
elites in Brussels, my focus is on how ‘Europe’ has reorganized itself after 1989 to 
integrate former communist societies. I agree with Shore in the significance he 
attaches to the relations between societies and Europe. These relations are mutually 
enforcing, but they are not identical. According to Shore, “to reify an outdated idea of 
cultures as fixed, unitary and bounded wholes that is both sociologically naïve and 
politically dangerous”45. To reiterate this, Europe is not a rigid idea but a rather 
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dynamic idea, valid in a certain context, under continuous shape from history, culture 
and politics.  
Also for Eder (2001) Europe is more than law and politics: “Europe has a 
cultural meaning”46. Taking up the issue of ‘integration through culture’, Eder calls 
for a European consciousness and a re-invention of Europe based on historical 
memories, symbols, metaphors and a collective identity47. His main thesis is that “to 
the extent that integration beyond the nation state continues, cultural factors become 
central to this process”48. Considering the hypothesis that more culture in connection 
with the constitution of a society in Europe is needed, Eder underlines that “how 
much culture is needed to generate such a transnational social order, and whether the 
existing cultural repertoire is suitable for this constructive task is an empirical 
question” (Eder, 2001: 225). Exactly because of the role of culture in the integration 
process, “a reconstruction of cultural processes (…) is the key to the explanation of 
the formation of a European society”49. This focus on the cultural dimension of 
integration is inspired by current debates in academic research, where concepts such 
as ‘culture’ and ‘Europe’ are “increasingly seen as non-essential discursively shaped 
categories in a permanent flux where boundaries are constantly contested and 
negotiated”50.  
2.2.2. Discursive Approach to European Integration  
Discourse analysis constitutes less than a homogenous field. Different strands 
proliferated and the label ‘discourse analysis’ itself has been used with different 
meanings. The notion ‘discourse analysis’, usually used in humanities, has been 
inspired in political science mainly from the French post-structuralist tradition 
(Foucault, 1972, 1991; Derrida, 1974, 1980). While Foucault’s traditional discourse 
analysis tends to minimize the influence of the actor, Landwehr (2004) focuses on the 
interdependence between the actor and the discourse. He argues that discourses are 
being socially, historically, and politically rooted through actors. Researchers have 
also defined discourse analysis as a system that adjusts the structure of statements 
(Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982; Wæver, 1994; Bartelson, 1995; Torfing, 1999). In 
                                           
46 Eder, 2001: 245. 
47 Eder, 2001: 222. 
48 Eder, 2001: 225. 
49 Eder, 2001: 225. 
50 Malmborg and Stråth, 2002: 5. 
 41 
other words, ‘discourse’ designates a number of statements created by the same 
pattern thus forming a discourse which is constitutive to the object of communication. 
Particular to discourse analysis is the assumption that language has a constitutive 
effect on meaning and reality. The ontology of discourse analysis rejects the 
existence of a reality outside language. When language is attributed a constitutive 
role, language is not just a medium for the actor to deliver his message. The actor is 
actually part of an interdependent relationship with language, and this relationship 
decides the frames of what it is possible to express.  
‘Critical discourse analysis’ (CDA) is an interdisciplinary approach to 
discourse analysis which looks at micro-features of texts in order to reach the macro 
level and draw on more general debates (Fairclough, 1992, 1995; Chouliaraki and 
Fairclough, 1999; Titscher et al., 2000). Within CDA various models of use have 
been propagated. For instance, Fairclough’s model of discourse analysis is revealing 
the obscure ideological relations between discourses and socio-cultural practices. 
Fairclough defines discourse in terms of “language as a form of social practice”51. In 
other words, linguistic phenomena are social, given that “whenever people speak or 
listen or write or read, they do so in ways which are determined socially and have 
social effects” (Fairclough, 2001: 19). Social phenomena are linguistic, because 
“language activity which goes on in social contexts (...) is not merely a reflection or 
expression of social processes and practices, it is part of those processes and 
practices”52. For Wodak (1996) discourses are multi-layered and discourse analysis 
studies power relations and ideological discourses in order to examine how they are 
embodied in cultural forms of life. Wodak uses the historical discourse method which 
emphasises that discourse is historical, i.e. linked to events that have happened and 
are still happening. This represents an important opening for my analysis as I point 
out the significance of precommunist and communist discourses in the understanding 
of Eastern European societies. Van Dijk (1993) notes that discourse analysis focus on 
how social agents influence social beliefs and values, and shape ideologies through 
the standards they set for what is and what is not overall accepted. Van Dijk’s model 
of discourse analysis examines the hidden power structures reflected by ideological 
discourses. For Van Dijk, common understandings of a group or society are 
conceived as the result of discursive interactions within that given group or society 
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(Van Dijk, 1997). Discourse analysis treats discourse as a societal practice and looks 
at the influences of social, political, and cultural contexts on discourse. The most 
significant, in any discourse is its own context and the process that makes its 
construction possible. Discourse analysis investigates the process of construction of 
meaning by looking at language as a social practice for the reproduction of meaning 
between actor and social context (Keller, 2004). Thus, discourse analysis aims at 
showing how meaning is created in a society, in other words it investigates categories 
of observation, meaning, and identity. Wæver (1994) refers to the societal and 
cultural structures and their influence on foreign policy, an important point for this 
thesis, as the case study will demonstrate how national perceptions and discourses 
define Romania’s approach to the outside world.  
In EU studies, discursive approaches have often been applied to 
constitutionalism, democracy, legitimacy and (collective) identity. These studies refer 
to a set of ideas such as: the way economic and political national interests influence 
the EU level decision-making (Hall, 1993; Blyth, l997; Parsons, 2000); policy 
narratives, discourses, and frames that (re)construct actors’ understandings of 
interests and structures (Radaelli, 1999; Doty, 1996; Milliken, l999; Jobert, l992; 
Muller, l995; Muller and Surel, l998); or national identities, values, norms, and 
collective memories that serve to shape interests (Finnemore and Sikkink, l998; 
Rothstein, 2000), and constitutional discourse in the EU (Shaw, 2000). Immigration 
and the ‘politicisation’ of migration is yet another favourite topic chosen by 
discursive approaches.  
In European integration studies a discursive dimension to constructivist 
approaches has recently been introduced to address the changing nature of societal 
identities and of the nation-state within the process of integration53. Through practice 
and meanings, discourses provide an insight into the dynamics of change. In this 
sense, a more ‘moderate’ constructivism has come “to occupy the ‘middle ground’ 
between rationalism and poststructuralism”54. Such studies have, for example, 
investigated the structure of meaning in a given political issue55, as well as the role of 
agents’ multiple identities in national political discourses. The studies on discourse as 
an interactive process also cover policy construction issues that generate collective 
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action and identity (Haas, l992; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, l993; Hajer, 1993; 
Singer, 1990; Jobert, 1992; Muller, l995; Jobert, 2001; Finnemore and Sikkink, l998), 
or the discourse of political actors (Schmidt, 2000). It also includes studies on the use 
of ideas in public arguments (Mutz et al., l996), open public debates (Guiraudon, 
2000), the democratic governance discourse (March and Olsen, l995), national 
political discourses (Hall, l989), or communicative action (Habermas, l996).  
According to Wæver, “discursive approaches can be seen as either a 
methodology (‘discourse analysis’) and therefore compatible with quite different 
theoretical approaches, or as a theoretical approach that had been developed in other 
disciplines and has been applied to EIS in different ways”56. By analysing discourse 
points on Europe, Wæver identifies some frequent themes: ‘not one Europe but 
many’ (Wæver, 1990; Stråth, 2000), EU seen in non-state terms, but rather as a “post-
modern empire” (Wæver, 2004: 202; Diez 1997), and finally, European issues related 
to other matters due to the “relational nature of language, which means that concepts 
are valorized in relation to each other”57 (traditions, and socio-economic divisions). 
Wæver (2004) discusses the values and limitations of discursive approaches by 
distinguishing among three bodies of work analysis: governance and political 
struggle, foreign policy explained from concepts of state, nation, and Europe, and the 
European project as productive paradox. The first two can be perceived as the 
‘discursive manifestations’ of multi-level governance and intergovernmentalism, 
while the third approach refers to wider Europe and locates a few general discourses 
as describing the integration process.  
Building on Giddens’ structuration theory (1984), Thomas Diez (2001a) 
used the term ‘linguistic structurationism’ to look at the way discourses exist and are 
reproduced. Diez identifies that “discourses do not ‘cause’ but enable (...). They set 
limits to what is possible to be articulated, but also provide agents with a multitude of 
identities in various subject positions, and are continuously transformed through the 
addition and combination of new articulations” (Diez, 2001a: 98). But that also 
implies that institutions “cannot be separated from the discourses they are embedded 
in”58. For Diez, “‘Europe’ becomes a discursive battleground with ramifications (…) 
for the wider political debate” (Diez, 2001b: 6). Discourses, thus, have an effect on 
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institutions, social contexts, practices, policies and the way they are conceptualised. 
Actors use specific meanings to precede their interests, but in the same time language 
structures how actors understand and construct their milieu. This is the understanding 
of discourse that provides a starting point for Delanty’s argument that “Europe can be 
viewed as a discursive strategy which is articulated by shifting signifiers in relational 
contexts” (Delanty, 1995: 8). 
There are a number of crucial aspects in the discursive dimension to 
constructivist approaches that require special attention because they imply that social 
reality is shaped by social agents. Like Diez (2001b) and Delanty (1995), I seek detail 
explanation of how social agents recreate Europe based on their specific 
understandings. Furthermore, I share the importance of issues of meaning and 
interpretation for discourse analysis. However, my own perspective is closer 
connected to the constructivist approach’s overall assumptions than to discourse 
analysis. The emphasis that constructivist approaches place on examining the 
linkages between societal identities, politics, and the issue of change has made them 
highly relevant to the study of contemporary transformation in Eastern Europe and to 
the conceptualization of Europe in general. I believe that a choice of constructivist 
rather than a discourse analytical approach allows me to reach a more comprehensive 
explanation of how processes of transformation may come about. Moreover, a 
constructivist analysis includes the possibility of transformation even in the absence 
of discourses. As Sine Just put it, “one can be a constructionist without being a 
discourse analyst, but the reverse is highly unlikely” (Just, 2004: 19). As a conclusion 
to the discursive approaches I mention one missing aspect they will have to cope with 
in the future, that is the separation from social constructivism and multi-level 
governance approaches. A more detailed explanation of the constructivist 
approaches’ assumptions will be given in the section 2.2.5.  
2.2.3. Social Change Approaches  
Social change approaches (referred to as ‘transition’) have been widely used to make 
sense of Eastern Europe. The so-called ‘transitology’ (Przeworski, 1991; van Zon, 
1994; von Beyme, 1996; Diamond et al., 1997) has been mainly concerned with 
institutional democracy and market economy changes. The first generation of 
research on Eastern Europe, inspired by insightful studies, theoretical considerations 
and sometimes based on analogy with earlier transitions, has used the term 
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‘transition’ to cover the radical changes that occurred after the end of communism, 
indicating a shift from planned to market economy and from dictatorship to 
democracy. The past years have been marked by lively controversy among those who 
see signs of a decline or the disappearance of transition studies (Bunce and Csanádi, 
1993; Burawoy, 2001; Carothers, 2002) and therefore believe that a radical rethinking 
of the transitology is necessary (Stark, 1993; Srubar, 1994; van Zon, 1994; Illner, 
1999; Dahrendorf, 1997; Borinski and Wagner, 2002; Wagner, 2004), and others who 
advocate the continuing significance of transition (Offe, 1991; Sztompka, 1992; 
Balcerowicz, 1995; Linz and Stepan, 1996; Mason, 1996; Shleifer, 1997).  
Two directions in transition studies have been used for to deal with 
Eastern European countries: the functionalist and the genetic schools of thinking. The 
functionalist school (the state model) has dealt with long-term socio-economic 
structural developments, i.e. the impact of structural factors over time and the 
economic preconditions for democratization (Pridham and Vanhanen, 1994; Pridham, 
1995). On the other hand, the genetic school (the society model) has mainly been 
concerned with short-term political determinants of the transition process (Mason, 
1996; Linz and Stepan, 1996). To cut a long story short, transition studies have been 
confronted with mainly three issues in order to describe and analyse the central and 
Eastern European countries after communism: breaking with the communist rule, 
building democratic institutions and the making of reforms based on a linear 
movement from a planned to a market economy. 
Five main assumptions delineate the transition paradigm. The first, basic 
assumption is that any country in transition is moving away from communist rule to 
embrace liberal democracy and market economy. This assumption also implies that 
bringing together market economy and democracy is the most favourable state of 
development for any modern society59. Kennedy sustains even that transition studies 
centre on the ‘making of modernity’ (Kennedy, 2002: 20) that is on the making of 
markets and democracy in the aftermath of communism. The conceptual tools of the 
transition paradigm came thus to analyse postcommunist societies (designated as ‘in 
transition’) in terms of the normative affirmation of the Western modern project (seen 
as a blue print for the Eastern Europe’s future) and a teleological view on their 
political processes. Or as Arnason put it, transition studies assume that “the current 
western constellation of capitalism, democracy, and the nation-state (allowing for 
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some differences of opinion on the relative weight of the last factor) represents a 
universal and definitive model on its way to global ascendancy” (Arnason, 2000: 90). 
By assuming the transition of the East after the Western model, the emphasis comes 
on uniformity and unanimity. 
The second assumption is that transitional countries follow an alleged 
path made of three core stages: opening, breakthrough and consolidation60. 
Deviations from these stages are defined in terms of the path itself (i.e., what 
Carothers calls ‘democratic teleology’). The third assumption is the idea that 
elections have a determinative role in the process of transition itself. As such the 
outcome of elections is considered to have a key role in generating democratic 
reforms. Transitologists believe that the elections will expand and deepen political 
participation among citizens. By emphasizing the dominant role of the political elites 
in the transition process to the sacrifice of civil society, the transition theory has been 
criticised for not being able to address developments in Eastern Europe (Ost, 1990).  
The forth assumption refers to the fact that the internal conditions of the 
country in transition (economic level, political history, institutional legacies, ethnic 
structure, social-cultural dynamics) “will not be major factors in either the onset or 
the outcome of the transition process” (Carothers, 2002: 8). Yet, no transition can 
break entirely with the past because of the previous historical legacies and their 
impact on the national culture. This assumption seems to imply that market economy 
and democracy have an existence of their own. The fifth assumption of the transition 
paradigm concerns the institution-building processes or as Offe (1991) called them, 
the process of ‘copying of institutions’ which looks at the emulation of Western 
defined institutions. These processes precede at the level of organizations and 
institutions and are articulated by laws and strengthened by state power.  
The critique of the transition paradigm concerns some of its assumptions. 
Firstly, the idea of transition stops at ‘postcommunism’. Taking its point of departure 
from the notion of postcommunism, the transition paradigm has imposed a simplified 
conceptual framework on Eastern European transformation. To focus on the idea of 
postcommunism (as a special case) is to accept that East has remained separate from 
the West. But this divide is more than a prejudice: it also declines the impact of 
Eastern European transformation on the transformation(s) in Europe itself. 
Postcommunist societies appear then as an offshoot of the communist world, further 
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marked by the East-West divide rather than by their own ‘responses’ to 
transformation. In other words, to talk about Eastern European countries as 
postcommunist countries is not enough. To move beyond postcommunism means not 
only to bridge the longstanding East-West divide, but also acknowledging that these 
countries have been shaped by wider processes of transformation. An adequate 
understanding of this complex theoretical issue requires a better understanding of the 
nature of political changes occurring inside the Eastern European countries 
themselves.  
Secondly, not only is the general label and concept of ‘postcommunist’ 
society unhelpful, but transitology hardly offers an empirical tableau of the complex 
nature of Eastern European transformations. With the emphasis on a ‘certain’ path of 
development, theoretical approaches to democratic transition have avoided to address 
the major implications for how ‘transition’ is distributed in a society. By taking one-
sided perspective on transformation (based on preconditions for democracy), the 
transition paradigm has neglected the interconnections between historical legacies, 
internal dynamics, and global contexts. It is however, possible to draw attention to 
some differences among Eastern European countries. Indeed, Eastern European 
societies have very little in common today besides the fact that they were once called 
communist. Therefore, analysts cannot assume that they are destined to follow 
identical trajectories. In the words of Carothers “the transition paradigm was a 
product of a certain time (…) and that time has now passed” (Carothers, 2002: 20).  
Thirdly, transition studies have been deficient in accepting history as an 
explanatory factor. Indeed, countries from Eastern Europe have been defined in the 
literature on transitions more by where they are headed – towards open societies and 
democratic governance – than by where they come from. The prospect that Eastern 
European countries might generate their own version of modernity has not been 
considered. Drawing comparisons between these countries based on their future 
orientation and the ‘unfinished character’ of the transition appeared more useful than 
attributing their peculiarities to inherited legacies61 (other than communist). 
Extending the ‘transition’ model to a universal paradigm, these studies have ignored 
the many variations in the patterns of democratic change. Overlooking the causes, the 
nature, and pace of different trends across Eastern Europe, the transition approach has 
had its own interpretation of these patterns away from reality. As Thomas Carothers 
                                           
61 Bunce, 1995: 158-59. 
 48 
pointed out, it is more and more obvious that reality in Eastern Europe is no longer 
compliant to the model. This is not to say that important democratic reforms have not 
occurred in these countries or that the EU should discard efforts to promote 
democracy in Europe.  
  Recently, F. Peter Wagner has regarded postcommunist societies as a 
challenge for transition studies by using Romania as an example. In Wagner’s view, 
transition studies do not identify the “differentiated development of 
underdevelopment in the countries of the former Eastern Europe” (Wagner, 2004: 
52). Likewise, transition studies do not cover the aspect of “indigenous 
conceptualizations and leitmotifs” (Wagner, 2004: 52). I concur with this critique and 
argue that instead of ‘transition’ type of change, Romanian society experiences today 
cultural integration, seen as the ‘transformative dimension’ of the Romanian society. 
Fourthly, these studies have underestimated both the internal and the 
external dynamics of transformation. Moreover, the reorganization of Eastern Europe 
after the end of the East-West divide cannot be accurately described simply as a 
transition from state socialism to market economy. Last but not least, transition 
studies do not place Eastern Europe within the more complex postwestern and 
postnational condition of Europe. A more adequate understanding of these issues 
requires new frameworks of analysis. Based on this critique, I argue that the analysis 
of transformation in Eastern Europe can benefit from a cultural integration approach. 
Below I will shortly turn to examine the state-centred, the multi-governance model, 
and social constructivism.  
2.2.4. Nationalist Approach to European Integration  
Another approach that I distance myself from is the nationalist approach, 
emphasizing that in the European integration process nationalism is the expression of 
the nation. The nationalist approach to European integration is related to the idea that 
nation-states remain distinct, unique, and secure (i.e. ‘Europe of nation-states’). 
Cultural integration, I have suggested, does not seek to explain the link between 
nationalism and integration. The main changes occurring today in Eastern Europe 
under conditions of cultural integration support neither the end of nationalism nor the 
end of integration (associated with the EU) but the emergence of postnational 
developments. These developments refer to “the shifting of the nation code from the 
 49 
state to new reference points which allow for different kinds of identification” 
(Delanty, 2000a: 95). 
The main debates around nationalism and European integration are to be 
found in the work of Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State (1992). 
Milward’s main contribution is to have made an explicit link between the defence of 
the nation-state, the pursuit of national interests, and the acceleration of European 
integration. In other words, what has driven the integration process is not a sense of 
European consciousness but the national interests of the member states. Central to 
Milward’s argument is that, rather than replacing the nation-state by another form of 
governance, integration has been “the creation of the European nation-states 
themselves for their own purposes, an act of national will” (Milward, 1992: 18). 
According to Alan Milward, the purpose of European Community (EC) policies was 
not to supersede but to reinforce the nation-state. Hence, integration has sought to 
reconcile, on the one hand, “the reassertion of the nation-state as the fundamental 
organizational unit of political, economic, and social existence” and, on the other 
hand, “the surrender of some of its powers to the European Community” (Milward, 
1992: 20). The key aspect of ‘the rescue of the nation-state’, Milward suggests, has 
been the peaceful “surrender of national sovereignty” (Milward, 1992: 7) in favour of 
the pursuit of national interests. However, this has not made the EC the ‘antithesis’ of 
the nation-state. The development of the EC, Milward suggests, “has been an integral 
part of the reassertion of the nation-state as an organizational concept” (Milward, 
1992: 2-3). Thus, both nation-state and European Community have reinforced each 
other, not as separate and divergent entities, but within a process of mutual 
reinforcement. 
It was obvious after 1945 that European nation-states could no longer 
exist in isolation. The ideological rhetoric of integration was in fact concealing the 
real political and pragmatic reasons. Put differently, the EC existed simply to ‘rescue’ 
the nation-state, and not to establish a European State. As Milward pointed out,  
after 1945 the European nation-state rescued itself from collapse, created a new 
political consensus as the basis of its legitimacy, and through changes in its 
response to its citizens which meant a sweeping extension of its functions and 
ambitions reasserted itself as the fundamental unit of political organization 
(Milward, 1992:3).  
In this light, the EU is merely an intergovernmental body, used as a tool by its 
member states to fulfil their own domestic agendas against the force of economic 
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liberalization and globalization. For Milward there is some evidence to emphasize the 
domestic rationality of European integration. Milward finds that integration has been 
pursued by the nation-state as “one way of formalizing, regulating and perhaps 
limiting the consequences of interdependence, without forfeiting the national 
allegiance on which its continued existence depends” (Milward, 1992: 19). 
According to Milward, European states have long pursued their political project of 
the European rescue of nation-state in order to overcome the absence of a system of 
global governance in Europe. 
Inevitably, Milward’s thesis leads me to the idea that my cultural 
integration approach does not focus on integration as another version of Europe of 
nation-states. My cultural integration approach differs, then, from the nationalist 
approach to European integration which stresses the preservation of the interests of 
the nation-state as the main mechanism for integration. Cultural integration does not 
aim to analyse the framework within which nation-states articulate their nationalism 
in order to better advance their objectives.  
2.2.5. Constructing Theories  
In sum about theories of European integration: they derived originally from 
International Relations (IR) and became first popular in the 1950s and 60s. They are 
usually exclusively used as a framework of analysis in the study of the EU. The usual 
dichotomies used to label theories of European integration are: constructivism versus 
positivism, governance versus IR approaches (rationalist) and institutionalism (path 
dependence theory and supranationalism) versus structuralism (realism and 
intergovernmentalism). The question now is if they can grasp the realities of 
European integration when matters related to culture are included.  
Researchers have generally avoided the issue of cultural integration and 
so far the literature has been rather negative and critical towards the use of culture as 
an explanatory factor for European integration. Rosamond (2000) foresees integration 
theory “as moribund; an interesting, but ultimately futile intellectual experiment” and 
argues that “there are serious problems involved in cordoning off ‘theory’ in EU 
studies”62. Even if Rosamond (2000) realizes a critical analysis of the theories of 
European integration, he does not touch upon a view of the cultural dimension of 
European integration as an eminent dimension of further deep integration. 
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In the following, I will shortly go through the rationalist approaches to 
European integration. To shorten a long discussion two models have dominated the 
rationalist approach. The first one is the state-centred model; the second is the multi-
governance model.   
 
The State-Centred Model  
The state-centred model looks at the role of power and interest. The model is based 
on the ‘realist’ assumption that states are the major actors in the European integration 
process and regarded as mutually exclusive. This state-centred theory explains the 
context of intergovernmental conferences where the production of treaties is regarded 
as decisive steps in the process of integration and as reinforcing the role of the nation-
states. The accomplishment of the integration process in the post Cold War 
multipolar order “is more likely to be a venue for conflict rather than cooperation”63. 
States are driven by rational preferences. Bulmer (1983) offers an interesting theory 
of the formation of national preferences.  
One attempt within this tradition to theorize European integration is 
Moravcsik’s Putnam-inspired ‘two-level game’. The pressure of domestic interests is 
seen as “the primary source of integration that lies in the interests of the states 
themselves and the relative power each brings to Brussels” (Moravcsik, 1991: 75). 
EU is viewed as a two-level game: national and intergovernmental (Putnam, 1988). 
The decisive elements in the interstate negotiation process are the threats of non-
agreement, the threats of exclusion and the possibilities of compromises. The most 
powerful states are decisive. Here integration is accepted because it increases the 
control in domestic affairs but it neglects the integration dynamics. This theory 
provides only a limited explanation of European integration and characterises mostly 
political and economic bargaining among member states. Moreover the question 
about the future of the nation-state as the primary unit in the European politics 
remains untouched. 
 
The Multi-Governance Model  
In this regard the multi-governance model of European integration, propagated by the 
neofunctionalists differs. The theory argues that nation-states “are loosing ground in 
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the face of growing transnationalization and regionalization of decision-making”64. 
According to some proponents of this model, the multi-governance model is “the 
dispersion of authoritative decision-making across multiple territorial levels” 
(Hooghe and Marks, 2001: xi). The EU policy process is considered to be a process 
that occurs across multiple levels (supranational, national and subnational). This idea 
is a challenge to Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalist theory. Authority has 
moved from the national towards the European level and therefore weakened the 
nation-state. The multi-governance model remains “an attempt to capture the 
complexity of the EU, but it also represents a clear denial of the idea that there can be 
a single all-encompassing theory of the EU”65. 
When dealing with Eastern Europe, the above models have emphasised 
the conditions either related to the EU enlargement or the EU economic and political 
integration. Moreover, in these models of integration, culture has been treated top 
down. When culture is considered it is as something that in a neofunctionalist sense 
would result from integration in other spheres.  
 
Social Constructivism  
In studying the cultural dimension of integration it is useful to turn from the 
traditional European integration theories to the latest approach to theorising 
integration that is social constructivism. A number of scholars have applied the 
framework of social constructivism to the European integration process. A special 
issue of the Journal of European Public Policy published in 1999 marks a major shift 
in this regard (Christiansen et al., 1999; Rosamond, 2000; Risse, 2004).  
A lot of confusion is found in European studies on what makes social 
constructivism relevant to the study of European integration. According to Thomas 
Risse, social constructivism “does not make any substantive claims about European 
integration”66. Therefore, he claims that “social constructivism does not represent a 
substantive theory of integration, but an ontological perspective or meta-theory”67. 
One could easily read for example intergovernmental negotiations or neo-
functionalist spill-over effects (Haas, 2001) from a constructivist perspective.  
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What defines then social constructivism? Social constructivism is an 
approach to the study of social phenomena which emphasizes the importance of the 
idea that reality is socially constructed. Berger and Luckmann argue already in 1966 
in their prominent book entitled The Social Construction of Reality that what creates 
social order is interpersonal communication and understandings made of shared 
history and experiences. Reality is socially constructed. Consensus and interpretation 
are important parts of this social order. Members of a society produce patterns of 
meaning that legitimate their actions. This social constructionist position asserts that 
the structure and culture of a society are invented and maintained by the ways of 
thinking of its members. In other words members of a society make a socio-cultural 
context of their own.  
Another central claim of constructivists is the proposition that meaning is 
socially constructed. “Constructivism emerged as scholars entertained the problems 
and difficulties posed by empiricist and rationalist accounts of knowledge and other 
perspectives that maintained sharp separations between the knower and the known” 
(Mascolo and Pollack, 1997: 1). Constructivist principles are well embodied both 
across and within different cultural and intellectual trends. Some of these trends are 
postmodernism (Kaplan, 1988; Lyotard, 1986), deconstructionism (Derrida, 1980), 
feminist theories (Jagger and Bordo, 1989; Code, 1991), sociology and philosophy of 
science (Kuhn, 1962; Latour, 1993), sociology of power and language (Bourdieu, 
1991) and even the reader-response criticism in literary theory (Iser, 1974; Fish, 
1980). Postmodernist accounts of social constructivism argue that there is no 
‘reality’, but a special kind of knowledge that creates the social reality. That is why 
one should ‘deconstruct’ this reality.    
A variety of constructivist approaches has entered the sociology of 
science and technology. “In these theories, the constructive process cannot be 
reduced to agency or to structures, but occurs in a mediated context in which agency 
is embedded in structures that are at the same time the outcome of the action of social 
agents” (Delanty and Rumford, 2005: 13). It started with ‘scientific constructivism’ 
that conveyed that all science was constructed and that reality is artificial. The 
sociology of knowledge had proven the determinant role of social factors. ‘Radical 
constructivism’ represented by Luhmann, Ernst von Glasersfeld, and others is 
concerned with the everyday reality experiences and what lies beyond knowledge. 
‘Radical’ “because it breaks with convention and develops a theory of knowledge in 
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which knowledge does not reflect an objective, ontological reality but exclusively an 
ordering and organization of a world constituted by our experience”68. According to 
Luhmann, “knowing is only a self-referential process”69. ‘Radical constructivism’ 
assumes that knowledge is in the minds of people; people construct this knowledge 
on the basis of their own experiences. In epistemology there has been a trend to move 
from a passive view of knowledge towards an active view.  
In contrast to these versions of constructivism, social constructivism has 
become known as a form of the philosophy. Heylighen (1993) explains that social 
constructivism "sees consensus between different subjects as the ultimate criterion to 
judge knowledge. ‘Truth' or 'reality' will be accorded only to those constructions on 
which most people of a social group agree"70. It is through the writings of Nicholas 
Onuf, The World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International 
Relations (1989) and Alexander Wendt, Anarchy is What States Make of It: The 
Social Construction of Power (1992) that constructivism enters political science and 
contemporary international relations. Social constructivism in political science and 
contemporary international relations unites international theory with sociological 
concerns. The different versions of constructivism emerged can be described after the 
distinction positivist/post positivist. According to Ruggie (1998), Wendt’s modernist 
constructivism that is supposed to be a bridge between institutionalism and reflexive 
constructivism is rather related to neo-classical constructivism (Kratochwill, Onuf, 
Adler, and Katzenstein) and postmodernist constructivism (Ashley, Campbell, and 
Walker). Alexander Wendt (1998) argues that the fundamental nature of states is not 
given, but has changed over time, can change again, and, most essentially, can be 
changed. Structures, in constructivist analyses, are not described in materialistic 
terms. They are rather described as “shared understandings, expectations and social 
knowledge (…). Intersubjective structures give meaning to material ones, and it is in 
terms of meanings that actors act”71. In contrast to the rationalist perspectives, 
constructivism argues that states' identities and interests are not given but construed 
within the international system. For this reason, institutions and structures are social 
                                           
68 Von Glasersfeld, 1984: 24. 
69 quoted in Delanty and Strydom, 2003: 437. 
70 Heylighen 1993: 2. 
71 Wendt, 1998: 389. 
 55 
normative constructs and agents’ interests are influenced by norms, culture and 
identities72. 
In European Studies constructivism has been viewed lately as an 
ideational transfer from intergovernmentalist and actor-centred approaches73. 
Constructivist accounts arise from, and attempt to resolve, what Jan Ifversen has 
termed as “inter-relations between a cultural and a political field”74. Ifversen’s 
constructivist point of view relates culture to the process of accession into EU. This 
perspective cannot avoid the presence of political background and terminology. Any 
political process develops on the basis of a given yet cultural dynamic. Political 
decisions affect developments in the underlying cultural dynamics. This 
constructivist approach makes sense in the context of EU enlargement. It means that 
now that the Cold War is over, other forces, cultural ones are playing a dominant 
role. Ideas do not just re-produce themselves. They have causes and sometimes-
collective ones. Political power takes place through collectiveness. Reality is 
constructed and re-constructed by social actors. Yet, constructivism, as a ‘cultural’ 
theory of European integration regards reality as a social construction and 
concentrates on the way conceptions influence actions. Classical theories only cover 
limited aspects of European integration. As to Enlargement, “they cannot account for 
the evolution of the enlargement process which itself is rooted in not just a densely 
institutionalised politico-economic setting but is also crucially underscored by 
normative understandings of what the European construction is about”75. 
Thomas Risse depicts constructivism as “based on a social ontology 
which insists that human agents do not exist independently from their social 
environment and its collectively shared systems of meanings (‘culture’ in a broad 
sense)”76. In this case actors are seen as role players that take into consideration a 
‘logic of appropriateness’: “Human actors are imagined to follow rules that associate 
particular identities to particular situations, approaching individual opportunities for 
action by assessing similarities between current identities and choice dilemmas and 
more general concepts of self and situations” (March and Olsen, 1998: 951). This 
logic is dependent on context and expectations on the decision-making process. Thus, 
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actors base their resulting decisions in consequence. In this sense actors’ identity and 
options are dynamic. For example, the response to the challenge of the EU 
enlargement is, in social constructivist terms to offer flexibility in decision-making. 
The constructivist approach highlights the importance of language and knowledge 
and refers to the understandings shared by the agents involved in the decision-making 
process. Constructivism can also offer an explanation for a shift in identity in national 
policies issues. The nature of postcommunist politics goes beyond the rational 
numbers of cost and benefit of the EU accession. According to Hoskyns, “social 
constructivist accounts deal particularly with identity formation, the process of 
socialization, and the importance of discourse in shaping and setting limits to what is 
achievable” (Hoskyns, 2004: 228). 
I believe that social constructivism can contribute to my general theory of 
cultural integration in two ways. First, the social constructivist perspective 
emphasizes the interpretivist and the sociological turns in the social sciences. The 
interpretivist turn starts from the idea that every action is meaningful, and therefore 
open to interpretation. Reflexivity i.e., “the idea that modernity is undergoing a 
transformation”77 is another aspect of this type of theorizing. Second, social 
constructivism also explains the main concern with ‘identity’ issues. The sociological 
turn entails that actions are perceived as social phenomena. This approach gives 
importance to the social context within which identities are shaped. In my view social 
constructivism is a meta-theory that has the following features: taking critically the 
social action and its cultural significances; using a subjectivist epistemology, 
knowledge is relative to the observer, depending on the social and cultural context; 
using a subjectivist ontology which highlights the idea that what exists is a social 
construction.  
Moreover, constructivism offers a framework that entails the significance 
of values in the development of a common identity. This is something that otherwise 
would be overlooked by employing traditional theories of integration. Using a 
constructivist approach makes us better understand the motivations involved. Such an 
approach looks at identity as something dynamic and flexible from which integration 
is constructed or as a framework through which actors see themselves and thus define 
the relationship with their community. This approach is based on the assumption that 
actors’ interests are derived from within social integration. The constructivist 
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approach looks also at how decisions are made and on what base (beliefs, 
conceptions of identity, symbols, myths and perceptions) they are created. This 
approach produces a model that will allow us to analyse how identity changes over 
time. In the case of constructivism, cultural perspectives are more likely to gain some 
space and significance. Yet, what seems to be missing from the social constructivist 
arsenal is a theorising of culture. 
As it looks now, social constructivist accounts appear to have more 
relevance in engaging with cultural integration. Social constructivism has the 
potential to confront the basic grounds of the integration process and depict its 
inherent challenges in a way that other theories do not. Following this outline, the 
conceptualization of Europeanization will be discussed in terms of its current usage. 
This will help outline a framework for how Europeanization is to be applied later in 
this thesis, and sets the scene for the cultural integration model in the next chapter. 
2.3. The Conceptualization of Europeanization  
Having discussed a number of traditional approaches to European integration, I now 
turn to Europeanization theory. Europeanization is the latest development in 
integration theory over the last five years. Any usage of the term Europeanization 
must discuss its definition first. Despite the popularity of the term among social 
science disciplines, Europeanization has no clear definition. This is a major obstacle 
to the closer analysis of the Eastern European societies and the process of social 
transformation they undergo in present-day Europe. One reason that the area has 
emerged very strongly in the last few years is that it contains wider fields than just 
the EU and European integration. Also, questions of culture and Europeanization 
have came to the fore partly because of globalisation and the crisis of the nation-state 
in the Western societies, partly because of the increased migration and the uncertainty 
after the end of the Cold War era. Klaus Eder and Bernhard Giesen (2001) argue that 
“Europe is also a symbolic space where projections and memories, the collective 
experiences and identifications of the people of Europe are represented. Europe has a 
cultural meaning”78. For Borneman and Fowler (1997), the field of Europeanization 
needs new methods and theories of analysis. The contemporary debates concern the 
way European societies relate to the process of Europeanization in the wider context 
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of uncertain national boundaries and “societal transformation of modernity by 
transnational processes”79. According to Vink, Europeanization has become ‘a major 
new agenda for research’80. These developments and others have contributed to 
raising the issue of culture. 
Europeanization as a concept has been applied with a variety of meanings 
attached to it. There exists no consensus on what ‘Europeanization’ really is except 
that normally it has to do with the idea that European integration has an impact on 
structures, national policies, and national governance. There are different variations. 
Some emphasize the way in which European level processes are actually being 
incorporated within national structures. In this sense, Europeanization seems to be a 
synonym with the traditional notion of systemic integration. Yet this is a rather 
simplistic definition of the term. Some might even state that some forms of 
Europeanization have very little to do with the EU and the dynamics of integration 
(see also Delanty and Rumford, 2005): “identities and interests change as a result of 
shifts in social norms, values and beliefs and these may occur in response to 
transnational or global pressures only loosely connected to the EU”81. This first 
interpretation falls within the study of European integration and refers to 
Europeanization as domestic change caused by European integration.  
A second interpretation that I would favour - and which includes culture 
and identity - concerns the way in which Europe, especially Eastern European 
countries, are in the process of becoming more European and European self-aware. 
This interpretation is broader than the EU and the dynamics of European integration. 
Bauman (2004: 15) has recently termed Europeanization as the result of 
Westernization. To understand Bauman’s idea of Europeanization it is first necessary 
to appreciate the extent to which Europe has become a fortress continent. As Bauman 
points out, the Eastern European countries have ceased thinking of being ‘European’ 
as something adventurous and challenging. “No longer does the globe feel inviting 
and hospitable; neither does it look like an empty stage for countless heroic exploits 
and glorious unheard-of feats. It seems hostile and threatening now” (Bauman, 2004: 
21). 
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 This interpretation opens up the question of what ‘European’ actually 
means. Where does Europe start and where does it end? What does it mean to be 
European? What is European identity? What is European culture? In fact, that these 
questions are at all being asked is an example of Europeanization because they 
indicate that Europe or Europeans reflect upon these questions and seek to define 
Europe for themselves.  
In national political debates ‘Europe’ often enters as a dimension of national 
identity rather than a project of transnational unification.(...) Rather than ‘How 
shall Europe be united?’, the questions dwelt upon in public debate have been: 
How European is our nation?’, ‘How shall we relate ourselves to Europe?’, ‘To 
what extent should we be European, something else or simply ourselves?’ 
(Malmborg and Stråth, 2002: 9).  
This meaning of Europeanization is presently being investigated in what has 
developed into a new agenda for research. 
Research in the area of Europeanization has followed several avenues. 
Researchers have analysed ‘Europeanized’ aspects of national politics (Cowles et al., 
2001), domestic structural transformation (Featherstone and Kazamias, 2001), 
policies (Kohler-Koch and Eising, 1999), or one country (Dyson and Goetz, 2003). 
Work by Marteen Vink (2003) was concerned with the new institutionalist approach 
based on the question of ‘how Europe matters’. A weakness mentioned by Vink is 
that “scholars on Europeanization run the risk of missing the bigger picture by over-
emphasising differences in processes of change across European changes”82. 
Therefore, so far research fails to present a comprehensive overview of the 
interpretation to Europeanization as the way in which Europe as a whole, not just EU, 
is somehow concerned itself with the process of becoming more ‘European’. This 
approach to Europeanization is accepted for the use of this thesis. This also means 
that I do not see Europeanization as deriving from integration or as being dependant 
upon or secondary to integration.  
2.3.1. Dimensions of Europeanization  
This section introduces the main dimensions of Europeanization in the context of 
European integration process and argues that it necessitates a broad focus and a 
complex ontology. Without claiming to be exhaustive, Europeanization has mainly 
                                           
82 Vink, 2003: 6. 
 60 
three dimensions that can be expressed in an abstract sense such as: political 
pressures and challenges for adaptation caused by European integration (this 
dimension refers also to domestic change under European integration); daily cultural 
encounters between peoples of Europe; and Europeanization as the process of 
becoming more ‘European’. 
 
Political Pressures and Challenges for Adaptation Caused by European Integration 
Europeanization in this approach is focused on the study of EU and its administration 
as well as the administrative adaptation by national states to EU membership. Early 
work by Shore (1993, 2000, 2001) was concerned with the idea of an ‘ever closer 
union’ concentrating mainly on the European identity and the role of EU bureaucrats 
in constructing it, the creation of a European state and culture at the EU institutional 
level and the actual challenges we face with regard to further European integration, 
the ‘role’ culture plays in the process of integration and the consequences of creating 
a European nation-state. Additional work by Herzfeld (1992), Wright (1994), and 
Börzel (1999) deals with the idea of EU having its own bureaucratic culture. Ladrech 
(1994: 70) has suggested that Europeanization is a process that has made EU shape 
and reorient the national politics of its member states and acceding countries. These 
challenges and pressures caused by European integration may evolve into 
institutional change, or in resistance from the national level and hence limited 
structural change. Even so, Europeanization should not be perceived as a synonym 
for European integration. Rather the focus is situated on the way European 
integration has led to redefinitions of conceptions, relations and structures of power, 
both at national and supranational levels.  
Works by Hanf and Soetendorp (1998), Kassim et al. (2000) were 
concerned with an indirect perspective on the domestic level of European institutions 
via assessing the European sources of national politics. EU as a two-way process of 
policy-making and institution-building is the focus of Knill (2001) and Kohler-Koch 
and Eising (1999). The way European integration influences national politics is 
analysed in Cowles et al. (2001) and Featherstone and Radaelli (2003). Radaelli’s 
definition of Europeanization refers to the process of construction, diffusion and 
institutionalization of EU decision-making procedures. Hirst and Thompson (1996) 
relate Europeanization to the consequences of globalization, while Garrett (1996) 
sees Europeanization as a regional reaction to globalization. This approach on 
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Europeanization has also focused on other aspects than national politics and EU 
administration such as citizenship, human rights and ethnic minorities (Checkel, 
2001; Vink, 2001, Soysal, 1994), state – economy relationship (Mjoset, 1997), and 
widening of the EU integration process (Grabbe, 2001).  
This approach to Europeanization takes also into consideration the 
‘download’ and the ‘nationalization’ of EU public policies (Wilson, 1996, Börzel, 
1999), the national meanings of EU symbols (Hofer, 1994) and the change in the 
identity of nation-states under EU influence. This view looks also at the 
implementation of EU directives, and from a wider perspective, change in the 
structures and identities of nation-states under pressure from EU level. This 
perspective addresses also the creation of national symbols, national consciousness 
and stereotypes in interaction with EU. For Hix and Goetz (2000) Europeanization is 
defined as a “process of change in national institutional and policy practices that can 
be attributed to European integration”83. A critique of this dimension of 
Europeanization has been taken up by Vink who argues that Europeanization is more 
than EUropeanization. The theoretical foundations of this argument are made explicit 
in Moravcsik (1998) and Caporaso (1999). The way European policies, rules and 
norms affect domestic politics and policies are explained by the theory of ‘neo-
institutionalism’ which accounts as well for the emergence as for the ‘constructivist’ 
reproduction of institutions (Checkel 1998, Vink 2003). To Maarten Vink, 
Europeanization is a process of domestic political change. Vink’s central idea is that 
Europeanization comes to be perceived more as resource than a restraint. Ágh (1998: 
42-45) wrote, in this vein, of Europeanization as the process of ‘joining Europe’. 
Essentially this type of Europeanization describes an accomplished process of 
transition and integration into the Western political, economic and security models.   
Based on an insightful analysis of history and civic school books and 
public debates, Soysal depicts the way European public space and identity is 
constructed in the specific field of education. Soysal’s article ‘Locating Europe’ 
(2002) deals with empirical patterns of the Europeanization of identity from an 
institutionalist perspective. As it comes forward from her analysis, “European 
identity is a loose collection of civic ideals and principles, such as democracy, 
progress, equality and human rights” (Soysal, 2002: 265). Yet, none of these 
principles are specifically European. Domestically, European identity can be seen as 
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not replacing the nation but rather reinterpreting it “as another repository of the same 
ideals and principles for which Europe stands” (Soysal, 2002: 265). Soysal’s 
empirical analysis stresses on three modes of constituting Europe. These can be 
summarised as: cultural collectivity, individual subjectivity and institutional unity. 
Europe as a cultural collectivity refers to what obviously makes us Europeans and 
therefore has to draw upon broad hypotheses such as Europe’s past, civilizational 
legacy and distinctive cultural values. Europe as a category of subjectivity is 
concerned with the emotional field of what it means to be European that is “desires 
and sentiments, civic constitution, loyalties, and a distinctly ‘European’ sense and 
sensibility of self”84. Finally Europe as an institutional unity has to do with “Europe’s 
prospects vis-à-vis the existing nation-states” (Soysal, 2002: 267) and with political 
identification at supranational level.  
For Soysal, Europeanization (or ‘the creation of Europe’) happens outside 
EU’s institutional framework. According to Soysal the location of European identity 
takes place at two levels of analysis: first, at transnational level that is EU, “secured 
in commonplace symbols of statehood and cultural collectivity (flag, anthem, heroes, 
holidays)” and second, at national level “in individual citizens’ consciousness and 
dispositions as subjects”85. For example in Germany the outcome is a “prudent 
representation of the nation and its history”86 while in France “Europe becomes 
French”87. This is the reason why “Europe is fuzzy, no longer historically unique and 
precise to perpetuate a coherent, homogenous collective”88. This is, in Soysal’s 
perspective, what makes European identity broader than Europe itself.  
 
Daily Cultural Encounters between Peoples of Europe  
The second dimension of Europeanization deals with the study of daily cultural 
encounters between peoples of Europe and the politics of recognition. Here 
Europeanization refers to interaction in daily life, “where peoples of Europe engage 
in face-to-face encounters with each other” (Borneman and Fowler, 1997: 497). 
These encounters refer especially to increased transnational and intercultural relations 
and are a consequence of globalization and European integration. Harmsen and 
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Wilsen (2000: 18) suggest that “this form of Europeanization is about boundary 
maintenance and boundary crossing, in both the metaphorical sense of the 
borderlands of cultural and political identity as well as the more concrete sense of 
legal, political and administrative borders between and within states”.  
This approach is to be found in the works of MacDonald (1995) and 
Fossum (2001). The focus here is on the study of interpersonal encounters in daily 
life in order to understand the way EU and its policies are perceived. In their own 
words, ”the EU is not inherently composed (…) of any mosaic or patchwork of 
national cultures (…). It is composed of people who mutually construct their sense 
and boundaries of self through relations with others”89. For Delanty (1999: 221-38), 
Europeanization is less a matter of social integration through cultural cohesion than a 
matter of institutional adaptation and cultural pluralization. In his opinion, the 
proposed model for European recognition is one that provokes a sort of exclusivist 
identity. Instead, there should be recognition of multi-identification among the 
peoples of Europe.  
This interpretation of Europeanization is also discussed in the volume The 
Meaning of Europe edited by Mikael af Malmborg and Bo Stråth (2002). Their book 
seeks for a cultural-historical understanding of Europe and on the feed-back effects of 
the Europeanization process. Declining from any false characteristics to the idea of 
Europe, the book shows that “when European institutions and politics emerge, they 
transform the images of Europe. Since the 1950s, there has been, in this sense, an 
Europeanization of the nations, a Europeanization which during the Cold War meant 
images of a west European community of destiny, but which since 1989 has become 
much more open. Open means that the images of Europe lost orientation and 
confidence”90. Europe in this context is understood as a discourse, as an ideological 
programme, and “as a carrier of certain values in national public life”91.  
 
Europeanization as the Process of Becoming more ‘European’ 
The last approach deals with Europeanization as the process of becoming more 
‘European’. This is the approach I find more useful for my purpose. A good starting 
point in looking for a definition of ‘European’ is Gerard Delanty. In a recent essay 
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called ‘What does it mean to be a “European”?’ Delanty (2004) analyses the meaning 
of being ‘European’ in connection to the meaning of being ‘American’. The main 
differences in his opinion consist in the fact that unlike America, “Europe does not 
exist as a subject in the sense of a subject that has sovereign power. Europeans, then, 
are not like national subjects, who have, to varying degrees of political power, based 
on the subjectivity of the nation-state”92. This is the use of the term found mostly in 
anthropological research. Here, Europeanization concerns “the reshaping of identities 
in contemporary Europe in a manner which relativizes (without necessarily 
supplanting) national identities” (Harmsen and Wilsen 2000: 17).  
Borneman and Fowler wrote an anthropological study on Europeanization 
where they propose dealing with Europeanization “pragmatically as a spirit, a vision 
and a process” (Borneman and Fowler 1997: 510). As a process, Europeanization “is 
fundamentally reorganizing territoriality and peoplehood, the two principles of group 
identification that have shaped modern European order”93. According to them, there 
are two conceptions of what ‘European’ is: for some “the Real is Europe before 
World War I, a continent consistent primarily of competing national interests, without 
the internal divisions wrought by international working class movements. For others, 
there is a sense in which the Real itself is now haunted by a spirit yet to take form”94. 
In other words Europeanization is not only about reshaping Europe, but also to 
influence the way people build their identities. Territoriality is also shaped: travelling 
around Europe has become much easier. Our idea of where the limits of Europe are, 
in terms of territory, is being re-shaped. According to Borneman and Fowler, “the 
relatively positive specter of an Americanization of Europe and the negative specter 
of a Sovietization of Europe are being replaced by the anxiety of Europeanisation” 
(Borneman and Fowler, 1997: 488). 
But why should Europe become more European? Borneman and Fowler’s 
answer refers to both external and internal reasons. As to external reasons, 
Europeanization is a process that has its own dynamics. These dynamics affect 
societies’ space and demos. Now Europe is no longer caught in the middle between 
the United States and the Soviet Union power struggle. Therefore it has to get an 
identity of its own. One way of forming such an identity is often by contrasting 
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Europe to the ‘Other’. One such ‘Other’ is the Orient, “marked by an anxiety over the 
politically and religiously explosive Middle East and economic rivalry with the east, 
south, and Southeast Asia. Both of these Oriental phantasms are, of course, already 
embodied within Europe by persons, ideologies, images, and material goods from 
those other geographies”95. For Said (1978), the question ‘what is European?’ makes 
us identify Europe with its power relations and the eternal negative sight towards the 
Other (Islam or the East).  
The EU with its administrative apparatus is internally seen as “a means to 
realize some ill-defined community”96. Primarily based on economic interests, the EU 
“is now a set of explosive and indeterminate effects of late-twentieth-century social 
and political processes”97. Among other internal reasons for seeking to become more 
‘European’ is the EU enlargement that brings domestic changes within the EU in 
terms of territoriality and its people. These two principles - territoriality and 
peoplehood – are appealed to in order to both “strengthen the ability of sovereign 
nation-states to organize space and to create a larger sphere of European space free of 
some of the costly national welfare state provisions” and “direct historical memories 
from both national and continental perspectives” (Borneman and Fowler, 1997: 489).  
The present author agrees with John Borneman and Nick Fowler (1997) 
when they say that Europe is an unstable, non sovereign and non-autonomous entity 
but exists only in historical relations and fields of power. However, they focus on 
Europeanization as a strategy of self-representation and a device of power from a 
European centre. Thus in contrast to them, I focus on the cultural constructions of 
Europe in the ex-communist nation-states and the way they are influenced by the 
Europeanization force towards European unification. This view regards 
Europeanization as an independent process. In this respect my view differs from 
Borneman and Fowler’s who assume that Europeanization orientates itself mainly 
towards individualism and market narratives (see also Milward, 1992; Wintle 1996). I 
argue that Europeanization is closely tied to categories of identity and culture and 
their historical links to the past of the nation-states.  
Conversely for Malmborg and Stråth (2002) the Europeanization of 
nation states “is in part the outcome of deeply entrenched notions of nation and of 
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Europe, which does not, of course, exclude that the view on Europe – as well as on 
the nation – is also deeply contested within the various national settings”98. A parallel 
can be made to the argument of Fossum that “the quest for internal cultural unity 
would be pursued in conjunction with a similar quest for delineating the unique 
features of Europe so as to distinguish between Europeans and non-Europeans or ‘the 
others’” (Fossum, 2001: 1). As it will be discussed in the case of Eastern European 
societies, cultural Europe is rather marked by diversity than by coherence. The 
preceding dimensions of Europeanization are about aspects of political and social 
transformations of present-day Europe. As such the first two dimensions of 
Europeanization are attempts to understand European integration and the role of the 
EU. It is only the third dimension that moves beyond European integration. It evokes 
a much wider paradigm of change beyond the EU. Europeanization admits that 
important changes are happening at national and subnational levels. Europeanization 
thus recognizes diversification at various society levels. The concept of 
Europeanization is in this sense focused on identities and the way they are being 
reshaped. Europeanization adds with this new understanding more focus on cultural 
and societal contexts.   
2.3.2. The Approach to Europeanization in This Thesis 
This thesis examines the reshaping of Eastern European societies within the wider 
context of transformation in Europe and the reconstruction of societal identities 
within these societies. Emphasis will consequently be placed on social agents’ 
conflict over interpretations of the existing societal order highlighted through a social 
constructivist perspective. Based on the third meaning of Europeanization this thesis 
rests on a two-fold definition of Europeanization: firstly Europeanization as a process 
of adaptation around conceptions of Europe and what it means to be ‘European’. 
Europeanization is about ‘being and becoming more European’. Europeanization is 
also about defining the ‘other’ within Europe. Europeanization is an approach to the 
study of the current developments in Europe. Put differently, Europeanization is the 
process of the external becoming the internal. In other words, Europeanization is the 
construction of new boundaries between the external and the internal and more 
generally it involves processes of re-bordering (see also Delanty and Rumford, 
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2005). What are the consequences of this encounter? This is what attaches to the 
topic of Eastern European transformation such interesting aspects.  
The second definition sees Europeanization as a process whereby national 
identity is re-defined. This is a rather socially re-constructed and inter-subjective 
process. It is about a society or a group of societies’ place as it looks for answers to 
the questions: who are we and how do we relate ourselves to Europe. Overall my 
approach to cultural integration points to the idea that Europeanization has 
encouraged a rethinking of the relationship between Eastern Europe and Europe after 
the end of the Cold War. To understand the dynamics of Eastern Europe we need to 
move beyond Europeanization. Developing such an approach that places 
contemporary Eastern Europe in a postwestern and postnational Europe allows for a 
different object of study. In short, this interpretation looks at how Europe has 
reorganized itself after the end of communism. In this context, cultural integration is 
understood as a postwestern and postnational response to European integration. 
In current research on Europeanization what is missing is a concern with 
the domestic factors of transformation in Eastern European societies. When dealing 
with domestic factors (as I will detail further), I suggest that cultural integration has 
more potential for a proper analysis of Eastern Europe. We need to move away from 
an understanding of Eastern Europe as the result of Europeanization. From this 
perspective, cultural integration understands Europeanization as a two-way traffic: 
not only the West has influenced the East but also the East has an impact on the West 
(Delanty, 2003c). Looking at Eastern Europe beyond Europeanization offers a more 
dynamic view on Eastern European transformation(s), thereby making Eastern 
Europe less dependent on Europeanization. This is an advance for seeing postwestern 
and postnational Europe in the ‘East’ as an emerging reality. On this reading, Eastern 
Europe is being re-shaped in a postwestern and postnational way. This is to say that 
cultural integration offers a more suitable approach for understanding contemporary 
Eastern Europe transformation(s). Particularly, cultural integration is not alone the 
product of Europeanization but also reshaped by postwesternization and 
postnationalism. As the discussion will move from theory of Europeanization towards 
cultural integration from a social constructivist perspective and then on to the cultural 
integration model (Chapter 3), keep in mind, that I define culture as a socially 
constructed reality based on social imaginary significations (section 2.1.3., The 
Meaning of Culture). 
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2.4. Cultural Integration  
The above remarks point to some crucial aspects of an alternative approach to the 
transformations in Eastern Europe, and to cultural integration in a more general 
sense. Such an approach finds an effective point of departure in Europeanization 
approaches that underline Europeanization as a process of adaptation around 
conceptions of Europe and what it means to be ‘European’, something that forms the 
basis for the approach in the present study. The analytical concept of cultural 
integration, I suggest, adds to the existing literature on Europeanization, in that it 
emphasizes that Eastern Europe is being re-shaped in a postwestern and postnational 
direction. This section suggests how to analyse cultural integration and discusses the 
added value of such an approach.  
2.4.1. The Conceptual Analysis 
The changing context of Europe after the breakdown of the Iron Curtain and the 
redesign of Eastern European societies, diffusion resulting from the EU, and more 
generally from current processes of transformation in Europe, have all contributed to 
the emergence of new (culturally oriented)  trends of integration, thereby challenging 
and transforming old understandings of integration. The post Cold War preoccupation 
with Europe’s ‘dynamics of openness’ (Delanty, 2003c: 9) has shifted the emphasis 
towards processes of societal transformation in Eastern Europe. The need for 
conceptual tools to grasp these transformations became necessary. I propose that in 
contemporary Europe, cultural integration is a necessary and useful concept in the 
debate around processes of societal transformation.  
Cultural integration falls in the category of ‘essentially contested 
concepts’ (Connolly, 1983). In my case, both concepts ‘culture’ and ‘integration’ 
come into being through social constructivist articulation (Diez, 2001 b). The 
articulation of cultural integration, for instance, binds together a set of issues such as 
the reconstruction of an existing societal order and identities, the way social agents 
understand this process, and the wider situational context in which societal order and 
identities are reconstructed (external influence). As a process of change, cultural 
integration can be perceived over time in the cultural dynamics of these societies. But 
these dynamics are not clear and certain. In presenting the process of societal 
adjustment, the analytical framework of social constructivism represents a useful 
tool. However, since the thesis focuses on cultural integration and since there is a 
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great deal of disagreement on the meaning of the concept, I advance my definition of 
cultural integration as the process of reorganization caused by social agents who seek 
to reconstruct an existing societal order on the basis of their specific understandings. 
This meaning looks at cultural integration in Eastern European societies as a process 
reflecting domestic cultural change. Change takes place on the basis of “a multitude 
of co-evolving, parallel and not necessarily tightly-coupled processes” (Olsen, 1996: 
271). In this context cultural integration is examined in terms of social constructions 
and cultural responses to this process. Cultural integration does not refer to a more 
integrated European culture (the extension of a national culture to a European culture 
has not been a success). Reflexivity plays a greater role in cultural integration than in 
other types of integration.  
Following these considerations, another point in this section deserves 
attention. It is not enough to say that cultural integration is different from political, 
economic and legal integration. Further, one has to distinguish between cultural 
integration and systemic integration (Lockwood, 1964; Habermas, 1987; Delanty and 
Rumford, 2005). While systemic integration – as already mentioned- is defined in 
relation to the EU institutions, cultural integration refers to the dynamics of cultural 
change and societal transformation. What is the basis then for cultural integration? 
Cultural integration cannot have a communitarian basis since cultural integration 
does not aim at constructing a community or reproducing the nation-state model (see 
also Delanty, 1998). Can then the emergence of a postwestern and postnational 
society be the basis for cultural integration? In order to answer the question whether 
the emergence of a postwestern and postnational society can be the basis for cultural 
integration, I shall look into the emergence of a postwestern and postnational Europe 
in the East. Cultural integration emphasizes the emergence of a postwestern and 
postnational Europe and its major cultural transformation(s). The new definition of 
Europe can not relate itself to the West, as well as one cannot define the East with 
reference to the West. In the same line of thinking, the Cold War does not define the 
European social imaginary any longer. European modernity is not a product of 
Europeanization in the sense of transfer of the acquis from West to East. “The 
reshaping of the postcommunist societies by capitalism, democracy and national 
autonomy, a new geopolitical field has come into view characterized by a dynamic of 
openness” (Delanty 2003c: 9). The addition of former communist societies to wider 
Europe involves a new process of cultural integration beyond the EU and its systemic 
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integration. According to Delanty, this is a matter of cultural transformation that 
“differs from all previous dynamics of Europeanization” (Delanty 2003c: 10).  
Instead of a ‘transition’ kind of change, Eastern European societies 
experience today cultural integration. The fundamental question is: how cultural 
integration is at all possible? In an article called ‘Social Theory and European 
Integration: Is there a European Society?’ (1998), Gerard Delanty, rejecting 
Durkheim’s thesis on the formation of a European society as a reproduction of the 
nation-state, introduces another interesting theoretical approach, closely related to 
cultural integration. According to Delanty, the central point is “how can European 
integration articulate a cultural integration model which would give expression to the 
reality of the social”99. Or better, what is the cultural in so far cultural integration is 
concerned? Hence, as Delanty explains, “the debate on the social and cultural 
element in European integration – that is, questions pertaining to citizenship, identity, 
democracy, inclusion – have been hopelessly confused by borrowing the conceptual 
vocabulary of the nation-state”100. My position here, close to that defended by 
Delanty, points to a possible model of cultural integration based on the idea of 
reorganization and the dynamics of transformation. This emphasises both that social 
agents are not completely autonomous, but constrained by their specific 
understandings and that the societal context is seen as supported by two visions of 
transformation: postwestern and postnational.  
2.4.2. The Cultural Integration Model 
There is no commonly agreed definition on the concept of ‘cultural model’. Indeed, a 
number of different senses have been used interchangeably and, as such, frequently 
conflated. First, in its most general meaning, the cultural integration model has been 
used to refer to certain commonalities in the cultural construction of Europe. Here, 
the European cultural model is regularly contrasted with the American model, each of 
them being characterised by distinct identities. The European cultural model in such a 
representation is conventionally characterised by Hellenic philosophical tradition, 
democratic freedom, Roman law, and the Judaeo-Christian tradition. Secondly, 
within the context of this distinctive European cultural model, a variety of rather 
more specific national cultural models have been identified (the British, the French 
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and the German model). Thirdly, more recent developments in the literature have 
identified a rather different sense of the ‘cultural model’. Here, in contrast to the 
similarities between national culture models within the European context, the 
development of a distinctive trans-national cultural model is emphasized. Finally in 
light of such development and with the reality of the EU enlargement, we might 
experience the emergence of a new cultural model, as former communist societies are 
incorporated into the process of cultural integration. 
Before I proceed with the outline of the social constructivist standpoint on 
cultural integration, let me describe the cultural integration approach. The kind of 
sources that generate the dynamics of cultural integration will be a function of three 
clusters of variables: tradition, institutions, and diffusion. As I will show in my case-
study on Romania, tradition (that is the influence of the past) matters in the analysis 
of cultural integration as it identifies the continuities and discontinuities in a given 
society and can inform about earlier encounter(s) with cultural integration. In 
addition, a sociological analysis of cultural integration in Eastern Europe cannot be 
separated from the analysis of institutions, which in themselves stand for cultural 
responses through rules and codes. Last but not least, the analysis of cultural 
integration cannot be completed without analyzing the encounter with external 
models and ideas that are taken on, adapted and/or reproduced, i.e diffusion. Cultural 
integration can take different forms, and it is rather by the identification of particular 
constellations of actors and conflicts between social actors that the nature of cultural 
integration can be understood. By thus relating systemic integration (institutions and 
diffusion) to culture-building (tradition), I seek to transform a static integration model 
into a dynamic model of cultural integration. There are mainly two implications of 
this model: first, the shift towards a societal perspective. Cultural integration has 
something to say about Romania’s internal societal dynamics. Second, the analytical 
framework has to be construed as a move away from EU integration and 
Europeanization understood as harmonization, institutionalization, and politicization. 
Looking at Romania within the context of a postwestern and postnational Europe, the 
dynamics are different and therefore the object of study and the place of Romania are 
different.  
Taking this model of cultural integration as my point of departure, I 
advance in the next section my examination of cultural integration through a social 
constructivist perspective. By applying a social constructivist approach I seek to 
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highlight the capacity of change of a society and stress the importance of the process 
of social construction based on significations mediated in cultural contexts. In the 
next pages the chapter implicitly refers to cultural integration as another dimension of 
Europeanization rather than an alternative approach to European integration. What is 
needed is a more postwestern and postnational interpretation of what political science 
research has called ‘Europeanization of Europe’101.  
2.4.3. Towards a Social Constructivist Perspective on Cultural 
Integration 
Before proceeding, it is important to note some observations concerning the social 
constructivist approach.  My approach is inspired by Delanty and Rumford’s 
perspective on social constructivism. According to Delanty and Rumford, the social 
constructivist approach “highlights the transformative capacity of societies; it asserts 
the creative self-constitution of social realities; and it recognizes that imaginary 
significations enter into the on-going process of social construction”102.  
The authors thus define four main features of using a social constructivist approach. 
The first feature of using a social constructivist perspective is reflexivity 
that is “concern with the reflexive nature of social science as a self-questioning 
endeavour that recognizes that science is part of society” (Delanty and Rumford, 
2005: 14). Delanty and Rumford relate reflexivity to Beck’s idea of ‘reflexive 
modernization’ perceived as “an attempt to re-capture the dynamic of modernity from 
the grasp of postmodern theory” (Delanty and Rumford, 2005: 15). Postmodern 
theory is one result of this reflexivity. The overall idea is that knowledge is 
fundamentally fragmented and therefore it is difficult to have an integrated and 
singular view.  
Seen from a Lyotardian perspective, reflexivity is based on ‘grand 
narratives’ that try to give explanations to the existence of belief systems. Now 
instead of ideology we have language games defined as denotative statements about 
reality and prescriptive statements about what counts as a valid denotative statement. 
The concept of ’grand narrative’ and in particular what Lyotard called the 
‘emancipation narrative’, refers to the kind of ‘meta-narrative’ which sees events as 
interconnected, a procession of social systems that makes sense rather than just 
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isolated events in history and so on. Scientific discourse does not reflect but covertly 
constructs reality. The term ‘postmodern condition’ is used by Lyotard (1984) to 
depict the state of knowledge and the question of its legitimation in Western culture. 
These transformations are seen within the context of the epistemological crisis of the 
Enlightenment metanarratives or grands récits concerning meaning, truth and 
emancipation which have been used to legitimate both the rules of knowledge of the 
sciences and the foundations of modern institutions. Postmodern society has made the 
conception of real progress difficult to sustain, since its meanings are contested and 
fragmented.  
There are transformations within the East European nations which alters 
the ‘state of their culture’. According to Lyotard, postmodernism deconstructs these 
grands récits by detecting that creating order or unity means also creating disorder. 
Therefore in order to replace grand narratives Lyotard appeals to mini-narratives that 
are “provisional, contingent, temporary, and relative”. Lyotard’s argument for the 
postmodern fragmentation of beliefs and values is meant to substitute Habermas’ 
proposal for a society unified under a ‘grand narrative’. The solution offered is 
deconstruction that is the act of condensing everything to basic suppositions. But 
deconstruction claims self-reflexivity, a way of understanding oneself and the 
contiguous world. The result of this self-reflexivity is that social agents cease having 
singular identities and start producing multiple perspectives on the changing world.   
The second feature of social constructivism refers to the argument that 
“agency and structure are mediated in cultural contexts” (Delanty and Rumford 2005: 
15). Social agents’ interests and identities are not given, but take place in interaction 
and are therefore socially constructed. This is related to ‘invention of tradition’ that 
emphasizes “the creative process by which reality is fabricated out of various 
elements in highly contextualized conditions”103. This argument takes also into 
consideration the “relational conception of social actors and structures”104. 
The third argument is that “social reality is the product of a process of 
becoming and is open to new designs” (Delanty and Rumford, 2005: 16). The social 
constructivist view advocates the challenging opportunities offered by change. This is 
the type of logic that drove towards the fall of communism in Eastern Europe. 
However one should also consider the consequences of changing social reality. 
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Discourse is an important dimension to the constructivist perspective that is the way 
in which language constructs reality, and within this reality, identity. To follow 
Delanty and Rumford’s exposition of Habermas’s theory of discourse, this theory is 
“particularly useful in conceptualizing how social worlds are normatively created 
through deliberative reasoning (Habermas 1996)”105. For example the use of terms 
‘East’ and ‘West’ involves a social order with roles of dominance once the division is 
accepted.    
Finally, Delanty and Rumford mention the socio-cognitive dimension. 
This dimension refers to the “creation of frames, imaginaries, worldviews and 
cultural models, which go beyond the immediate discursive context and express 
emergent forms of social reality” (Delanty and Rumford, 2005: 16). This approach is 
related to the concept of ‘social imaginary’ as used by Cornelius Castoriadis and 
Charles Taylor. For Taylor (2004) the contemporary ‘multiple modernities’ need to 
be understood in terms of the ‘social imaginaries’ involved. The main differences 
among ‘multiple modernities’ consist in their ‘social imaginaries’ (defined earlier as 
the way members of a society imagine their collective social life). According to 
Taylor, the cultural formations that characterise the Western social imaginary are: the 
economy, the public sphere, and self-governance.  
Each of these features depicts cultural integration under “a conflict of 
competing conceptions of political community and cultural models of society”106. 
The underlying assumption of this model of society is generating a new conception of 
social reality based on normative models and imaginaries which “are not yet fully 
embodied in a political order or institutional framework”107. Likewise, Castoriadis 
(1987) claims that the ‘real’ is made of human functions of ‘social imaginaries’ (i.e. 
the undetermined creation of figures, forms and images). It is from these figures, 
forms and images that we construct our significations. Castoriadis suggests 
community as being one of the first ‘social imaginaries’ of human society. According 
to Castoriadis, our contemporary society is in a crisis of culture. Through 
privatization, depoliticization, emptiness of values the contemporary society is 
dissocialising itself. One of Castoriadis’s most relevant contributions lie in the idea 
that imaginary significations are the main sources of meaning in the social and 
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cultural life; they can also be seen as the constitutive centre of cultural models. These 
imaginary significations endow also with frameworks for interpreting social reality 
and patterns of societal identity. Consequently, the focus when analysing an East 
European society will be put on a social constructivist perspective. Yet, it has been 
argued that social constructivism fails “to live up to its own publicly acknowledged 
standards”108 and therefore the use of social constructivism came to an end. However, 
I see no reason why this should be the case, as there are at least four good reasons for 
the adoption of a social constructivist position in the context of this thesis.  
The first reason is its theoretical qualities. Social constructivism has 
outstanding qualities in identifying general tendencies and conditions regarding 
former communist societies. In addition, the theory can be credited in other respects 
such as relevance and consistency. The second reason is the promising results based 
on previous use (Eder, 2001; Risse, 2004; Delanty and Rumford, 2005), and its 
relevance for the study of society and for conceptualizing my topic, East European 
societies and cultural integration. Research has shown that social constructivism 
works well in the case of European integration (Heikki, 1992; Diez, 1997; 
Christiansen, 1994, 1996; Checkel, 1997). By 1989, three social constructivist 
expectations seemed to have been proven convincing: (a) the Cold War was both real, 
and politically ‘constructed’; (b) the effects of the Cold War were the construct of the 
international system-society; (c) peaceful change was possible after the Cold War. 
These considerations are central to East European transformation and social 
constructivist theory (Guzzini, 2002). Consequently and aside from its suitability to 
my purposes here, the compatibility of these expectations with the consequences of 
1989 shows that there are no a priori reasons not to adopt a social constructivist 
position for analysing former communist societies and cultural integration.  
Thirdly, one may ask why social constructivism is preferred to other 
theories of European integration that include culture such as discursive approaches 
(Wæver 2004). Social constructivism is preferable for my purpose because it better 
outlines culture and change. Culture only exists in the act of being performed, and it 
can never stand still or repeat itself without changing its meaning109. According to 
Eder (2001), this issue becomes dangerous when societies re-construct themselves. In 
a very real sense, understandings about Eastern European cultures have to take into 
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consideration this varied and complex process of cultural integration, as both an 
internal and external process. Therefore, the European integration process alone 
proves to have insufficient tools to succeed if cultural dynamics and structures do not 
interact with it. Internal cultural dynamics are influenced by the external factors that 
can be found in the cultural system itself. 
Fourthly, Eastern European politics relies on commonly shared cultural 
understandings. “These understandings include not just a spatial conception of what 
constitutes (or should constitute) Europe but also, crucially, ideas about common 
cultural traditions and historical experience, as well as the common evolution 
throughout Europe and distinctly Western constitutional and political principles”110. 
The end of the Cold War in itself is a ‘structural change’ because it evolves into a 
new ‘order’ on the European scene and lastly because it relates the concept of 
European identity to the integration process. 
Finally, an additional reason for the usefulness of a social constructivist 
approach is its emphasis on the cultural integration of former communist societies as 
an important part of the approach to contemporary European society. In sum, the 
social constructivist position is taken as the point of departure for the argument below 
owing to the following pros of social constructivist theory: previous validity; post-
1989 context; its nature and emphasis on society, culture, identity, and change; 
compatibility with the aim of outlining hypotheses concerned with general tendencies 
in the current Eastern European societies; and the assumption of culture as a social 
construction based on significations. 
Social constructivist theory has of course limits which must not be 
overlooked. In particular, the prophecies it provides are of a general nature. However, 
social constructivism is a theory about culture, identity and change. In general, social 
constructivist analysis highlights the integration process and its implications. 
However, the analytical focus must be on the societal dynamics rather than on more 
specific integration issues such as cultural policies. Following the logic of the theory, 
a model for cultural integration points to a range of possible and probable outcomes: 
such outcomes should be found in Eastern European societies; these outcomes should 
describe major trends in these societies; and finally, the outcomes should be expected 
to have a ‘cultural’ content.  
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2.5. Conclusion: Towards a Theory of Cultural Integration? 
This chapter has given some suggestions on how to theorize cultural integration. 
Cultural integration (defined as the process of reorganization caused by social agents 
who seek to reconstruct an existing societal order on the basis of their specific 
understandings) as depicted in this chapter is based on a cultural understanding of 
Europeanization and social constructivism. This development is a challenge to the 
other approaches to integration. A theory of cultural integration at European society 
level, I argue, would begin with the meaning of culture and a broad notion of 
integration.  
The cultural perspectives in theories and discursive approaches to 
European integration were then taken into consideration. The debate around the 
social constructivism was reviewed. The conceptualization of Europeanization and 
the outline of cultural integration approach were also discussed. The conclusion here 
is that a kind of synthesis between the cultural dimension of Europeanization and 
social constructivism was needed and that a cultural integration approach offers such 
a possibility. This chapter served to conceive a framework and is the theoretical basis 
for the next chapter: ‘The Cultural Integration Model’. The following chapter will 
detail on the process of cultural integration beginning with the depiction of the 




3. The Cultural Integration Model 
Trends of Cultural Integration in Eastern European Societies 
 
ased on the theoretical framework presented in the last chapter this part of 
the thesis outlines a conceptual framework for the study of cultural 
integration in Eastern European societies. Placing Eastern Europe in a 
postwestern and postnational Europe implies that Eastern Europe’s and the wider 
European transformation are interdependent. In the present debate concerning 
Europe’s future between integration, historical diversities and new forms of 
disintegration, the chapter aims to make a contribution to the development of the 
concept of cultural integration. Further, the chapter looks at the consequences of 
cultural integration on societal identities in former communist societies. I will focus 
my chapter on two dimensions of cultural integration: postwestern and postnational. 
My hypothesis is that it is possible to create common tools to analyse the discourses 
of cultural integration. It is only the content of these discourses and the social and 
political issues that change.   
In this chapter I claim that East European societies are neither just new 
EU members, nor copies of them, nor a return to societies from pre-communism. 
Rather these societies are reproducing themselves in a new form. There are two 
reasons for this: firstly, because I consider that there is a ‘continuum of changes’ 
(Elias, 1992) in their development as societies and communism is just a part of this 
continuum. Not everything about communism was negative. Communism provided 
an egalitarian social system and a general education system that provided highly 
qualified labour force. Secondly, as Illner (1999) suggested there will be more 
differentiation among Eastern European societies than the development of an 
integrated European society.     
This chapter defines the basic concepts through which the analysis of 
cultural integration is developed. The focus is on the relationship between cultural 
integration and societal identities in former communist societies. I take Delanty and 
Rumford, Wagner, and Habermas as points of departure and argue that in the post-
B 
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communist societies postwestern and postnational patterns emerge from the process 
of cultural integration. In this respect I believe the present work fills a gap in the 
existing debates. I see cultural integration as another dimension of Europeanization 
rather than as an alternative integrative approach to the question of European 
transformation.  
Cultural integration and its consequences are crucial for the understanding 
of the Eastern European transformation. The social constructivist theoretical 
framework will help to explain how the dynamics of these societies are subject to 
continuous internal and external pressures. The communist model has been replaced 
but the new dimensions of the model are a combination of both old and new cultural 
patterns that influence the newborn societal order. This is why the cultural specificity 
of former communist societies will be looked at in terms of a ‘continuum of changes’ 
(Elias, 1992). In this chapter I shall also consider some of the more significant 
consequences of these tendencies of cultural integration on societal identities in 
Eastern European societies.  
3.1. Conceptual Framework for the Study of Eastern European 
Societies 
A preliminary stage is necessary before constructing a cultural integration model: the 
outline of a conceptual framework for the study of Eastern European societies. My 
presentation considers the concepts of state, society, societal identity, recognition, 
postcommunism, and social agents. These theoretical concepts will be drawn into the 
analysis of cultural integration in order to explain the (postwestern and postnational) 
forces of cultural integration. In the following, I aim to untangle the different 
explanations of the relationship between the four concepts. In so doing, I shall begin 
with a presentation of the concepts of state, then move on to society, societal identity, 
recognition, postcommunism, and social agents. The aim of these sections is to 
identify a conceptual framework in order to analyse on a general level the 
development of the societies from Eastern Europe, followed by a specific case-study 
in Chapter 4. On the other hand, the purpose of this conceptual framework is not 
directly to take on the challenge of explaining the process and dynamics of societal 
transformation in former communist societies. Nor do the following sections search 
to judge whether ex-communist societies have become postwestern and postnational 
and how. Such a task would require specific analyses of the involved countries. What 
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follows is an overview of the concepts that will guide the overall structure of the 
cultural integration model. I start by considering the notion of state under 
transformation. Then the concepts of society, societal identity, recognition, 
postcommunism, and social agents will be abridged.    
3.1.1. The Notion of ‘State’ under Transformation 
The concept of ‘state’ has always been at the heart of the social sciences. How should 
this concept, the state, be understood? Generally, Dunleavy and O’Leary (1987) 
suggest that not one definition can be given, but - as a result of the long-lasting 
debate on the subject - rather different categories of definitions. According to their 
terminology, the State can be defined either in organisational terms, as a set of 
institutions, or in functional terms, by its objectives and/or consequences on the 
social order of a given society. I will briefly return to this distinction below.  
In the context of Eastern Europe, the concept of state has in recent years 
undergone a double transformation. Double in the sense that both exogenous and 
endogenous dynamics have influenced the idea and the actual role of state in these 
societies. As to the ‘exogenous’ dynamics, Eastern European states, along with other 
European states, are subject to fundamental changes these years due to European and 
global dynamics of integration. In the realist tradition, theories of international 
relations have tended to regard the State as the central actor and as having a quasi-
monopoly of transformative capacity. This idea is currently being fundamentally 
disputed as the significance of other types of actors is being recognized. New 
approaches go beyond the traditional dispute between intergovernmentalists and neo-
functionalists by adopting theoretical tools and frameworks that have not previously 
been used for the study of the EU, such as policy networks and policy analysis 
(Peterson, 1995). 
Still in the making, no agreement as to the nature of the changes and their 
impact on the European state and state system has been reached. Yet, authors largely 
concur that developments have crucial impact on political structures and that 
governance is becoming increasingly multi-layered and overlapping, involving 
networks of public and private actors at local, sub-national, national, regional and 
global levels. The state becomes one actor among other actors, and it is not any 
longer regarded as an inevitable checkpoint through which all external influences 
flow. The notion of ‘international’ gives way to ‘transnational’. We are witnessing 
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the emergence of a European state (or super state). An order characterized by a 
multiplicity of centres, similar to Alain Minc’s idea of ‘nouveau Moyen Age’ (Minc, 
1993). New regulating mechanisms are replacing the Keynesian interventionist state 
(Majone, 1996).   
This development has several consequences, of which I will stress in 
particular three: first, it challenges the traditional idea of the state as a unitary actor 
with a clearly delineated jurisdiction. Second, it also implies a move away from a 
state centric view on transformation. Third, on the one hand, new channels of 
influence open to (capable) citizens, while - on the other hand - power structures and 
legitimacy become less transparent with increasing use of unrepresentative forms of 
policy making. 
In addition to these overall changes in the nature and perceptions of the 
state and the European state system, the Eastern European countries experience 
parallel internal transformations in the role of the state and the way the state is 
understood. The communist regimes were generally characterised by a de facto 
merger of the Party and the state. The state per definition worked for the ideology of 
the Party. A Party to which there was no alternative. At least formally, this model 
also had implications for the concept of civil society, since in a ‘people’s republic’ it 
was not meaningful to separate the state from the people. Adding to this a state-run 
economy, the independent role of the ‘market’ – as the third leg of the liberal trinity 
of state, market, and civil society – the result was that the state in a sense was 
‘everything’ (and that everything was the state). As I will elaborate in later sections, 
however, in reality a civil society – though weak – did exist during communism, as 
did an alternative economic system. 
With the collapse of communism, a pluralist, liberal order has gradually 
emerged in Eastern Europe. Hereby, the state in terms of institutions and the state in 
terms power and ideology gradually become more separate. The state apparatus is at 
disposition of whatever political leadership the population decides to entrust with 
power. In fact, a shift from the before mentioned functional understanding towards a 
more organisational concept of the state. With the on-going re-instalment a civil 
society and market, the state has no longer the monopoly on legitimate allocation of 
resources and values. Obviously, the relationship between the state and civil society 
is hereby changing. Civil society has its most direct expression in elections, where 
citizens have exchanged the role of subjects to the ‘Party state’ with the role of 
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legitimizers of power. Finally, the relationship between state and market is possibly 
the most radically changed, as the force of a liberalised economy in most cases have 
proven much stronger than the regulatory powers of the relatively weak, new states. 
Linked to this, the public perception of the state varies dramatically among different 
social groups in Eastern European countries. From regret and disappointment to 
accept and optimism.  
In combination, these two interacting sets of dynamics – exogenous and 
endogenous – leaves us with a quite blurred picture of the nature of the state and how 
it is perceived. Democracy has overall led to a clearer, and more confined 
understanding of the role of the state in Eastern Europe, alongside with a 
revitalisation of the role of the civil society. However, at the same time the overall 
European trend toward multilayer types of governance results in a diffusion of power. 
This study overall concurs with the idea that the state’s role as the sole agent of 
transformation is a far from accurate concept. 
3.1.2. Society as Reconstructed Social Space 
This section outlines the interrelation between various conceptions of society and 
Eastern European transformation(s). In a broad sense, society refers to interaction 
between individuals in ways that create a pattern on the basis of shared meanings. 
Society is frequently used merely to refer to something that exists ‘out there’, 
something beyond the individual (e.g. communist society). For the purpose of my 
analysis, I will define society as the social space reconstructed by social agents under 
conditions of cultural integration. This meaning has implications for the depiction of 
cultural integration in former communist societies. This idea of society rejects the 
assumption according to which the West represents the developmental model that can 
predict the future of other societies. Not so much convergence should be expected of 
former communist societies. As Latour (1993) argued, the breakdown of communism 
in Eastern European revealed the failure of modernity and that, actually, ‘we have 
never been modern’. It will be suggested here that society is the co-product of 
internal and external cultural integration forces, namely postwesternization and 
postnationalism. My understanding of society reflects the ‘double synchronicity’ 
(Wagner, 2004) of transformation (Western as well as Eastern).  
 Recently sociologists have argued that society, hitherto understood as a 
set of processes of order and integration must now be envisioned of as a process of 
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change (Outhwaite, 1983; Touraine, 1999). Indeed, with the collapse of communism, 
Eastern European societies are not static but in a constant state of transformation: 
they change, adapt and respond to internal and external challenges. For Urry (2000), 
we should move beyond society and social structures and think instead in terms of 
flows and mobilities (of migrants, ideas, capital). Bauman (2000, 2002) discusses the 
question of society in the context of what he calls 'liquid modernity'. Bauman's thesis 
is that we have moved from a solid to a fluid phase of modernity, in which nothing 
keeps its shape, and where social forms are constantly changing at great speed, 
radically transforming the experience of being human. Eastern European society after 
communism is both a condition and a constantly reproduced outcome of action. 
Outhwaite and Ray stress how “the postcommunist experience, though beset by 
contingencies of all kinds, also demonstrates the importance of notions such as 
society or civil society and social structure”111. More broadly, they suggest that 
“societies, still largely shaped according to the frontiers of the territorial national 
state, retain a substantial quality, a ‘stickiness’, which defies attempts at short-term 
transformation”112.  
The overall picture is uneven. Transformations in these societies after 
communism emerged from particular historical and cultural contexts. Thinking about 
Eastern European societies forces a rethinking of (prejudged) stereotypes about 
communist societies. Despite the fact that in the past they were ideologically linked 
to each other through the communist model, the main feature of Eastern European 
societies is diversity. However, even before the end of communism, societies from 
Eastern Europe differed from each other in most respects – for example, in the 
intensity, span, and effectiveness of the Communist Party, in the extent of public 
support or resistance, or in terms of reforms. As Outhwaite and Ray put it, “[t]he 
transformations of postcommunist societies in the context of an increasingly 
globalized but unstable world are crucial for our understanding of these very 
processes” (Outhwaite and Ray, 2005: 22). Crook et al. (1994) argue that 
contemporary societies from Eastern Europe undergo the same process of crisis and 
restructuring as Western societies: cultural fragmentation, state decentralization, 
economic privatization, gradual breaking down of the public/private boundary, 
                                           
111 Outhwaite and Ray, 2005: 5. 
112 Outhwaite and Ray, 2005: 5. 
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globalization113. Münch (1990) sees social differentiation as the only answer to the 
issue of social order under modernity.  
It will be suggested that the transformations in Eastern Europe are not 
unproblematic to sociological theory: is there one European society or many? Is 
societal transformation situated within the borders of the nation-state? Where are 
these transformations heading to? The post-1989 experience challenges most of the 
prevailing ideas about social transformation. Outhwaite’s definition of society as 
‘sociation’ identifies both society in singular and societies (Outhwaite, 2006). For 
Outhwaite, an elaborate answer to the above questions has also been offered recently 
by Delanty and Rumford (2005) through the formulation of a (much needed) theory 
of society. In their theory of the social, they attempt to sketch out “a conception of 
Europeanization in terms of a theory of society beyond national societies” (Delanty 
and Rumford, 2005: 1).Their theory of society emphasizes “the diverse ways in 
which the social is constructed under conditions that are not fixed or reducible to 
institutional structures” (Delanty and Rumford, 2005: 2). The authors suggest that 
Europeanization is the most prominent way of bringing theorization of society back 
in the study of contemporary European transformation. Overall their theory of 
European society wishes to emphasise the diversity of social transformations that are 
currently shaping Europe. The features that Delanty and Rumford use to depict a 
theory of society could stand for the Eastern European societies as well. Firstly, they 
assume no relation between EU integration and a European society; in this 
perspective the authors believe that society is not an area covered by the EU project. 
Societies are in continuous transformation and becoming. In this context, 
Europeanization is a two-way process: it identifies with the dynamics of society 
while at the same time society is being shaped by Europeanization. Secondly, their 
theory of society situates Europe in a global frame. To understand the transformation 
of society necessarily includes understanding the global dimensions of society. 
European society cannot be envisioned without a global society. Thirdly, “the idea of 
society provides an important resource for both social theory and for thinking about 
contemporary Europe” (Delanty and Rumford, 2005: 5). According to Delanty and 
Rumford, “society as a normative construct is the necessary social context for any 
debate on rights, justice, citizenship, belonging, and identity” (Delanty and Rumford, 
2005: 5).  
                                           
113 quoted in Outhwaite and Ray, 2005: 21. 
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It will be beyond the aim of this thesis to establish here a theory of 
European society. Instead I draw my analysis of Eastern European societies on 
Delanty and Rumford’s constructivist approach on the theory of society. Drawing on 
Delanty and Rumford, my social constructivist approach to study Eastern European 
societies looks at the way an existing societal order is constantly reconstructed. The 
reconstruction of this order should be seen, inter alia, as an unfinished and open-
ended process. I assume, on the basis of the argument of the previous chapter that we 
can refer to a plurality of societies in Eastern Europe. As I have suggested in Chapter 
2, there are many reasons to relate society to the cultural dimension of integration. 
Recent developments in Eastern Europe show us that integration does not take place 
in a vacuum. To put it briefly, system integration and cultural integration are 
analytically distinct. More importantly for this study, the nature of Eastern European 
societies needs to be rethought in postwestern and postnational terms. As argued 
earlier, this perspective focuses on cultural integration as the context in which 
postwesternization and postnationalism activate.  
3.1.3. Societal Identity as Ideological Construction 
Questions concerning societal identity have in recent years come to the fore. In 
particular, the deep political, cultural, and social changes taking place in Eastern 
Europe accentuate the issues of societal identity. Overall, sociological approaches to 
identity centre on the interaction between identity and social environment. Whereas 
nationalism theories draw on group relations, stereotypes and fears about the Other, 
social identity theory suggests that identities shape society and not the other way 
around. Aware of the different theoretical implications suggested by the notion of 
‘societal identity’, I propose to use the term in a broad sense: societal identity will be 
understood as an ideological construction whereby individuals are contextually linked 
to their social environments through normative statements. This definition 
distinguishes societal identities from personal and collective identities. For instance, 
Romanian identity is a societal identity which contains the ethnic Romanian, the 
Hungarian, the Jew, the diasporic, and other ethnic groups’ collective identities. My 
social constructivist approach sees the development of societal identity in Eastern 
Europe as deeply affected by postwestern and postnational forces of cultural 
integration. From this perspective cultural integration can be used to describe how 
open, uncertain and reflexive societal identity has become. As Castells writes, “how, 
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and by whom, different types of identities are constructed, and with what outcomes, 
cannot be addressed in general, abstract terms: it is a matter of social context” 
(Castells, 1997: 10). A closer look at societal identities in Eastern Europe indicates 
that they are in general not naturally given but reconstructed, and that such a 
reconstruction constitutes their basic contingent dimension.   
For Delanty and Rumford, “the nation no longer fits into the sphere of 
the state, providing the latter with an identity and cultural legitimation (Delanty and 
Rumford, 2005: 53). On this background, Delanty and Rumford announce that 
“[t]here are few national identities that do not contain critical, reflexive and 
cosmopolitan forms of self-understanding” (Delanty and Rumford, 2005: 54). 
According to Delanty and Rumford, “[a]ll national identities are becoming more like 
societal identities, that is, broadly defined cultural categories” (Delanty and Rumford, 
2005: 53). Delanty and Rumford suggest that the nation has become a contested 
space where postnational forms of consciousness are emergent. Thus the particular 
configuration of cultural-national belonging is not something fixed but subject to 
transformation. Societal identities are thus becoming more fluid, unstable, and 
reflexive. One stimulus for this transformation has been the changing role of the 
nation-state and the dissolution of the official collective memory after the end of 
communism. Societal identities can be constructed and appropriated within multiple 
structures of interpretation. In Eastern Europe these structures of interpretation relate 
to wider postwestern and postnational issues.   
Castells (1996, 1997, 1998) gives particular attention to the ‘plurality of 
identities’ to engage simultaneously with difference and community. In this sense, 
identity is dynamically defined as a “process of construction of meaning on the basis 
of a cultural attribute, or related set of cultural attributes, that is/are given priority 
over other sources of meaning”114. A more reflexive form of identity is part of what 
Castells calls ‘network society’. Castells looks at the fragmentation of identity and its 
changing boundaries in a network society. The transnational global culture and the 
changeability of European (geo-political and cultural) boundaries have had a great 
impact on identities, including identity formation. From this perspective, cultural 
integration could be seen as the result of the need for a new kind of national and 
regional identity reflecting and responding to the process of transformation in 
different ways. In Castells’s The Power of Identity (1997) individual identities are not 
                                           
114 Castells, 1997: 6. 
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given for granted but have to be recreated and reshaped. This creates reflexivity and a 
permanent focus on identity. This reflexivity can both be a threat and a challenge to a 
cosmopolitan form of self-understanding. “People increasingly organize their 
meaning not around what they do but on what they are or believe they are. There 
follows a fundamental split between abstract, universal instrumentalism and 
historically rooted particular identities” (Castells 1997: 3 and 22). Castells examines 
the idea of a new reflexive modernity in which cultural identity challenges traditional 
forms of the construction of identity. Cultural, religious and national identities are 
source of meaning and experience for individuals. But in the context of the network 
society identities become more and more isolated and societies become more and 
more individualized.  
As a way to highlight a more relevant constructivist line, I propose 
Castells’s theory of identity formation as a starting point. Castells  assumes 
hypothetically that “who constructs collective identity, and for what, largely 
determines the symbolic content of this identity, and its meaning for whose 
identifying with it or placing themselves outside of it” (Castells, 1997: 7). The 
cultural construction of the identity is based on cultural dimensions of the 
community. Cultural integration emphasizes on cultural continuity as the key to 
identity-formation. In a theorization, whose main lines I share, Castells states that 
resistance identity is “generated by those actors that are in positions/conditions 
devalued and/or stigmatized by the logic of domination, thus building trenches of 
resistance and survival on the basis of principles different from, or opposed to, those 
permeating the institutions of society” (Castells, 1997: 8). Indeed, it makes sense to 
speak of the societal identity after communism as a “defensive identity in terms of the 
dominant institutions/ideologies”115. Given Castells’ cultural-driven assumptions, the 
answer to this issue be it empirical or historical “determines whether societies remain 
as societies or else fragment into a constellation of tribes, some times euphemistically 
renamed communities” (Castells, 1997: 9). Cultural integration is most likely to lead 
to more diversified and flexible forms of cultural identities crossing national 
boundaries.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
My understanding of how identities come into being follows a 
constructivist view. From a constructivist perspective identity is a ‘cultural construct’ 
(Cederman, 2001; Eder and Giesen, 2001). This means that identities can be multiple, 
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internally changing over time and dependant on environment rather than on 
inheritance of genes. A constructivist view on identity separates personal from 
collective identities – “the identities of individuals and the identities of social 
groups”116 - since they have different functions and developmental purposes. 
According to Eisenstadt (2001), collective identities are formed through the cultural 
construction of boundaries, which males the difference between those who belong 
and those who do not. The most important feature of collective identities is their 
multiple and changing nature. 
The recognition of the difference between individual and collective identities 
should not, however, lead to denial of the intrinsic relationship between 
individual and collective identities that – all useful divisions apart – is one of the 
main defining features of both concepts (Just, 2004: 40).  
The idea of reconstruction suggests that societal identities are both flexible and open 
categories for the subject (social agent), “legitimated by the state in order to facilitate 
the integration and democratic government of an increasingly fluid society” 
(Dressler, 2002: 6). In this context, societal identity will be reconstructed by social 
agents out of the existing cultural capital (Delanty and Rumford, 2005: 51). When 
referring to the Romanian societal identity, for example, I will look at the national 
identity that Romanians subjectively consider being their identity, and which they 
imagine to be shared by the entire national community. This will be my narrower 
focus. Yet, this identity cannot be constructed separately from the social reality of 
Eastern European countries, namely the situational context in which this identity is 
reconstructed. Looking at the different ways of reconstructing identity and the nature 
of transformations at social and political level enables an understanding that what is 
changing in Eastern Europe happens at the same time as in the rest of Europe.   
What we are witnessing in former communist societies is unstable and 
reconstructed identities that have lost the ‘significant Other’ (Taylor, 1994). 
Following Outhwaite and Ray, I would like to note one more aspect of societal 
identity that is especially relevant for my study: “[t]he postcommunist condition is 
one of increasing instability, with multiple forms of social identification and 
rethinking of a past that was often subject to official controls” (Outhwaite and Ray, 
2005: 196).  
                                           
116 Delanty and Rumford, 2005: 52. 
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On the basis of these theoretical considerations, a few points can be 
made with regard to the reconstruction of societal identities after communism. First, 
there is no national identity without social agents reconstructing it in an on-going 
process within a certain institutional structure and a given historical-social context. 
Second, societal identities are articulated within a particular historical pattern of a 
given nation. This pattern offers a basis for how to rethink or articulate national 
belonging which both facilitates and confines the reconstruction of the existing 
national identity. Third, to a great extent, societal identities are open to wider 
situational context in which these identities are reconstructed. This situational 
context refers to the socially determined conditions and widespread ideas and norms 
that affect a given national context. There are mainly two discourses on societal 
identity, not necessarily convergent, taking place at the same time. There is the 
nationalist (in the sense of neonationalist) discourse that regards societal identity as 
defined by shared ethnicity, culture and language. This discourse defends the past 
which becomes a political tool regardless of the changing circumstance. But apart 
from and alongside this discourse is the Western discourse promoting change 
inspired by the western democratic Europe and a break with the communist societal 
identity. This also means a reassertion of the Romanian identity in integrational 
terms with Europe as the main reference point. From this perspective social agents 
have an important role in constructing a reliable and meaningful societal identity and 
in applying existing ideas and available historical codes on Europe and the EU.    
3.1.4. The Concept of Recognition  
Questions concerning the politics of recognition are central to the context of the 
cultural integration. Each society relates to the process of cultural integration in ways 
that reflect its own culture, that is to say that all societies rise on what Delanty and 
Rumford (2005: 21) call ‘order of recognition’. The concept is internal to the 
dynamic process of cultural integration. Former communist societies need 
recognition, i.e. “demands for the equal status of cultures” (Taylor 1994: 27) which 
is related to the identity of the community or nation.  
As already suggested by Bourdieu (1984), Taylor (1994) Honneth 
(1995, 2002) and Bauman (2000), the concept of recognition is related to both 
society and identity since individuals and cultures struggle for recognition. Bourdieu 
speaks of ‘capital of recognition’. The lack of this form of capital brings about 
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misrecognition. In Bourdieu’s usage, misrecognition symbolizes not a simple lack of 
awareness of the objective reality of a particular cultural practice but a strategic 
misconstrual of practice as other than what theoretical knowledge makes it out to be. 
Misrecognition (of what people think, or do, or value) is not simply imposed on the 
dominated, but is a condition of the action of the dominators. In Bourdieu’s own 
words, “I call misrecognition the fact of recognizing a violence which is wielded 
precisely inasmuch as one does not perceive it as such” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 
1996: 167-168). 
Taylor (1994) distinguishes between two kinds of recognition: 
unconditional (given to individuals by virtue of their standing as citizens) and 
conditional. Conditional recognition refers to expressions of approval or status or 
prestige. Like Bourdieu, Taylor understands terms such as misrecognition and non-
recognition through relation to ‘damaged self-identity’ as well. For Taylor 
recognition is a source of the modernity itself. Taylor pointed out two poles of 
recognition: a pole of ‘dignity’ (recognized by state institutions and others) and a pole 
of ‘authenticity’ that refers to cultural esteem.  
Like Bourdieu and Taylor, Axel Honneth argues that individuals have 
two types of needs: respect and recognition. Respect refers to dignity and the way we 
want to be treated by others. Recognition, individuals want to be treated as singular. 
Recognition is based in ‘affective needs and the reciprocation of social esteem from 
concrete others’. Our self-trust is based on recognition, states Honneth. A negative 
remark on our national origin does not only refer to us as individuals but also to our 
collective culture. Honneth finds three levels of recognition: legal (recognition by 
law), of love (recognition by singularity) and of the state (that in theory should mean 
both universal and singular recognition). Honneth argues, that a purely universalist 
moral order is not enough. Our contemporary societies need a principle of solidarity 
based on recognition as much as redistribution (respect, dignity). In other words, 
recognition must be incorporated into the changing moral order of society. This is 
close to a cosmopolitan perspective on recognition. Honneth regards recognition not 
as given for granted, but “created through social struggles, the moral grammar of 
social conflicts”117. Drawing on Honneth’s concept of recognition, I want to move 
from the recognition of the individual to the recognition of the culture that facilitates 
this singularity. Thus recognition of the individual involves recognition of culture the 
                                           
117 Delanty and Rumford, 2005: 22. 
 92 
individual belongs to. I argue though that recognition speaks insufficiently of issues 
of change. Therefore, it is difficult to grasp the reality of recognition. What Honneth 
contributes to our study is his normative view on struggles for cultural recognition.   
Zygmunt Bauman (2000) writes about the contemporary ‘great war of 
recognition’. ‘Liquid modernity’ means no longer domination but mobility and the 
ability to ‘dis-engage’ that makes individuals powerful. Zygmunt Bauman argues that 
we live in a post-recognition age where the master-slave type of recognition no 
longer prevails. Hence recognition in liquid modernity is a great war, consisting of 
constant ‘reconnaissance battles’. As Bauman argues, recognition is fine for global 
elites as long as it does not imply material redistribution.  
In an article dealing with the politics of recognition in the search for a 
European identity, Fossum (2001) perceives recognition as a precondition for 
identity formation. In his opinion, all members of a society – be it ex-communist or 
not – are searching for recognition. I concur with Fossum’s suggestion for using the 
framework of recognition, “both regarding recognition of uniqueness, as well as 
recognition of equality and of equal value” (Fossum, 2001: 2). Societal identities in 
Eastern Europe are looking for the recognition of their distinctiveness. Individuals in 
these societies hope that the EU will recognize the different identities in Europe. This 
also means that the thesis of an overarching ‘primary’ European identity is a 
challenging one. Fossum says that this “deep diversity of culturally and nationally 
distinctive groups and communities” (Fossum, 2001: 16) is seen as a ‘plurality of 
ways of belonging’ (Charles Taylor). EU becomes then poly-ethnic and 
multinational. This seems the scenario that recognizes as equal all national identities 
of the member states. This scenario is more likely to promote recognition in the case 
of societal identities in Eastern Europe. The question is of course whether the 
outcome of it will support deep diversity. Fossum shows that “nationally based 
difference is generally held to be a source of deep diversity. In the EU the Member 
States also have retained the main institutional levers through which they have 
socialised past generations into loyal bearers of each country’s national identity and 
culture”118. This can also mean “weakening of national identities and the emergence 
of a novel form of identity in the EU, one of a post-national kind”119.  
                                           
118 Fossum, 2001: 18. 
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The notion of recognition refers somehow to the postwestern condition 
of our times. It is likely to think that the entire problematic of recognition is under 
threat after the Eastern Enlargement. The process of recognition is not automatic, but 
depends upon culturally variable conditions. The act or recognition means assessment 
of difference. Fraser (1995, 1997) notes that the politics of recognition is linked to 
notions of difference and is mostly concerned with cultural issues. In order to 
understand the struggle for recognition in the context of the ex-communist society, 
we therefore have to go beyond the matter of recognition to the question: recognition 
for what? It is not only about power: the dominant would not be the dominant unless 
it would have access to the valued goods. Recognition is rather about identity esteem 
and about crossing moral boundaries. 
3.1.5. Beyond  Postcommunism 
To ensure that my discussion of cultural integration is conceptually clear, I need to 
describe the extension of the concept ‘postcommunism’. Postcommunist societies 
have represented in the last decade and a half an object of research and theoretical 
reflection. Recently, research on Eastern Europe transformation has been concerned 
with processes produced at societal level. These processes include assumptions, 
premises, and understandings that influence the societal identity. These 
transformations are created spontaneously, but develop as practices of social life, 
protected by what it has been called the ‘folkways and mores’ (Summer, 1906) or 
‘habits of the heart’ (de Tocqueville 1945). Dahrendorf (1997), Sakwa (1999), 
Staniszkis (1999), Kennedy (2002), Tismãneanu (2002), and others have already 
debated some of the elements of postcommunism in Europe and the democratization 
transition: end of the communist ideology over politics, economics, and society; 
emergence of relatively weak pluralistic societies; uneven introduction of market 
economy into highly bureaucratized economies that encourage corruption; change in 
class structure; the “incomplete nature of the transformations, marked by the strong 
institutional, cultural and social imprint of the state socialist period on the 
postcommunist order” (Sakwa, 1999: 5); the emergence of new institutions and 
practices although, but with an old modus operandi; “various facets of identity 
politics, including national, ethnic and cultural questions accompanied by the tension 
between ‘nativist’ trends and ‘cosmopolitans’ who define the transition in terms of 
‘rejoining world civilization’” (Sakwa, 1999: 6).    
 94 
Postcommunism has been depicted as a time of crisis for state, 
bureaucracy and ethics (e.g. corruption), of impoverished citizens, a time of 
uncertainty and of identity crisis. The process of cultural integration which breaks 
down the boundaries within which all traditional forms of identity were constructed 
intensifies this identity crisis. Indeed cultural integration challenges the (formation 
of) societal identity and its traditional structures. 
Although significant residues of the past remain, the scope of transformation has 
been unprecedented: monolithic societies are being converted into pluralistic 
ones, economies are being reoriented towards the market, new nations are being 
born, and states are rejoining the international community that is itself being 
recast (Sakwa, 1999: 6).  
For Sakwa (1999) the term ‘postcommunism’ defines “an epoch that 
claims to have moved beyond the ‘extremism’ of ideological politics and its 
associated ‘metanarratives’ towards a more open and ‘discursive’ type of politics”120. 
Another scholar, Cristian Joppke had defined postcommunism as “the vindication and 
recovery of already established nationhood against a regime whose purpose had been 
to wipe it out” (Joppke, 1996: 19).  
According to Tismãneanu (1992), the cultural perspective demonstrates 
how continuity and change interact and how Eastern Europeans adjust positions and 
re-interpret phenomena in new circumstances. Another influential description of how 
culture forms social and political change in former communist societies is given by 
Michael D. Kennedy in his Cultural Formations of Postcommunism: Emancipation, 
Transition, Nation, and War (2002). What Kennedy labels transition is the ‘epoch 
with two mantras’ (Kennedy, 2002: 1), that is from plan to market and from 
dictatorship to democracy, but also a “culture of power with its own contradictions, 
contentions, repressions, and unrealized potentials”121. His approach is a cultural 
sociological one based on the assumption that “transition’s virtues can be 
strengthened, and its tragedies ameliorated, by making culture more explicit”122. 
Staniszkis’ book, Post-communism - The Emerging Enigma (1999), is 
devoted to the analysis of two theoretical problems meant to theorize 
postcommunism: the end of communism (its causes and mechanisms) and the reasons 
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for deviation in different regions of the communist bloc. According to her, 
communism ended due to internal contradictions (ideology, collective property, 
monopoly on power, dependence on Moscow), on the one hand, and to globalization 
(that is dependence on the global capitalist system), on the other. Staniszkis’ theory 
of postcommunism is based on the theory of communist regimes. This also means 
that her theory detaches features of the postcommunist regime coming from the 
communist legacy from other ‘new’ factors. Since she looks at three main areas 
where communism ruled (central and Eastern Europe, Russia and China), her main 
assumption is that general features of postcommunism should not be confused with 
local cultural conditions. However, unlike most work on postcommunism, Staniszkis 
claims that the nature of postcommunism varies according to the epistemological 
assumptions of the culture that influenced how the idea of change was perceived and 
implemented. This assumption makes her question the democratic nature of 
postcommunist regimes.      
The transformation processes to which the phrase ‘postcommunist 
societies’ (as defined above) refers is not compatible with my framework of cultural 
integration (i.e., postwesternization). Cultural integration, in the way I develop it, 
goes way beyond the simple notion of ‘postcommunism’. Thus, rather than restricting 
my view to ‘postcommunism’ that refers to newborn societies that come into being 
after a communist past,  I propose to use the terms ‘Eastern European’ that makes 
these societies geographically distinctive, rather than ideologically. I also disagree 
with another politically influential distinction between those countries that are 
believed to be better at making the transition and others that are lagging behind. As 
Pickel pointed out, these fine distinctions “have been put in the service of an 
exclusionary regional politics” (Pickel 2002: 108). For me the notion of 
‘postcommunism’ limits itself to the relationship between these societies’ present and 
their past. Eastern European societies exhibit a lot of differences. Therefore, they 
must be seen as highly differentiated both internally and from each other. While one 
can not contest that they come after a communist-type state and society, they are 
nonetheless new and different from the past. Furthermore, the term ‘postcommunism’ 
makes reference to a certain socio-political context; that of a transition from one 
economic and political order to another. As argued earlier, this teleological 
conception of postcommunism as transition (to the Western model) should be called 
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into question. I will refer instead to the term ‘transformation’ that implies an open-
ended process of change.  
However, my argument is that postcommunism as a meaningful concept 
in cultural integration is not enough. This is not the same with saying that something 
is wrong when talking about postcommunism. Especially in the way Outhwaite and 
Ray (2005) have used it recently. Outhwaite and Ray understand by the term 
‘postcommunism’ “the geographic European and Asian region of former communist 
states but also the wider postcommunist global condition” (Outhwaite and Ray, 
2005: 22). This postcommunist condition refers to “the complex political, social and 
intellectual transformation brought about by the collapse of the ‘socialist’ alternative 
to capitalism” (Outhwaite and Ray, 2005: 22-23). In other words, the term 
postcommunism does not only refer to the fall of the Iron Curtain but also to a more 
general change caused by the end of the bipolar order. Understanding this 
postcommunist condition is important for interpreting the main directions the 
European society will follow. The premise that the authors follow in their book is 
that “we are all postcommunist now, (…) in the sense that Europe, as well as the EU, 
are radically transformed by what has happened” (Outhwaite and Ray, 2005: 24). 
Moving beyond the EU enlargement and transition, Outhwaite and Ray assert that 
postcommunism concerns not only Eastern Europe but the whole of Europe. A 
similar argument is presented by Castells (1996) that argues that the second 
industrial revolution “has led to a major restructuring of the economies and social 
structures of the European societies bringing about new relations between centres 
and peripheries across countries as well as within them”123. This widening of the 
meaning of postcommunism emphasises the idea that Eastern Europe cannot be 
viewed in isolation. Another way of interpreting this premise is that Europe has 
eventually come to terms with postcommunism. Such an understanding excludes the 
‘convergence’ thesis that reduces Eastern Europe to a narrow meaning.  
3.1.6. Social Agents and the Reconstruction of Society 
I define ‘social agents’ as a diverse group of decision-makers whose specific 
understandings have a determinant impact on the reconstruction of the new societal 
order. Put more simply, social agents have the ability to impose their views on 
transformation. This also implies that social agents influence the forces and dynamics 
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that put forward the process of transformation thus making a contribution to the 
construction of a new societal order. In the Romanian context, for example, the 
significant social agents include anyone who is directly involved in the process of 
political transformation. These social agents unintentionally use some theoretical 
‘knowledge’ – more or less well-founded, more or less refined – as they try to put in 
practice political programmes, economic agendas, and ideologies. An important 
continuity in Eastern European societies has been that the attempts to promote 
integration through elite-driven projects, i.e. they have been carried out by quite small 
groups of individuals that were able of setting off projects of transformation (see 
Higley et al., 1998; Eyal et al., 1998). Although it is difficult to say what defines such 
an elite at different stages in time, social change theories take into consideration 
certain groups in society that seek to promote their own understandings of society. 
For instance, in classical modernization theory these groups consisted of urban 
bourgeoisie as the agent of modern society. In transition theory, ‘change agents’ or 
better ‘functional elites’ that will construct a new societal order on the basis of 
Western institutions are identified with radical reformers on a political level.  
According to Eyal et al., “if you create the proper institutions, they will 
shape the individuals that occupy them so that individual behaviour will conform to 
institutional constraints and imperatives” (Eyal et al., 1998: 8-9). In this 
transformational context there is a need for citizens and ‘change agents’ who are able 
to deal with the (re)production of the new order. The deficiency of satisfying social 
forces is perceived as the need to create these social agents, partly to justify the new 
societal project, partly to create agents that actually sustain the right vision of society 
(e.g. the working class during communism). Whereas the role of the ‘change agents’ 
is of a transitional kind, social agents have a significant role in the emergence of the 
societal new order. Stark and Bruszt in particular reject the idea of taking the Eastern 
European civil societies as the main agents of transformation as a critique to the 
postulation that a singular ‘right’ integrative agent can be acknowledged (Stark and 
Bruszt, 1998: 15-6). Rather, they suggest an interactionist approach in which they 
focus on relations between different agents and the fluid perceptions on their 
opponents’ strategies. They point that “these capacities, perceptions and strategies are 
fluid rather than fixed… [T]he political organizational identities of major social 
actors change as they react to and interact with other competing strategies in the 
political field” (Stark and Bruszt, 1998: 16). Indeed diverse constellations of actors 
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play the role of elites in a new society. These constellations can differ at different 
moments in time and in different societal contexts. To identify one specific a-
historical transformational agent seems a rather provisional exercise. Moreover, this 
does not strengthen the idea of new societal order as being an open-ended and 
interpretative process. In this sense, the social agents are those agents who possess 
the culture or knowledge, thereby including technocratic-intellectual elites, to cope 
with the emergence of a new form of society. My focus therefore will be on the 
autonomy and reflexivity of social agents that put forward on a political level a more 
or less coherent project for some kind of societal order according to their own 
understandings. In this sense, social agents produce meaning by way of their 
particular socio-cultural background and through their contingent interpretation of the 
key mechanisms of the process of reorganization – thereby creating variety and 
divergence or as Therborn (1995) put it, ‘different routes to and through modernity’.  
What makes social agents (e.g. political elites, intellectuals, and civil 
society) central to the process of reorganization is their intention to reconstruct a new 
societal order (as ‘initiators’ of the project) that goes beyond an existing societal 
configuration. Whereas political elites are central to the process of reconstruction on 
the basis of their key role in decision-making, intellectuals’ role is important in that it 
provides legitimation to the former group of social agents. As to civil society, I 
consider it as a “symbolic construct deployed in political argument”124. Yet, it is 
difficult to differentiate these three groups of social agents in the real world as their 
social roles partly cover each other and as conflicts may rise between them. In the 
new context of societal transformation, social agents control the society which thus 
becomes “an object of active reconstruction by human beings” (Eisenstadt, 1999: 41-
2). In this sense social agents are extremely political in that they put forward a project 
of reconstruction of society which they argue answers better to the needs of the 
members of that society. This project of reconstruction is attached to the ‘indigenous’ 
context (traditions, culture, and identity) and biased interpretations of the new order, 
however not without producing tensions and exclusions that are most likely to 
generate counter-reactionary forces. In order to study cultural integration one 
therefore needs to take into account these forces and their alternative version of 
reorganization. Cultural integration is finally about the conflict over its 
understandings, embedded in local significances. As noted earlier (Chapter 2, Section 
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2.4.), these understandings are themselves the product of an interpretative process, 
which is delimited by: (a) institutions (the position of social agents in the political 
field produce meanings as well as counter responses); (b) tradition (existing multiple 
understandings seen as a common good of the community); and (c) diffusion 
(external discourses that influence and ‘empower’ the local understandings). Cultural 
integration is the outcome of these factors. They may reinforce each other but may 
also exacerbate contradictions and incongruence. It is this incongruence between 
systemic integration and culture-building that produces the dynamics of cultural 
integration. 
A cultural integration approach emphasizes the variety and diversification 
in the development of a societal order. This societal order can historically be 
understood in multiple ways, depending on historical conditions, existing traditions 
and societal context, as well as the particular way in which social agents understand 
the dynamics between the ‘external’ and the ‘local’. Blokker (2004) uses the notion 
of ‘transnational discursive paradigms’ to define “the dynamics between extraneous 
ideas/models and perceptions of local modernising actors”125.  Blokker stresses the 
importance of these paradigms in the reconstruction of local programs of 
modernization as local political actors “do not simply reproduce but also re-interpret 
and adapt universalistic models to the local context”126. This is why it is difficult to 
depict cultural integration without contextualizing the process itself. Cultural 
integration penetrates the local not only through the dominant nature of ‘transnational 
discursive paradigms’ and the appeal they offer to ‘later newcomers’ but also by 
means of the creation of a direct response by the adoptive society.     
Touraine uses the word subjectivation to define the individual’s effort to 
become an agent in the middle of multiple processes of change, “to act upon his or 
her environment and thus to create his or her own individuation” (Touraine, 1998: 
169). In other words, the individual is in a continuous search to construct his or her 
own unique story. His argument “we are all equal in the sense that we all seek to 
construct our individuation” (Touraine, 1998: 170) makes sense. Delanty takes 
further Castells’ idea of network society in order to explain the dynamic of social 
change. Network society, as Delanty argues, is the basis for social integration. “The 
present model of change is one that is best termed ‘transformation’; it is less one of 
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historical or epochal ‘transition’ than of the multidirectional flows of information”127. 
As such, Delanty considers ‘knowledge society’ – defined as “the ability of society to 
cognitively interpret itself”128 to be a suitable model of social integration. Knowledge 
can now be seen as becoming a ‘medium of cultural experience’.  
3.1.7. How Are the Concepts of State, Society, Societal Identity, 
Recognition, Postcommunism, and Social Agents Interrelated?  
Let us submit to Castoriadis’s argument before I refer to the way these social 
concepts are related to each other. “What is wrong with the society we live in”, said 
Cornelius Castoriadis “is that it stopped questioning itself. This is a kind of society 
which no longer recognizes any alternative to itself and thereby feels absolved from 
the duty to examine, demonstrate, justify (let alone prove) the validity of its 
outspoken and tacit assumptions”129. The following is a presentation of the theoretical 
conceptualization of the interrelation between state, societal identity, society, 
recognition, postcommunism, and social agents in the context of cultural integration. 
Thus, I shall set up the position I follow here, and will come back to it at the end of 
the analysis at which point I will explain its respective illustrative potential and 
normative authority. 
The academic debate of cultural integration in the context of Eastern 
European societies finds its root in the question how do we analyze their 
transformation from a societal point of view. The debate about Eastern European 
society in the context of cultural integration asks for a theory of society as it has been 
described by Delanty and Rumford (2005). While the preceding introduction of the 
concepts relied mostly on issues related to the normative conceptions of state, 
society, societal identity, recognition, postcommunism, and social agents the 
theoretical perspective presented here develops mainly from Delanty and Rumford’s 
theory of society. This issue is connected to the discussion of the relationship 
between societal identity, society, recognition, and social agents because cultural 
integration is the expression of a rethinking of these conceptions. In the debate about 
Europeanization, Delanty and Rumford represent the constructivist promotion of such 
a process. Delanty and Rumford argue in favour of a normative theory of society 
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because they believe this would facilitate understanding the process of 
Europeanization, the major social transformations of our modernity and the 
emergence of a postwestern and postnational social order. They accept the 
constructed character of identities and argue that such a construction is created in 
action and that identities “express not an underlying consciousness or essence, but the 
self-understanding and self-recognition of the social actor” (Delanty and Rumford, 
2005: 51). In my opinion, Delanty and Rumford argue their theoretical case 
convincingly. They provide a good explanation of the need of a theory of society but 
their theory lacks adaptation to the current Eastern European reality.  
As it has surely emerged from the previous presentation, my personal 
predilection is towards the social constructivist conceptualization of state, societal 
identity, society, recognition, postcommunism, social agents, and Europe. This thesis 
is moving away from a state centric view on transformation. I presume that societal 
identities refer to national identity that individuals subjectively consider to be their 
identity. I wonder if some form of recognition is not a precondition for cultural 
integration. The social scientific study of cultural integration is primarily concerned 
with explaining the general conditions that enable cultural integration. The 
constructivist understanding of societal identity takes the individual as its starting 
point. The creation of societal identity cannot be separated from the specific context 
in which cultural integration occurs. Having established the conceptual framework in 
Eastern European societies, I can now turn to the introduction to the actual 
theoretical sources of the cultural integration model. Accordingly, the next section 
will present the theoretical framework of the cultural integration model.  
3.2. Approaching the Cultural Integration Model: Theoretical Sources  
The following is a presentation of the social theory framework within which my 
cultural integration model is coming from. That is the ‘double synchronicity’ thesis as 
well as existing theoretical conceptualizations on the postwestern and postnational 
dimensions of integration. I shall establish the positions here and shed light on their 
explanatory potential. The theories that will concern the analysis directly are 
conceptualisations of the process of cultural integration. The purpose here is not to 
give an exhaustive elaboration of these theories’ attempts to reformulate the 
transformation(s) of Europe, but to show that new elements have been embodied or, 
at least, reflected upon in the study of the new Europe.    
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Deprived of a clear-cut theoretical approach in the existing literature on 
cultural integration, I am forced to broaden the theoretical sources of my analysis. Do 
more general theories provide me with a tool in understanding the current trends of 
change in Eastern Europe? The answer is definitely affirmative. The key explanation, 
as this section will argue, is found in the fact that we are dealing with a relatively new 
area in European studies. One could indeed take the analysis one step further arguing 
that studies on postwesternization, postnationalism, and former communism Europe 
is an underdeveloped field.  
Due to the complexity of the issues of postwesternization and 
postnationalism the rest of this section shall be organized as follows: first, I give a 
short overview of the theoretical sources; then I describe the cultural integration 
model. By carrying out such a deconstruction of the cultural integration process, I 
hope to provide a clearer picture of the overall process. Due to the substantial overlap 
between the theoretical sources, the different perspectives will both be split-up by 
themes and by researcher. The issue of transformation has been approached 
differently by Delanty and Rumford, F. Peter Wagner, and Habermas. These three 
theoretical accounts represent clusters of views rather than clearly delimited and 
mutually exclusive positions. 
3.2.1. Gerard Delanty and Chris Rumford: Europeanization and the 
Transformation(s) of Europe 
The theoretical work of Delanty and Rumford (2005) represents perhaps the most 
forceful contemporary restatement of Europeanization. I will mostly be concerned 
with three aspects of their work: modernity, the emergence of postwestern and 
postnational Europe, and Europeanization.  
The first aspect relevant to my study of cultural integration is Delanty 
and Rumford’s debate on modernity. Delanty and Rumford argue that the term 
‘modernity’  
signals a condition of self-confrontation, incompleteness and renewal in which 
the localized past is reshaped by a globalized present; it expresses self-
confidence in the transformative project of the present time as a liberation from 
the past; modernity is the belief in the possibility of a new beginning based on 
human autonomy, the belief that the world can be shaped by human agency; and 
above all it is the consciousness of global or world cultural concepts (Delanty 
and Rumford, 2005: 41).  
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Further, Delanty and Rumford argue that, modernity is a process in permanent 
construction which can be found in all types of societies. Delanty and Rumford depict 
modernity no longer in Western European terms, but cosmopolitan. Modernity is 
“neither entirely singular nor plural, universal nor particular, but an ongoing process 
of transformation that arises in the encounter of the local and present time with the 
global. This is why modernity cannot be equated with globality as such; it arises 
when the particular – the local – encounters globality” (Delanty and Rumford, 2005: 
41). According to Delanty and Rumford, postcommunism may not represent the 
fatigue of modernity, but rather a fresh beginning.  
Delanty and Rumford explain ‘modernities’ not as articulated and static 
units, but “in a constant process of change due to the nature of the particular forms of 
interaction, selection, combination, adaptation and processing of cultural codes, 
resources, imaginaries etc”’130. Further, Delanty and Rumford argue that European 
modernity is both multiple and hybrid: “[t]here is not one single societal model of 
modernity, but several which can also be seen in civilizational terms” (Delanty and 
Rumford, 2005: 42). One claim made in this context is that modernities have 
undergone major social transformations and this may lead “to a reconfiguration of the 
European civilizational constellation” (Delanty and Rumford, 2005: 43). Delanty and 
Rumford make the specific claim that “one expression of this is a new modernity 
based on cosmopolitanism” (Delanty and Rumford, 2005: 43). New models of 
modernity have emerged after the end of communism, beyond the EU enlargement 
and the new dynamics of Europeanization. According to them, the EU enlargement is 
about a re-shaping and reconstruction of modernities. 
The second aspect refers to the emergence of postwesternization and 
postnationalism now that a new East is shaping Europe. It is around the ‘revival of 
the East’ that postwestern Europe comes into being. Europe “is no longer based on a 
singular, Western modernity, but multiple modernities” (Delanty and Rumford, 2005: 
49). The role of the EU in Eastern Europe and with more enlargements to come 
means that “Europe is becoming more poly-centric, with more than one centre and 
also more than one historical origin” (Delanty and Rumford, 2005: 49). Moreover, 
Delanty and Rumford illustrate that “the identity of Europe will become more and 
more ‘post-western’” (Delanty and Rumford, 2005: 47). This does not mean “anti- or 
non-western, but a condition defined increasingly by the legacy of an earlier 
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modernity which will have to be negotiated with other modernities” (Delanty and 
Rumford, 2005: 47). This is especially evident in new questions concerning the 
identity of Europe raised by the latest Eastern Enlargement. As Delanty and Rumford 
put it, “in this case is not just about getting bigger. It is also about a very decisive 
kind of cultural transformation in terms of both the identity of Europe and in terms of 
the rise of new kinds of symbolic conflicts over identity and belonging” (Delanty and 
Rumford, 2005: 47-48). Delanty and Rumford argue that there “there is no 
underlying European identity that makes this impossible, that there is no foundational 
European identity that prevents Europe from adopting a more inclusive kind of 
identity” (Delanty and Rumford, 2005: 191). 
Delanty and Rumford seek to account for the emergence of postnational 
forms of loyalty. That is loyalty towards principles or pan-European forms of 
solidarity and guarantees of security rather than those entirely defined by the nation-
state. According to Delanty and Rumford, there are two options facing contemporary 
Europe: postnational and cosmopolitan Europe. To them, the postnational model of 
Europe has some deficits. According to them, 
while post-national trends are in evidence, a post-national political entity is 
ultimately confined to a limited number of societies and ones that are at a similar 
level of development in terms of social, cultural and political structures and 
values. It does not lend itself easily to the current situation of a large-scale polity 
composed of very diverse societies (Delanty and Rumford, 2005: 190).  
Moreover, the lack of “secular, liberal and post-cultural forms of identification” 
(Delanty and Rumford, 2005: 190) in a postnational Europe might have difficulties in 
dealing with conflicts concerning belonging and identity. Delanty and Rumford 
suggest that “the viability of this model – which assumes a European people can be 
called into existence by a constitution – has been called into question by the current 
enlargement of the European Union and growing post-liberal anxieties” (Delanty and 
Rumford, 2005: 190). The introduction of a postnational Europe takes them back to 
the West and its values that “must be defended by Europe” (Delanty and Rumford, 
2005: 190). The reorganization of Europe can be read in Habermasian terms as 
“opening up post-national possibilities in which communicative forms of social 
integration may be possible” (Delanty and Rumford, 2005: 49). Much in ex-
communist societies is indeed made of postwestern and postnational openness, 
contributing to the perception of these societies as belonging to a ‘Europe beyond the 
nation’. A postwestern and postnational East has emerged as a renegotiation of its 
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role within the context of the post-bipolar order. A postwestern and postnational East 
places itself in a new relationship to wider Europe.  
The third facet of Delanty and Rumford’s work concerns 
Europeanization. According to them, Europeanization is a “process of social 
construction rather than one of state building and one in which globalization, in all its 
facets, plays a key role in creating its conditions” (Delanty and Rumford, 2005: 6). 
From a social constructivist perspective, Europe’s current transformation is “one of 
self-creation” (Delanty and Rumford, 2005: 49). Their social constructivist approach 
pays particular attention to globalization and the historical process of modernity as 
the context for Europeanization. Although I fully accept the constructivist agenda on 
Europeanization, cultural integration contrasts with the Europeanization argument 
offered by Delanty and Rumford. This includes most notably the emphasis on the role 
globalization and its cosmopolitan currents play in the process of transformation of 
Europe. Delanty and Rumford take a global perspective on Europeanization, placing 
Europe and the EU within a global frame. This means that the explanatory force of 
their cultural integration model can possibly be affected by the chosen case-study of 
Romania and that this would lead to a difficulty in understanding the way Romania’s 
transformation might fit in the global scenarios.   
Basic to the difference between Europeanization, as defined by Delanty 
and Rumford and my cultural integration model is the way they understand change. 
Whereas Delanty and Rumford argue that the dynamics of transformation are global 
rather than European, the perspective I offer sets enlargement within a wider context 
of transformations in Europe. Cultural integration encourages us to re-think the 
relationship between Romania and Europe. Placing Romania within the context of a 
postwestern and postnational Europe, allows for a different object of study. With the 
main focus on the “the impact of global forces in Europe and the emergence and 
development of global dynamics” (Delanty and Rumford 2005: 9), the notion of 
Europeanization as defined by Delanty and Rumford offers a different perspective on 
the nature and dynamics of the process of transformation. Furthermore, Delanty and 
Rumford see Europeanization as shaped by global processes, including the “lack of 
boundaries between Europe and the world” (Delanty and Rumford, 2005: 9). 
Whereas Delanty and Rumford see Europeanization in “a wider context of 
complexity” (Delanty and Rumford, 2005: 12) and as linked to globalization, I look 
at how Europe has reorganized itself after the end of communism. Likewise, whereas 
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Delanty and Rumford see Europeanization as a cosmopolitan response to 
globalization, I see cultural integration as a postwestern and postnational response to 
European integration. In this sense, my cultural integration approach takes on a 
different perspective. Delanty and Rumford look at globalization as the context for 
Europeanization. In contrast I look at postwesternization, postnationalism and 
Europeanization as the context for cultural integration.   
My cultural integration model is therefore different from Delanty and 
Rumford’s cultural integration model seen as a particular response to globalization 
and within the global frame of globalization. Alternatively Delanty and Rumford 
could be read as advocating a rewriting of the narratives of European integration with 
a view to opening new analytical paths. In my view, cultural integration is a 
perspective which is better adjusted to analyse social and cultural fragmentation. 
Cultural integration offers an alternative model of culture that emphasizes the 
contrasting dimension to culture seen by Delanty as cultural pluralization (Delanty, 
1999).  
3.2.2. F. Peter Wagner: the Thesis of ‘Double Synchronicity’  
F. Peter Wagner has formulated a general thesis on Eastern transformation which I 
believe is equally important to my general theoretical model. Wagner’s thesis, 
announced in ‘Sonderweg Romania’ (2004), amounts to a conceptualization of 
Eastern transformation as ‘double synchronicity’. As Wagner notes, “the integration 
of the former ‘Eastern Europe’ into the former ‘West’ is not a one-way process – 
meaning the alignment of one system ‘East’ to the other system ‘West’ – but rather 
concerns both sides” (Wagner, 2004: 59). The thesis of ‘double synchronicity’ as 
used by Wagner describes the integration of Eastern European countries’ internal 
transformation into the wider European and global context which is itself 
transforming, deeply affecting all aspects of their societies. On this basis, the East’s 
‘great transformation’ (Polanyi, 1944) cannot be sufficiently explained by using the 
convergence and transition’ theses.  
For this reason, it has been commonly assumed that the influence of 
European integration increases with time, rather than at the outset of transition which 
is short-lived anyway (Pridham, 1991). For Wagner, the transformations of Eastern 
Europe societies are equal to the construction of as many societal projects. In this 
way, Wagner links the discussion of ‘double synchronicity’ to politics: 
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In the case of the East European process of transformation, the ‘political steering 
of society’ (the politically initiated and controlled makeover of society) animates 
the entire process. Politics, thus, do come first. Yet by the same token, politics 
cannot be reduced to the creation of institutions in the narrow sense of the term, 
or to the implementation of a particular set of economic measures, exclusively 
labelled ‘reform’, and set to make up ‘the transition’ (Wagner, 2004: 59). 
For Wagner “the consequences of historical-structural, international, and regional 
context of ‘post-state socialism’ therefore present, in each case, an Eigendynamik 
grounded in the challenge to conceive and construct a new societal identity” (Wagner, 
2004: 59). Wagner stresses the importance of “the idea of an Eigendynamik” when 
‘coming to terms’ with Romania’s ‘special case’, “perhaps thereby aiding us at last in 
accepting ‘development’ as a common question after the demise of state socialism 
(Wagner, 2004: 59-60). In an earlier study, Borinski and Wagner (2002) argue that 
the transformation of the East is about creating new societies. According to them, this 
gives a new meaning to Europe after the end of the Cold War.   
Howesver, in his ‘double synchronicity’ model Wagner does not situate 
Romania in a postwestern and postnational Europe. Yet, scholars point to the 
increasing role of these ‘transformative’ dimensions of the contemporary Europe 
(Eder, 2001; Delanty, 2003b, 2006a; Delanty and Rumford, 2005; Outhwaite and 
Ray, 2005; Therborn, 2006; Rumford, 2006a). While I agree with F. Peter Wagner’s 
thesis, this chapter goes further and sustains that Eastern European societies have to 
reconstruct themselves to adjust to a postwestern and postnational Europe which is 
itself under ‘great transformation’ in the wider context of modernity. Europe is 
redefining itself in a global era with all its overwhelming influences and implications 
for the new societal identity.   
3.2.3. Jürgen Habermas: the Postnational Europe  
Habermas (1998, 2003) argues in favour of a postnational constellation and a 
‘European demos’ as the subject of a postnational democracy which is imagined in 
terms of an ‘extended closure’ of national democracy. In his book, The Postnational 
Constellation (2001), Habermas’s social theory explores among other issues the 
future of democracy in the wake of the nation-state age. Habermas holds for a 
‘postnational’ Europe where shared identity is connected to nonterritorial values of 
constitutionalism and democratic rights. In his opinion, the dynamics of globalization 
speak of the declining significance of the nation-state. While elaborating on the 
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dilemmas and uncertainties of modernization, Habermas writes that democracy might 
not necessarily survive such a postnational order. Habermas’s work moves then from 
a local historical perspective to more theoretical formulations on postnational 
constellation. This postnational constellation answers the current crisis facing a 
universal communicative order produced by the inequalities of capitalism. The new 
constellation must be taught how to reallocate burdens, rather than simply sharing 
risks. Habermas refers to the postnational constellation as a global condition. He 
writes, “we will only be able to meet the challenges of globalization in a reasonable 
matter if the postnational constellation can successfully develop new forms for the 
democratic self-steering of society” (Habermas, 2003: 88).    
Although not concerned with a theory of society or with Eastern Europe, 
Habermas provides a normative political philosophy on society. Drawing from Kant, 
Habermas has argued that ‘constitutional patriotism’ is a successor to nationalism. 
The political culture of a country crystallizes around its constitution. Each 
national culture develops a distinctive interpretation of those constitutional 
principles that are equally embodied in other republican constitutions – such as 
popular sovereignty and human rights – in light of its own national history. A 
‘constitutional patriotism’ based on these interpretations can take the place 
originally occupied by nationalism (Habermas, 1998: 118). 
Habermas’s main argument is that any cultural particularism is precarious and ought 
to be replaced by universal categories. Even if the end of the Cold War, understood as 
‘self-domestication of nuclear powers’, is a positive outcome of the twentieth 
century, under globalization this outcome is endangered. Globalization has led to a 
postnational constellation, a condition defined as the relative incapacity of the state to 
control its consequences.  
According to Habermas, constitutional patriotism rests on human rights 
and democratic participation. Habermas understands constitutional order as a 
“political order created by the people themselves and legitimated by their opinion and 
will formation” (Habermas, 2003: 65). This constitutional order does not necessarily 
demand the existence of the nation. Habermas argues that there is a sense in which 
the achievement of postnational democracy is both a conceptual desideration and a 
real option. In Habermas’s own words, 
any political community that wants to understand itself as a democracy must at 
least distinguish between members and non-members. The self-referential 
concept of collective self-determination demarcates a logical space for 
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democratically united citizens who are members of a particular community. Even 
if such a community is grounded in the universalistic principles of a democratic 
constitutional state, it still forms a collective identity, in the sense that it 
interprets and realizes these principles in light of its own history and in the 
context of its own particular form of life. This ethical-political self-understanding 
of citizens of a particular democratic life is missing in the inclusive community 
of world citizens (Habermas, 2003: 107).  
Habermas applies his idea of constitutional patriotism to the transnational context of 
the EU. The development of some kind of postnational solidarity is needed. “It is 
neither possible nor desirable to level out the national identities of member nations, 
nor melt them down into a ‘Nation of Europe’… But positively coordinated 
redistribution politics must be borne by a European-wide democratic will-formation, 
and this cannot happen without a basis of solidarity” (Habermas, 2003: 99). 
Habermas presents a more philosophical argument that is his belief in the potential of 
communication. Through communication, he argues, individuals are re-discovering 
sources of solidarity. For Habermas, globalization is not a threat but an opportunity 
for learning and taking further steps towards higher civility and a more rational 
closure. This means that the link between the nation and the state must be broken in 
favour of ‘postnational democracy’. 
Habermas is ambivalent about the possibility of securing cosmopolitan 
democracy. However, he argues that this postnational transformation has to come 
from individuals within nation states. For Habermas, the transnational political 
community equals the nation-state in the contemporary age of postnational 
constellation. Habermas perceives the EU as a new democratic nation-state, with a 
binding constitution, an elected parliament, rule of law, an active civil society and so 
forth. For Habermas, the term ‘postnational’ refers to something located at the global 
or transnational level. Habermas is a defender of the postnational project as opposed 
to a national driven political project. He defends this project by stating that this is a 
response to the contemporary political and social change; the postnational idea is at 
the same time a necessary stage in the development of the nation-state (where the 
idea of the nation is considered false). Last but not least, this idea is a response to 
forces of globalization. According to Habermas’s view on a postnational vision, 
Europe ought to have a constitution in order to create a European demos. This 
constitution would raise constitutional patriotism and postnational forms of loyalty. 
In Habermas’s view, Europe appears as the owner of cosmopolitan values that are 
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neither East nor West, as a universal nation able of endorsing the democratic 
attainments of the nation-state at a postnational level that is beyond the limits of the 
nation. Most significantly, although, he admits the failures of Europe’s history, 
Habermas rejects the division between Eastern and Western Europe. His social 
constructivist approach takes only what is good from the past and forgets the rest.  
There are two critical points to Habermas postnational thesis: firstly, 
Habermas fails to break away from the conceptual framework of the nation-state; 
secondly, he does not succeed in describing the necessity of the transition from the 
national to the postnational level. In Eastern European societies, ‘postnational’ is a 
part of their ‘post’ enlargement condition. Habermas’s imagines postnational 
constellation as a stage of social and political life after nationalism, overlooking that 
postnationalism can actually coexist with the nation-state. 
3.2.4. Summing-up the Theoretical Conceptions of Cultural Integration 
Common to the above standpoints is that whether they promote or not a purely 
postwestern or postnational position with regard to cultural integration, they all 
understand the legitimation of transformation through a social constructivist 
perspective. They all invoke culture, society and transformation. To clarify the 
postwestern and postnational trends which take place in Eastern Europe, I make use 
of Delanty and Rumford’s ideas on postwestern and postnational Europe, although I 
do share the same perspective on Europeanization. Whereas Habermas urges the 
creation of a postnational constellation and suggests that constitutional patriotism 
should be its basis, Delanty and Rumford propose that Europe should base itself on 
individual cultural entities. Individuals should be free to choose their loyalty. 
Alternatively, Wagner’s thesis of double synchronicity suggests that Eastern 
European internal transformations are part of wider transformations. Based on the 
theoretical approaches presented above, I believe the two integration types, 
postwestern and postnational, provide the best framework for integration from a 
cultural point of view.  
Drawing on these theoretical sources, I sustain that while cultures, 
institutions and incommensurable versions of history bring in a lot of diversity and 
differences between these societies, it can be argued that the majority of ex-
communist societies are affected fundamentally by the type of social construction that 
I call ‘cultural integration’. The point that I share with Delanty and Rumford is that 
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the world taking shape around us has to be increasingly understood in cultural terms. 
In other words, the transformations caused by cultural integration are meaningful, 
around conceptions of Europe, becoming more European and the new borders of 
Europe. Fundamental conceptions change. In this sense what it is characteristic to 
Eastern European societies is not only the amount of information and technology that 
individuals cannot grasp, but also a new set of concepts that people have to deal with 
on a daily basis.  
If I agree to the idea that a postwestern and postnational European 
society may exist or is in the process of formation, then this implies that features of 
this emergence are already to be found in Eastern Europe. To accept that a 
postwestern society emerges in Eastern Europe implies that cultural integration is 
based on recognition and cultural diversity. The question is of course, what potential 
impact this would have on former communist societies and on my view of social 
constructivist? This type of integration puts more emphasis on the dynamics of 
becoming and belonging which are otherwise difficult to grasp. A similar point could 
be made about cultural integration which is a continuous process that has its own 
dynamics. The result is that former communist societies are more and more part of 
the global space and affairs. While complex internal threats that “could affect the 
emergence of united Europe as a political, economic and cultural entity”131 still exist, 
it is too early to declare the failure of cultural integration in Eastern European 
societies.  
Since it is generally agreed by the social constructivists that society is 
socially constructed, an obvious place to begin my analysis of cultural integration is 
by considering the social construction of Eastern European society. Indeed the social 
constructivist aspect of the theory of society as formulated by Delanty and Rumford 
has much in common with my theory: ex-communist societies are not going to be 
seen as concrete and bounded in and of their states; they are rather contingent 
historically and contextually specific. Having sketched out, in general terms, the 
conceptual positions with which I am concerned, I shall now discuss in more detail 
the cultural integration framework.  
Theorizing cultural integration is problematic since there is a difficult 
balance to strike between generalised abstraction, such as a theory of transformation, 
and historical thickness, where general processes risk being lost from view. No 
                                           
131 Tismãneanu, 2002: 87. 
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matter what theoretical approach I choose here is likely to be a tension between 
universal claims on the one hand and giving proper attention to local detail and 
specificity on the other. Is Eastern Europe’s transformation to be termed cultural 
integration and if so, what exactly is meant by this?  
3.3. Cultural Integration in Eastern Europe 
As mentioned earlier, in this thesis I look at integration from a cultural perspective as 
a distinct type of integration that I name ‘cultural integration’. As already noted in 
Chapter 2, I use the term ‘cultural integration’ to distinguish the process of 
reorganization caused by social agents from systemic integration (political, economic 
and legal integration). On this basis the thesis can be advanced that a traditional 
European integration approach is inadequate to account for developments associated 
with cultural integration. Understanding Eastern European societies necessitates a 
focus on society and culture, more than on economy or politics. 
Since I have defined the ‘cultural integration’ concept as a process of 
reorganization, the link to the constructivist theory reviewed in Chapter 2 should be 
obvious. Societal transformation in ex-communist societies has been a major focus of 
interest in the social sciences. Early research has been focused on challenges for 
transformation, often in analogy with earlier transitions in Southern Europe (Ash, 
1990; Dahrendorf, 1990; Offe, 1991; Stanizskis, 1991). Some of these 
‘transitological’ studies included empirical research and date-based knowledge on 
transformation. Recently, societal transformation in Eastern European societies has 
brought about a new research agenda, not predicted by ‘transitologists’, which asks 
for explanation. First, the process of transformation that started in Eastern Europe in 
the early 1990s has proven to be more complex than originally predicted. Secondly, 
Eastern European societies are constantly in search for a balance between integration 
and differentiation (Delanty and Rumford, 2005). The present societal changes in 
postcommunist Europe (in a postwestern sense) seen within the post-Cold War period 
ask for new answers to this challenge. According to Delanty (2003c: 16), former 
communist societies are concerned with four main transitions: from political 
authoritarianism to democracy; (b) from state socialism to market economy, from 
industrial culture to postindustrial/postmodern culture, and from a national to 
transnational order.  
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Following these considerations, a number of features of cultural 
integration in the case of Eastern European societies are worth mentioning. Firstly, 
denial of former existing political and societal order opens up for social agents’ claim 
of reconstructing a new order on the basis of self-produced understandings of such an 
order. The moving away from conventional understandings makes possible the 
development of alternative visions of how the new society should be shaped. This 
means that cultural integration is very dependent internally on social agents’ 
assumptions about its meaning, as well as on their discursive contexts and concerns. 
Secondly, the emphasis is set on social agents, i.e. the carrier agents of cultural 
integration as subjects able to understand cultural integration and perform on these 
understandings. This supports the idea that society is fluid and that social agents can 
therefore reconstruct society based on their own visions. Thirdly, the new ideas and 
programs promoted as visions of a better society (as distinct from that of the past) are 
mainly future-oriented.     
The choice for a (cultural integration) generalizing approach to Eastern 
Europe is based on the following assumptions: (a) there is a certain geopolitical 
established historical and cultural commonality among these societies that makes 
them all Eastern European; (b) there are structural and cultural resemblances among 
these societies given their communist past; and (c) cultural integration brings more or 
less the same factors. Nonetheless, I argue that each society has a specific historical 
and cultural context. Leaving aside a singular, teleological model and favouring 
instead the existence of multiple patterns of cultural integration, my sociological 
approach will take into consideration (Chapter 4) the historical formation of a 
particular modern society, Romania, its specific encounter with communism, and the 
contingency of transformation after communism as context of the cultural integration 
project. These all inform the approach and add a theoretical dimension to it.   
The particular features of building a new societal order on historical 
legacies (and particularities) and in interaction with European dynamics has not (as 
yet) been considered. Following an approach which does not emphasise the 
convergence of the East into the West but instead the unique response of later 
integrated societies to wider transformations of Europe, cultural integration can be 
seen to entail ‘multiple responses’ inherent to the project of reconstructing an existing 
societal order. A focus on particularities rather than commonalities creates the insight 
that “historically different beginnings bring about different modernities, and different 
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contexts do not permit modernizing states simply to imitate the Western model of 
modernity” (Kaya, 2004: 31). The lack of comprehension for national specificities 
and historical particularities may entail a major obstacle inside Europe. 
   Illner (1999) suggests that the postcommunist transformation ought to 
be analysed in a broader perspective than the post-1989 period or the years of 
communism alone. Eastern European transformation should be analysed “within 
wider sociocultural space than the individual societies” (Illner, 1999: 242-243). For 
Illner the proper time scale is the whole modern history of Eastern Europe, within 
which the communist rule is just a small component. As to the socio-cultural scale, 
Illner suggests that of ‘civilizational orbits’ established by shared cultural and 
political experiences (i.e. religion or after ‘belonging’ to supranational units like 
Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman or Russian). I concur to Illner’s proposition, and look in 
the next chapter at the process of cultural integration currently taking place in 
Romania from a wide historical perspective.  
After more than four decades of communist rule radical changes took 
place in East European societies. All states have experienced a socialist type of 
economic and political system. The social changes in the region during communism 
included nationalization, the collectivization of agriculture, raw material oriented 
industrialization, the annihilation of rural communities or the peasant society, 
increasing the convenient working class, and massive village to town migration. As it 
applies to former communist societies, cultural integration evolved most directly out 
of the events of the late 1990s as these unfolded in Eastern Europe. After the 1989-
1990 revolutions, the research on cultural transformations in Eastern Europe has 
focused mainly on the downfall of communism, the transition to democracies and 
from industrial to post-industrial societies. With the collapse of communism, a new 
Europe seemed to have opened to the peoples of Eastern Europe. After the removal of 
the communist system, societies have been struggling with questions of ‘belonging’ 
and ‘becoming’ European often understood in the sense of loosing their unique 
Eastern features.  
Cultural integration forces have been interacting with the legacy of 
communism and pre-communism to create a new reality that is different both from 
Western and pre-communist situations. Communism has had a significant impact on 
social networks, idiosyncratic patterns and the cultures of Eastern European societies. 
There is a continuous interaction with forces and models transferred from Western 
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democracies, the communist heritage, the more distant past of Eastern Europe and the 
innovative solutions called for the way out from communism. It is still early to 
predict the final form these societies will take as a result of many often contradictory 
pressures presently being exercised. Their development choices are open and the 
ending may prove difficult to consider under any of the known societal types. The 
emerging societies may be as specific as it is the process of cultural integration itself. 
The societal development in Eastern Europe is complex and contradictory.  
As analysts have often announced a ‘sudden, radical break with the past’ 
(Sztompka, 1992: 11), the influence from the past has widely been ignored. However, 
there has been a ‘continuum of changes’ (Elias, 1992) of both cultural and structural 
nature. Sztompka (1993) wrote about ‘civilizational incompetence’ as the trap for 
East European societies emphasizing the cultural heritage from the past. Apart from 
communism, and on a deeper level, the process of cultural integration seems to be 
influenced by long-range factors from pre-communism. Such legacies, ‘frozen’ 
during communist decades have been re-triggered after the end of the regime. So far, 
the long distance of this continuum has been neglected, the research focusing mainly 
on the handicaps inherited from the communist society. Both pre-communist and 
communist era legacies co-determine the post-1989 space for transformation. 
Perhaps, one common feature to all former communist societies is their timing with 
regard to modernization and the beginning of the communist rule. We have, on the 
one hand, the countries which did not experience any sign of modernization before 
communism or whose modernization was not finished by that time. These societies’ 
modernization was completed by the communist regime as part of the ‘building 
socialism’ project. Even awkward, communism did play a role in the modernization 
process in these societies, and the benefits of modernity are associated with the 
‘golden era’ of communism.  On the other hand, we have countries that had already 
been modernized before communists came into power. In these societies the process 
of modernization has been disrupted by the socialism, this fact having a damaging 
effect on the process.  
The process of internalizing external influences is an important aspect of 
cultural integration. Cultural integration process is dependant on the external 
constellation of cultural influences. Delanty and Rumford argue that transformations 
shape Europe continuously. Within the contemporary order, these transformations are 
“taking on a post-western orientation in which a new East has emerged to shape 
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Europe” (Delanty and Rumford, 2005: 24). In their view, the Iron Curtain “has been 
more of a hard or closed border and has served to define the edge of Europe; an 
absolute line of demarcation, rather than a point of intersection between two 
territories” (Delanty and Rumford, 2005: 32). Their conclusion is that “the plurality 
of Europe is more than a diversity of cultures and nations, but extends into its very 
civilizational nature. In other words, as a geopolitical entity Europe is as much 
eastern as it is western” (Delanty and Rumford, 2005: 35). After the end of the Cold 
War, the East has been reinvented, losing traditional reference points (Delanty, 1996). 
It is difficult to predict the outcome of the present changes in the Eastern Europe, but 
it is possible to suggest what kind of future trends are implied by different 
understanding of cultural integration.  
 
The Basic Propositions of Cultural Integration  
Having outlined the theoretical framework guiding this analysis, I will now proceed 
to summarise the basic propositions of cultural integration in Eastern Europe. There 
are at least four reasons that are in favour of a cultural integration analysis of ex-
communist societies. Firstly, the rapid and radical nature of Eastern European 
societies’ transformation of society and identity speaks in favour of cultural 
integration. Secondly, the notion of cultural integration connects this study to social 
constructivism more firmly than do other terms. Thirdly, cultural integration can 
explain society changes and cultural dynamics. Last but not least, it recognizes the 
importance of the cultural dimension of integration and a growing interdisciplinarity 
in the study of Europe. Such propositions have obvious connotations as to the 
persistence of an exclusively cultural model or, indeed, a variety of distinctly cultural 
models. In the context of such generalizations it is suggested that cultural integration 
serves to undermine the distinctive European cultural model (if there is one). 
Consequently, if I am to disclose the mechanisms that advance cultural integration in 
the contemporary Eastern Europe, it is essential to examine the ‘constructed reality’ 
of such a model.  
3.3.1. Components of the Cultural Integration Model 
Cultural integration as it has occurred in Eastern Europe is, without arguing, 
significant and complex. Faced with wider processes of transformation, ex-
communist societies have been marked by two trends: first, engagement in approving 
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nationalism/autochthonism (inward oriented – a traditionalist and conservative 
tendency based on national specificity by accentuating its national specificity, 
traditions and values: ‘we are better than many other Europeans’, but also based on 
xenophobic and racist attitudes towards minorities); and at the opposite, an 
intensification of all signs of modernity and Europeanism (orientated towards the 
outside Europe and towards European integration). These internal trends can not be 
seen isolated from European transformations.   In fact, they coexist with postwestern 
and postnational dynamics of cultural integration emerging from the new relationship 
between Eastern Europe and Europe. Transformations in Eastern Europe has been 
dominated by two forms of cultural integration, on the one hand postwestern (i.e. 
interaction with the new East and the global), and on the other the postnational (i.e. 
recognition of the status of minorities). These dynamics touch upon the complex 
issue of the construction of the new societal identity, so crucial to former communist 
societies. As indicated earlier, a combination of several interrelated factors that link 
structural and historical-institutional legacies to transnational (external) discourses 
has contributed to direct cultural integration.  
The first factor refers to the influence of the past which continues to 
generate inertia. Tradition matters in the analysis of cultural integration as it identifies 
the continuities and discontinuities in Eastern European societies. The post-1989 
development of Eastern Europe points to a persistence of historical-institutional 
legacies (precommunist as well as of a communist type). Continuity is evident in 
political terms, i.e., in the election and even re-election of former communist elites. 
Particularly, in the way political elites have interpreted the reconstruction process 
(e.g., old discourses of particularism and nationalism are set in motion). The 
framework of specific understandings has had a strong impact on the process of 
transformation and has defined the potential directions of the Eastern transformation. 
This is however, not to say that historical-institutional legacies have a deterministic 
role on the present. The conceptions of domestic reorganization of the major social 
agents of transformation are conditioned by locally shaped discursive legacies. As I 
will show in the historical analysis of precommunist Romania, to the westernist 
discourse, a form of autochthonism or particularism (nationalism) has been opposed. 
Looking at the legacy of these two dominant discourses offers a better understanding 
the reconstruction of the new societal order. This dual legacy has been placed at the 
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structural level in that they remain the main indigenous sources for societal 
reconstruction discourses.  
The second factor refers to structural and institutional legacies, i.e. the 
persistence of centralised and unitary state structures. The post-1989 political project 
of reconstruction of the new societal order has been conditioned by these legacies 
(Shafir, 2001: 91 and Gallagher, 2001). At the institutional level, social agents partly 
reproduce the old tenets of the dominant discursive traditions; partly combine them 
with transnational elements. For instance, the state and its institutions are still 
perceived (like the communist state) as the main agent of reorganization and as the 
symbol that identifies the necessities of the society. For Sztompka, “culture-building 
and ‘civilizing process’ (…) do not proceed by design, but as emergent, learned 
responses to the conditions in which people live, the entire context of their ‘life-
world’” (Sztompka, 1999: 206).  
An example from the institutional sphere: although institutions are 
adopted after the Western model, political culture manifests indigenously through 
suspicion towards those in power, non-participation in public life, electoral 
absenteeism, and lack of what Weber (2002) called the ‘spirit of capitalism’.       
Third, one of the chief factors of transformation has been the encounter 
with external models (i.e. diffusion) and ideas that are taken on, adapted and 
reproduced. With the fall of communism Eastern European societies have become 
open to transnational governing discourses which are most likely to be adopted and 
integrated into the local discourses. This also means that the indigenous discourses 
are endangered by diffusion. This is mostly evident in the analysis of cultural 
integration in the domestic political field.    
Cultural integration has evolved under the auspices of these internal 
(institutions, tradition) and external (diffusion) forces. These forces may reinforce 
each other but may also exacerbate contradictions and incongruence. It is this 
incongruence between systemic integration and culture-building that produces the 
dynamics of cultural integration. Cultural integration can acquire different forms and 
it is rather by the identification of particular constellations of social agents and 
conflicts between them that the nature of cultural integration can be understood. The 
incongruence of institutionalization and cultural integration makes for yet another 
‘duality of synchronicity’ (Wagner, 2004).        
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3.3.2.   A Social Constructivist Approach to Cultural Integration in 
Eastern Europe  
It is from a constructivist perspective that the process of cultural integration will 
come to be understood as a transformation from an existing societal order (i.e., the 
communist type of society) to a new societal order. A social constructivist approach 
to cultural integration in Eastern Europe has following as main dynamics: change 
based on continuity (a factor for transformation dynamics); postwestern and 
postnational transformation; and reconstruction of societal identities. 
Firstly, cultural integration as a theory of change based on continuity. 
The main reason for choosing a social constructivist approach is the interest that has 
been growing lately in the process of transformation. As a theory of change, social 
constructivism identifies the following key dynamics in the social construction of 
Eastern Europe: (i) cultural integration as a process of continuity; Eastern European 
societies are becoming more and more diverse. Continuity as a factor for 
transformation dynamism; (ii) cultural integration as an open-ended process; (iii) 
transformation of society and identity; (iv) reaction to challenges coming from 
cultural integration (ambivalence). When dealing with cultural integration one of the 
questions that the theoretical model must address is whether it can explain society 
transformation and cultural dynamics. 
The famous notion of ‘continuum of changes’ (Elias, 1992) is close to 
the emphasis on transformative elements within a certain society. Elias declines any 
sort of self-sustaining logic of development. Instead he concentrates on the historical 
and institutional conditions through which political-cultural premises are rendered as 
meaning systems. In other words, meaningful cultural and political claims are 
informed both by a significant past and a present which is continuously being 
transformed. On this view, the past shapes the present order and the legitimacy of 
claims. According to Elias, we cannot look at the political culture of a society from 
the perspective of the present. What matters for the present (social constructivist) 
argument is that the ‘long continuum of changes’ and the cultural integration process 
are no longer entirely linked to the space of the nation-state but to its transformation.   
Secondly, cultural integration as postwestern and postnational 
transformation. A social constructivist perspective draws attention to the emergence 
of two axis of cultural integration: postwestern and postnational. I will not deal with 
the question whether or not these forms of cultural integration can be an idealistic 
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model for Eastern European societies. It will suffice to mention that cultural 
integration does not refer to a fixed cultural model, to a rigid cultural perfection. My 
aim is to introduce an explanatory theoretical model for cultural integration by 
presenting some hypotheses on the cultural dimension of European integration.  
Thirdly, cultural integration as reconstruction of societal identities. 
Another particular aspect of cultural integration to which is given considerable 
attention in the study of Eastern Europe is the changing nature of societal identities. I 
assume that the social construction of reality is attributed meaning in on-going 
processes in which each individual takes part (Searle, 1995). The process of cultural 
integration refers to the process of reconstruction of societal identities in former 
communist societies. Self-images are reconstructed according to specific needs for 
meaning in a given time and place. The cultural integration model explains how 
historical views change and societal identities emerge by focusing on processes of 
social construction. Cultural integration does not mean reproduction of existing 
cultural models; rather it is re-adaptation of ideas so that they fit their carriers 
(Stråth, 2000), that is to give meaning. This can explain why the process of cultural 
integration has as its point of departure the construction of ‘here and now’ by carriers 
who search for meaning within their own culture (Schutz and Luckmann, 1989). 
When old ideas and meaning no longer serve their agents, these elements are re-
adapted, but always within a specific social context. The cultural integration model 
refers to the dynamic interrelation between the culture of carriers, existing societal 
identities and the social context in which the process of cultural integration takes 
place. The next sections will deal with the cultural integration model and its impact 
on the interpretation of societal identities from a social constructivist perspective.  
3.4. Unpacking the Cultural Integration Model: Towards 
Postwesternization and Postnationalism 
To begin with, a model should make complex processes and structures easier to 
understand. My aim is to explain central aspects of the on-going changes with the 
help of two dimensions of the cultural integration model: postwestern and 
postnational.  
Whereas recent research on Eastern European societies replaces the 
concept of transition with the concept of transformation (Illner, 1999; Sztompka, 
1999), older research deals with transition towards a Western European model and 
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democratization (Dahrendorf, 1990; Habermas, 1990). The new theoretical approach 
towards understanding how Eastern European countries are responding to the 
transformation of Europe and at the same time how they are dealing with the 
reconstruction of their own societal order has been for some time now in the making 
(Delanty, 2003c; Wagner, 2002, 2004; Delanty and Rumford, 2005; Rumford, 2006a; 
Therborn, 2006). Theorists have become much more aware of the complexity of 
integration, Europeanization, and postcommunism (Borinski and Wagner, 2002; 
Outhwaite and Ray, 2005). As argued in the previous chapter, the study of integration 
requires a different, more open, and decentred cultural model. Such a model will be 
developed further. 
Given the focus of this chapter, it is crucial to establish whether the 
process of cultural integration in Eastern European societies reflects the development 
of a trans-national cultural model or contributes to the creation of a distinctively new 
cultural model. Finally, one may also consider the compatibility of such an emergent 
model with the already existing cultural models at national level. Some may argue 
that the problem with the notion of cultural model is that it is static whilst the process 
itself is dynamic. If used imprudently, then, it may serve to reify, and therefore to 
prejudge. Yet, as a heuristic term it does have some advantages reminding us that, 
while there has been, and remains much difference between national cultures 
throughout the post-1989 period, there are some overall cultural trends affecting these 
societies.  
Some preliminary remarks are necessary. Firstly, while it is precarious to 
use the broad sense of a common ‘cultural model’ for all former communist societies 
(from Beck's perspective I would be guilty of 'methodological nationalism'132), used 
cautiously the term may provide a useful heuristic. Methodological nationalism gives 
rise to particular theoretical and methodological difficulties when dealing with post-
1989 transformation. Given my focus on cultural integration and in order to show 
how postwesternization and postnationalism shape the on-going transformation 
process in postcommunist societies I suggest joining Beck’s ‘methodological 
cosmopolitanism’ (Beck, 2002). This methodological concept helps me surmount 
methodological nationalism and build a framework of analysis for the dynamics of 
                                           
132 The term ‘methodological nationalism’ “can be defined as the by explicit or implicit assumptions 
about the nation-state as the container of social processes and the national order as the key to the 
understanding of major social, economic and political processes” (Beck, 2001: 182-183). 
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cultural integration. On this view, the local (that is culturally specific) and the 
transnational are mutually constitutive. From this perspective development is rather 
seen in terms of transformation.   
This section looks at a cultural integration model which is not to be 
reduced to a certain nation. As Delanty suggests, “cultural models are embodied in 
institutional frameworks and are related to particular forms of material life that have 
evolved over time” (Delanty, 2003c: 15). The mission of ‘belonging’ and ‘becoming’ 
European takes two main directions in former communist societies: postwestern 
direction, on the one hand, and postnational direction, on the other. To follow 
Michnik’s exposition of postcommunism, this part of Europe is facing a great conflict 
of two spiritual cultures. 
One of these cultures says, ‘Let us join Europe’ and respect European standards, 
while the other says, ‘Let us go back to our national roots’ and build an order 
according to our national particularity. They are spiritual, rather than political, 
camps, and they express themselves as a dispute over culture, not politics 
(Michnik, 1990: 4). 
Looking at the cultural core of postcommunist transformations, Sztompka notes that 
there are mainly three cultural traditions in Eastern Europe: the first one is what he 
calls a ‘bloc culture’, “based on a philosophy of dependence instead of self-reliance, 
of all-embracing collectivism and conformity, of rigidity and of intolerance”133; the 
second is formed by the national culture; and the third one refers to the existence of a 
Western culture (even if repressed under communism, its main features survived). 
The changes in ex-communist societies raise the question of cultural 
integration in several ways, in particular whether these societies are to become like 
the rest of Europe or whether they are changing in different ways from the western 
Europe, or whether they move in a direction of postwestern and postnational 
integration along with the rest of Europe. An important claim of this chapter is that 
both at European level and within the individual Eastern European societies we find 
tendencies towards postwestern and postnational integration, and these apparently 
opposing trends co-exist at the same time. These integrative trends are especially 
pronounced around societal identities.  
While the final analytical ambition is to examine both models in the 
context of former communist societies, the analysis will also be dependent on the 
                                           
133 Boje et al., 1999: 17. 
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general theoretical understanding of these two directions. When analyzing the process 
of cultural integration one should consider the dynamic interrelation between four 
elements: the social agents that are the carriers of a societal identity, the social 
context in which carriers apply such ideas, the existing ideas on Europe and the 
available historical codes for societal identity. These issues can only be answered 
analytically and this is a key purpose for the development of the cultural integration 
model.  
The postwestern and postnational visions with regard to the cultural 
integration model will be depicted below. These sections will answer the following 
questions: What are the specificities of the postwestern and postnational types of 
cultural integration? And which are the consequences of such specificities on societal 
identities? May we better understand Eastern European societies by considering that 
it is going through a double sided integration? That is, on the one hand, systemic 
integration which includes the adaptation of the EU rules at national level, and, on the 
other hand, the most obvious change (at societal level), towards becoming 
increasingly postwestern and postnational. Let us proceed. 
3.4.1. Postwestern Integration  
Based on Delanty and Rumford’s conception of postwestern Europe, it is very 
tempting to develop the argument of postwestern integration as a cultural model in 
which a postwestern society comes into existence. From the perspective of 
postwesternization, Eastern Europe is changing at the same time Europe is changing. 
Postwesternization brings Eastern Europe and Europe closer and not necessarily 
because of the EU. Against the East-West distinction, Eastern Europe and Europe 
have become one. The term ‘Western’ has ceased to divide Europe, civilization, 
cultures and values. We can no longer speak of Europe as synonym for the West. 
Particularly the latest enlargement is the evidence that the EU balance of power is 
moving eastwards. “The enlargement of the EU towards Euroasia (…) will bring with 
it a reconfiguration of politics and the shaping of a post-western Europe” (Delanty, 
2003c: 14). Former communist societies are fully absorbed in the European reality. I 
suggest that rethinking Eastern Europe along the lines of the postwestern integration 
model sheds light on the process of change and clarify our understanding of its 
dynamics. The view of the new postwestern culture as a ‘patchwork’ of European and 
local adjustments, in a constant redefinition of meanings may help redefine the 
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emerging societal identities. Or as Göran Therborn put it, “[a]ny dialogue today on 
the traditional conception of East and West cannot escape the decisive Cold War 
transformation of it” (Therborn, 2006: 2).  
Linked to postwesternization is the theme of ‘multiple modernities’ 
(Eisenstadt, 2000; Therborn, 2003; Delanty and Rumford, 2005). The idea of multiple 
modernities suggests that modernity can no longer be theorized as a singular path of 
transformation. This understanding of modernity moves away from conceptualizing 
‘postcommunism’ as merely a historical intermezzo, where further progress entails a 
rapprochement with the ‘main pattern’, i.e. the Western model. Moreover, the reality 
that emerged after the end of the Cold War fails to sustain the ‘convergence’ of the 
Eastern bloc. These societies should be seen as distinct from one another, with their 
own specific interpretations of ‘imaginary significations of modernity’ (Castoriadis, 
1987). From the perspective of ‘multiple modernities’, each society has its own 
specificity and its own projects of modernity. 
The underlying conception of ‘multiple modernities’ is much more 
flexible and sensitive to societal transformation than the singular view on modernity. 
For Eisenstadt, the idea of multiple modernities assumes that “the best way to 
understand the contemporary world – indeed to explain the history of modernity – is 
to see it as a story of continual constitution and reconstitution of a multiplicity of 
cultural programs” (Eisenstadt, 2000: 2). There is not one project of modernity but 
several and this allows for greater diversity and differentiation among Eastern 
European societies. Most of all, the perspective of multiple modernities should enable 
us to see that modernity can no longer be read as a homogeneous progress towards 
final integration. This makes modernity more open to interpretations. This 
observation sees modernity as a condition under which conflicts and tensions among 
social agents are at stake. The concept of ‘universalization’ of societies according to a 
unique pattern must be rejected in order to elaborate on the idea of 
postwesternization.     
According to Delanty and Rumford, the making of a postwestern Europe 
will lead to “a reconfiguration and reconstruction of modernities” (Delanty and 
Rumford, 2005: 49) where former communist societies will play a major role in 
shaping them. Delanty and Rumford argue that the “dynamics of fragmentation 
versus autonomy suggests that Europe is not necessarily becoming more unitary or 
cohesive” (Delanty and Rumford, 2005: 26). Apparently, Eastern European countries, 
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no longer dominated by the West, have started to develop a global and a ‘new’ 
orientation towards the east. Seventeen years ago these things were difficult to 
imagine.  
Postwestern integration is not an articulated kind of integration. The idea 
that Europe is becoming postwestern (Delanty, 2003c, 2006a; Delanty and Rumford, 
2005; Therborn, 2006) refers to the encounter between the (former communist) local 
and national with the European. If I agree to the idea that a postwestern European 
society may exist or is in the process of formation, then this implies that the model 
that can explain cultural integration in Eastern Europe is postwestern integration. 
Postwestern integration can be understood as a reflexive relation between Eastern 
European societies and Europe. As I will argue in the case of Romania, 
postwesternization (in the sense of postwestern dynamics of cultural integration) is 
likely to have rather different impacts upon culturally specific national models. 
Particular constructions of postwesternization still vary in line with different national 
environments.   
The postwestern dimension of Eastern European societies reflects their 
dynamics. The obvious transformation of Eastern European societies does not mean 
some overall cohesion or uniformity. The idea of European modernity is linked to the 
postwestern integration model. “With the new inter-civilizational encounters, major 
shifts in modernity occur. This is precisely what is happening today: major social 
transformations in modernity are leading to a reconfiguration of the European 
civilizational configuration” (Delanty and Rumford, 2005: 43). However difficult it is 
to reconcile ‘post-Eastern’ tradition with postwestern forces, postwesternization in 
Eastern Europe will eventually lead to recognition of the cultural diversity of Europe. 
There is no doubt that after the downfall of communism, Eastern democracies 
suddenly found themselves without the Other and in need of new and resurrecting 
sources of legitimation. In the era of postwesternization these sources allow them to 
create justifications for embracing other goals than ‘we are Western’ or ‘against 
communism’ and fill in the vacuum of institutions with a postwestern assignment. 
After reviewing the ways in which cultural integration and postwestern vision on 
Eastern European transformation are typically associated, next section looks at the 
emergence of a postnational type of integration.  
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3.4.2. Postnational Integration 
I shall situate my analysis of the postnational vision on cultural integration with 
presumptions about borders, modernity, and reflexivity (Beck et al., 1994). I start by 
engaging with some of the theoretical debates on postnationalism. To analyse the 
emerging postnational society in meaningful terms, I have to define what postnational 
is and elaborate on its role in shaping the current process of transformation. As Curtin 
argues persuasively, “the ‘post’ in ‘postnational’ is meant to express the idea that 
democracy is possible beyond the nation-state: what is being left behind in terms of 
political identity is the link with nationalism in the sense of cultural integration” 
(Curtin, 1997: 51).  
In the most general sense ‘postnational’ is about separating cultural 
traditions (i.e. nationalist ideology) from political institutions (i.e. constitutional 
norms). Postnational integration in Habermasian terms is not separated from loyalty 
towards discursive principles of democracy. ‘Postnational’, then, implies a 
commitment to the discourse of civil and human rights. Habermas talks explicitly 
about ‘postnational constellation’ that is a sort of constitutional nationalism where the 
loyalty is not simply towards a nationalist ideology or a territory, but towards the 
civic values which are embedded in the constitution and in a shared political culture. 
Habermas has put this concisely, “the initial impetus to integration in the direction of 
a postnational society is not provided by the substratum of a supposed ‘European 
people’ but by the communicative network of a European-wide political public 
sphere” (Habermas, 1998: 153).  
It is useful to distinguish between different aspects of postnationalism: 
first, the institutional dimension. In the case of Eastern Europe, this dimension of 
postnationalism comes mainly from being incorporated into the EU and other 
European normative systems. Indeed, Eastern European countries’ membership to the 
EU becomes particularly significant within this postnational framework as they will 
have to meet the demands of becoming a member and submit to regulatory policy 
making. But there is also a second dimension that has to do with the nature and 
structure of communities. In the sense, that community issues should be depicted 
politically in plural rather than singular terms. Furthermore, one should not neglect 
the transnational linkages between the new member states, increasing mobility, 
networks and flows enable new forms of identification to develop and point all in a 
postnational direction. For Deirdre Curtin, “[w]hen one refers to a postnational 
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context, we must think of the link between the new means of communication offered 
by cyberspace and the exercise of imagining ‘communities’ where borders are 
irrelevant” (Curtin, 1997: 60). In other words, ‘postnational’ articulates the idea that 
“the link implied by nationalism between cultural integration and political integration 
can be prised open” (Curtin, 1997: 51). The new communication technologies can 
ease imagination beyond national borders, thus constructing postnational identity. 
This is potentially the modern way of integrating, leading to imagined communities.  
As such, postnationalism has emerged as a response to global and 
transnational transformations in Europe. As Jo Shaw (1999: 587) has suggested, 
postnationalism is an attempt to recuperate and rethink some of the central values of 
nationalism (i.e. the negative sense of exclusion). There is much to suggest that there 
are enough developments to warrant the label of postnationalism (e.g. the declining 
significance of the nation-state, the changing approach to interethnic relations and to 
minority rights). The transition from a communist order to a postnational order brings 
about the coexistence of the nation-state society with the postnational society. In this 
light both postnationalism and nationalism can be seen, not as essentially opposed to 
each other, but as co-existing. Postnationalism expresses the idea of transformation in 
relation to the nation state because of changes within the nation-state.  
The question of postnational order cannot be ignored, particularly in the 
new democratic societies which are constantly threatened by their own past. Indeed, 
this is what Tismãneanu (2002) illustrates by stating that the threats of 
postcommunism are part of the Eastern democracy. Tismãneanu sees as relevant the 
following threat factors that can obstruct the road to an open society in Eastern 
Europe. The first threat factor follows the Marxist idea that all new societies cannot 
ignore their origins in terms of habits, mores, visions and mentalities. In other words, 
ex-communist societies experience the confusion and uncertainty of the reinvention 
of their politics. “We are witnessing the explosion of a long-obsolete model of liberal 
democracy that can no longer accommodate our dynamic, complex societies with 
their sophisticated electorates of vast diversity and highly differentiated interests” 
(Tismãneanu, 2002: 87). The question is, if this phenomenon is exclusively Eastern 
European? It does not seem so if one looks at the waves of xenophobic populism in 
i.e. Austria, Switzerland, and Denmark.  
The second threat factor refers to the influence of the past. This 
argument refers to certain signs of disillusionment such as: intellectual stupor, moral 
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disarray, frustrations and yearning for the ‘magic saviour’. What was left after 1989 
was a cultural chaos in which old precommunist and communist cultural constructs 
re-emerge often irrationally. With the failure of the communist political culture, 
political commitments and affiliations are fluid and unstable. Many established 
values and ‘icons’ have dissipated. Social memory has become discontinuous. There 
is very little or no public trust and only a vague appreciation of the need for a shared 
vision of the public good (Tismãneanu 2002). For Martin Palous, “the most important 
and most dynamic factor in post-totalitarian politics has to do with the way people in 
postcommunist societies perceive and conceptualize the social reality and political 
processes they are a part of”134. Radical tendencies inherited from communism such 
as intolerance, exclusiveness, corruption and the search for charismatic leadership 
still exist in certain countries, including Romania. This tendency is also linked to an 
increasing nostalgia for the communist regime. This trend is especially exploited by 
radical nationalist parties, e.g. the Greater Romania Party.  
The disintegration and instability of most of the political parties as result 
of the crisis of values and authority represents the third threat factor. For example, 
Romanians are regretting not Ceauşescu as a leader, but rather the predictability and 
the stability of communism, when the party-state was taking care of everything. This 
threat refers to the fragility of the political class. This is, according to Tismãneanu, 
the consequence of weak and corrupted political élite that has no definite values, and 
no clear programmes. An example is the short existence of most political parties in 
former communist societies135.  
From a postnational perspective, norms and values are fragmented and 
the role of state has been weakened. This might led to the formation of postnational 
societal identities. As it is best depicted in Delanty and Rumford’s work, “national 
identities are increasingly taking on a postnational form; they are compatible with 
multiple identities and require identification only with the limited values of the 
demos” (Delanty and Rumford, 2005: 105). Moreover, the claims for the necessity of 
a post-national integration stems from the fact that the nation has been “overcome by 
a post-national order” (Delanty and Rumford, 2005: 92). In other words, the nation-
state has outlived its role; as a consequence, societal integration has to be conducted 
                                           
134 Palous, 1993: 162-3.  
135 For example, in Romania from seventy-three parties in 1990 (Roper, 2000: 67), there were only 
fifty-one (including eighteen ethnic-minority parties) registered as of February 2006 (www.gov.ro). 
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in a ‘postnational constellation’. After the enlargement Europe “has been troubled by 
rising xenophobia and cultural backlashes, fuelled by fears of immigration (Holmes, 
2000)” (Delanty and Rumford, 2005: 29). These developments have raised the issues 
of culture and identity, “as to the cultural form of Europe” (Delanty and Rumford, 
2005: 29).  
The fragmenting effects of nationalism lie at the heart of the debate on 
postnational integration. The first level of such a postnational transformation is 
recognition. “To recognize the Other is (…) to acknowledge that, while we act in 
different situations, we all make the same efforts at combining instrumentality and 
identity” (Touraine, 1998: 172-173). This postnational recognition requires 
institutional preconditions, “without which the individual would be unable to 
construct him or herself into a Subject (Touraine, 1998: 173)”. It is thanks to the 
recognition of diversity and reconciliation of conflicts that Eastern Europe has 
become postnational.  
3.5. Consequences of Cultural Integration on Societal Identities  
In this section, I will be concerned with the way societal identities in Eastern Europe 
relate to the process of cultural integration. The section emphasises the social 
construction of identity and analyses the consequences of cultural integration on 
societal identities. My hypothesis is that the driving forces of cultural integration are 
postwestern and postnational and that identity formation takes place under constant 
influence from these forces.  
Today former communist societies are in a state of change. Societal 
identities are struggling to find a balance between pre-communist and communist 
heritage and the realities of the twenty-first century. The question is: what kind of 
societal identity are these societies adopting? To answer this question, one needs to 
look at the social imaginary (i.e. the way social agents imagine their project of social 
change) of these societies. The historical locus of this imaginary has often provided 
one of the means by which national identity has been constructed. Maybe it is the 
place to note that to these societies the term ‘Eastern Europe’ is perceived as rather 
discriminatory, as a loss of identity. The 1989-1990 revolutions rose not only for 
economic reasons, but also for a historical recognition of their societal identity 
(Tismãneanu, 1992). There is of course a trend of integration into the European 
framework of political and economic standardization. But culturally these societies 
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remain fragmented. For the moment, having escaped the constraints of a false 
ideological unity, the Eastern European countries are in search of new societal 
identities.  
My analysis refers to the two constructions of societal identity: 
postwestern and postnational. The first one, postwestern, refers to the construction of 
a societal identity around the process of reviving the ties to the new East (e.g. 
Moldova, Ukraine). In their search for a (new) postwestern societal identity, former 
communist societies have overcome the identity-crisis about the East. This identity 
has a postwestern vocation even if sometimes the shaping of such an identity seems 
more a target than a reality. There is a strong link between these two sides of identity 
(national and postwestern) in that the former has consequences upon the latter. 
Liberated from Soviet ideology and communist community, it was easy to foresee 
that the newly Eastern European democratic states would be looking for a societal 
identity of their own. It is not difficult to foresee from this perspective the emergence 
of a postwestern identity “embodied in the pluralized cultural models of a societal 
identity rather than as a supra-national identity or an official EU identity that is in a 
relation of tension with national identities” (Delanty and Rumford, 2005: 23). A 
second reconstruction of societal identity refers to the postnational societal identity. 
This societal identity is constructed around the normative identification with 
democratic and constitutional norms which has been suppressed by the communist 
regimes. Postnational identity is the expression of a ‘legal identity’ (Habermas, 1998) 
based not on national or cultural traditions but on normative principles of diversity.  
The process of cultural integration shatters the boundaries within which 
all previous and traditional forms of identity were constructed. Indeed postnational 
integration (in a Habermasian sense) challenges societal identities and their 
traditional structures. Living in an open society whose boundaries are disappearing, 
challenges the traditional social structures and forms of collectivity. Postnationalism 
challenges also the cultural independence of societal identities. A lot of individuals 
have difficulties in accepting the new postnational identity as determinate. The 
majority of those who do not win from the resources of economic transformation see 
postnational integration as an external threat. Cultural integration makes them feel 
insecure. One issue that concerns many ex-communist societies, including Romania, 
is whether taking part in the cultural integration process will allow preservation of the 
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Romanian societal identity and traditional values which make Romanians 
differentiate from other societies.  
An ideal society is one where social cohesion includes all members and 
gives equal opportunities. The space where societal identities develop contains 
central values of society. There might be claims that these societies are highly 
corrupted in a negative sense, but people have experienced that it made sense to bribe 
for less waiting time at the doctor or to get a better position; then corruption becomes 
the public norm. As Eisenstadt has written, there is a lack of critical thinking and 
participation that would help to organize the public space more harmoniously 
(Eisenstadt, 2001). There is also a lack of self-reflection in their identity, as Giddens 
(1991) pointed out. This lack of reflection makes identities fragile and not aware of 
risk and its consequences. 
3.5.1. Postwestern Identity 
Research into societal identities in ex-communist societies suggest that identities 
actively drive social change and influences the appearance of new social structures 
and relationships which reflect the desires and efforts towards what individuals want 
to become. Individuals today in Eastern Europe want difference, change, and 
individualization. The meanings of the traditional social structures and the pressure 
from major groups such as class and nation are forced to withdraw. It might be said 
that societal identity is moving in a postwestern direction of development. For them 
culture, ethnicity, nationality and state no longer stigmatise their societal identity. 
Rather, they are non-compulsory forms of association which individuals choose for 
themselves.  
When analysing the emergence of the postwestern identity, the issue of 
European identity cannot be avoided. This section makes a distinction between 
European identity and EU identity. This division is as important as between European 
integration and Europeanization. Members of Eastern European societies might feel 
they belong to Europe, but not to the EU. “European identity is not a given or falls 
from heaven; it is a specific construct in time and space whose content actually 
changes depending on the social and political context in which it is enacted” (Risse, 
2004: 171). 
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Through a cross-country data136 analysis concentrated on several cultural 
dimensions such as language, religion, and popular culture, David D. Laitin (2000) 
argues that Eastern European societies share a pan-European identity. This identity is 
complementary to their national identity. Therefore Laitin concludes that “the 
incorporation of the East European states into the EU, from a cultural point of view, 
has a greater potential for the deepening of European integration than for its erosion” 
(Laitin, 2000: 2). He links this outcome with the idea of postwesternization of 
European cultural modernity. In his opinion, the tensions of peripheralization will 
encourage East Europeans to support a deepening of European integration process.  
According to Schöpflin, the emergence of an Eastern European identity 
is “a viable way of re-Europeanizing the area (…) of recovering some of the values, 
ideals, aspirations, solutions and practices that were eliminated by the Soviet-type 
systems”137. In parallel, Tamás Hofer, from a Hungarian perspective develops a 
notion of common European identity from the idea of Europe as a single cultural 
whole, with a diversity of links that even the Cold War years could not dissever 
(Hofer 1994). Hofer argues for the Western orientation of Eastern Europeans and for 
the association of Eastern Europe with Western values and liberal democracy, 
distinctive from those of Russia. Similarly, Garton Ash highlights on the preservation 
of “major elements of western traditions (western Christianity, the rule of law, 
separation of powers, constitutional government and civil society)” (Ash, 1989: 250) 
although included at different times in Austro-Hungarian, Prussian German and 
Russian empires.  
Postwestern integration involves a very distinct mode of construction of 
the boundaries of societal identities than simply western. Since an important element 
in the construction of these identities has been the self-perception of Western society, 
the making of a postwestern identity is linked to reconfiguration of politics after the 
end of the Cold War. The major issue here is not how much Eastern European 
countries have catched-up with the West, but the impact of the centre-periphery 
relations on their societal identities. From a postwestern perspective, enlargement 
means a major transformation not only for Eastern Europe (which can not be viewed 
as a periphery any longer), but for Europe as a whole. With the assimilation of 
                                           
136 The cross country data for language and religion are based on surveys conducted by the 
International Social Survey Program (ISSP); full details are available at 
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu. 
137 quoted in Neumann, 1993: 354. 
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Eastern Europe into the EU, it has become more problematical to preserve the project 
of a ‘Fortress Europe’ (Delanty, 2000b).  
The end of the East-West division has brought about a rethinking of 
former communist relations to the East and of their own role in the world (i.e. the 
transatlantic relations). With the reopening of the traditional Eastern border, Eastern 
Europe has experienced a new stance of openness, this time towards the new East and 
the global. However, it has not always been an easy task to reconcile the changes 
produced by the new conditions of openness with the internal cultural traditions (i.e. 
nationalism). Anxieties, hesitant approaches, ambivalence, and antinomies have also 
featured the making of a postwestern societal identity in the former East.  
The postwestern articulation of the societal identity conveys itself 
within, and beyond national identities. The assimilation of Eastern Europe into the 
EU requires recognition of difference (Habermas 1998). According to Thomas Risse 
(2004), there are three ways of conceptualizing the relationship between European 
identity and other identities. The first way is to conceptualize this relationship as 
nested, “conceived of as concentric circles, or Russian Matruska dolls, one inside the 
next” (Risse, 2004: 168). My identity as a Romanian is nested in a national one which 
is nested in my European one. Then Risse suggests that identities can be cross-
cutting; this means that members of one identity group can be member of another 
identity group. The last way, is represented by the marble cake model of multiple 
identities. This model refers to the fact that “various components of an individual’s 
identity cannot be neatly separated on different levels”138.   
The European dimension of various societal identities in Eastern Europe 
is to be seen in the competing conceptions of Europe and identity present in the 
political discourses or within their political cultures. It is these cultural and political 
dynamics created by integration that allow changes in the societal identity, even if 
this identity is rooted in collective memory and a self-defined community. Delanty’s 
idea that societies are being converted into more and more diversified and less and 
less territorialized entities is also valid in the case of former communist societies. 
National identities 
are becoming more decentred, liquid and reflexive in their awareness of their 
limits, and through societal cross-fertilisation more and more mixed. The 
European space has grown to the extent that it is no longer possible to say what is 
                                           
138 Risse, 2004: 168. 
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national and what is European. In Europe today, there is no national identity that 
exists on the level of a simple collective identity, i.e., an identity that is 
underpinned by a particular social group. All national identities are becoming 
more like societal identities, that is, broadly defined cultural categories (Delanty 
2003a: 78).  
The relationship between the former communist nations – partly constructed and 
imagined - and Europe is much more complex than in perspectives that see it as based 
on the European market. One example is Mary Fulbrook (1992: 10) who imagines a 
possible scenario according to which postsoviet national identities would be 
transformed into a European identity. In this sense, identity refers rather to 
aspirations and images. In the context of Eastern European societies, Europe is a real 
space where they have always belonged to but European identity is imaginary, found 
only at the level of ideal. The ideal of a postwestern identity leaves enough room for 
optimistic assumptions. By looking too much at the differences between the old and 
new Europe, one runs the risk of making unclear the fact that the basis of their 
societal identities is still European. In many ways Eastern European countries regard 
themselves as the preserver of the traditional European culture.  
According to Castells, there is no European identity (Castells, 1998: 
353). He adds though, that European identity “could be built, not in contradiction, but 
complementary to national, regional, and local identities” (Castells, 1998: 353). 
Castells concludes, however, that “European unification, in a long term perspective, 
requires European identity” (Castells, 1998: 353). Likewise, Eder (2001) sees the 
search for a European identity as “an example of the attempt to create a common 
concern out of the interest-based relations of citizens” (Eder, 2001: 231). The 
problem with constructing a unified notion of European identity comes from the lack 
of cultural integration that could determine the claim for dealing with issues of 
identity. For Eder, this “explains why a common language has been so important in 
the construction of national identities” (Eder, 2001: 231). In the context of European 
integration, though, a common culture cannot function as an integrating mechanism, 
since a common language is missing. The issue of the enlargement has led to the 
innovation of the notion of ‘symbolic borders’ (Eder, 2001: 232).  
To summarise the argument so far, the notion of postwestern identity has 
emerged after the end of the Cold War both in the former East and West and it has 
involved a rethinking of the relations between Eastern Europe and the new East. This 
has contributed to a major shift in the centre of gravity of Europe and in the centre-
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periphery relations. At the same time, the new conditions of openness have redefined 
the new societal identities by reference to the global. One might go so far to suggest 
that the meaningful construction of a new kind of postwestern governance has been a 
means to exert influence on the global and regional level, but also a way to 
accomplish recognition – and thereby escape the complex of inferiority.   
3.5.2. Postnational Identity 
My analysis will refer to a specific context, the rise of a postnational society. A 
sociological insight into Eastern European societies shows that transformations 
caused by cultural integration have a fundamental impact on societal identities. 
“Society appears as incessant, perpetual movement (…) any fact turns out to be an 
event; any agent resolves into action; any state is only a phase in an ongoing process” 
(Sztompka, 1993: 190, 232). The dynamics of postnational identity in this context can 
be better understood by Habermas’s characterization of identity. To follow Delanty 
and Rumford’s exposition of Habermas’ argument, “the identity of a ‘postnational’ 
society can be based only on cultural forms of commonality that accept certain basic 
principles – e.g. procedural rules for conflict resolution, communicative solutions, 
and the limited patriotism of an identification with the constitution (a ‘constitutional 
patriotism’) – rather than on territory, cultural heritage or the state” (Delanty and 
Rumford, 2005: 55-56). The introduction of postnational identity is closely related to 
the division between cultural and political identities. The term ‘postnational identity’ 
is meant to express not only the partition from the nation-state, but it also implies a 
more normative notion of society than implied by traditional social theory. 
Postnational integration is strengthening the civic dimension of societal 
identities. Eastern European societies cannot simply exist on the basis of cultural 
politics of ethnicity or politics of national patriotism. Following Delanty, I argue that 
there are three postnational kinds of governance at work in Eastern Europe: 
regulatory policy making; new networks of communication; and discourses of human 
and minority rights. Unlike in the past when nationalism prevailed, “today it is forced 
to live in a world in which many identities exist” (Delanty, 2000a: 144). Common 
denominators which smooth the progress of postnational integration include an 
enforced civil society, human rights, and democratic values. For instance, Romanian 
societal identity since the collapse of the communism has moved from nationalism to 
a diversity of forms of identity and to new forms of civic collectivity.  
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One could also say that from the raise of communism in Europe till 
today’s nationalistic orientations in European societies, identity has been built on fear 
and denial of the Other. The ‘mécontentement’ of the present, this modern wish of 
always planning for better living, for the future comes also from denigrating the 
present. Communism during its existence in Eastern Europe has tried to completely 
restructure identities and convert them according to a machiavellic plan; to reiterate 
this, “communism’s ambition was to seize the hinterland and build steel towns from 
nothingness, inhabited by a new breed of Homo Sovieticus” (Joppke, 1996: 20). 
However, cultural traditions and nationalist ideology have been put into question 
after the end of the communist rule. The postnational perspective would argue that 
cultural traditions cannot survive the postcommunist condition of Europe.  
This is related to Cederman’s position (2000). Cederman’s constructivist 
perspective on the process of identity-formation entails manipulation of cultural 
symbols. Cederman centres his analysis on the notion of ‘bounded integration’. 
‘Bounded integration’ emphasizes the ‘staying power of nationalism’ (Cederman, 
2000: 14) and “explains why a corporate identity is indeed unlikely to form on the 
supranational level” (Cederman, 2000: 27). His assumption is that “the modern nation 
constitutes an abstractly and categorically constituted ‘imagined community’”139. 
Even ‘imagined’, national identities “take on an objective character often quite 
resistant to change” (Cederman, 2000: 14). Cederman’s constructivist approach to 
political identities concentrates on the demos debate, even if, in principle, his 
‘bounded integration’ concept does not leave out the possibility of identities being 
“bounded and ‘sticky’ without being based on ethnic principles” (Cederman, 2000: 
21).  
For Joppke, the postcommunist problematique is to redraw state 
boundaries so that they include historical nations. However, such an assessment 
ignores two facts. The first is that not only Eastern European countries are 
continually changing but Europe is also under transformation (Wagner’s concept of 
‘double synchronicity’ describes best these dynamics). Or as Outhwaite and Ray 
applied the idea, ‘we are all postcommunis now’ in the sense that the end of 
communism affects us all. The second fact is the role of their history: coming into 
terms with the past, as we shall discuss later, is one of the main characteristics of 
postcommunism (see also Sakwa, 1999: 4). Their societal identity has suffered 
                                           
139 Cederman, 2000: 14. 
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essential conversions since 1989. Identity-building has been as much conditioned by 
the legacy of communism as by the legacy of precommunist nationhood, but also by 
identification with democratic norms that are not longer confined to the nation-state. 
For instance, human and minority rights are no longer left up to the nation-state issue 
in these societies, but they have moved beyond the nation-state. This also implies that 
postnational identity “is compatable with multi-identities, since constitutional 
patriotism requires identification only with normative principles of argumentation” 
(Delanty, 2000a: 115). 
The 1989 Revolutions constitute the most dramatic, and presumably the 
most successful attempt in contemporary history to put into practice on a macro-
societal scale the postnational vision of Europe. Central to these events were the ideal 
of a united Europe and the emancipation of eastern societies from the restraints of 
traditional political and cultural communist authority. Such a process required several 
dimensions: first, reflexivity; second, dynamic re-construction of society. This 
integration encouraged also a strong participation of all members of society in the 
creation of social and political order. As Sakwa put it, “postcommunism is a multi-
faceted, heterogeneous phenomenon shot through with paradoxes while at the same 
time revealing the underlying paradigmatic shifts, not only in theory but also in 
reality, of our times”140.  
3.6. Concluding Remarks on the Cultural Integration Model 
The above propositions have drawn attention to those features of cultural integration 
that, I believe, have emerged lately in Eastern European societies. As a constructivist 
process, cultural integration can be seen as a form of “reflexive creation in which the 
entire process produces its very own terms” (Delanty and Rumford, 2005: 12). 
Understanding the complexity of the process, the link with the recent as well as with 
the more distant history of these societies, awareness of the open-endedness of 
transformation as well as of its irregular path in different countries should all add to a 
more partial and constructivist analysis of what is taking place in Eastern Europe. 
Cultural integration in Eastern European societies does not refer to cultural 
uniformity. The contemporary postwestern and postnational trends of cultural 
integration augment cultural pluralization and make it particularly important to 
                                           
140 Sakwa, 1999: 7. 
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develop the ability to accept the Other and to co-operate across national and cultural 
borders. The question is: can the two models co-exist? The answer is yes. 
Postwestern and postnational forms of integration are not exclusive but interwined. A 
distinction should be made at this point: postwestern and postnational are theoretical 
perspectives and not daily terms that social agents operate with. These perspectives 
are most likely unknown to the social agents. My argument has been that postwestern 
and postnational integration did not entail the disappearance of nationalism and 
westernization.      
The chapter has also argued that it is useful to analyse Eastern European 
transformation from a constructivist perspective. Social constructivism provides an 
appealing framework as it consents to make connections between Europeanization 
and cultural integration by looking at the consequential effects on societal identities. 
Constructivism places much more emphasis on ideational factors than other theories 
of integration. However, it is worth writing that no theory can fully confine the 
complexity of Eastern European societies. These societies remain indebted to their 
past ‘social imaginaries’ and orientations that have developed after the revolutions of 
1989. As Tismãneanu positively noted, “the good news is that the ongoing transitions 
take place simultaneously with the reinvention of Europe, and that the ideal of a 
united Europe is one of the most contagious and magnetic models these countries 
have ever dealt with” (Tismãneanu, 2002: 96). 
Finally the chapter looked at the cultural integration model and its 
implications for the societal identities. Cultural integration is reinforcing domestic 
conditions, national cultures, traditions, and politics, but is also changing them. 
Another important consequence of cultural integration is that Eastern European 
countries are being brought into new relations with each other and with Europe, 
creating new alliances and enmities, and recreating themselves under the new 
context. All in all ex-communist societies have witnessed major changes in their 
societal identities. These changes remain indebted both to their past and orientations 
that have developed after the revolutions of 1989, but also to wider transformations 
(i.e. globalization). The question is whether the traditional ethnic, national and 
cultural boundaries of identity can be expanded without loosing the cultural features 
of their national communities. The conclusion is that no mechanistic answer is 
possible. The more fragmentary and fluid societies become the more difficult it is to 
grasp their realities and fit them into models. 
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The attempt to create the so-called cultural integration model is an effort 
to conceptualize transformation beyond national boundaries of the Eastern European 
societies. It is also an attempt to begin to challenge existing conceptions. The 
framework of cultural integration developed in this chapter goes beyond the idea of 
postcommunism in the sense of cultural identification with communism. As such 
cultural integration is a model applicable to the whole of Europe. Whereas 
postnational dynamics of integration refer to, broadly, identification with 
transnational normative principles, postwestern dynamics suggest that Europe’s 
territorial borders have started to lose their significance internally and externally. 
These trends co-exist with more traditional tendencies (Western and nationalist). Of 
course, much of what I have proposed has hypothetic nature and must be documented 
in the case-study on the Romanian society. As Bauman (1994) argues, it is still too 
early to produce ultimate conclusions since the main feature of these transformations 
is open-endness.  
The preceding chapter has dealt with the depiction of a cultural 
integration model. Although I did not make an explicit argument about linking this 
model to the specifics of a country’s societal dynamics transformation, my discussion 
implied that two elements of cultural integration were formative: postwestern and 
postnational integration. The framework I offer to analyse these transformations 
cease to characterise Europe in terms of the ‘East’ and ‘West’; indeed its applicability 
to Romania in the next chapter is already diminishing the usability of traditional 
approaches to integration. Nevertheless, I believe the model I presented is appropriate 
to analyzing cultural integration in Europe. In what follows I will apply the cultural 





4. Case-Study: Romania and Cultural Integration 
The Forces of Postwesternization and Postnationalism 
 
oving from the cultural integration model elaborated in the previous 
chapter, this chapter offers a specific country perspective on the process 
of transformation as a concrete operationalization of the model. Based on 
the theoretical framework, I will interpret developments in Romania, trying to depict 
the internal dynamics of cultural integration. In the case of Romania mainly two 
forces of cultural integration have come forward after the swift demise of 
communism. Emerged from the new relation between Romania and Europe, these 
forces may be termed ‘postwestern’ and ‘postnational’. 
Political events will serve as the empiric basis for this case-study. It is 
against this background that broad trends of cultural and social development will be 
measured. What makes political elites central to the process of reorganization is their 
intention to reconstruct a new societal order (as ‘initiators’ of the project) and their 
key-role in decision-making that goes beyond an existing societal configuration. As 
the ‘clock of the citizen’ Dahrendorf (1990) lagged behind the institutional 
development, the adaptation to the process of self-identification with Europe proved 
rather problematic. The rather narrow link between Romania’s internal dynamics, 
Europe’s transformations and cultural integration in previous literature on Romania 
leads me to the central purpose of this chapter. That is the concern with situating the 
Romanian process of cultural integration within the context of a postwestern and 
postnational Europe and evaluate its consequences for Romanian societal identity. I 
argue that Romania is integrating itself into a European order, which is itself 
undergoing major transformation. These transformations, subject of intense academic 
debate (Delanty, 2003c, 2006a; Delanty and Rumford, 2005; Outhwaite and Ray, 
2005; Rumford, 2006a), I argue, are crucial in shaping Romanian society and 
identity. By looking at Romania from a cultural integration perspective the 
relationship between Romania and Europe gets a different dynamic than simply 
defining Romania in terms of a (linear) process towards EU membership.  
M 
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Romania is in a continuous process of reconstruction. Its reconstructed 
nature implies that Romanian society can no longer be conceived in terms of the 
‘East’. Moreover, this reconstruction can not be restricted to EU integration or 
Europeanization (understood as convergence in terms of harmonization, 
politicization, and institutionalization). Debates have until recently been dominated 
by Romania’s undergoing transition to the Western European model after the period 
of communism (Ionescu, 1992; Pasti, 1997; Stan, 1997; Negrescu, 2000; Smith, 
2001; Light and Phinnemore, 2001; Jackson, 2001; Cernat, 2002). In fact, it is no 
longer possible to define Romania exclusively in terms of transition and adaptation to 
Western political, economic, and legal institutions. Rather, it is argued that 
Romania’s transformation can only be identified within the context of 
postwesternization and postnationalism. As they relate to Europe as a whole, these 
open-ended processes go beyond EU integration and Europeanization.    
My overall purpose in this chapter is to interpret the process of cultural 
integration from a social theory perspective. When looking at cultural integration 
from this perspective I refer to what F. Peter Wagner (2002: 233) calls the ‘larger 
societal problematic’. That is I try to look beyond the mere problems of transition 
from a state-led command economy to a free market economy – the subject of 
‘mainstream’ studies of Romania – and seek instead to grasp Romania’s distinct 
experience with postwesternization and postnationalism. Linked to this problematic is 
the process of societal identity-formation. In a theorization of which I share the main 
lines, Wagner states that “the consequences of historical-structural, international, and 
regional context of ‘post-state socialism’ therefore present, in each case, an 
Eigendynamik grounded in the challenge to conceive and construct a new societal 
identity” (Wagner, 2004: 59). Eigendynamik is understood here as the unique process 
of change that characterises societal identity formation in the Romanian case as 
opposed to the “linear” understanding usually applied in transition studies. Referring 
to Anderson’s statement that “communities are to be distinguished, not by their 
falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined”141, I take this new 
societal identity as an important element in the process of cultural integration, 
intrinsically related and constructed by the ‘imagined community’, understood as the 
social space shared by the majority of individuals from which social reality emerges. 
                                           
141 Anderson, 1983: 6. 
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That is, the identity that provides meaning to the real existence of its social carriers 
and which exercises demands and constraints on each member of society.  
In order to study how the new societal identity is being shaped by cultural 
integration, this chapter proposes – as mentioned - to focus on how Romania is 
responding to the process of transformation of Europe and at the same time how 
Romania is dealing with the reorganization of its own societal order. Cultural 
integration is highly complex as it operates on multiple levels and involves a double 
dynamic: both reorganization of the existing societal order and its integration into the 
wider European context which itself is under transformation. This main idea helps us 
examine the particularities of the Romanian case, but also to place Romania in a 
wider European context of transformations. This chapter looks at the process of 
societal identity-formation as carried out by social agents in the Romanian national 
context.  
Romania is an example of society where the contemporary debate on 
Europe is in many ways defined by ideas, debates and processes that antedate current 
events. Thus, I argue that Romania’s transformation is best understood when studied 
from a long historical-sociological perspective. History is a necessary precondition 
but not sufficient to explain cultural integration in present-day Romania. History will 
serve as a guideline, rather than amounting to a culturally deterministic assumption 
for the future142. The purpose of the historical-sociological preamble is not to offer an 
alternative account of Romanian historiography. Rather it looks at a partial 
reinterpretation of the dominant features of modernization in order to search for a 
Romanian specificity, by focusing on particularities rather than on commonalities 
with Western modernization.  
In this chapter, I study Romania’s political transformation, which can 
reveal much about a society’s self-image and political culture. After examining 
precommunist and communist stages of political transformation, I will argue that 
after the end of communism Romania’s development is less determined by a ‘classic’ 
                                           
142 In this sense, my analysis does not use ‘path dependence’ theory to explain Romania’s 
transformation and does not consider Romania’s historical ‘path’ as a key condition for change. In 
other words, I do not explain fundamental changes within Romanian society by using arguments 
about ‘path dependence’ and the constraining power of context. In my opinion, the ‘path 
dependence’ argument preserves historical determinism at the expense of admitting the creation of 
new forms of change and the prospects for fundamental transformation (only accepted as opening 
new paths of transformation). Thus, I consider ‘path dependence’ only partly satisfactory and 
ultimately self-negating for the purpose of this case-study.   
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nationalist-Westernization logic of integration; Romania’s transformation is better 
understood through the ideas of postwesternization and postnationalism. 
The analysis is inspired by the latest developments in Europe as well as 
by theoretical and empirical research on Romania (Srubar, 1994; Van Zon, 1994; 
Illner, 1999; Wagner, 2002, 2004; and Blokker, 2004). In particular, the ideas 
expressed by F. Peter Wagner on the transformation in Romania have been useful in 
this regard. Wagner has argued that there is no single path of development and that 
the thesis of ‘double synchronicity’ of the Eastern transformation is more appropriate 
than what has been termed ‘transitology’. While I concur with F. Peter Wagner’s 
thesis, in this chapter I support a different interpretation of these transformations, 
namely that Romanian society has to reconstruct itself to adjust to a postwestern and 
postnational Europe which is itself under ‘great transformation’ (Polanyi, 1944) in 
the wider context of modernity. Europe is redefining itself in a global era with all its 
influences and implication for the new societal identity.   
There are five inter-related arguments that will be developed in my case-
study. First, I argue that the case of Romania can only be viewed as a challenge to 
existing studies of post- 1989 transformation. As the second argument, I will advance 
the thesis that the roots of today’s dynamics of cultural integration can be traced back 
to the Romanian past, including the communist era. According to this thesis, the 
process of reorganization caused by social agents is on-going and is influenced by 
social agents’ already existing understandings. This is not separated from the wider 
situational context which might need re-adjustment based on a rethinking of no 
longer meaningful patterns. Third, I will show how the external dynamics of the 
process of cultural integration encounter internal dynamics in postcommunist 
Romania and explore the consequences of this encounter on the Romanian societal 
identity. Fourth, I argue that looking at cultural integration from a postnational and 
postwestern perspective provides a unique opportunity to see Romania ‘in the 
making’. To illustrate this I will analyse a number of concrete examples. Applying 
the cultural integration approach places the relationship between Romania and the EU 
in a different light. Cultural integration makes Romania less separate from the rest of 
Europe. Finally, and based on the preceding four points, it is argued that cultural 
integration can better explain the complex nature of post-1989 transformation. I 
demonstrate the usefulness of cultural integration and argue thus that the approach 
offers a relevant lens to analyse European transformations.   
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This chapter attempts to add to the debate on what constitutes the new 
societal identity by examining the complexities and the contradictions inherent to the 
process of transformation. The following case-study argues that cultural integration 
has significantly reshaped national identity during the transformation years after 
communism in Romania. To sustain this argument the first part of the case-study 
develops the prerequisites for cultural integration in Romanian history since the 
construction of the Romanian nation state. The second part of the case study 
investigates the various forms of cultural integration that have emerged after 1989 in 
the Romanian society (i.e. postwestern and postnational). The third part considers the 
effects of cultural integration on the Romanian societal identity. Taking all these 
developments together the concluding section of the chapter reflects on the future of 
cultural integration in Romania.       
As will be unveiled below, the case-study on Romania asks for an 
accurate re-evaluation of the conceptions and frameworks that have insofar been used 
in the study of both Europeanization and postcommunist transformation. Against the 
main view of the Eastern European transformation as a process of transition, the 
present analysis draws attention to the fundamental reconstruction problematic that 
the Romanian society has been faced with since the end of communism. If this is 
sustained, it has wider implications for the analysis of Europe and asks for a more 
general perspective on the process of integration. As this case-study will demonstrate, 
without taking cultural integration as a societal problematic,  with its indigenous and 
external context, no rewarding explanation of the forces, dynamics, and outcome of 
cultural integration can be attained. Thus, as argued in the previous chapters, the 
analysis of cultural integration demands an analytical framework that goes beyond 
classical approaches to the study of integration and Europeanization.  
4.1. Second Thoughts on Transformation   
The fall of communism, which also implicitly meant the failure of the communist 
type of societal organization, has created a certain ‘condition of openness’ (Wagner, 
2002: 370). What is at stake in Romania is not only the process of transition as such 
but the whole reconstruction of the Romanian society and its implications for the 
societal identities. As noted in Chapter 3, section 3.1.4. on Postcommunism, the 
importance attached to transition in explaining the process of cultural integration in 
Eastern European societies is generally on the decline. There has been an active 
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debate about the significance of transition, but those who defend the continued 
usefulness of transitology usually do not challenge the idea of ‘declining 
significance’ (Offe, 1991; Sztompka, 1992; Mason, 1996; Linz and Stepan, 1996).  
Much of the previous literature on Romania has looked at the problems of 
making a political transition to democracy and an economic transition to market 
economy (e.g. Light and Phinnemore, 2001). The fundamental premise is that the 
‘democratic market society’ is ‘universally applicable’ (Bönker et al., 2002). This 
perspective has been subject to rising criticism, especially on the basis of its central 
theoretical assumptions (i.e. teleology and singularity). Recently, critics (Wagner, 
2002; Borinksi and Wagner, 2002) have focused on the a-historical nature of these 
approaches (i.e. integration, Europeanization, social change theories), as they ignore 
the diversity in historical-institutional legacies. This critique constitutes my main 
point of departure in the analysis of Romania’s particularism and divergence in the 
process of transformation.   
Romania has been referred to in transition studies as a “problem case”, 
and rather a negative example for the other Eastern European societies. According to 
Wagner (2004), a number of problems in the case of Romania threaten to undermine 
the transition studies framework. In particular, these problems include social tensions, 
partly due to increasing inequality within the Romanian society and massive 
migration to the cities, but is also linked to corruption, insufficient public services 
and rising unemployment as thousands of workers have been laid off in the reform of 
the state-owned sector, while agriculture still displays huge structural under-
employment. Problems which to some extent can be found in all former communist 
countries, but which are particularly present in Romania. Secondly, the transition 
studies framework is not an adequate approach in the case of Romania due to the 
precarious nature of Romania’s political development after 1989 and its internal 
dynamics, including the role of politics and its constructions. Moreover, the transition 
framework cannot grasp the nature of a conflictual society – and the Romanian 
society is highly conflictual today. On the one hand a desire to ‘go postwestern’ and 
integrate into the new European context, and on the other, traditional nationalism. 
Again, counter acting forces which are present in all the transforming societies, but 
which are notably manifest in Romania. 
As already mentioned in Chapter 2 (sections 2.1. and 2.2.), existing 
approaches to integration need to be enhanced as they fail to fully capture the unique 
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characteristics of former communist societies. Since these societies’ transformations 
are multi-dimensional processes, created by entangled components (political, 
economic, social and cultural) cultural integration cannot avoid considering them as 
mutually conditioning both in theory and in the empirical world. According to Illner, 
“there are no such things as purely ‘economic’, ‘constitutional’, ‘political’ or ‘social 
and cultural’ transformations, the real process is always multidimensional – 
sociocultural, economic and political at the same time” (Illner, 1996: 158). While I 
agreed in my theoretical analysis that these components can be separated analytically, 
empirically they are mutually supporting for the simple reason that they occur at the 
same time and are parts of the same transformation process.  
I will give attention to the societal changes and connect them to the 
construction of the new societal identity, thereby attaching the Romanian process of 
transformation to the theoretical framework of cultural integration. One should keep 
in mind this framework as a central part of the general argument. In view of these 
considerations and in the light of the cultural integration process today, a social 
constructivist approach seems an appropriate choice. As Wagner has pointed out, “in 
sustaining the West as a model of development, the transition framework refuses to 
reflect upon its own categories, upholds an East/West divide, and is therefore unable 
to integrate the former East into the new, post-Communist European, international, 
and global context(s)” (Wagner, 2004: 52).  
At this point I need to make an additional note on the so-called ‘social 
agents’ as major carrier of societal transformation. What is meant by ‘social agents’? 
In the case of Romania, social agents refer to a group of decision-makers whose 
specific understandings on the reconstruction of the new societal order play a 
determinant role. Put even more simply, social agents have the ability to inflict their 
views on transformation. For example, in precommunist Romania social agents had 
an important role in putting forward the project of creating Greater Romania, but also 
in imposing their views on modernization in Romania. As to communist period, the 
social agents belonging to nomenklatura adapted well Romania to the new conditions 
according to their own understanding of modernization. Likewise, in present 
Romania political groups – who often have their roots in the communist regime - 
influence the forces and dynamics of transformation thus making a contribution to the 
construction of a new societal order. In Romania the newly created institutions “had 
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to be integrated into a new ‘self-understanding’ of the actors (people) involved”143. 
According to Borinski and Wagner, “[i]t is in this dynamic that we find, among other 
things, the roots of the return of ‘history’, i.e. nationalism, as a powerful means of 
self-clarification” (Borinski and Wagner, 2002: 371). Difficulties in promoting 
reforms and democratic culture were exacerbated by conflict over social agents’ 
understandings of transformation. Conflict came about over the rhythm of reforms, 
their aims and the adoption of the social model and societal identity for Romanians.   
By choosing Romania as a case-study, one is theoretically challenged. As 
pointed out, Romania is rather the exception than the rule. What then explains my 
choosing Romania as case-study? Firstly, Romania is one of the least known and 
least researched societies from Eastern Europe. Yet, with Romanian accession to the 
EU in the near future, the need to enlarge understanding of its particularities will 
increase. Not least because Romania, due to its size, will be a relatively large player 
in the EU’s institutional setup (in any case, the largest of the new coming member 
states after Poland). Secondly, Romania has been perceived at as a ‘hard case’ 
(Borinski and Wagner, 2002). According to Wagner, Romania "has become 
something like a special case in the field of transition studies" enjoying a “position of 
peripheral specialization” (Wagner, 2002: 219). Thirdly, Romania has displayed 
various peculiarities (such as the violence used to get rid of the totalitarian regime or 
the election and re-election of old communists to lead the country) and the large 
difficulties in complying with EU membership conditions. Last but not least, since it 
is my native country, and having experienced the Romanian communist society till 
the age of fourteen, I find Romania to be of particular interest, because I hope to 
make Romania’s problematic post-1989 development more accessible and more 
comprehensible for the outside observer. 
F. Peter Wagner’s recent work examines Romania and the process of 
transformation after 1989 in two prolific studies, ‘EU, NATO and Romania: Beyond 
"Sultanism" (2002) and Sonderweg Romania? (2004). These studies are centrally 
concerned with the links between integration, Romanian society and postcommunist 
transformation. The first article, ‘EU, NATO and Romania: Beyond ‘Sultanism’, 
sheds light on the complex interaction between the external pressure on Romania and 
the bases of the Romanian domestic politics. Taking his concept of ‘Sultanistic 
regime’ from Linz and Stepan (1996), Wagner’s work explores the reasons for 
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Romania’s failure in transition politics and policies through analysing the reinvention 
of politics after communism and the role of the external forces in these changes. It is 
the ambiguity of such a problematic case as Romania that makes Wagner re-examine 
the conceptions and frameworks that have been used in the analysis of the process of 
change in postcommunist societies.    
Wagner questions openly the modernization perspective that has 
dominated the contemporary debate on Romania.  
Modernity and modernization are not anymore, if they ever truly were, self-
understood, nonproblematic notions, they themselves have become highly 
problematic, the centre of concern and investigation… Western scholarship has 
found in Romania an exemplary test-case for the analysis of the development of 
underdevelopment, or the development of a periphery (Wagner, 2004: 58-59).  
Particularly, Wagner questions the Western model of political and economic 
development, arguing for a reinterpretation of some fundamental assumptions in 
transition studies. This also means that the categories by which Romania has been 
analysed are rather tricky. Wagner believes that the case of Romania “challenges the 
basic idea behind transition studies: the idea of a transition” (Wagner, 2004: 51), that 
is a linear movement from a stage A (communism) to a stage B (Western model of 
development), which itself is under profound transformation. Wagner suggests 
instead an alternative transitional framework based on the concept of ‘double 
synchronicity’ to define the dynamics of transformation.  
The present case-study on Romania will proceed as follows: I will start 
with a historical-sociological analysis of the path taken by Romanian society in the 
process of cultural integration; this path can be summed up chronologically in a 
precommunist and a communist Romania that can be considered as prerequisites to 
Romania’s transformation. Subsequently, the precommunist period can be divided in 
terms of four great themes: the construction of the modern Romanian nation-state; the 
early process of integration into Europe; the emergence of nationalism; and civil 
society. Likewise, the depiction of the communist period for analytical purposes can 
be subdivided into four elements: the emergence of Romanian communism; the 
nature of Romanian communism; the communist version of Romanian nationalism, 
and civil society in communist Romania. These highlighted elements of Romania’s 
early modernisation then serve as points of reference when – in the second part of the 
case study – I analyse the transformation of contemporary Romania emphasizing the 
postwestern and postnational aspects of this development. By so doing, I want to 
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stress upon the challenging nature of integration as such, as well as contest the 
hypothesis of convergence often applied by conventional transition studies.  
4.2. Historical Background of Romania’s Transformation: 
Precommunist Society 
Even though ideas concerning the unification of Romanians within one state 
autonomous from foreign rule were circulating in the eighteenth century, these ideas 
became a well defined political project only in the first half of the nineteenth century. 
In the course of the suppression of the Romanian principalities by the Ottoman and 
Habsburg Empire, ideational currents like humanism, the Enlightenment and 
liberalism inspired political writers to form a vision of independence and unification 
of the Romanian principalities against foreign dominance. The young generation (the 
so-called ’paşoptişti’) stemming from the middle and lower strata of the native 
nobility (i.e. the liberal nationalists), often educated abroad, formed the major 
intellectual and political force in the Revolution of 1848. Their nationalist and liberal 
projects built around modern ideas of national consciousness, self-rule, and a 
common history and culture (Georgescu, 1971: 51-3) was shared by higher layers of 
nobility and the economic bourgeoisie (i.e. the liberal conservatives).  
The relatively limited success of these ideas can partly be explained by 
the insignificant number of representatives of this social group in the Romanian 
principalities and by the foreign provenience of the middle capitalist classes who 
sought to maintain their privileges and oppose any reform (i.e. the conservatives who 
were against the project of social and political change). Hence in Romania liberalist 
ideas were mainly defended by two major political groups, the Walachian and 
Moldavian National Parties (partida naŃională). These Parties represented the upper 
and middle layers of indigenous nobility’s ideas of independence from Ottoman rule, 
institutionalization of local political power in state structures, and the formation of 
the Romanian nation-state. 
4.2.1. The Construction of the Modern Romanian Nation-state  
The Romanian nation state as it exists today is the result of a ‘complex construct’144 
that evolved in three stages. In the first stage, the principalities of Walachia and 
                                           
144 Wagner, 2002: 222. 
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Moldavia secured their autonomy and united (1859). In the 1860s the Romanian 
nation state took the name of Romania, settled its capital in Bucharest, and adopted a 
new Constitution proclaiming Romania a constitutional monarchy. Romania’s 
independence from the Ottoman Empire was recognized by the Treaty of Berlin 
(1878).  
During this first phase, two political parties were formed, which would 
play important roles in Romanian politics up until 1914: the National Liberal Party 
(Partidul NaŃional Liberal) which represented the bureaucrats, the urban bourgeoisie, 
and the capitalist middle class145; and the Conservative Party (Partidul Conservator) 
which represented the antireform landowners146. By promoting the national idea of 
sovereignty as well as wider universalist ideas such as Western-type 
institutionalization and social equality, the Liberal Party became the political voice of 
the peasants. Likewise, the Conservative Party, guarding the economic interests of 
upper nobility, did so by calling upon national traditions and by reference to the 
newly created (not least ‘invented’) national identity. Their culturalist doctrine should 
not be read as antiwestern, though. Its western educated leaders associated with a 
modern-style conservative doctrine, favouring the solid synchronization with the 
Western model while at the same time preserving national particularities147. Already 
at this early stage, one observes the contours of the institutional and ideological 
pattern of modernization that led to the founding and strengthening of an independent 
nation-state.  
The second stage in the construction of modern Romania was the creation 
of the Greater Romania Union (România Mare) in 1918. The Old Kingdom 
(Moldavia and Walachia) was merged with Transylvania, Bukovina, and eastern part 
of Banat (all from the Habsburg Empire) and Bessarabia, annexed from Russia. The 
international treaties, which reconfigured large parts of Europe after the First World 
War, acknowledged the unification of these provinces into one single state. Greater 
Romania was founded on the idea of a union of all ethnic Romanians. In this sense, 
related to the German concept of nation based on ethnicity, history and culture. On 
the other hand, the founders of the Romanian state preferred the French model, a 
highly centralized political and administrative system with little consideration of 
                                           
145 See also Rădulescu, 1998. 
146 Hitchins, 1994: 22, 92; Iacob, 1995: 228-39. 
147 Călinescu, 1988: 352-3. 
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cultural as well as the remaining ethnic diversity between the different composing 
parts. Moreover, the new state comprised four regions that had for a long time been 
politically separate. This, as I shall demonstrate in a later section, would eventually 
have abiding effects on the socio-cultural orientation of the Romanian society. Not 
least challenging the meaning of national identity. 
The third and so far final stage in modern Romania’s geographic genesis 
coincides with the end of the Second World War. Bessarabia (present-day Republic 
of Moldova) and Northern Bukovina became part of the Soviet Union while a part of 
Dobrogea was lost to Bulgaria148.  
Modern Romania – like other South-Eastern European states – has mainly 
been shaped on the basis of an ethnic principle, but also historical and geopolitical 
criteria have reigned. Hence, the symbol of the historical space ‘Dacia’ – dating back 
to the Roman Empire - and the Romanian language (derived from Latin and hence 
distinct in this otherwise Slavic corner of Europe) has continuously taken up a 
prominent place in the nation building discourse.  
A note should be made on the features that link the just presented premise 
to the analytical part on post-1989 transformation and to the model of cultural 
integration. Firstly, one can observe the diversity of large groups of territorially 
concentrated minorities, which will challenge the national idea and the answer to the 
remaining question ‘what does it mean to be a Romanian’. This would, as we shall 
later see, lead to the emergence of Romanian nationalism. Secondly, in terms of 
identity, from this period Romania inherited weak ethnic identities. With these 
features of nation building in mind, in the next premise of my analysis I will look at 
the emergence of early nationalism in the Romanian public discourse. In the 
following, I will avoid an exhaustive chronological history of institution building149, 
looking instead at the autochthonous understandings of reconstructing the Romanian 
modern society.    
                                           
148 As a result of the second Balkan War, Bulgaria ceded (1913) Southern Dobrogea to Romania. 
The Treaty of Neuilly, signed in 1919 between Bulgaria and the Allies of World War I, gave all of 
Dobrogea to Romania. In 1940, however, the German-imposed Treaty of Craiova forced Romania 
to transfer Southern Dobrogea to Bulgaria. 
149 For a detailed history of institutions in nineteenth century Romania see Hitchins, 1994 and 
Treptow, 1997.  
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4.2.2. The Early Process of Integration into Europe  
Another theme closely related to the formation of Romanian nation-state and identity 
is the early process of integration into Europe. This process both aided the national 
integration project and was itself transformed and strengthened by it. In looking at 
this process of cultural integration in the period between the mid-nineteenth and mid-
twentieth century, I will approach it in its political and cultural context, while 
working with a broad definition of cultural integration, as the process of 
reorganization caused by social agents who seek to reconstruct an existing societal 
order on the basis of their specific understandings (as elaborated in chapter 2, section 
2.4. on Cultural integration). I will attempt to understand the concrete ideological 
conditions of cultural integration as it developed in Greater Romania. 
The early approach to Western Europe can be dealt with in two stages: 
first stage coincided with the creation of the nation state in 1859. The second stage, 
devoted to the synchronisation with European culture, started with the achievement 
of the Greater Romania union in 1918 and continued during the interwar period. 
Signs of the process of cultural integration were evident already in the 
nineteenth century in Romanian society, under quite different conditions than today. 
Romania’s early west-bound integration (before 1918) seems to have consisted of 
two consecutive phases that – for analytical purposes - I label ‘negative integration’ 
and ‘positive integration’. The first phase, ‘negative integration’, was a differentiation 
from the Eastern civilization. Initially anti-Greek attitudes manifested partly because 
the Greeks were the symbol of the East, partly because of the Phanariot regime; then 
came the demarcation from the Ottomans who “introduced into our [Romanian] 
ethnic soul the seeds of corruption and idleness, which cause peoples to degrade and 
degenerate” (Drăghicescu, 1995: 262). After Greek and Ottoman, the Russian/Slav 
model was opposed when after 1830 Russia increased its protectorate over the 
economy and administration in Moldavia and Walachia. The second phase of this 
early integration was the actual adaptation to the Western models (French and 
German), hence the term ‘positive integration’: first in the form of the idealized 
French model (between 1830 and 1848 and during the interwar period); later, the 
German model from the mid-nineteenth century up until 1914.  
Although weak and fragmentary, the process of ‘becoming European’ 
started around 1830, a period marked by the end of the Ottoman suzerainty on 
Moldavia and Walachia, the core of modern Romania. The first consequence was that 
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the two principalities made significant socio-economic progress, entering the 
international economic and political order dominated by Western Europe. This 
period, where Romanian society underwent an evolution from a predominant agrarian 
society to a partly urban and industrial society, is also characterized by high 
population growth especially in urban areas. Also culturally it was a time of 
important discontinuities, as the Roman alphabet replaced the Cyrillic, the urban 
bourgeoisie started wearing Western style clothes and a strong influence from French 
realism made its way in Romanian literature. Moreover, the idea of the ethnic nations 
in Eastern Europe took shape during this period. Being surrounded by Slavs and 
Hungarians, Romanians felt different from their neighbours. Their religion was 
orthodox, they spoke a language derived from Latin and they were proudly aware of 
their Roman ancestry. This made Romanians look both West and East for inspiration.  
In the beginning, the process of cultural integration evolved only among 
the elite groups. The ideology of elitism in Romania started with the 1848 
Generation, the first important intellectual movement involved in the modernization 
process. In the view of its intellectuals, Romania needed emancipation and 
synchronization with Europe, but mainly as a nation, and not with a view to give 
freedom to its individuals. A conception which eventually had important negative 
consequences for the development of the society. Even so, the Romanian national 
movement of 1848 meant a shift towards Europe and the Western model of 
civilisation. Modern ideologies were imported and adapted according to the 
autochthonous realities by the educated bourgeoisie (boieri) who returned from their 
studies abroad. According to Hitchins (1996: 3), the new elite developed a new 
conception of community which influenced the evolution of modern Romania. Indeed 
the new elite or avant-garde assumed the task of building the united Romania and 
bringing it into Europe. The great challenge was to transform a dominant rural 
society into a modern capitalist and democratic society. Between 1860 and 1900 the 
Romanian state borrowed widely from other European systems: the constitution, the 
Parliament, the legal codes, the education system and so on. 
However, the mentality of the majority remained largely untouched in a 
society, where more than 80 percent of the population was rural at the start of the 
twentieth century. Rural Romania was in clear discrepancy with the Western 
orientation of the urban bourgeoisie, of which many were of ‘non-Romanian’ origin. 
According to Boia, “this suggests a traditionalist and anti-bourgeois sensibility; a 
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mental brake that delayed, even if it could not block, the modernization of Romanian 
society” (Boia, 2001a: 36). In my opinion, it was therefore during this period that 
Romania experienced the founding a resistant dichotomy between on the one hand, 
the traditionalists/autochtonists, who argued that the process of cultural integration 
was not entirely compatible with the Romanian society and, on the other hand, the 
modernists/Europeanists - advocates of synchronization with Western culture.  
After the unification of Greater Romania in 1918, the new state speeded 
up the adoption of the Western model. Diverse reforms, universal suffrage and new 
Constitution were introduced in the early 1920s - creating a democratic framework 
and paving the way for a better though slow economic development (the industrial 
output doubled between 1923 and 1938)150. Politically Romania was dominated by 
shifting coalitions of the three ‘moderate’ parties:  the People’s Party, the National 
Liberal Party and the National Peasant Party. Extremist parties - the Romanian 
Communist Party and Codreanu’s Iron Guard - were banned during the twenties and 
thirties. During this second phase of modernization the attachment to the Western 
models developed into a fundamental reference point for the Romanian society. But 
the reverse reaction should not be undervalued, either. The tension between the 
Western model, promoted by the pro-Western elite, and the widespread rural-
indigenous mentality continued during this phase.  
This early process of cultural integration was without problems, notably 
because in the Romanian case it was not accompanied by any substantial economic 
modernization. While Romania integrated itself in the Western cultural space, 
economically Romania failed the process of industrial modernization. “State-induced 
and state-led growth, or in other words, forced industrialization, became the chosen 
strategy by the Romanian ‘Westernizers’ to integrate Romania into the new, 
industrial Europe in order to make it (and them) partake in the wealth and industrial 
society was promising to provide” (Wagner, 2002: 226).  
The above section has sought to explain the process of modernization and 
the changes it entailed for Romanian society between 1860 and 1930. Notably, three 
aspects should be retained for my further analysis: first, cultural integration first 
emerged as a differentiation from the Oriental models and only later took the form a 
conscious adoption of the Western model; second, a persistent cleavage between a 
                                           
150 Per capita national income reached 94 USD in 1938 as compared to Greece (76 USD), Portugal 
(81 USD), Czechoslovakia (141 USD), and France (246 USD) in http://www.romaniaunog.org/. 
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pro-Western elite and a large traditionalist majority was instituted during this period; 
third, the transformation did not create significant economic progress in the 
predominant agrarian country; and fourth and related hereto, this later created 
propitious cultural and economic conditions for the consolidation of the communist 
authoritarian regime. 
4.2.3. The Emergence of Nationalism 
Nationalism emerged in the Romanian principalities at the end of eighteenth century 
and as such it was connected to the elite’s imperative of the unification (i.e. 
‘nationalism of elites’), driven more by political and cultural motivation rather than 
economic interests. The starting point is marked by the petition, sent in 1792 to 
Emperor Leopold II of Austria by the Uniate and Greek Orthodox Church leadership 
by which they asked for the recognition of the Romanians as a nation and for equal 
political and religious rights with other ethnies of Transylvania. In Transylvania, 
Romanians did not have political rights, as membership of the Transylvanian diet was 
restricted to the three ‘nations’ of the Magyars, Szekels and Saxons. By 
acknowledging the importance of these nationalist responses to shape the later 
Romanian nation-state, Breuilly (1993: 135-6) labels this early type of nationalism as 
‘separatist nationalism’.  
The unification of Greater Romania marked an important shift in the 
Romanian national ideology. Before 1918, there were Romanians outside the state 
borders whose interests had to be defended against discrimination by other national 
groups. After unification, practically all Romanians were contained in a single state 
within which they, along with a certain number of non-Romanians, were oppressed 
by their own leaders. As pointed out by Verdery (1991), “[a]n ideology that had been 
developed for several centuries as a way of gaining rights for Romanians now 
became the ideology of a social system that had its own fundamental inequalities”151. 
As such, the national discourse in the interwar year did not only represent the 
consequence of these general causes but also served to consolidate the social position 
of intellectuals in a society under fundamental change. Hence, the intellectuals 
became important carriers of a widely appealing nationalist discourse turned against 
the various imbalances in the transforming society:  
                                           
151 Verdery, 1991: 70. 
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[t]he tensions of localism and centralism, the fragility of the new borders, the 
efforts of the left to create an international working-class movement hostile to the 
Romanian state, the disproportions of national minorities in occupations of high 
reward, and all the other exigencies of nation-building gave pre-eminence to the 
idiom of the Nation (Verdery, 1991: 45-46).               
The 1848 revolutionary elite was guided by the overall idea of the 
restoration of ‘Daco-Romania’, that is the creation of a nation-state including all 
those of Romanian ethnicity. Questions of individual liberty and equality were less 
prominent in the national discourse. The main obstacle was therefore encountered 
when the question arose of how and by whom the reconstruction of society on the 
basis of self-rule was to be performed. By avoiding the issue of the collective 
representation, political rights were to be granted on the basis of social and economic 
criteria. Only after 1859, the issues of political representation and extensive political 
rights arrived at the centre stage of a political struggle between Liberals and 
Conservatives. Yet, only a nationalism based on claiming external territory 
(irredentist) could mobilise all Romanians. Popularly speaking, everybody could 
agree to enlarge the cake. Difficulties occurred once it came to decide how to share 
it! Hence, governments of the period turned irredentist nationalism into policy, and - 
as Sugar suggests - it “became the slogan with which the bureaucracy justified its 
actions and omissions and its condemnation of all opposition as unpatriotic” (Sugar, 
1994: 175). 
Eventually, as we have seen, “a ‘nation’ state”152 was created in 1881 
under the name Old Kingdom. However, the identified absence of a coherent national 
vision - other than irredentism – soon made its influence in this new context where 
“nationalism acquired a popular basis only in the form of anti-semitism” (Breuilly, 
1993: 137). The early twentieth century witnessed the emergence of various strands 
of nationalisms (i.e. peasantism/populism, nationalism and ‘progressive 
conservatism’) that although they looked with scepticism at the industrialization and 
democratization processes, failed to propose a coherent alternative to the project of 
liberal nationalism. Hutchinson sees this type of nationalist project as a distinct 
species of nationalism, that he calls ‘cultural nationalism’. A type of nationalism that 
“seeks a moral regeneration of the community”153. This is different from political 
                                           
152 Breuilly, 1993: 137. 
153 Hutchinson, 1994: 41. 
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nationalism that “has as its aim autonomous state institutions” (Hutchinson, 1994: 
41).  
The formation of the Romanian state in 1918 granted the occasion for a 
‘national redefinition’154 in order to fit the conditions and opportunities created at the 
end of the World War I. Romania and what it means to be Romanian had to be 
reinvented in order to legitimate the idea of a single nation. In spite of historical, 
cultural and linguistic ties among the ethnic Romanians, the Greater Romania union 
brought also socio-cultural and economic challenges and tensions.  
Institutional and legal homogenization, the replacement of foreign elites, the 
recruitment and expansion of national elites, the fight against regionalism, and 
the implantation or nurturing of national consciousness among uneducated and 
educated strata that had lived for as long as anyone could remember under 
foreign rule (Livezeanu, 1995: 19),  
were just a few of the tasks that the newly created nation-state had to cope with. John 
Breuilly aptly describes the problems of coping with all these tasks in the interwar 
Romania as those of ‘reform nationalism’. This form of conservatism is, according to 
Breuilly, “an attitude of mind rather than a distinct political doctrine” (Breuilly, 1993: 
288). As such, it emerges in an already existing nation-state and “takes its position 
from the given situation and then develops, in a cautious and pragmatic way, 
piecemeal policies designed to secure a basic stability” (Breuilly, 1993: 288). Indeed, 
the ‘shaping’ process was not easy for Romania, as a latecomer to nation building and 
industrialization. According to Livezeanu, in Romania “the reconstitution of the 
nation within its newly enlarged boundaries brought opportunities for national 
redefinition as well as profound social and cultural crises, and that these two aspects 
were intricately linked to each other” (Livezeanu, 1995: 7).  
The achievement of Greater Romania implied that large minority groups 
(often more urban and educated than the average Romanian) had to be integrated. Not 
a tensionless process. In Livezeanu’s words, the union “inaugurated ground-breaking 
cultural transformations, policies, and politics rather than the return, envisaged by 
Romanian nationalists, to an idyllic, natural, primordial state of the Romanian 
community” (Livezeanu, 1995: 18). This explains partly why the application of the 
‘Western’ demands for equal rights of minorities - the dominant international 
discourse in the years around the Versailles Treaty - were largely perceived as alien, 
                                           
154 Livezeanu, 1995: 7. 
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illegitimate, and suspicious. It is worth reminding that minorities’ struggle for rights 
has been perceived as a threat to the national unity in the Romanian space.  
 
Table: The population of Greater Romania by ethnicity in 1930
155 
   Number                 Percentage 
    (in mio.)                  of total 
Romanians       13.0                              71.9 
Hungarians         1.4  7.9 
Germans         0.7  4.1 
Jews          0.7  4.0 
Ukrainians         0.6  3.3 
Russians         0.4  2.3 
Bulgarians         0.4  2.0 
Roma               0.3  1.5 
Others156         0.5  3.0 
Total                             18.0* 
 
   *hereof 79,8 pct. rural population 
 
In the territories annexed in 1918, Romanians had mainly belonged to the 
rural population. The elite of the new Romanian space was therefore often Russian, 
Hungarian, German or Jewish, rather than ethnically Romanian. A situation which 
incited to tensions between the Romanian peasants (4/5 of the total population) and 
the ethnic minorities. Interethnic struggles were recurrent, in the attempts of 
Romanian individuals to dislodge the ‘foreign’ elites and their place for centuries in 
the urban areas in order to safeguard the legitimacy of Great Romania, ‘the’ 
Romanian national state. The issue of minorities, perceived as the ‘other’, was the 
basis for regular conflicts in Romania after 1918. These feelings came to dominate 
Romanian politics and society between the two World Wars. However utopian, the 
ideal of a unitary and ‘pure’ Romania kept feeding both the state policies and the 
programs of the radical nationalist movements. One could say that this was an answer 
to the ethnic fragmentation of the Romanian population as well as to the general 
confusion that characterized the transforming society. 
                                           
155 Source: Institutul central de statistică, Anuarul statistic al României 1937 şi 1938, pp. 58-61. 
156 Refers to nationalities that each constitutes less than 1 percent of the population: Turks, Tatars, 
Gagauz, Greeks, Armenians, Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. 
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In this historical context, nationalism became the overall ideological 
framework for Romanian politics. The assimilation of the new provinces and their 
minorities was made through cultural and educational policies that required national 
mobilization. Not surprisingly the minorities – whether on Romanian territory before 
1918 or ‘created’ by the unification - came to feel uncomfortable in Greater Romania, 
as they often had even less rights than during the imperial rule. At the same time 
Romanians felt disadvantaged and discriminated against by the new urban 
environment. The urban – i.e. ‘modern’ - economy was mostly funded by foreign 
Jewish, German or Magyar capital. Changing governments were perceived as serving 
the interests of the ‘foreigners’. A situation which gave birth to widespread anti-
Semitism and a nationalism of elites who reminded their compatriots of their origin 
and the injustices afflicted on the ‘innocent’ Romanians. This double-alienation was 
an insurmountable obstacle to the instauration of a coherent and democratic society. 
Not withstanding these fundamental problems, the trend of integration 
into the wider Europe continued with land reforms, intensification in literacy, and 
involvement in cultural exchanges as important catalysts. However, as noted by 
Breuilly (1993), now the elites were not as enthusiastic about this development as 
before 1900. A possible explanation is that the integration process in the meantime 
had acquired its own dynamic, which left the elites in a position of less control. An 
autochthonist reaction did not fail to show up. Especially after World War I, where it 
became part of mainstream political discourse, also among the democratic forces. 
National authenticity had to be conserved, recognized and integrated harmoniously 
with the European model. Politically speaking, being nationalist had a better pay-off 
than being pro-Western. Hence, also after unification, the discourse on unity, the 
national identity and Romania’s exceptional destiny continued to be the scene for 
ardent declarations on the fear of being torn apart by the Great Powers menacing the 
national construction (what actually happened in 1940). Masses were more appealed 
to by this nationalist discourse, which manipulated them through the label 
‘democratic’. Yet, there is little doubt that the Romanian nationalist ideal of unity 
favoured totalitarism in full concordance with the European trend at the time. 
Political life in Romania in the interwar period was characterised by 
growing instability: regular changes of government, corruption, fragmentation of 
political parties and political migration. The democratic parties – still caught up in the 
nationalist discourse as described above - failed to deliver efficient and broadly 
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accepted answers to the large internal challenges that Greater Romania was facing.  
The way for instauration of authoritarian regimes lay open. 
Radical right nationalists, known as ‘the Iron Guard’, with Corneliu Zelia 
Codreanu as their charismatic leader, did not hesitate to seize the opportunity. The 
overall fascist programme included strong ideas of revolution and construction of a 
fundamentally new order based on a pure, ‘authentic’ Romanian spirituality (i.e. with 
emphasis on the orthodox religion). This ideology was blended with nationalism to 
such an extent that it is difficult to draw the line between them. The old order was 
criticised for being artificial and for having failed to install their modern liberal 
project. ‘Reform nationalism’ became a broadly accepted response to Greater 
Romania’s both internal and external threats. From domestic social problems to the 
potential spread of Bolshevism from the eastern neighbour. Moreover, behind the 
political nationalist focus and socio-economic reforms, the Iron Guard could offer an 
additional factor. Codreanu proposed an alternative indigenous model of progress tied 
to the idea of resurgence of the Romanian nation by the elite. According to this 
model, “the elite would be Christian (…); it would enjoin a pure life upon its 
members; it would make any sacrifice, including the supreme one of eternal 
damnation, for the national cause” (Breuilly, 1993: 303-4). His ideas started a 
significant movement. The ‘new’ Romanian state should not only represent the ethnic 
nation but also its essential elements. As the spiritual mentor of the Iron Guard, Nae 
Ionescu, claimed: the essence of being Romanian was being Orthodox (Ionescu, 
1937).  
Nationalism and ‘orthodoxism’ turned out to be an appealing political 
cocktail. The orthodoxist ideology – which in a way relinked Romania to the East - 
strengthened the Iron Guard’s discourse on ‘ethnocracy’. According to its leader, 
Codreanu, a singular form of rule (i.e. totalitarian) that would embody the unanimity 
of the nation was needed to construct a ‘new’ Romania. This new political order 
would represent the essential Romanian value of eastern Orthodoxy by uniting the 
political leaders and the people under a single leader. In Codreanu’s own words, ”the 
leader is not anymore a ‘master’, a ‘dictator’ that does what he wants and rules 
according to his own will: he becomes the expression, the incarnation of this invisible 
spiritual state, the symbol of this enlightened condition that underpins the entire 
national community” (quoted in Blokker, 2004: 209). 
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The well-thought ideological construct paid off. And echoing the bigger 
European picture, the fascists gained significant ground in the 1937 elections, when 
they became the third biggest party after the Liberal Party and the Peasant National 
Party157. Yet, it is worth noting that semi-nationalist rhetoric adopted by the latter 
more mainstream parties, probably kept the fascist from cashing in their full electoral 
potential. Despite winning 15 percent of the votes, the Iron Guard however was kept 
from formal powers, as King Carol II intervened and formed a minority government. 
The following year, Carol II established a regular personal dictatorship not meeting 
significant opposition. Nevertheless, far stronger geopolitical forces were at play 
outside Romania, which would soon deprive the King of any political legitimacy. 
Thus, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1940 implied loss of most the territory gained 
just two decades earlier. With Greater Romania crumbling, Carol soon gave up his 
powers in favour of General Antonescu. From then on Romania was a satellite of 
Nazi Germany. In a paradoxical way, a seemingly very effective move – if only 
short-lived and short-sighted – towards integrating with what was then core-Europe 
(or ‘Neuropa’ in the Nazi terminology). 
As I will sustain below, although popular among a large section of the 
public, the nationalists encountered strong resistance from the promoters of the 
cultural modernism imported from the West as a way of synchronizing Romanian 
culture with European culture. However, during the interwar period, nationalism 
achieved wide popularity, due to its gifted initiators and outstanding scholars. They 
succeeded to give nationalism a cover of universality.  
In this section I have attempted to look at the emergence of nationalism as 
an expression of the elite class interest to obtain and use political power. Nationalism 
has played a major role in the pursuit of these objectives. Three factors are, as I will 
later demonstrate, of particular importance for nowadays’ Romanian transformations: 
first, nationalism has been used to control politics or to seek or exercise state power. 
This gave way to the debate on the Romanian identity and the invention of a national 
discourse which aimed at promoting a cohesive national vision. Second, it is worth 
retaining that most parties, also the moderate ones, adopted certain elements of the 
nationalist discourse. Third, nationalist (rural) values, the religious Romanian 
spirituality embodied by Christian Orthodoxy, and the question of belonging to the 
                                           
157 Bărbulescu et al., 2002: 350. 
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Romanian nation have added new features to nationalism, forming the ideology in the 
years prior to communism. 
4.2.4. Civil Society in Precommunist Romania  
Retrospectively seen, the interwar period (1918-1938) seems to have been the most 
favourable to the emergence of civil society in Greater Romania158. At first glance, 
many aspects of daily life signified the existence of a ‘vigorous’ civil society:  
an abundance of agricultural and consumer goods as well as a number of 
important rights and freedoms: people then could travel as far as their financial 
means allowed them; rather than one party there were several; a richly varied and 
free press thrived; writers published their works without censorship; and 
elections in which candidates from opposing parties ran against one another were 
the rule (Livezeanu, 1995: 310).  
Nevertheless, and in spite of these apparently favourable conditions, the 
development of civil society in the interwar Romania proved rather problematic. 
Previous contributions (Focşeneanu. 1992; Livezeanu. 1995; Popescu, 1998) have 
highlighted three main causes that led to the development of a weak civil society. 
First, the weakness of civil society has been attributed to the negative effects of 
structural changes. Thus, in a country where ethnic Romanians formed an 
overwhelming rural and illiterate population (Mungiu, 1996: 335), the social 
equilibrium has been troubled. This disorder provoked anti-Semitic and xenophobic 
attitudes on the geo-political, territorial and socio-economic scene and in the 
‘Romanisation’ discourse of the time. More specifically, Irina Livezeanu stresses 
upon the way the policies of unification (aimed at nationalizing and homogenizing 
the country) have undermined the development of civil society. For the author, the 
project of ‘remaking’ Greater Romania “had its own logic of undoing previous civil 
social traditions”159. As a reaction to the grant of formal citizenship to non-Romanian 
elites, “the state and its radical nationalist opponents joined in attempting to try to 
demote these ‘foreigners’ to non-elite status, in order to replace them with educated 
ethnic Romanians or peasant stock who mostly lacked a previous – civil – tradition” 
(Livezeanu, 1995: 311-12).   
                                           
158 Livezeanu, 1995: 310. 
159 Livezeanu, 1995: 311. 
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In addition I see the insufficient development of the middle class – in part 
due to the lack of economic development - as a second cause that led to an 
inconsistent and fragile civil society. Indeed, within civil society, tensions were 
created through the concern with the ethnic composition of the middle class. The 
‘Other’, mainly perceived in negative terms (i.e., as belonging to a different ethnie or 
religion) was not only considered an outsider but also a potential enemy. Moreover, 
the autonomous sphere of voluntary actions had only existed in their earliest phase, 
and consisted of a relatively small number of individuals. Consequently, ‘nationalism 
against democracy’160 (i.e., against minorities’ rights) emerged. As mentioned, these 
minorities, mainly Hungarian, but also German and Jewish, were often better 
educated and more advanced in the process of social modernization than the ethnic 
Romanians and occupied important positions in the country’s economic and political 
structures. Since these inequalities were not perceived as the result of different 
historical evolutions, but rather as the effect of democratic conditions which granted 
equality to all citizens independent of his/her ethnic origin, a strong trend of public 
opinion emerged demanding for a revision of these rights and a guarantee for the 
dominant position of ethnic Romanians.  
What was not developed in terms of civil society in the interwar Romania 
was even more difficult to accomplish after 1938 with the new Constitution that 
mostly referred to the duties of the citizens rather than to their rights161. Civil society 
could not develop either under the legionary authoritarian regime (which 
acknowledged only one party, the Iron Guard), under Antonescu’s military 
dictatorship (1940) or during World War II when Greater Romania was an ally of 
Hitler’s Germany. After the removal of Antonescu’s regime, the communists 
gradually took over power meaning a (continued) limitation of citizens’ rights and, 
indeed, the dismissal of all opposing segments of civil society.       
4.2.5. Concluding Remarks  
The above sections highlighted Romania’s precommunist past through four major 
themes, necessary to properly understand Romania’s transformation: the formation of 
the Romanian nation-state, the early attempts of entry into Europe, the nature of 
nationalism from the end of the nineteenth century till the first half of the twentieth 
                                           
160 Badrus, 2001: 61. 
161 Focşeneanu, 1992: 70-75. 
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century, and the emergence of civil society.  These themes bring together the 
specificity of Romania before communism. The presented premises do justice, I 
hope, to the complex nature of the Romanian society. The historic conditions of the 
construction of the Romanian nation have been far from unproblematic but rather 
conflictual with borders being shifted, and identities and ethnies in constant dispute 
over recognition. It should be clear already by now that major problems faced by 
contemporary Romanian society are problems, which have their root in pre-
communist Romania (i.a. the question of minorities and the compromised 
industrialization).  
4.3. Romanian Society under Communism 
The last premise of transformation in post-1989 Romania is logically the 
development and impact of communism itself. Romanian society was transformed in 
the post-World War II period in response to the changing global constellations. The 
exhaustion of both liberal and fascist projects and the atrocities of the war made the 
internal political, cultural and social realities particularly vulnerable to external 
interference. At the ideas level, Romanian communism was featured by a synthesis 
between the specific Romanian understanding of the nation, on the one hand, and 
Stalinism on the other. The Romanian experience was, as I will try to demonstrate, a 
particularly interesting example of the relation between the structural logic of the 
communist model and the internal power struggles. These power struggles entailed 
the particular path that societal change would pursue. This is why I will concentrate 
on the dominant role of the party elite and the effects of their understandings of 
societal order on the Romanian society. The nature of Romanian communism was 
based on two elements: the emergence of radical nationalism and the rather abnormal 
continued loyalty to Stalinism. In the following, I will sketch out the emergence of 
Romanian communism, analyse its nature, the civil society issue and depict the 
communist version of Romanian nationalism.    
4.3.1. The Emergence of Romanian Communism 
Communists came to power in 1944 as a result of a ‘revolution from above’, openly 
activated by the Soviet occupation of Romania. With Soviet support, the party 
gradually consolidated power and sought to extend its base of popular support. Even 
if initially communism was externally imposed, gradually “it had become 
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indigenous” (Arato, 1993: 134) and along the way a particular Romanian pattern of 
communism emerged. The reorganization of society concerned the concentration of 
political, economic, and ideological power in one party (i.e. the Communist Party) 
which progressively enclosed both state and societal fields “as it infiltrated society at 
large, undermining autonomous, alternative centres of power outside of the state” 
(Blokker, 2004: 123).   
The communists soon gained control over the existing, democratic 
parties. In 1948, it merged with a wing of the Social Democratic Party to form the 
Romanian Workers' Party. Four years later, however, almost all social democrats had 
been replaced by communists. The People's Republic of Romania was formed in 
1947 under the Soviet occupation following Second World War. Due to his very 
strong Stalinist principles, the Soviet influence circles chose Gheorghe Gheorghiu-
Dej to take power in 1953162 and let him carry on with the Stalinization of Romanian 
politics. Eager to rule over the Romanian political scene and by revealing nationalist 
attitudes, Dej was proceeded to cleanse the Communist Party of its ‘cosmopolitan’ 
leaders and eliminate the old elite. Loyal to Moscow in the beginning, the Romanian 
communists gained some independence after the death of Stalin in 1953. For Wagner, 
this explains “why Romanian Communism began to take a different trajectory from 
the rest of Eastern Europe, and, indeed, from the Soviet Union” (Wagner, 2002: 228). 
The first signs of ‘exceptionalism’ in pursuing the national communist path came 
when Dej contested COMECON’s goal to transform the Romanian economy into its 
main agricultural provider. This path allowed him to confront changes in the reforms 
in the Soviet bloc and maintain a fairly independent and nationalist rule. He then 
pursued the development of the heavy industry. While other Eastern European 
countries were going through a de-Stalinization process, Romania under Dej’s rule 
resisted it, gradually becoming more Stalinist than the Soviet Union itself.  
After Dej’s death in 1965, Nicolae Ceauşescu took the leadership and 
continued the Stalinist path traced by Dej. On the surface, however, some visible 
change took place. The name of the party was changed to the Romanian Communist 
Party, and Romania was re-baptised from the People's Republic of Romania to the 
Socialist Republic of Romania. On the external scene, Ceauşescu condemned the 
1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. All this plus a quasi-relaxation in internal 
                                           
162 This is the year when Gheorghiu-Dej is named president of the Council of Ministers (Roper, 
2000: vii). 
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repression gave a positive image both internally and in the Western world. As a form 
of recognition, the Romania became a member of the Bretton Woods institutions and 
was granted the status of a ‘most favored nation’ by the United States. Making new 
friends - based on the Cold War logic of ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’ -  
Ceauşescu during this period made state visits to USA, France, and UK, where he 
stayed as a Royal guest at Buckingham Palace as late as in 1979. Not least, Romania 
was the first country of the eastern Bloc to have official relations with the European 
Community. Blinded by Ceauşescu’s apparently East-defecting foreign policy – and 
not withstanding the paradox that opposition to Soviet control was mainly determined 
by the unwillingness to de-Stalinize - the West did not give attention to the fact that 
Ceauşescu was creating a new form of ‘anti-Soviet Stalinism’163.  
In parallel to his seemingly west friendly policy, Ceauşescu was also 
fraternizing with the Far Eastern communist regimes. Thus, in the early 1970s the 
Ceauşescu couple visited China and North Korea and got inspired by the personal 
cults of Mao and Kim II Sung. These visits marked a change in his leadership style, 
from totalitarian to a sultanistic type of regime that “made the Romanian regime very 
resistant to any form of nonviolent transformation” (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 349). As 
Linz and Stepan argue,  
in sultanism, the private and the public are fused, there is a strong tendency 
toward familial power and dynastic succession, there is no distinction between a 
state career and personal service to the ruler, there is a lack of rationalized 
impersonal ideology, economic success depends on a personal relationship to the 
ruler, and, most of all, the rule acts only according to his own unchecked 
discretion, with no larger, impersonal goals (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 52).  
In 1974 Ceauşescu calls himself President of Romania in a ceremony imitating a 
king’s coronation. 
In the context of cultural integration, it is worth noting that the Ceauşescu 
regime – which in hindsight is often described as introvert - in a sense searched and 
adapted inspiration from both East and West. Yet, contrary to earlier and later cases 
of deliberate interaction with the outside world, it was not inspiration sought with the 
view to promote transformation, but rather an instrumental search for means to 
preserve the existing order.    
                                           
163 The expression is borrowed from Linz and Stepan (1996: 348). 
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Against Ceauşescu's ‘independent’ and creative foreign policy, Western 
leaders by the late 1970s turned against a regime that had become increasingly harsh, 
arbitrary, and highly repressive internally. Moscow’s reformist line under Gorbachev 
was perceived as betrayal. The economic growth, which willing foreign credits had 
allowed Romania for some years, gradually gave way to national austerity and severe 
political oppression. Ceauşescu was successful in making what Wagner calls a 
‘double regime’: “while the national Communist bureaucracy, party and ideological 
apparatus remained in place, a personalized regime was erected alongside this 
apparatus which availed itself of the resources and capacities of that apparatus 
without actually being part of it” (Wagner, 2002: 231).  
However, Ceauşescu did not succeed in keeping either the “hope of plenitude, 
harmony, and happiness” (Todorov, 2003: 18) his regime created, or the promises his 
communist project was based on: to construct a better Romania. 
To serve the Party’s interests, Ceauşescu manipulated both the future and 
the past. The future because it is not yet; the past was manipulated since “knowledge 
of the facts may lead a person to dangerous thoughts”164. From the communist 
regime’s point of view, ignorance of the past offered more than any knowledge of it: 
it brought about obedience, stability, previsibility and constructive thinking. A letter 
from March 1989 written by six former officials of the Communist Party and 
addressed to Ceauşescu stated that “Romania is and remains a European country… 
You have begun to change the geography of the rural areas, but you cannot move 
Romania into Africa”165. This letter was about to preview Romania’s immediate 
future: by Christmas that year, Nicolae and Elena Ceauşescu’s regime was 
overthrown and they were executed in the most violent of the 1989 Revolutions.  
4.3.2. The Nature of Romanian Communism  
Overall, Romanian communism seems to have gone through three phases. First, a 
‘Soviet’ phase, where the ideology of the Eastern ideal was more or less uncritically 
adopted. Second, Romanian communism entered a ‘nationalist’ phase, where 
Romania became ideologically as well as politically more self-reliant. And third, a 
                                           
164 Heym, 1997: 82.  
165 This letter was signed by Gheorghe Apostol, Alexandru Bîrlǎdeanu, Corneliu Manescu, 
Constantin Pârvulescu, Grigore Rǎceanu, and Silviu Brucan. 
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‘terminal’ phase, where the Ceauşescu regime became gradually more isolated, 
draconian – and absurd. 
When looking at the specificity of Romanian communism, it is worth 
noting that it was only from 1944 that it gained a broader social basis166. Before the 
war, when nationalism had been the dominant ideology, the membership to the 
Romanian socialist movement was dominated by minorities who searched a 
revolutionary, internationalist dogma in opposition to a centralized Romanian state. 
Ethnic Romanians, on the other hand, repudiated the idea of supporting an 
(ideological) alliance with their ‘historical enemy’ Russia which was rather for the 
undoing the newly created Greater Romania167. Moreover, Romanian communists 
were unpopular domestically because “[their] party championed ideas and slogans 
with minimal appeal to the class it claimed to represent, portraying Romania as a 
‘multinational imperialist country’ and advocating the dismemberment of the 
Romanian nation-state brought into being by the Versailles and Trianon treaties” 
(Tismăneanu, 2003: 24). By the end of World War II, the Communist party had only 
about 1,000 members. 
This soon changed after 1944. Under strong Soviet pressure, Romanian 
communists were prearranged a central role in the government formed in March 
1945, and by October 1945 approximately 240,000 new members had joined the 
party (mainly workers and peasants – but also intellectuals, including members of the 
Iron Guard)168. The victory of the Romanian communist alternative emerged as a 
reaction to the economic and social deficiency that came with capitalism, the 
economic crisis in the 1930s, and the harsh experience of the Second World War.  
 
Early Phases of Romanian Communism: From ‘Soviet’ Communism to ‘Nationalist’ 
Communism 
Communism was imposed in Romania ‘from above’ as a entirely alien and – initially 
- antinational ideology. As a consequence, the early phase of Romanian communism 
had the form of an abstract and inflexible framework. The Romanian communist 
leadership lacked historical traditions, political confidence and not least an 
indigenous embedding, something which would probably have allowed the 
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Communist Party to approach all levels of society by other, more fundamentally 
persuasive means than repression. Backward, rural Romania was not the natural 
home for theoretical communism as a basically internationalist ideology. 
The early phase of Romanian communism followed closely the Soviet 
ideal. After a short transition period new structures and mechanisms of society 
replaced the old ones. The remaining elite was persecuted and sent to prison or 
remained in exile. The peasantry - considered the foundation of the ill-seen pre-war 
Romania - was dissembled by a forced collectivization process. The urban space was 
heavily industrialized and a new working class took the role that peasantry played 
before 1944, that of a leading class and the new elite, the proletariat, needed for the 
communist party’s propaganda and ideological utopia. Tradition was disintegrated. 
According to the communist ideology, the past had a meaning insofar as it kept open 
the promise of the ‘radiant future’ and the creation of the ‘new socialist man’, a very 
intentional project that included totally new ways of constructing the person. The 
‘real’ history of Romania started and ended with the Communist Party. The 
Romanian relations with the Europeans were replaced with the Romanian relations 
with the Slavs, from the beginning of the Middle Ages to the liberation event on 23 
August 1944, by the Soviet troops. Latin Romania belonged as the ‘Latin island in a 
Slav sea’ and it was there that it should return. The past was reconstructed in 
communist terms. The union with Bessarabia, for example, became an ‘imperialist 
intervention against the socialist revolution in Russia’ and likewise the 1918 union 
with Transylvania was reinterpreted as an ‘imperialist intervention against the 
revolution in Hungary’. Communists re-invent the language of politics: national 
solidarity becomes ‘class struggle’, while nation and national spirit became class and 
class spirit. Meanwhile, Romanians were forced to reassess their hopes and dreams 
with regard to Europe, and to convert them into a united image of Romania through 
the construction of a progressive European ‘Other’. The role of the church and 
religion in history was significantly reduced. In full concordance with the Soviet 
model, the communist regime of Romania raised the secularization of the Romanian 
national history. Moreover, during this first ‘Soviet’ phase of Romanian communism, 
a certain openness towards avant-gardism and innovation especially in arts and 
science can be registered. Later, the communist regime showed a more rigid and 
conservative attitude towards any ‘transformative’ initiative. A new culture was born, 
a Romanian version of the Soviet culture.  
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By the late 1950s - at a time when de-Stalinisation was under way in 
other countries of Eastern Europe - a shift also occurred in Romania. But the 
Romanian reorientation of communism was different. Main features of this ‘new’ 
Romanian version of communism became its militant atheism, devotion to Stalinism 
and strong nationalist elements, including the revival of such as the myth of the 
homogenous nation and the Dacian roots of the Romanian nation169. Most members 
of the powerful Political Bureau came from the rural areas, and were easily aware of 
autochthonism and its appeal to the masses: the Slav elements and the 
internationalism (‘antinational’) were hereafter replaced with a nationalist discourse 
with a much broader appeal. In parallel, the state accelerated the social protection of 
Romanian citizens, covering generously pension, sickness, and maternity leave. 
Education and medical assistance were for free for all. Ambitious housing projects 
were implemented. As part of the rehabilitation and reintegration of the Romanian 
national values in Romanian ‘official’ culture, a few intellectuals were allowed to 
travel to the West and participate in European and international seminars. Some 
interwar ideological works were even if rehabilitated, manipulated and republished. 
This should not however be confounded with liberalization; it was a very limited 
practice, closely controlled by the Securitate.  
Eventually, the 1960s and early 1970s - the passage from the ‘Soviet’ to 
the nationalist version of communism – became a period of relatively less tension 
between the Romanian society and the political elites. With nationalism reintroduced, 
the link between the state and the population had again been relatively reinforced.  
 
Late Phase of Romanian Communism: Degeneration and Collapse 
In the late phase of Romanian communism, from around 1980 till the 1989 
Revolution, Ceauşescu heightened his authoritarian regime by isolating Romania 
from the rest of the world and by exercising cultural megalomania. His nationalist 
discourse became the ultimate political and historical argument:  
As a political instrument of legitimization and domination, nationalism gained 
advantage from the amalgamation of the authentic nationalist tradition and the 
specific aims pursued by the communist dictatorship. It seemed like recuperation, 
when in the first instance it was actually a manipulation (Boia, 2001a: 77). 
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Characteristic for the period is the paradoxical parallel emphasis on the virtues of the 
interwar Romania and the virtues of overthrowing the interwar system. Ancient 
history was re-analysed and became an even more useful tool than the contemporary 
history. All commemorations of the Communist Party followed the same pattern: it 
would start with the glorification of origins, highlighting continuity and unity of the 
Romanian people and end with the celebration of the dictator era. In this way, history 
itself was eradicated. 
From a cultural integration point of view, an important consequence of 
Ceauşescu’s isolationist policy and strong emphasis on the ‘unity of the Romanian 
people’ was a seemingly new process of mythologizing the image of the foreigner. 
The image of the foreigner created by the Romanian communist regime was different 
from the same image in the nineteenth century. The symbol of the West became as 
banal as a ‘Toblerone’ chocolate bar and ‘Kent’ cigarettes. The ‘Other’ became a 
broad notion, the definitive materialization of the West.  
The political circumstances had a strong impact on economic 
development, but not in the positive way argued by the Marxist theorists celebrated 
under early Romanian communism only decades earlier. In the case of Romania, 
Ceauşescu developed his ambition of a multilateral, independent economy that had to 
produce everything inside the country. The Five-Year Plans created for the need of 
economic growth and high productivity became one of the distinctive features of the 
social imaginary in most Eastern European communist societies. This will be 
explored further in the next section, dedicated to the communist version of Romanian 
nationalism. 
Needless to say, lop-sided emphasis on heavy industry, along with 
strained export to cut Romania’s external debt and reduction of the imported goods 
was far from the medicine needed for successful economic development. The 
resulting shortage of even the most basic needs of ordinary Romanians undermined 
any remaining legitimacy of the system, and eventually triggered the Revolution. 
4.3.3. The Communist Version of Romanian Nationalism  
As noted in the previous section, deficient of indigenous traditions, the communist 
regime in Romania established itself by means of oppression. In this context the only 
basis the regime could draw on to construct a new societal identity was certain 
elements of traditional Romanian nationalism.  
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Strengthening his power late 1940s, Dej took power and started 
promoting his own version of communism. In an attempt to raise popularity and to 
give expression of the anti-Soviet feelings of many Romanians, Dej readopted 
nationalism as a legitimizing ideology. Under Dej the Party advanced national 
concerns for two reasons. First, nationalism was an ‘easy’ way to increase the popular 
support for the party. After purging the ‘foreign’, internationalist communists, Dej re-
discovered himself as a national communist (Roper, 2000: 29). As an example, in 
1958 Dej insisted on carrying on with industrialization despite COMECONs plans for 
Romania to remain mostly agricultural in the intersocialist division of labour. This, 
on the other hand, did not imply that Dej gave up the Soviet model and developed a 
more individualistic model of communism. On the contrary, his domestic politics 
revealed faith and uniformity the Soviet ideal. In Gilberg’s words, “the 
[industrialization] policies that were implemented were Stalinist in form, content, 
speed, and thoroughness” (Gilberg, 1990: 113). Second, nationalism was used by the 
Party as a way to reduce dependence on the Soviet Union. By relying on support 
from the masses, Dej would need less support from Moscow.  
Dej’s pattern of nationalism has been differently perceived by scholars. 
Stephen Fischer-Galati argued that the “postwar mass opposition to Communism 
cannot be characterized as an overtly anti-Russian phenomenon. It was anti-Russian 
only by identification of Russia with Communism” (Fischer-Galati, 1966: 129). But 
opposition to the implementation of the COMECON’s (abstract) development 
reforms was not enough to make the Party and its ideology more popular among 
Romanians. More was needed to convince the population of the necessity to 
construction a new society after the Soviet model. Roper suggests that “[u]nder 
Gheorghiu-Dej, nationalism took on a historical element. He linked the 1952 purges 
with the 1944 coup. He made the coup the starting point of Romanian communist 
nationalism. He blurred the realities of the coup to increase not only the role of the 
home communists but also the party’s popular support” (Roper, 2000: 29).  
As part of his agenda, Dej put into practice a series of cultural policies 
whose aim was to emphasize the role of the nation. Chen enumerates some of these 
policies: “The Romanian Academy was abolished and replaced by a new one whose 
members were selected by the party, all history research was put under party control, 
the press and publishing houses were nationalized, and the state took education into 
its own hands” (Chen, 2003: 182). The role of the Orthodox Church was weakened 
 174 
by deprivation of its right to engage in educational and charitable activities, the 
Uniate Church was dispersed and numerous campaigns of atheism and pro-Slavic 
orthography were promoted.      
As mentioned, Dej resisted the de-Stalinization process, which was 
underway elsewhere in the communist world after 1953. Partly because there was no 
will neither from the Party leadership (de-Stalinization candidates, like Ana Pauker, 
had already been removed) and from lower levels who were concerned about their 
newly-won positions, afraid “that the population would interpret de-Stalinization as 
de-communization” (Roper, 2000: 30). Instead, the regime launched the nationalist 
strategy to appeal to both the national intelligentsia and the wide population. In an 
interesting analysis, Roper argues that “Gheorghiu-Dej was able to blend nationalism 
and Soviet ideology turning issues that challenged his authority to political 
advantage” (Roper, 2000: 41). From the identity view point, it is worth noting that 
this nationalist turn had important consequences for the minorities, which from then 
on were met with more clear assimilation policies, especially after the Hungarian 
Revolt, when Dej’s regime became less tolerant vis-à-vis relative cultural autonomy. 
Indeed, after becoming the leader of the party in 1965, Ceauşescu 
expanded that use of Dej’s nationalist rhetoric and symbols. Adding as we have seen 
a strong interest in history and creating his own cult of personality, communism 
under Ceauşescu was reinterpreted as ‘national Stalinism’. Obviously, communism 
had also an internationalist version of nationalism in the sense that there was an 
international ideological model of what communist nation-states should look like. 
Communism, as a global ideology, forecasted a world order of interrelated 
communist nation-states. From this perspective internationalism was associated with 
nationalism in terms of the need to construct nation-states that sustained this 
anticipated order. This ‘internationalist nationalism’ was different from national 
communism which manifested mainly as a critical reaction against the Soviet 
imperialism, being innovator and flexible and even encouraging intellectual 
creativity. Conversely, national Stalinism was methodically against liberalisation, 
reactionary and closed, using unlimited political power and exclusivism. 
In an analysis that I share, Tismăneanu’s argues that the ideological 
options of the political elites were to a large extent determined by the preexisting 
particularities of the Romanian society:  
 175 
national Stalinism emerged as a continuation and improvement of a certain 
subculture within the Leninist revolutionary political culture, i.e. one based on 
historical anxiety, insecurity, marginality, archaic nostalgia and mythological 
resentments. It is the result of a political and intellectual syncretism which 
reunites a perspective on the world as rationalist programmatic (scientific 
socialism) and a set of semi-mystic beliefs, deeply rooted in the infrastructure of 
the national political cultures in the under-developed (dependent) agrarian 
societies. Thus the national Stalinism, especially in its Romanian version (…) 
was the synthesis of a fervent nationalist rhetoric and of a semi-religious 
adulation of the leader (Tismăneanu, 1990: 28).   
Contrary to what some might think, rather than leading to the decline of 
the communist system, it seems the recovery of nationalism marked the start of a 
symbiosis where tradition and communism became mutually underpinning and 
reinforcing. Ceauşescu’s effort to merge communism and nationalism seem to sustain 
this thesis. During his regime, a new form of communism170 emerged from two 
simultaneous processes: ‘communization of nationalism’ and ‘nationalization of 
communism’ (Romanian communism and nationalism). The arguments were 
‘pragmatic’ on both sides: reduced to a simplistic nationalism, two different concepts 
(‘communism’ and ‘nationalism’) associated with different (even opposing) 
ideologies could co-exist. Communism accepted nationalism for pragmatic reasons. 
First, distancing himself from Moscow and proclaiming himself as the carrier of 
national tradition, Ceauşescu hoped to obtain more internal and external legitimacy. 
Second, Ceauşescu hoped to take advantage of the people’s anti-Soviet sentiments 
and at the same time mobilize some of the population’s latent nationalism. This way a 
“certain solidarity between leaders and those led - otherwise difficult to obtain”171 
was achieved.  
Up against the initial, pro-Soviet form of communism, the nationalist 
communism took advantage of an image improvement: communism seems 
deliberated from its horrors and crimes (blamed on Russians) and present itself as a 
continuator of national tradition; and nationalism, through tradition and xenophobia, 
seems less unpleasant when it is associated to an ideology which is by definition 
transnational, as communism is. Botez concludes, “in their strange marriage, both 
nationalism and communism seem more appealing than nationalism and communism 
taken separately; in couple, both seem more diluted, less dogmatic and more 
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pragmatic – and thus even humanized” (Botez, 1993: 43-44). But instead of 
humanization, according to Botez, in the case of Ceauşescu, “communism and 
nationalism degraded each other in their strange marriage: communism remained at 
the Stalinist level of the 1930s, whereas nationalism remained at the aggressive level 
of the 1930s, their alliance strengthening the role of the leader, who combines the 
communist cult of personality with the principle of the messianic nationalist leader” 
(Botez, 1993: 44-45). Moreover, in their simplistic form, it seems that communism 
and nationalism complemented and strengthened each other in such a way that 
extreme left and extreme right dictatorship could exist in parallel within the same 
totalitarian structure – in the same person. Indeed, because of the West’s incorrect 
evaluation of Romanians separation from Moscow, Ceauşescu’s regime enjoyed a lot 
of appreciation both internally and externally. This experience confirmed that through 
incorporation of traditions and nationalism, communism improved its image. 
Nationalism offered the communists the story telling, the heroes and the myths that 
populations need in order to identify collectively, but which imported, scientific 
socialism was not capable of providing. 
A recurrent theme in Ceauşescu’s rhetoric was the socalled ‘national 
specificity’. According to Mihăilescu, promoting this idea served two strategic aims: 
“internal convergence around ‘specific’ values and external divergence against the 
values and structures opposed to this specificity” (Mihăilescu, 1992: 84). Indeed, at 
least four motivations for Ceauşescu to promote a nationalist discourse can be 
identified: the force this discourse had mobilised in the interwar period and under 
Dej’s regime; nationalism was a ‘shortcut’ to the lower classes, notably the peasants, 
whom had felt particularly alienated by the Soviet type of communism and not least 
punished by its forced collectivization; to legitimate his regime and remove all 
internal resistance; and last, but not least, nationalism was used to create the powerful 
and unified image of a “unitary symbolic space (the Nation) that denied diversity” 
(Verdery, 1991: 71). I will develop these four main reasons in the following. 
First, the revival of earlier nationalist discourses proved to be quite 
efficient, especially because it represented a ’return’ to the national identity discourse 
used before the creation of the Romanian nation-state (1918) and during the interwar 
period (section 4.2.3. The Emergence of Nationalism). In particular, the interest of the 
communist leadership for the nationalist type of discourse was due to the force this 
discourse had accumulated in the decades before the instauration of the communist 
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regime in Romania. In this way, even if the social, economic, and political conditions 
were featuring the ‘real socialism’, the resumption of the national discourse created 
the illusion of continuity with the interwar period (be it only at the discourse level). 
This is why, in order to understand Ceauşescu’s nationalism, one has to go back to 
the interwar nationalist discourse. Ceauşescu was not an innovator. He simply took 
over existing themes in the public discourse in the interwar period and used them to 
serve his own interests. For instance, Georgescu has linked Ceauşescu’s ‘obsession 
with the history’ and his emphasis on the autochthonous ancestors to interwar 
nationalism. As he points out,  
another feature of the new elite is its obsession with the history. This obsession 
transformed itself in a form of neonationalism, similar to that practiced by 
Romanian radical right circles in the 1930s: an emphasis on ‘dacism’, opposed to 
the Roman origins, an exalted national ego, and an indirect support for 
xenophobe attitudes, non-patriotic, anti-Semite, anti-Russian or anti-Hungarian 
(Georgescu, 1992: 311).  
This explains the process of restoration of some Romanian intellectuals, initially 
repudiated by the regime (e.g. Constantin Noica and his book, Sentimentul românesc 
al fiinŃei
172
, published in 1978 which approached communist nationalist themes such 
as the exceptionality of Romanians and the detachment from the West). 
The second reason for Ceauşescu’s to reinvent nationalism, was that it 
encouraged a collectivist mentality by engaging different levels of society. Andrei 
Roth (1999) uses the notion of ‘nationalist paradigm’ to refer to the intensity and the 
spread of nationalism at different levels of society. This ‘nationalist paradigm’ is 
characterised by “a mentality constituted through quasi-general consensus, meant to 
orientate the way in which the country’s social problems are formulated, approached 
and settled” 173. This mentality, shared by political elites and journalists, made that 
individuals otherwise belonging to different political orientations, had the same way 
of thinking. Cultivated through education and major cultural production (media, 
literary, historical, and philosophical), the mentality infiltrated extremely in the way 
of thinking of all layers of society, “where the professionals’ ideology and the 
common conception had the same denominator, ‘confirming’ and strengthening each 
other, for more decades, actually since the second half of the last century till 
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nowadays”174. Only by understanding this nationalist paradigm one can explain the 
echo that the national ideology had in people’s mind even in the darkest period of 
Ceauşescu’s regime.  
Third, Ceauşescu’s nationalism played a significant role in eliminating 
the internal resistance against the regime. Ceauşescu used the Securitate to repress all 
resistance to his leadership and used it also to enlist the population to report on each 
other. According to the former Romanian secret police General, Ion Pacepa, “one in 
seven Romanians worked for the Securitate in one way or the other”175. In his pursuit 
for supreme power Ceauşescu controlled Romanian politics, economic policy and 
even – to some extend - the West’s perception of Romania. After becoming the leader 
of the party, Ceauşescu created as mentioned the image of somebody who opposed 
Soviet Union and rehabilitated the national values. Thus, through creating this false 
image nationalism contributed to the legitimacy of his regime.  
Fourth, Ceauşescu appealed to the invocation of national values to 
construct a unified image of the Romanian nation and to emphasise the holism of the 
Romanian communist project. This marked the shift of his mode of control: from 
being coercive to being symbolic-ideological (Verdery, 1996). This was very much a 
way to distract the attention from the country’s economic problems. Appealing to the 
masses through an impressive display of ethnic identity symbols, using and abusing 
them, he proved a good intuition for manipulating the collective imaginary (e.g., the 
images of Nicolae and Elena Ceauşescu in a cornfield surrounded by happy children 
wearing traditional clothes). This way Ceauşescu consolidated his own position: 
presenting himself as a supporter and defender of national identity (despite his 
‘economy of shortages’), he diminished substantially any embryonic kind of 
opposition vis-à-vis his regime. Retrieving this nationalist discourse he attracted 
intellectuals as well as the peasants on his side. 
 To sum-up, the above analysis has sought to identify the role and nature 
of nationalism under Romanian communism. Original, ‘internationalist’ communism 
found only limited support in mainly rural Romania. The restoration of nationalism 
helped Dej and Ceauşescu to legitimize their regimes. The false image created was 
partially accepted due to their assumed role as promoters of national ideals. The 
promotion of nationalism also encouraged a collectivist mentality, thus diminishing 
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individual initiatives (and hence further weakening the emergence of a coherent civil 
society). 
4.3.4. Civil Society in Communist Romania 
Trying to depict the conditions under which civil society developed during 
communism, Tismăneanu (1993) reminds us that it was not the Lockean concept of 
civil society at work where the individual was invited to participate in public affairs. 
Civil society under communism meant flight from the omnipresent state into private 
forms of organization. This partly explains the peculiar picture of civil society in 
communist Romania. On the one hand, there were under communism examples of 
individual as well as collective forms of dissent (e.g. the Jiu Valley coal miners’s 
strike in 1977 or the Braşov workers’ movement from 1987). On the other hand, 
though, many scholars (Dahrendorf, 1990; Laignel-Lavastine, 1992; Verdery, 1991; 
Tismăneanu, 1993, 1998) have expressed the precarious condition, the ‘anaemic 
development’, and the fragility of civil society in Romania under communism. 
According to Vladimir Tismăneanu, “those who dared to criticize the increasingly 
irrational policies of Nicolae and Elena Ceauşescu were automatically branded as 
traitors to the national interest, and some were expelled, others were kept under house 
arrest, were imprisoned, or simply disappeared” (Tismăneanu, 1993: 318). Even the 
few attempts to set up independent labour unions were quickly removed. He refers to 
“mental coercion, indoctrination, and regimentation”176 combined with fear for 
Securitate as the devices for the maintenance of the authoritarian system of the 
Conducător. Laignel-Lavastine (1992) writes of the main obstacles that delayed the 
emergence of civil society in communist Romania: the absence of democratic 
traditions; the attitudes of obedience vis-à-vis the political class; the influence of the 
Orthodox Church (traditionally subordinated to the government and which doctrine is 
linked more to community values than to individual values), the relatively low level 
of demands made by the Romanian working class, corruption, clientelism; last but 
not least, the disinterest of dissidents for civic responsibility manifested in the lack of 
solidarity with the workers’ movements that took place in 1977 and 1987.  
In the late 1940’s and early 1950’s the communists had a very active 
policy of removing or pacifying of all forms of civil society and political plurality. 
Securitate, created in 1948, was instrumental in targeting any potential opposition to 
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the Communist Party. Democratic leaders who refused to join the communists, Party 
member with divergent points of view or peasants opposed to collectivization were 
imprisoned. Orthodox Church leaders were replaced by those who agreed to the 
communist project177. After Stalin’s death these actions were for a while reduced in 
intensity, but soon revived by the second half of the 1950s as a response to the revolts 
in Hungary and Poland. This time repressions focused on students and intellectuals. 
The 1952 Constitution contained important – often concealed - restrains of citizens’ 
rights. For example, article 85 referred to the freedom of speech, media, meetings and 
demonstrations, but added that these liberties should be exercised with a view to 
strengthen the popular democracy regime178. In sum, the deliberate actions of the 
communist regime explain to a great extent the incapacity of forming a thriving civil 
society as a counterweight to the state, and were effective in further weakening the 
already weak civil society that survived the interwar period and the fascist regime. 
If in the beginning the communist regime controlled its population by 
force, starting with the 1960s the mode of control became more structural and less 
explicit in the sense that it gradually moved in individuals’ daily lives. This meant 
that in addition to the direct legal and political suspension of civil society, it acted 
more deeply in the very structure of social action itself.  As Srubar notes, the very 
concept of ‘social relation’ underwent several transformations. As the population 
gradually lost confidence in the communist system and its capacity to find solutions 
to their everyday concerns, alternative social networks based on personal connections 
started to form to solve multiple daily matters (for instance, the provision of 
consumption goods). This provoked rather a reverse of normality: in order to get your 
problems solved, you had to address not to the institution (undermining its function) 
but to your own network179. People focused on satisfying immediate needs, while 
they were increasing alienated from the formal societal structures. One severe 
consequence, were signs of total distrust in the relevance of the individual 
performance in a larger context. Hence, an apparent paradox of the system was that, 
in accordance with the official rhetoric, it did in a way advance a sense of ‘unity’ – 
but it was a unity not at the prescribed ideological or national level, but rather in the 
very banal sense that people on the microlevel became highly interdependent in order 
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to meet basic needs. Verdery (1991) sustains this thesis by arguing that by leaving 
individuals’ basic needs aside, communism suspended in fact the internal motivation 
of the individual to support the institutions.  
There is little doubt that the informal and ambivalent aspect of these 
networks had long term consequences at the individual level as well as in collective 
identity formation. Individual action was not only limited by the political and 
ideological pressure, but also by the dependence of these networks (not separated 
from moral and illegal compromises, often socially accepted). Thus, redistribution 
networks fulfilled not just an integrative function, but also developed the premodern 
institution of the ‘gift’ (dar), meant to assure the appearance of symmetry and 
mutuality inside the network. It is not hard to see the origin of the corruption 
problems, which today represent a major obstacle on Romania’s path to EU 
membership. It is worth noting that the widespread small ‘illegalities’ committed by 
literally everybody served an additional function in an increasingly repressive 
society; they signified that you could still do something against the system and this 
would grant a social identity that would throw you - even if only symbolically and 
momentarily - outside the system.  
The situation reached in the late 1980s to a critical phase. Botez (1992) 
uses the notion of ‘social fatigue’ to characterize the Romanian society between 1985 
and 1989 and to explain how the ‘economy of shortage’ actually contributed to the 
stability of the system. In this sense the moribund planned economy became a 
significant tool in creating a low level of expectations. This fact diminished 
drastically all attempts of critique and guaranteed even cooperation with the system. 
This mechanism made Botez note:  
when the simple movement from home to work becomes a nightmare, when the 
procurement of food remains a preoccupation that takes so much energy, when 
almost half a year you live – home or publicly – at a lower temperature than your 
organism normally functions, there is little strength (without mentioning time) 
for something else, for instance for critique and appeal. (…) Extended social 
fatigue does not necessarily imply the wish for change: I would rather recall the 
easy way in which one can obtain under such conditions insignificant 
satisfactions of some aspirations of a very low level (Botez, 1992:16).      
The informal redistribution networks were an important indicator of the 
emergence of what Paqueteau (1993) terms ‘black society’. Initially the creation of 
‘black society’ was meant to attenuate the insufficiencies of the system. Then, 
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gradually, the ‘black society’ oriented itself towards adaptation to the communist 
system and finally coexisted with the system. The effect was a social compromise 
between the communist power and the society, subversive both for the state and the 
civil society. Therefore, in line with Paqueteau, I argue that the expansion of ‘black 
society’ and its informal networks was a crucial factor in hindering the development 
of a strong civil society during communism. And likely, a much larger obstacle than 
the deliberate, direct oppression organised by the regime. The compromise which the 
society made with the power structures turned against the civil society’s own capacity 
to organize solidarity actions: “the antithesis of civil society [was] not the 
bureaucratic and totalitarian communist state but the society itself reconstructed in 
the shadow and flows of this state and which increased through its networks the 
fragmentation provoked by power. The black society is the civil society functioning 
against itself”180. 
A second factor which affected civil society’s development during 
communism was the system’s direct impact on the mentality of Romanians. In an 
interesting study, of which I share the main conclusions, Verdery’s basically 
endorsed the idea that the communist system in Romania affected all aspects of life: 
the past, the present and - most of all - the people’s consciousnesses and the resulting 
everyday behaviour:  
Not knowing when the bus might come, when cars might be allowed to circulate 
again, when the exam for the medical specializations would be given, or when 
food would appear in stores, bodies were transfixed, suspended in a void that 
obviated all projects and plans but the most flexible and spontaneous (Verdery, 
1996: 49).  
I argue that this arbitrariness of everyday life – reinforced by constant 
fear of the Securitate - caused widespread mental resignation. As a consequence, 
people became gradually subjects ready to accept anything, cold and hunger, 
whatever it took to please the system. Necessary, staged participation in communist 
propaganda was one thing; the general level of civic involvement in sustaining 
society was another. Instead of collective enthusiasm and productivity people became 
gradually reticent in public issues and a silent lethargy spread into the society, at its 
different levels. Seen in retrospect, it is not surprising that when the Revolution came, 
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it was as the direct result of these violent food and heating shortages, not because an 
organized, civil counter-movement had developed. 
As a third particularity regarding Romanian civil society, I want to draw 
attention to the limited role played by dissenting intellectuals during communism. 
Almost by definition, intellectuals have traditionally been producers of alternative 
and transformative ideas. Thereby often challenging the official version of the truth 
and even sometimes, in their personal capacity, serving as ‘rallying points’ for civil 
movements. In the context of cultural integration, the involvement of the intellectuals 
during communism is also interesting, because in earlier phases of Romania’s 
modernisation, intellectuals had played an important role as receivers and translators 
of external influences. Nonetheless, as I will demonstrate below, during communism 
the intellectuals seem to have been relatively absent in terms catalysts of 
transformation and representatives of civil society. It is worth noting that against the 
background of the massive cleansing among the national intelligentsia, which took 
place in the 1950s, many intellectuals accepted to join the Communist Party and even 
collaborated closely with the system (Deletant 1998a).  
According to Tismăneanu, the fear for persecution made many 
intellectuals emigrate externally or internally by “refusing to participate in the official 
pageants” (Tismăneanu, 1993: 319). Notably by the 1980s the Securitate was so 
infiltrated in people’s minds that just thinking that the secret police could act 
provoked fear. All forms of criticism were criminalised, which eventually resulted in 
self censorship. Andreescu (1992) points to this ‘fear for Securitate’ as being a main 
factor that hindered the formation of civil society among Romanian intellectuals. 
Indeed, the few dissidents Romania had, have explained the non-participation in 
collective protests and the non existence of civil society by mentioning that justice, 
press, police, and security usually meant to defend individuals were transformed 
under Ceauşescu into intimidating and terrorising tools181. Tismăneanu (1993: 318) 
argues that an additional obstacle to the emergence of civil society among and around 
intellectuals was Ceauşescu’s reputation in the West as being an opponent to the 
Soviet Union. Something which made Romanian intellectuals feel abandoned and 
powerless.  
The above does not signify that Romanian intellectuals entirely stopped 
producing alternative thoughts during communism. Yet, in general, they avoided 
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direct confrontations with the regime and practiced instead a form of dissent that they 
called ‘resistance through culture’ (Verdery, 1991; Lovinescu, 1998; Barbu, 1999). 
Barbu, for example, has described this form of resistance as “a formula devoid of any 
political and moral sense as long as the entire culture of the five totalitarian decades 
was, almost entirely the product of ideology and of variable but inexorable 
mechanisms of censorship” (Barbu, 1999: 51-52). According to Alina Mungiu 
(1996), the main feature of the political performance of intellectuals during 
communism was “its perfect gratuitousness”. 
Nobody, beginning with them, believed that a change of system was possible. A 
political position within the system did not interest them. The only possible thing 
to do was to escape the system through their own marginality. They thought their 
protests futile, but here was their strength and the beauty of their gesture – to 
fight an eternal immutable power. It was an autistic game, with rules and 
stereotypes understood only by the intimate partners, the secret police, and the 
dissenter himself (Mungiu, 1996: 338-9). 
For Verdery it is too simplistic to condemn the failure to develop civil 
initiatives and popular participation in the communist period. In her own words, “the 
retreat into veiled statements in the cultural press was about all that made sense”, and 
“to do anything more than they did would have been pure self-destruction” (Verdery, 
1991: 310-1). Yet, even if reduced to inferior positions in society, and persuaded not 
to act out of fear for the secret police, Georgescu (1992) and Barbu (1999) still 
question the more fundamental reasons for the relative inactivity of the intellectuals 
during the communist rule. As Georgescu puts it, it is difficult to explain that the 
Romanian civil society was weak because the secret police was strong. In his opinion, 
the power of the Securitate came also from the [already] fragile character of civil 
society182. Even more critical about intellectuals’ ‘complicity’ with the regime, 
Daniel Barbu writes, 
the highest responsibility that cannot be cancelled by any transition, was not the 
collaborationism, outspoken or confidential, of some individuals, but the state of 
moral emigration where the biggest part of the Romanian population escaped, for 
five decades. The general disinterest via-à-vis the community life, non-
involvement in events, mistrust about neighbours and friends, the obsessive 
concern with daily food, hunting at any price the own interests, (…) this is how 
the map of a geographical paradox is drawn: most of Romanians lived in 
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Romania without ever being present at what happened in their own country 
(Barbu, 1999: 55).    
To summarise, the already weak civil society was further weakened under 
the communist regime. This was for a number of reasons, including the alteration of 
social relations (‘the black society’), the fear for Securitate, and relative non-
involvement of intellectuals in actions of dissent. These reasons along with the 
repression from the communist regime have prevented the development of a strong 
civil society and determined the precarious and fragile nature of Romanian civil 
society by 1989.  
4.3.5. Concluding Remarks 
The previous sections have presented Romania’s communist era through analysis of 
four central themes: the emergence of Romanian communism; the nature of 
Romanian communism; the communist version of Romanian nationalism; and civil 
society in communist Romania. These themes bring together the specificity of 
Romania during communism. Thus, the sections represent -together with the sections 
on pre-communist Romania - the ‘prerequisites’ for the following analysis of 
Romania’s contemporary transformation. 
The communist era represents particular endeavour of modernization with 
a certain continuity. Many of Romania’s contemporary challenges were rooted in the 
more than forty years of communism and in this respect they are unprecedented. But 
it is just as important to recognize that many of Romania’s current difficulties 
antedate communism, and in this sense are old problems re-embedded in a new 
European context. Even if the revolution represented a significant discontinuity for 
Romanian society, the post-1989 development is subject to both types of influences.  
For a balanced assessment of the communist legacy, one should be aware 
that even today Ceauşescu’s regime is not only viewed in negative terms by 
significant large segments of the Romanian population. ‘Why?’, one may ask, 
knowing that the regime carries large responsibility for the high costs that many of 
the same segments pay under the current transformation. A related question will help 
me shed light on this seemingly paradox: How did communism survive for four 
decades? The issue of social legitimacy provides part of the answer. According to 
Illner, “legitimacy [under communism] was attained by trading political democracy 
for an egalitarian social welfare system” (Illner, 1999: 239). In the case of Romania, 
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the rural and semi-rural population benefited from joint supply of income from both 
agriculture and industry, as well as from the informal networks which were enjoying 
some social privileges. This has changed after the Revolution and has created 
disappointments, many Romanians being relatively worse off today than before 1989. 
The conception of the state as being the one providing for social welfare and 
responsible for the well being of its citizens is still to be widely found today. It will 
suffice to mention universal literacy, general education, and skilled labour as some 
the positive features that have turned out to be the ‘cultural capital’ (Bourdieu, 1973) 
of the post-1989 process of transformation. 
In my view there is not only one factor that contributed to the fall of 
communism in Romania: economic, as much as political, social and cultural factors 
contributed to making the regime irreversibly insolate. One can also argue that on the 
one hand, it is the absence of pre-1989 reforms and the use of military and secret 
police that separates the way the Romanian revolution occurred from the Polish, 
Czechoslovakian and Hungarian revolutions for example. On the other hand, it is the 
oppression of Ceauşescu’s autocratic rule and repressive policies which dehumanized 
the Romanian society and made the upheaval violent. 
After the end of the communist rule, Romanian society again found itself 
faced with a – partly externally imposed - process reconstruction vis-à-vis a reshaped 
European reality. The second part of this case study will deal with the process of 
cultural integration linked to the process of internal transformation and its 
implications for the Romanian societal identities. The present phase may be 
considered as Romania’s second entry into Europe or as the programme adopted by 
Tăriceanu’s government on 28 December 2004 presented it, a ‘second modernization 
of Romania’. Finally, talking about the legacy of the past – and as I will come back to 
later - one important element of continuity in today’s Romania is that this ‘second 
modernization’ project is very much an elite driven project183. 
4.4. Romanian Society after Communism 
The features of the modern Romanian nation and the communist type of society have 
been outlined in the premises for cultural integration. I will now focus my attention 
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on the way communism collapsed, the political forces engaged in the events of 
December 1989, and Romania’s political transformation since December 1989. As 
illustrated in the previous sections on precommunist and communist Romania, from 
the nineteenth century to the beginning of the communist period, cultural integration 
was defined by two tendencies: (1) Western (represented by those who were in favour 
of the ‘West’ model as put forward by the French and German models) and (2) 
nationalist tendencies (those who were against ‘Westerners’ and who saw the 
imitation of the Western model as a threat to Romanian national values and 
traditions). As I will demonstrate in the following sections, these two determinants - 
though persistant in Romania after the downfall of communism - are not sufficient to 
understand Romania’s current transformations and relation to Europe.  
Based on the historical background of Romania’s transformation, I will 
now explore the forces that are influencing the reconstruction of politics after 1989. 
Acknowledging the legacy of precommunist and communist past, should help us 
better understand Romania’s present societal dynamics. As we have seen from the 
historical and political conditions presented in the previous subchapters, Romania’s 
conditions for reconstructing its societal order have proven rather problematic. 
Moreover, Romania’s awareness of its societal backwardness (i.e. the ‘complex of 
inferiority’) and peripheral position, even more backward than in the case of other 
communist countries, perceived as inherited from communism, has definitely 
influenced the process of reconstruction. Retaining these legacies, I now turn to look 
in more detail at the reconstruction of politics, post-1989 nationalism, and at the 
postwestern and postnational dynamics of cultural integration.  
4.4.1. The Reconstruction of Politics after Communism  
Before elucidating the impact of postwestern and postnational dynamics, this section 
will analyse Romania’s political landscape in order to set the context for the process 
of transformation. As a first step, I will clarify the main political actors’ specific 
vision of Romania’s internal transformation. Thus, I concur with Wagner that argues 
for the need to look “at the situational horizon of the political actors” (Wagner, 2004: 
53) in order to depict the transformation process proposed by the elites184. This 
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section will start with an analysis of the major political actors of Romania after 1989 
and their Western and nationalist visions of transformation.  
A note should be made on the meaning of ‘opposition’. In Romania, it is 
very difficult to distinguish a veritable opposition since “the groups that might 
qualify for it kept changing colours and sides” (Verdery, 1996: 111). Romania’s 
political landscape has been extremely dynamic: parties disappeared, changed name, 
divided, reconfigured the coalition; members migrated from one party to another and 
allied with enemies against their closest friends.  For Kathrine Verdery, in post-1989 
Romania the term ‘opposition’ refers “to a quite miscellaneous collection of 
personages, orientations, and interests, defined only through their criticism of the 
ruling coalition”185. ‘Opposition’ qualifies therefore all Romanian political parties 
taking a position openly opposed to that of the party (or coalition) in government. 
Looking at the first years of pluralist democracy in Romania, one notices the unstable 
character of the opposition.   
The process of internal reorganization pursued by social agents can be 
divided in two political currents. First, a nationalist trend orientated towards 
continuity with the communist past, limited (or anti-) reforms, exclusivist 
nationalism, sometimes anti-Western, and scepticism towards democratic procedures. 
These ideas have been represented by the National Salvation Front – later Party of 
Social Democracy of Romania - as well as the nationalist parties, Greater Romania 
Party and Party of National Union of Romania. The emphasis has been on “the need 
to safeguard the living standards and is vary of radical economic experiments” 
(Breuilly, 1993: 352). Second, a Western movement orientated towards a radical 
break with the communist past, a swift transition to a Western type of democracy, 
capitalism, and a strong civil society. These aspirations have been pursued by the so-
called ‘historical parties’ - the National Liberal Party (PNL) and the National Peasant 
Party-Christian Democrat (PNł-CD) - and the newly formed parties, later united to 
form the Democratic Convention of Romania (CDR).  
Already several phases of political pluralization can be identified in post-
1989 Romania: first, the destabilization of the Communist Party by the revolutionary 
elites and anti-Ceauşescu propaganda (December 1989); second, the emergence of 
multipartism under ex-communist dominance (1990-1992); third, nationalist revival 
and stagnation (1992-1996); fourth, consolidation of the Western discourse (1996-
                                           
185 Verdery 1996: 111. 
 189 
2000); fifth, mainstreaming of the integrationist discourse (2000-2004); and 
presently, a process of political differentiation where the main question is whether 
‘indigenous’ values can resist the socio-economic price of modernization (since 
2004). These six phases will constitute in the last part of the chapter orientation 
points in my discussion of postwestern and postnational Romania.  
   
The National Salvation Front: Revolution and Early Polarization between 
Nationalism and Westernization  
Understanding Romania’s political transformation requires a shift in analysis from a 
discussion of general trends to a review of the specific political events around and 
right after the revolution. Beyond the controversial nature of the Romanian 
revolution186 (i.e. was it a genuine revolution or a coup?), there was a political 
consensus on the “restoration of democracy, liberties and dignity of the Romanian 
people”187. The other side of the revolution was its ‘unfinished character’ (Roper, 
2000), highly favorable to members of the former communist elites. Despite public 
demonstrations and other televised events in the days around the revolution, Holmes 
has pointed out that it was, first of all, “the struggle between two wings of the party-
state apparatus, the military and sectors of the Securitate, that sealed the fate of the 
Romanian anti-communist revolution” (Holmes, 1997: 82). 
The revolutionaries organized themselves on December 22 under the 
name of National Salvation Front (Frontul Salvǎrii NaŃionale, FSN) as a provisional 
government headed by a then second rank communist figure, Ion Iliescu188 who 
assumed power and proclaimed the abolition of the one-party system. Other actors of 
the FSN comprised members of the communist nomenklatura, various anti-
communist dissidents, students and military officers.  
After the execution of the Ceauşescu couple on 22 December 1989, 
Iliescu broadcasted that “Ceauşescu clan which has destroyed the country has been 
eliminated from power”189 and the creation of the National Salvation Front (FSN). 
Initially the FSN emerged as the interim government from the December revolution. 
As such it stated that it was not a political formation and therefore it will not 
nominate candidates for the first democratic elections. Against this commitment, in 
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January 1990, the FSN manifested a strong interest for participation in the 
forthcoming elections (for which it formally registered in February 1990). Partly 
because of this decision and partly because of the obvious control over mass media 
(especially television), the FSN came to be gradually criticized by the opposition that 
it was reinstituting the rule of the new ‘single party’.  
Indeed, the FSN used its key role in the revolution to legitimate its 
leadership position in taking all state power. Gilberg (1990) argues that communists 
and not the communist party exerted influence after the Revolution. This encouraged 
the persistence of former communist networks. This also provides an explanation for 
the lack of coherent reform programs allowing informal and illegal performances to 
become entrenched in institutional practices. As Wagner depicted in 2002, 
“Romanian reform thus far has been a stop-gap affair: it has reacted to demands and 
criticisms from the outside, while on the inside being continually picked to pieces by 
contending political and socio-economic (!) interests” (Wagner, 2002: 278). 
Wagner’s study suggests that in Romania the “process of reform could never make up 
for what it lacked from the very beginning: a national-political consensus on the need 
and trajectory of reform”190. Indeed, Romania experienced a slow process of reforms 
during the 1990s partly because Iliescu and his party formed mainly of former 
communist elites have remained in (or returned to) power at several occasions.  
After the 1989 revolution the new political, institutional and economic 
changes began to manifest a controlling impact on Romanian society. According to 
Roper, “[w]hile Iliescu and the FSN established the political agenda, nationalist 
ideology became a polarizing force soon after December 1989” (Roper, 2000: 67). 
Officially, Western integration has been the aim of Romanian foreign policy since the 
end of Ceauşescu’s rule. Significant from this perspective is the firm ‘we are 
returning to Europe’ declared in the ten-point programme as formulated by the FSN 
in December 1989. Point nine refers namely to Romania’s “integrating itself in the 
process of the construction of a united Europe, the common house of all the peoples 
of the Continent”191. Moreover, on 5 January 1990 a Declaration on the status of 
national minorities, issued by the FSN, stated that “[t]he National Salvation Front 
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solemnly declares that it shall achieve and guarantee the individual and collective 
rights and liberties of all the national minorities”192.    
However, soon after FSN’s official Western agenda, nationalist ideas, 
which appealed to many Romanians, became a polarizing force. For ethnic minorities 
in Romania the revolution was seen as a political event which has reconciled ethnic 
groups and that tolerance and not chauvinism should form the basis of ethnic 
relations (i.e. Laszlo Tökes and the way the 1989 Revolution started). This vision was 
highlighted in the Proclamation of Timişoara of 11 March 1990193 which main aim 
was to make clear the aspirations of the revolution. Yet, soon after this proclamation, 
the ethnic conflict194 between ethnic Hungarians in Transylvanian towns (Satu Mare, 
Târgu Mureş and Sovata) and ethnic Romanians was proving the fragility and the real 
nature of the ethnic relations. This event was largely exploited by the nationalist 
Party of Romanian National Unity in an obvious effort to increase their popularity in 
the 1990 elections.  
 
The Emergence of Multipartism under Ex-communist Dominance (1990-1992) 
The first democratic elections were held in May 1990 with seventy-three participating 
parties195. The ad-hoc revolutionary body FSN won an overwhelming majority (66 
percent of the votes). Presidential elections, held at the same time, saw Iliescu gain 
approximately 85 percent of the vote and Petre Roman was named prime minister. 
For Roper, ”the FSN, as a former communist party, benefited the most from the 
Ceauşescu’s cult of personality and use of the secret police, which undermined any 
opposition movement or underground media” (Roper, 2000: 68). The revived 
interwar parties, the National Liberal Party (PNL) and the National Peasant Party 
(PNł) obtained together less than 10 percent of the votes. Interestingly, the minority 
party, the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania (UDMR), attained over 7 percent 
of the votes196.  
Firstly, without a clear-cut political program, highly distrustful towards 
market economy and pluralist democracy, in favour of populist measures (e.g. 
reduction of prices and of working hours), the first Romanian democratic government 
                                           
192 Rompres, January 6, 1990.  
193 Roper, 2000: 66. 
194 Condemned by the EU, Council of Europe, and NATO. 
195 Roper, 2000: 67. 
196 Source: Combes and Berindei, 1991: 75-76. 
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did not mean a radical break with communism197. In fact the FSN carried over large 
parts of the communist legacy, such as the Securitate, interference in the judiciary 
and use of the political position for personal enrichment as well as certain policies 
including nationalization, collectivization and control over mass media. Moreover Ion 
Iliescu condemned on national television the rebirth of the ‘historical’ parties, the 
PNL and the PNł (Mungiu-Pippidi, 1999: 140). This created all premises for 
Romania to remain behind reforms, and as a consequence, Romania increasingly fell 
behind other East European countries in the race for EU accession. Iliescu related the 
prospective of integration to the erosive consequences of market society, which 
would eventually weaken the role of the state. Paradoxically, at the same time Iliescu 
held responsible the opposition’s criticism for Romania’s slowness of economic 
reforms, charges of corruption, and absence of foreign investment.  
Secondly, a general assessment of communism or an analysis of the 
Romanian revolution was never really initiated, possibly because an overwhelming 
number of people were personally affected (Mungiu Pippidi 1999: 135). The critique 
was directed instead upon Ceauşescu’s remaining fortune and family, the 
phenomenon of corruption in late communism, and elimination of any opposition 
when the FSN was tackled with its own past. Likewise, the FSN’s critique was 
directed more general towards the communist party’s ‘monopoly on the truth’ and the 
subordination of the individual to the communist system. The official denunciation of 
communism and the actual actions taken were in sharp contrast.  
Thirdly, Iliescu did not abandon the long (communist and precommunist) 
tradition of using nationalism to gain popularity. The nationalist feature of Iliescu’s 
rule became evident when his own rule was threatened. For instance, to control the 
urban opposition fearful of a Communist restoration, Ion Iliescu has more than once 
in the early 1990s resorted to vigilante groups, such as those among coal miners. In 
exchange for various benefits, the miners - presented as the vanguard of the working 
class by Communist propaganda - served as voluntary anti-opposition troops in 
favour of the FSN. The miners clashed with Bucharest protesters against the Roman 
government, mostly students, in June 1990, closing the new free media for weeks. 
Instead of dialogue, President Iliescu incited the miners to scatter the ‘hooligans’. A 
year later, the miners came back to protest against the government and against the 
                                           
197 Ion Iliescu has been the President of Romania for eleven years, from 1990 to 1996, and from 
2000 to 2004. 
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living conditions. They also assisted in bringing down Petre Roman’s government 
when he broke with Iliescu.  
In sum, the main changes in the Romanian political sphere that occurred 
between 1990 and 1992 concerned the installation of a multiparty system, adoption of 
a new constitution, and the replacement of ‘bad’ communists with ‘disguised’ 
communists. Following Mungiu-Pippidi, the FSN did not start as a Communist 
successor party; it became over time, as reformers were pushed out and conservative 
Communist elements were (re)introduced (Mungiu-Pippidi, 1999). Tismăneanu had 
already predicted as early as in 1988 that: “anybody who would succeed Ceauşescu, 
even an ardent, seasoned apparatchik, would be the most popular leader in the whole 
of Romanian history… because such a person would benefit from comparisons with 
the worst period in Romanian history. It would, of course, be an undeserved and 
passing popularity. But it would be enough for Ceauşescu’s successor to renounce 
some unpopular laws to achieve an extraordinary upsurge in popularity” 
(Tismăneanu, 1989a: 61).  
 
Nationalist Revival and Stagnation (1992-1996) 
In April 1992 due to internal power struggles the FSN was divided in two: first, the 
‘Iliescu group’ (formed mainly by former communist elites) that founded the 
Democratic National Salvation Fond (FDSN), in July 1993 to become the Party of 
Social Democracy of Romania (PDSR). Adding ‘democratic’ to the party name was 
an obvious attempt to meet some of the growing critique – at least at the discursive 
level, hereby institutionalizing the ‘coup’. The second faction was represented by the 
more reformist ‘Roman group’ led by Petre Roman who would found in May 1993 
the Democratic Party (PD). Iliescu’s FDSN won the September 1992198 elections with 
support from rural voters, who favoured the restoration of land and soft reforms, thus 
opposing the more radical changes proposed by the opposition. The new government 
led by Prime Minister Nicolae Văcăroiu was formed by the FDSN with support from 
the three nationalist parties: the Party of the National Union of Romania (PUNR), the 
Greater Romania Party (PRM), and the Socialist Labour Party (PSM).  
The internal reorganization project stated by Iliescu during the second 
mandate used two main modes of legitimation: first, a ‘revolutionary legitimacy’ 
(Blokker, 2004), based on the reestablishment of popular sovereignty as the basis of 
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political authority; second, a form of traditional legitimacy, populist nationalism (i.e. 
egalitarianism, social cohesion and national unity) perceived in direct continuity with 
the communist regime. Iliescu’s leadership under a discourse of ‘social-democracy’ 
failed coming to terms with the prerequisites for integration. Yet, lack of reforms 
made that gradually this legitimation faded. The state did not wholehearted sustain 
rule of law and the establishment of a market economy. Iliescu generally rejected the 
Western inspired reforms and formulated an indigenous model, based on the notions 
of ‘original democracy’, ‘social state’, ‘national consensus’, and ‘social market 
economy’. These ‘lost years’ are most likely also crucial in explaining why Romania 
turned out less pluralistic in terms of civil society (see section 4.7.4.).  
During these years, the opposition emerged as a response to Iliescu’s anti-
Western, exclusivist and anti-reform way of rebuilding Romanian society. The 
opposition first rallied around Petre Roman’s wing of the FSN199 which supported a 
quicker pace of substantial reforms and wanted an open debate over Romania’s 
communist legacy. After losing the 1992 elections, the FSN group found itself 
officially in opposition. Subsequently other parties outside the coalition joined the 
opposition in their claims for Romania’s need to go ‘West’. This included the centre-
right parties, PNł-CD and the National Liberal Party. Although different from a 
doctrine point of view, these re-emerged historical parties shared a Western 
orientation regarding freedom of the individual and democratic reforms. This came in 
contradiction with the anti-Western FDSN and the nationalist parties’ counter-
understanding of freedom as collective emancipation.  
 
Consolidation of the Western Discourse (1996-2000) 
In the November 1996 presidential and parliamentary elections the Democratic 
Convention of Romania (CRD), which included the historical parties and other liberal 
formations won the elections. Emil Constantinescu was elected President. A coalition 
government was formed with the UDMR (the Democratic Union of Hungarians in 
Romania) and the USD (the Social Democratic Union), with Victor Ciorbea, as the 
prime minister. This election marked a turning point in the process of transformation 
of Romania, meaning also that for the first time since 1989 a distinct break with the 
                                           
199 The split officially occurred in March 27-29 during the national congress of the FSN. Roman’s 
group continued being the successor of the FSN while Iliescu’s group renames itself the Democratic 
Front of National Salvation Front (the FDSN).  
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communist past and the adoption of a clear Western discourse. The change of policy 
consisted mainly in rapid privatization, fast economic reforms, anti-corruption 
measures, and a clear commitment to integrating Romania in the European and Euro-
Atlantic structures. This election proved a break with earlier interpretations of 
transformation and marked a change in the role of the state from ‘controller of 
society’ to ‘developer of society’.  
Whereas previous governments had chosen to reform the system without 
renouncing at the communist one (Wagner, 2002: 251), now the so-called ‘shock 
therapy’ was called upon. The positive reactions from Western institutions did not 
delay showing-up. Following the first and hitherto only swing in government from 
the former communists to the anti-communists and the subsequent association of the 
government with the Hungarian minority party (UDMR), the European Commission 
formally acknowledged in 1997 that Romania had satisfied the so-called political 
Copenhagen criteria and invited the country to start formal accession talks with the 
EU from 1999. Furthermore, the new government expressed clearly that it “would 
reduce government spending, reform the banking system and speed up the 
privatization of key industries”200. On this basis, an agreement with the IMF was 
signed in April 1997.   
The 1996 coalition could then use the adaptation to the new socio-
economic and cultural conditions of the integration into Western structures as a mode 
of legitimation. It could be argued that whereas the ex-communists were associated 
with arbitrariness and corruption, the CRD was equated with transparency, 
impersonal functioning, and reestablishment of the rule of law (Blokker, 2004: 315). 
As such the coalition reinforced its own democratic origins and pro-Western direction 
along the Romanian history, thereby creating potential links with Romania’s 
precommunist past to fill the identity void and at the same time trying to break with 
the communist past. Communism was perceived as a discontinuity in the history of 
Romania, while the Europeanist tradition was associated with the only way to 
establish stability and prosperity within the society. This was also a way for the 
historical parties to reinforce their discourses of democracy and to legitimate their 
political actions. 
The pro-Western orientation of the 1996 government was to a great extent 
endorsed to the fact that the minority party, UDMR, was included in the governing 
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coalition. The main impact of its participation was a significant shift: from an 
approach of ‘nationalizing nationalism’ (i.e. the domination of the minorities by the 
majority) towards a consensus between the national majority and the minorities. As a 
consequence of the internal pressure from UDMR and the external requirements from 
the EU, Council of Europe, and NATO, Romania started to internalize the minorities’ 
rights. Indeed, this indicated a significant change towards acceptance, recognition and 
tolerance vis-à-vis minorities.  
The integration of Romania into the European and Euro-Atlantic 
structures was decisively one of the first priorities of the CDR government. Whereas 
earlier in the 1990s integration was looked at as to something that would betray 
national interests, now the democratic coalition considered that integration was the 
best way to promulgate the national interest. However, despite election commitments 
and diplomatic efforts, by 2000 the government had not succeeded in bringing 
Romania neither into NATO nor into EU’s first wave of enlargement. This was a 
major disappointment, which made the electorate question the legitimity of the 
government project, and triggered intra-party disputes. Indeed, the government was 
under regular internal and external pressure: internal, through repeated attacks from 
the social democrats on the rhythm of the reforms, restitution of land, and cultural 
rights for the minorities; external pressure came from the Bretton Woods institutions 
criticising the government for the insufficient fight against corruption and requiring 
more economic progress. 
A new government coalition, led by Radu Vasile, promised to improve 
economic reforms and political stability, but without significant success (e.g. 
delaying privatization of key companies). In January 1999, encouraged by the 
nationalist PRM and the PDSR, the coal miners came again to Bucharest in protest 
aginst the closure of several mines. This made Roper note that the transition was in a 
fragile state and that Romania “does not possess a civil society in which conflict and 
disagreement can be resolved through negotiation without the threat of violence” 
(Roper, 2000: 84).  
Although between 1996 and 2000 Romania witnessed many changes of 
leadership (i.e. three prime ministers) and continuing internal struggles, the governing 
parties managed to preserve their coalition. Yet, the incapacity of the broad coalition 
to follow a common reform agenda and to generate a coherent discourse or to 
produce something different from the previous governments (i.e. economic hardship 
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brought by structural reforms), as well as the repeated corruption scandals loosened 
the belief that they could do better if reelected. This favored the come back of Iliescu 
in 2000.     
 
Mainstreaming of the Integrationist Discourse (2000-2004)  
Iliescu’s PSDR regained power in 2000 after the outgoing CRD had been held 
responsible for Romania’s socio-economic problems (including falling living 
standards and inflation), and corruption scandals. Already when finding itself in the 
opposition in 1997, the political program of the PDSR expressed clearly as national 
objective the modernization of Romania on the basis of ‘political and social 
consensus’ (PDSR, 1997). On the basis of a platform that highlighted the loyalty to 
European integration, Iliescu201 adhered to a more Western-type social democracy in 
terms of economic reforms, even if the applied vocabulary remained partly nationalist 
(i.e. the discourse on the ‘unitary character’ of the national identity). The outcome of 
the election raised concerns about the fragility of democracy in Romania, as the 
nationalist PRM obtained almost 20 percent of the votes. According to a survey from 
mid-November 2000, 85 percent of Romanians had no trust in the political parties, 
the parliament or the government. The nationalist leader, Corneliu Vadim Tudor, 
knew how to exploit the lack of a political alternative and presented himself as the 
alternative to Romania’s corrupt and ineffective political class.  
Despite PRM’s success, it is noteworthy that Iliescu’s Party of Social 
Democracy (PSD) chose not to be in coalition with the PRM. Instead, the PSD 
formed a minority government with support from the UDMR and the National 
Liberal Party (which within a few months left the coalition). In the parliament the 
opposition did not have much choice but to support the PSD, given that otherwise the 
PRM would benefit from further political stalemate and early elections. Iliescu 
repositioned himself as committed to European integration and ethnic tolerance while 
at the same time proposing a coherent economic program. This can be labelled as 
both a ‘strategic’ attempt to deal with Western Europe and the imperatives of a post-
Cold War scene and as a response to the changing nature of the electorate. In the 
period between 2000 and 2004, the PSD succeeded to a certain extent to transform 
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itself from a party with authoritarian and populist tendencies into a ‘European’ social-
democratic party. 
Iliescu appointed Adrian Năstase as Prime minister who, in office for four 
years, continued the pro-Western foreign policy of the previous government. In 2003 
the Romanian constitution was amended as necessary for EU accession. Indeed, 
Romania was able to join NATO in spring 2004 and signed an accession treaty to join 
the EU. Throughout this period, the reconstruction of the Romanian society 
progressed, with independent media and civil society gaining ground. External 
pressure from European and euro-Atlantic organizations proved a powerful tool for 
domestic politics. Here the increasing influence of international factors played a 
significant role in articulating a liberal model: democracy, market economy and rule 
of law.  
Though progress was slow and often caused controversy, Năstase's 
centre-left government administered reasonably the (previously initiated) market-
orientated reforms, and the economic and social results were better than most 
expected before the 2000 elections. Romania’s improved outlook with regard to EU 
membership gave way to a sort of optimism of both the political elites and the public. 
When confronted with exclusion from the group of countries that would join the EU 
in May 2004 it was perceived harmful not least in the eyes of the electorate because it 
presented the government with a failure in the project of Western transformation of 
Romania.  
Yet, these achievements were outdone by the numerous corruption cases, 
clientelist practices at high levels, and – not to forget - the publication of transcripts 
of party leadership meetings, which showed that the government routinely 
manipulated the justice system and the media. Although Iliescu’s PSD had supervised 
Romania’s entry into NATO and brought Romania closer to the EU membership, he 
has been criticized on the slow pace of reforms and not enough anti-corruption fight.   
Democratic Consolidation and EU accession (Since 2004) 
After long hesitations and despite ideological differences, the Justice and Truth 
alliance between the PNL and the PD was established in 2003. Following the 2004 
elections, Traian Băsescu (PD) became the president of Romania. Călin Popescu-
Tăriceanu was appointed as Prime Minister heading a government formed by the 
PNL, the PD, the UDMR and the Conservative Party (formerly the Humanist Party). 
Eighteen seats in the Romanian Parliament occupied by ethnic minority 
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representatives secure a majority for the coalition. The number one priority of the 
newly elected government has been bringing Romania into EU. Romania signed the 
accession treaty in 2005 and is expected to become a full member in 2007/2008.   
After the last elections in Romania (2004) the new formed government 
put forward the so-called ‘second modernization’ project. Widely mediatized, the 
project refers to the current government’s commitments towards shifting Romania’s 
evolution from systemic integration (dictated by the Acquis Communautaire), 
towards the Europeanization phase through the “consolidation of the social economic 
system”202. For Tăriceanu’s government this process is defined as the process of 
modernizing political, economic, and social systems beyond the overwhelming 
damaging consequences of socio-economic transformation. This process is apparently 
seen as the only viable option. In May 2006 the European Commission assessed the 
country’s preparations for the membership and postponed the decision for accession 
till October 2006 in order to maintain the pressure and make sure the Romanian 
government fulfils its commitments on accelerated reforms and anti-corruption 
measures.  
Romania’s governing coalition is not free of dissensus. Whereas the PNL 
is in favour of neo-liberal policies with low government spending, the PD is in favour 
of a social democratic approach with higher government spending. This division is 
openly aggravated by the unconcealed hostility between Băsescu and Popescu-
Tăriceanu. The gradually more tensed relation between the coalition parties warn to 
increase political instability and delay EU-related reforms. Not only is there potential 
for conflict among the various parties that make up the coalition, given their diverse 
ideological heritage and the long-standing personal rivalries of their leaders, there is 
also potential for internal dissension within each of the parties. Given current internal 
problems in the PSD, the government’s position is however relatively safe. The main 
question is whether this government will resist the socio-economic price of 
modernization or whether given the instability of the economy and unemployment 
rate, nationalist parties will turn out a popular alternative in the 2008 elections203.  
Summing-up, an analysis of the Romania’s ‘politics of transformation’ 
since the early 1990s reveals that Romania has apparently been characterized by two 
                                           
202 Programul de guvernare 2005-2008, Capitolul 3, Integrare europeană. 
203 According to the latest opinion polls conducted in November 2005, the PNL and the PD received 
support from almost fifty percent of the voters, the PSD thirty percent of the voters, while the PRM 
received almost fifteen percent and the UDMR five percent.  
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main trends: a Western-oriented force and a nationalist force. On one side advanced 
by the pro-Western political parties, such as the National Liberal Party, which are for 
radical privatization and rapid integration of Romania into the European structures; 
on the other side a nationalist tradition, which lived on during communism and 
retained its platform also after the revolution, expecially through the emergence of 
ultra-nationalists, but also expressed by Iliescu’s persistant ex-communist flank. 
These parties see integration as threatening the national structures and the 
specificities of the Romanian society (Wagner, 2004). This dichotomy is a main 
element of continuity from the precommunist era, in which Europeanist politicians 
were up against authochtonists/nationalists. Since the 2000 elections, however, a 
seemingly national consensus on a pro-integrationist approach has settled both among 
moderate political elites and the population. 
4.4.2. Nationalism after Communism: towards Postnationalism? 
As clearly shown by the above analysis, nationalism has been an immanent factor in 
Romania’s political life before, during and after communism. However, it has often 
been said that nationalism has experienced a ‘rise’ under the impression of increased 
uncertainty following Romania’s post-1989 transformation. While intellectuals in the 
west have observed Europe’s approaching the postnational age, Romania has been 
thought vulnerable to the revival of nationalism. Thus, analysts like John Breuilly, 
confirm that, in Romania, “is scope (…) for populist politicians to scapegoat 
minorities, for a politics and ethnic oppression, and for the upsurge of inter-ethnic 
conflict” (Breuilly, 1993: 352). As it is argued in the following, I do not see this 
development as a sudden ‘rise’ in the sense that Romanians have become more 
nationalistic after 1989 (something partly confirmed by high public approval of 
Romania’s integration into European structures). Rather I perceive it as a continuity, 
where nationalism has seen different forms and expressions made possible by the 
disappearance of the communist exclusion of competing interpretations of national 
identity.  
The fragmentation of the nationalist discourse has been evident in 
Romania, where parties and movements calling themselves national or nationalist 
have developed conflicting visions on nation and national identity. By its mere 
composition, Romania has always been a society where it has been very appealing to 
attribute great importance to ethnic division in politics. Thus, nationalism finds a 
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platform both among the ethnic Romanians and the ethnic minorities. Vladimir 
Tismăneanu (1998) has suggested a distinction between civic nationalism and ethnic 
democracy.  
 
The Different Appearances of Nationalism in post-1989 Romania 
Nationalism in Romania cannot be conceived separate from the inner minority 
conflicts, conditioned by conflicting historical traditions and political interests. The 
communist era had been characterised by massive assimilation or ‘nationalization’ 
policies. The revolution opened new possibilities for the minorities. Two most 
significant minority parties are the UDMR (Hungarian) and the much smaller FDGR 
(German)204. 
Already on 25 December 1989, the UDMR (the Democratic Union of 
Hungarians in Romania) was founded to represent the interests of the large 
Hungarian minority. Gradually, the UDMR has become an important political factor. 
The program of the UDMR has been based on some fundamental principles such as 
universal human rights, collective minority rights, as well as the rule of law based on 
parliamentary democracy and equality of chance. Already in 2000 the UDMR was 
part of the minority government with the PSD, the PNL and the PD. Again in 2004 
the UDMR became part of the governing centre-right coalition, with the UMDR-
leader, Béla Markó, serving as Deputy Prime Minister responsible for the (identity 
sensitive) portfolio of Education, Culture and European integration. UMDR’s rhetoric 
has been very pro-European. The integration process represents clear advantages for 
the minorities in terms of ensuring rights and achieving relative independence from 
the central authorities. 
Another minority party is the Democratic Forum of Germans in Romania 
(FDGR) also established in December 1989 as a political party to represent the 
interests of the German minority living in different parts of Romania (about 60,000 
individuals as of 2003). The FDGR, led by Sibiu-mayor Klaus Johannis, has won 
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different offices at local and regional level. It is difficult not to interpret Sibiu’s 
success in being appointed European Capital of Culture in 2007 by EU Council of 
Ministers – as the first city from Eastern Europe - as a significant event in 
strengthening the transnational link between minorities and the supranational 
European structures. Hence, as just seen in case of the Hungarian minorities, also the 
ethnic Germans seek for identification and recognition within the democratic 
framework of national, sub-, and supranational structures rather than resorting to 
separatist extremism.  
 Nationalism has found a quite different expression among in the populist 
‘majority’ parties such as PUNR, the PRM, and the PSM, which have not hesitated to 
use xenophobic, anti-Semitic, anti-Hungarian, or anti-Roma rhetorical discourses. 
Party of National Union of Romania (PUNR) emerged as the first post-revolution 
nationalist party in 1990, as a direct reaction to the Hungarian UDMR. In direct 
continuity with Ceauşescu’s nationalism, the PUNR’s doctrine centres on “the 
representation of vital existential interests of the Romanian citizens”205 and the 
promotion of the fundamental values of the Romanian nation and the ethnic unity of 
Romanians. For Gallagher, the PUNR “appealed to a sense of threatened Romanian 
identity and to Romanian cultural and political assertiveness, both of which were 
often expressed simultaneously in its electoral propaganda” (Gallagher, 1995: 170). 
After Gheorghe Funar, the controversial former mayor of Cluj-Napoca, left the party 
for the Greater Romania Party (PRM) it has lost its political weight. 
PRM was established by Corneliu Vadim Tudor (a former associate of 
Ceauşescu) in 1991. The party affirmed itself through the exclusivist nationalist 
position adopted by Tudor and his weekly magazine ‘Greater Romania’206. Its own 
‘national’ doctrine features the PRM as authoritarian, extremist (mainly anti-
Hungarian), and centralist. As the name indicates - and totally ignoring the post-1989 
geopolitical realities - the main ‘historical-strategic’ objectives are the internal and 
external remaking of Greater Romania and the protection of the Romanian nation. 
Authentic heir of Ceauşescu’s nationalism, Tudor considers himself a visionary and a 
Saviour of the Romanian nation, insisting on the various conspiracies against the 
country and the numerous threats to Romania’s national integrity (Gallagher, 2000). 
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206 Using a calumnious (often suburban) language, the magazine has been depicted as extremist, 
racist and xenophobe.      
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An obvious outcome is a traditional strong scepticism towards European integration, 
which has nevertheless been moderated over the last two-three years. 
The Socialist Labour Party (PSM) founded 1992 was led by another 
Ceauşescu associate, Ilie VerdeŃ. The party emerged directly from the disbanded 
Communist Party (PCR). Thus, members of this party include former Securitate 
officers, old communist nomenklatura and nationalist intellectuals. Using communist 
symbols and a cautiously choreographed political rite, the PSM has conducted an 
anti-Hungarian and anti-Semitic discourse. The nationalists blame Romania’s present 
economic situation on the market economy imposed by ‘foreigners’. Moreover, the 
Jews and Hungarians that held high positions in the Communist Party (in the 
beginning) are blamed for the ‘negative’ features of communism. In my opinion this 
is a way to divert from the role that the leaders and members of the PRM and the 
PUNR played themselves during communism. It is not difficult to explain why the 
former communist elites who lead the nationalist parties argue against 
Europeanization and integration into wider Europe. For Verdery, “many of them do 
not see a ready place for themselves in a democratic, market-based society” (Verdery, 
1996: 92). These supporters of the former communist regime as well as their voters 
(many of whom have lost their jobs after 1989) would be much better-off without 
market economy and democracy in Romania. But also because “they have long 
experience with disseminating their ideas and disrupting ideas of others” (Verdery, 
1996: 92). 
Less extreme, but finally much more influential nationalism can be found 
during the 1990s in Iliescu’s changing political constellations. As we have seen, 
Iliescu did not avoid emphasizing nationalist arguments such as the strength of 
national solidarity, unity and identity (especially under the uneasy coalition with the 
ultra-nationalist parties after the 1992 elections). As I will develop further on 
especially Iliescu’s ‘disguised’ nationalism has had important influence on the course 
of Romania’s post-1989 transformation. Let me first explore some of reasons for the 
resistant presence of nationalism in Romania’s political landscape. 
 
Identifying the Reasons for Nationalism in Post-1989 Romania 
There are many causes of the continued appeal of nationalism after 1989. At least 
four main reasons can be identified. The first is the obvious element of continuity. 
Nationalism plays a role in politics nowadays, because it has played a central 
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ideological role since the construction of the modern Romania nation-state. 
Historically the idea of Romania as a ‘Latin island in the Slav Sea’ lies at the heart of 
Romanian nation-building and societal identity. This idea has generated “a marked 
regional differentiation of identity ideologies and politics”207. According to Wagner,  
[s]ince the formation of Greater Romania, the relationship between ethnic 
Romanians and Hungarians and Germans has been a strenuous one, for most of 
its history characterized by a policy of Romanianization and the promulgation of 
a Romanian nationalism on the part of the ethnic Romanian political elites 
(Wagner, 2002: 246).  
Under communism – as I have demonstrated - nationalism was a way to legitimate 
the idea of ‘national interest’ which partly appealed to the anti-Soviet feelings of 
Romanians, partly increased the popularity of the Communist Party by engaging 
intellectuals and lower classes into the communist project. 
A second reason for the continued success of nationalism is the presence 
of large ethnic groups on Romanian territory. The largest minority in Romania is the 
Hungarian. According to a 2002 census208, 1.4 mio. people (or 6, 9 percent of the 
population) consider themselves Hungarians. The German minority counted in 2003 
less than 60,000 individuals, while the Romas count a little over half a million 
individuals (or 2.5 percent of the population).  
Third, there are also features of Romania’s transformation that makes 
nationalism attractive for average citizens, particularly in those parts of the country 
where ethnic minorities are the dominant population. These include the privatization 
of land and some aspects of constitutionalism (e.g. the citizenship law)209. In 
Transylvania, many Romanians blame the minorities for raising unemployment 
among ethnic Romanians. Likewise many Romanians feel threaten by the idea that 
the Hungarian government might claim the territory of Transylvania, even if this is a 
highly unlikely step in today’s European geopolitical context.  
A fourth and important reason for the appeal of nationalism is without 
doubt its proven capacity to create a safe ‘sense of belonging’ to a community. 
Related to the transformation many Romanians have experienced a loss of frame of 
reference. Even if the communist regime was unpopular among large groups of 
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citizens, as we have seen, the Party did provide a more or less coherent vision for the 
society. For the many Romanians who have only seen their living standards decline 
since 1989 or who have lost a certain social position that they held thanks to the now 
gone regime, the nationalist ideas are an appealing resort. Large parts of the present 
nationalist discourse echoe Ceauşescu, including the appeal to authoritarianism and 
answers to a nostalgic longing for the past. 
 
The Consequences of Nationalism for Romania’s Transformation 
What have been the consequences to Romania’s political and economic 
transformation of the continued alliance of nationalism and (reformed) communists? 
In terms of Romania’s relation to Europe, Iliescu’s so-called ‘social democratic’ 
discourse did contain certain integrationist points of view. Hence, the PDSR 
promulgated “the integration of Romania in the multifunctional structures of the 
developed world considering that this represents today a natural framework for the 
affirmation of national identity and to keep the unitary character of the Romanian 
state” (PDSR, 1997). But as it appears emphasize was often given to arguments such 
as national unity and identity, which are rather nationalist than integrationist. 
Especially, Iliescu’s early alliances with extreme nationalist parties compromised the 
approach to integration. Nationalism linked the national interest and national unity to 
the safeguarding of the ‘national unitary state’. Indeed, in the early 1990s, Iliescu 
proposed a vision of integration which isolated Romania from the western trends 
pursued in other eastern European countries. Blokker suggests that “integration was 
primarily perceived in a formal, legal sense, serving the purpose of securing 
international recognition of Romania’s sovereignty” (Blokker, 2004: 307). It was 
actually not until after 1993 that integrating Romania into European and Euro-
Atlantic structures became a policy objective. This marks the point where western 
external forces started to address the question of reforms. 
Also the economic transformation of Romania was delayed. The 
nationalist discourse basically denied the need for (systemic) transformation 
(Blokker, 2004: 306). It is difficult to explain this tendency and the particular line of 
development in Romania without reference to the political agents’ understanding of 
socio-economic transformation. To stabilize Iliescu’s regime and gain popularity, the 
nationalist discourse allowed little opening to western investments, flows of capital 
and structural reforms. This again can be understood only with reference to the 
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communist past. Socio-economic changes were understood in terms of social stability 
and solidarity where the state preserved its interventionist role. In this sense the 
external forces of integration and their effects on the Romanian economy were 
perceived as threatening the internal social cohesion and the national interest. In 
contrast to the prowestern vision of transformation, the nationalist understanding of 
socio-economic progress was collectivist. The argument for a ‘national unitary state’ 
was strongly affiliated with the objective of securing “the national wealth for the 
Romanians as a collectivity”210.   
Also with regard to Romania’s democratic transformation the nationalism 
associated with the ex-communists had a preserving impact. In 1992 Iliescu stated 
that one of his main political objectives was to reconstruct an ‘original democracy’, 
meaning governance by consensus. Vladimir Pasti comments in detail this objective: 
National consensus means that, beyond a group of personal interests, beyond any 
options, there is a unique solution, the best one, the solution imposed by reality 
if, assisted by technicians and specialists, one comes to know it well enough. (…) 
In order to stress the its absolute character, it is considered as representing the 
national interest and, [as] nobody can rise against the national interest, a 
consensus emerges about it (Pasti, 1997: 164). 
In fact, this is a definition of democracy which is difficult to distinguish from 
authoritarian forms of governance. In Iliescu’s opinion all those opposing this project 
were antidemocratic. In this sense, Iliescu opposed his concept of democracy to what 
the opposition (the CDR) called ‘authentic democracy’. Although contradictory and 
highly thinned the concept of ‘original democracy’ remained a leitmotif in the 
PSDR’s vocabulary. In the context of Iliescu’s nationalist politics, it is worth keeping 
in mind that the state was conceived as having the role of securing social 
responsibility. With placing social responsibility at state level, the PDSR “recovered 
[the] authoritative state, defined as ‘social state’”211.  Nationalism has had a harmful 
effect on the reorganization of civil society and generally on democratic practices, 
including the construction of a public space. 
Another feature of nationalism is represented by Iliescu’s position vis-à-
vis the minorities, as he failed to deliver a comprehensive set of rights, even after 
2000 where he adopted a more prowestern line. Indeed, Iliescu responded with 
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nationalism to western demands. By emphasizing autochthonous themes and 
criticizing the embracing of western political and economic models, the FSN and its 
successor the PDSR remained a predominant nationalist party. Iliescu’s nationalism 
appealed to less educated groups of citizens by offering “a sense of belonging to a 
wider national family via an emotional solidarity that democracy has rarely been able 
to replicate” (Gallagher, 1995: 3). 
 
Moderation of the Nationalist Discourse 
A lot of hope was raised – not least outside Romania - after the shift in power in 
1996. Yet, the change did not mean a radical break with nationalism. One may argue 
that the increased speed of reforms promoted by the incoming centre-right 
government actually even fuelled the nationalist forces. In any case, many political 
actors continued to exploit the nationalist theme in order to consolidate own interests 
and the outcome of the 2000 elections confirmed all pessimist thoughts with regard to 
the political potential of the ‘conspiracy theory’ (according to which ‘evil’ is situated 
outside the national community). On a background of deep social disappointment, the 
party which discourse is centred on such a theory (PRM) became the second largest 
party in the parliament, receiving roughly one fourth of the votes. The conspiracy 
theory in part represents another element of continuity from Ceauşescu, whose 
internal anti-western propaganda sought to implant in Romanians the idea that the 
world outside Romania was bad and violent. An image which was partly intact with 
the present author, when I for the first time visited the west in 1998! 
The before-mentioned 2000 election deserves some attention as they mark 
an important shift in post-1989 nationalism. Pop-Eleches (2001) enumerates a 
number of factors which led to PRM’s success. Among them, the moderation of 
PDSR’s nationalist tone, which allegedly reoriented the nationalist voters towards the 
PRM. Yet, during the electoral campaign the PRM itself moderated its discourse and 
claimed that the party – if elected to govern Romania - was ready to engage in a 
constructive debate with the Hungarian minority. Moreover, the PRM focused on its 
outsider role between 1996 and 2000 and presented itself as the only alternative 
capable of driving the country’s progress with regard to European integration while 
improving living conditions. It is not difficult to see that the PRM’s capacity to 
reinvent itself as an alternative to the PDSR was influenced by the wider stand of the 
Romanian electorate. In November 2000 surveys showed 68 percent were in favour 
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of EU membership while 62 percent favoured NATO; 76 percent sustained economic 
reforms212. Important to note is the overwhelming support for European and Euro-
Atlantic integration despite the low and often declining living standard of many 
Romanians. In the same survey 75 percent of Romanians had little or no trust in the 
justice system while 86 percent did not trust political parties. The fact that PRM now 
received support also from more progressive segments of the electorate reflects the 
widespread dissatisfaction with Romania’s political elites one decade after the 
revolution, rather that deep nationalist sentiments among the Romanian population. 
Given the high percentage of support for European integration and the 
open conditionalities imposed by both NATO and the EU, both political elites and the 
population have already accepted ‘the rules of the game’, even if they do not totally 
agree to them. This explains why the PRM has realised that politically it would be 
imprudent to oppose minority rights and other external influences and thus ‘softened’ 
its nationalist tone in recent years. In other words, it seems sustained that Romania’s 
progress in approaching European institutions has played a significant role in 




By its mere composition and geographic location at one of Europe’s ‘crossroads’, 
modern Romania has always been a society where it has been appealing to attribute 
great importance to ethnic division in politics. At the beginning of this section, I 
argued that what has often been perceived as a ‘rise’ of nationalism after 1989, 
should rather be understood as a continuation of the nationalist discourse of the 
procommunist and communist era in a transforming context (see sections 4.2.3. and 
4.3.3.). 
The rebirth of nationalism in Romania neither represents the recovery 
only of precommunist past (kept untouched during communism). On the contrary, the 
history of nationalism, far from being ‘cold’ under communism, followed its own 
course, but under particular forms, those which were allowed and used at the 
advantage of the instituted power. Gallagher notes, “chauvinists have benefited from 
the nationalist conditioning to which much of the population was subjected before 
1989 and from the backing of important sections of the Iliescu state” (Gallagher, 
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1995: 226). Both the context and the content of nationalism are different now. 
Although post-1989 nationalism re-establishes the link to interwar nationalism, there 
are many differences between them, not least because the former emerges after 
decades of communism. Nationalism in post-1989 Romania has been generated at the 
intersection between external influences and the particularities added in the local 
development processes. An interesting difference from the communist era – with 
democratic potential – is the coexistence of the multiple forms of nationalism as the 
communists have lost monopoly. According to Dobrescu, “[i]n spite of the nationalist 
limitations laid on the political stage, the polemics between different types of 
nationalism can (and actually do) go very deep as far as political and moral principles 
are concerned, thus inducing a vibrant, really functioning pluralism” (Dobrescu, 
2003: 413-4).  
 Another important change is the increased and better organised voice of 
the national minorities, which represent a clear postnational trend in Romanian 
politics. Hence, it was noted that minorities have chosen a strategy based on 
cooperation - not separation – and on appeal to European and universal values. 
Herein lies also an important move in the postwestern direction of developing 
‘multiple identities’ (Rumford 2006a), as the minorities rather explicitly have proven 
the capacity to be both ethic, local, national, and European at the same time – and that 
with increasing recognition from central authorities.  
The blend of ‘ex-communism’ and nationalism sustained by the early 
Iliescu governments was certainly a disruptive element, which negatively influenced 
both the political and economic development of Romania in the first years after the 
revolution (Paqueteau 1995; Verdery 1996; Tismǎneanu 1998; Rupnik 1999). 
However, the recent political development shows that even Romania - perceived as 
the embodiment of the backward ‘east’ - can make real progress in weakening the 
forces of traditional nationalism. The 2004 elections for example brought into power 
a coalition government consisting of parties that are certainly more open towards the 
legitimate demands of national minorities than previous coalitions were. Also, 
elections have shown that even if nationalism retains a certain appeal, its most 
extreme expressions have been marginalised, as the rejection of European integration 




The Diffusion Factor   
The above sections have discussed the internal political development in Romania 
after the Revolution. We cannot discuss the nature of Romania’s political 
transformation without briefly considering the role of diffusion. As stated earlier, 
‘diffusion’ in this thesis is defined as ‘the encounter with external models and ideas 
that are taken on, adapted and/or reproduced’. 
In particular since 1996, the Western reference model, associated with 
Romania’s integration into European and euro-Atlantic structures, has played an 
essential role in Romanian society. This model has been used to legitimize the 
introduction of a new societal order but has also raised hope with regard to 
transborder relations, mutual support and peace (Scholte, 1998: 61). Ultimately under 
the new condition dictated from both outside and inside forces, Romania has 
developed close relations and applied to join the EU and NATO. Early in 1990s 
Romania became a member of the Council of Europe and the OSCE. Different 
institutional structures have been either created or adapted to meet the exigencies of 
Euro-Atlantic integration. Romania could not resist the external forces that 
determined the extent to which Romania was able to attain its integration aspirations. 
Such a reality has slowly been acknowledged by the ‘integration agents’ after EU and 
NATO have markedly raised their expectations. The transformation process has 
therefore very much been concerned with coming to terms not only with the inside 
transformation but also with the external dynamics of the post Cold War order.  
Western integration meant also that Romanians had to reconstruct their 
images of Europe. During communism ‘Europe’ had represented a struggle between 
two different value systems and types of society. The interpretation was rather static, 
as the division of Europe was for decades taken for granted. Also it was an image, 
which was primarily generated internally, as the Communist Party had an interest in 
imposing the idea of the West as the (negative) Other. Since the revolution, the image 
of Europe has evolved. External forces have come to play a larger role in the 
understanding of, what is Europe. Moreover, this has induced a dynamic into the 
image of Europe, as Romania’s relationship with Europe has had its ups and downs 
since the revolution. Yet, also internal developments continued to influence the image 
of Europe. The image that Europe and the EU have acquired in the last years is partly 
the result of the political instability, widespread insecurity, corruption, moral 
vacuum, and deteriorating living conditions, which Romanians have experienced. In 
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this situation Romanians have turned both against Europe – claiming that the 
hardship is caused by the EU imposed reforms – but also to Europe to look for a way 
out of the socio-economic problems.  
The EU integration is publicly perceived as a key to national security, 
economic success and political stability. According to the Eurobarometer’s national 
report on Romania from 2005, seven out of ten Romanians declare themselves in 
favour of closer unity within the European community. Lower than the 81 percent 
measured in 2003, but significantly higher than in e.g. Hungary, where less than half 
support further integration.  
Yet, the future of Romanian society within the EU integration framework 
is filled with uncertainty and unfulfilled expectations. People fear – with a reason - 
that their life standard will not reach the level of France or Germany the second day 
after accession. Social and economic conditions of present Romania explain the 
prevailing uncertainty and lack of trust in a united Europe. The purchasing power has 
already decreased significantly, which also means that the living standard has 
lowered. Recent statistics (March 2006) show that the monthly income average was 
as low as 233 Euros while the average pension was only 78 Euros213. This makes it 
difficult for many Romanians to meet ends every month.  
To sum-up, the linkage between the domestic and external context is 
important for understanding the kind of societal order which is underway. The 
relationship between Romania and Europe is not one-way and political agents have 
not always been able to determine the rules of ‘reorganization’. It would be a 
mistake, however, to see Romania’s transformation as merely the product of the EU 
and NATO influences. As I will illustrate below, from a cultural integration 
perspective, the process of reorganization caused by political agents has been largely 
influenced by wider transformations in Europe, going beyond the formal institutions.  
4.5. Rethinking Romanian Society: Transformation through Cultural 
Integration 
Having outlined and discussed the specificity of Romania’s post-1989 political life 
and the role of diffusion, in what follows I will seek to understand post-1989 
Romania’s experience through a sociological analysis of cultural integration. While 
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approaching the matter from an overall theoretical angle, in accordance with the 
cultural integration model, I am not leaving aside the ‘uniqueness’ of the Romanian 
case (as also defended by Wagner, 2004). Political developments will serve as a point 
of reference along my analysis given that political structures are useful in revealing 
the inner forces, dynamics and main patterns of the Romanian process of 
transformation. As Wagner suggests that “it is safe to say that the condition of post-
Communism has generated its own history, causes, and explanatory variables 
beginning with the political process itself” (Wagner, 2002: 277-78).  
When the communist regime collapsed, the Romanian society had an 
opportunity to transform itself into an open society (Popper, 1995). Sztompka (1999: 
211) used the term ‘cultural clash’ to describe the difficult exercise to bring the post-
1989 East and West together, linking the Western cultural orientation to an anti-
democratic, nationalist culture. As we have seen, even today, for the extremes of the 
Romanian political scene, such a division makes sense. Present-day Romania is still 
struggling internally with these two opposed cultural and political options. Despite 
these apparent reasons to regard Romania’s internal changes and relation to Europe 
as being solely the outcome of Western and nationalist political forces, I will 
demonstrate in the following sections that a more complete picture of Romania’s 
transformation can be achieved through the analytical framework of 
postwesternization and postnationalism. What is needed to be examined is the 
‘openness’ of Romania’s transformation to the outside Europe. The question is not 
whether Romania can become fully ‘Western’ (which is often the point of departure 
of much of the previous research on Romania). Although the West has played a 
significant role in the reconstruction of the Romanian societal identity, Romania’s 
transformation needs further interpretation, as the ‘West’ is itself undergoing 
transformation and therefore is not a fixed point of reference. Consequenly, it is 
useful to explore Romania’s experience with cultural integration, and in doing so it is 
essential that both Romania’s transformation and European transformation are seen, 
not as clearly defined, but as open entities.  
In discussing Romania’s post-1989 transformation through the analytical 
framework of postwesternization and postnationalism it must be clear that these these 
terms do not simply replace Westernization and nationalism. In fact, the two ‘sets’ of 
concepts are applicable at different levels of analysis. On the one hand, 
postwesternisation and postnationalism – exactly because these concepts concern the 
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interplay of Europe’s and Romania’s transformation – are operating at a transnational 
level. On the other hand, Westernization and nationalism – as identified by this thesis 
– are analytically applied in the mainly in a purely Romanian context. 
Postwesternization and postnationalism must not be understood to be mutually 
exclusive, but rather coexisting patterns of cultural integration. This is contrary to the 
stop-go logic of nationalism vs. Europeanization which tends to look at integration as 
a sort of zero-sum game between those two forces. Finally, some may see 
postnational Europe as chronologically preceding postwestern Europe. Admittedly, 
trends of postnational Europe can be observed back to the early stages of (west-) 
European integration – long before the idea of postwestern Europe became relevant - 
and has accelerated as legal, economic and political matters have increasingly 
surpassed the national borders in a multi-centred European polity. This, however, 
does not imply that it has become obsolete to address postnational dynamics with the 
seemingly advance of a postwestern Europe. In my understanding the two sets of 
dynamics influence the European states and state-system simultaneously. One may 
even raise the hypothesis that this coexistence is particularly manifest in Eastern 
European countries, including Romania, which have only recently entered into 
(already) postnational Europe.  
With the end of communism, Europe offers itself to Romania again, this 
time as a ‘prestructured space’ that is “prestructured by the already existing – 
formerly ‘Western’ – institutions (most prominently the EU) and by a reinvigoration 
of the historical ‘East/West’ borderline of development” (Wagner, 2004: 57) to 
Eastern Europe. Even if studying Romania’s integration into European and Euro-
Atlantic structures provides us with an understanding of the internal changes taking 
place at the systemic level, it does not fully answer the question: what type of society 
are Romanians constructing for themselves after communism? The belonging to 
Europe, the process of becoming European is co-determined by new factors as well 
as old factors, producing much more continuity in the process of cultural integration 
than has often been acknowledged. Against what Sztompka called the ‘sudden, 
radical break with the past’ (Sztompka, 1992: 11) there is a continuity both of cultural 
and structural nature in the Romanian society perceived in individuals’ patterns of 
behaviour, values and attitudes.  
Romania’s transformation takes place in a “dual context or cognitive 
frame of reference and comparison” (Offe, 1996: 230). The two dominant dynamics 
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of cultural integration - postwestern and postnational - have emerged in this dual 
context, which includes both understandings of the past (communist and 
precommunist) and understandings of transnational processes. The pathways 
Romania is taking are therefore not determined by foreseeable or self-directed 
processes of change. Rather, these pathways are the outcome of individuals’ action 
and cultural constructions; culture - defined in this thesis as a socially constructed 
reality based on social imaginary significations - forms then a key concept in 
understanding the process of transformation.  
A five-step movement to understand the impact of cultural integration in 
Romania’s transformation is proposed: the acceptance of that not only does the West 
have an impact on the East but also the East influences the West; an 
acknowledgement of that both West and East are under transformation; the relevance 
of postwestern and postnational dynamics to explain Romanian transformation; the 
acknowledgement of the necessity to rethink Romanian society after coming into 
terms with the legacies of the past; a view on the Romanian transformation as not 
separated from the wider European and global transformation. 
The persistence of elements of continuity in the Romanian society as well 
as the contemporary relevance of the terms ‘postwestern’ (Delanty and Rumford, 
2005) and ‘postnational’ (Habermas, 1998, 2003; Curtin 1997) work in favour of 
describing the condition of Romanian transformation in terms of postwesternization 
and postnationalism, especially articulated around societal identities (as argued in 
Chapter 3). A problem in identifying the impact of postwesternization and 
postnationalism is the difficulty of separating external explanatory factors from 
domestic factors. One way to investigate postwesternization and postnationalism is to 
examine concrete events where both the external and internal pressures tend in these 
directions. Therefore, the following discussion places Romania in postwestern and 
postnational context that illustrate Romania’s complex relationship with Europe and 
the impossibility of reducing the question of cultural integration to the classic 
dichotomy between Westernization and nationalism.  
In terms of the relationship between postwesternization and 
postnationalism, they encounter each other because it is no longer possible for either 
to remain close in traditional contexts. When cultures enter postwestern and 
postnational Europe, their traditional cultures are altered. Despite the fact that there is 
also a cultural continuity in Romania, a break away from older structures occurs in 
 215 
the encounter with postwestern and postnational Europe. Postwesternization and 
postnationalism are thus more complementary than contradictory. To be sure, 
postwesternization and postnationalism have not only been the forces impelling 
Romania, but also increased internal concerns with maintaining political dominance 
have encouraged these trends in several ways. I now want to examine the Romanian 
experience in terms of the cultural integration process by keeping postwestern and 
postnational as key concepts of the argument.  
4.6. A Postwestern Romania in the Making  
In the following analysis, I will examine some aspects of postwesternization with 
respect to the internal transformation of Romania. In line with the argument in 
Chapter 2, I shall posit here that the main changes that are occurring today in 
Romania are not dictated by ‘the end of history’ (which implied the triumph of a 
singular modernity). From a postwestern perspective, Europe is best defined in terms 
of ‘multiple modernities’ (Eisenstadt, 2000; Therborn, 2003; Delanty and Rumford, 
2005). The theoretical discussion of how to approach Romania from a postwestern 
perspective will thus be linked to the concept of ‘multiple modernities’. I will then 
turn to examine how postwesternization is affecting Romania. The examples will 
substantiate the idea that a postwestern order is more than the simple absence of the 
Cold War and the geopolitical East-West division (a minimalist reading), but that 
postwesternization implies a more fundamental or qualitative shift in Romania’s 
behaviour and orientation. Postwesternization is characterized by reorganisation by 
and of social agents around objectives conditioned by ‘multiple belonging’ (Rumford, 
2006a) in the sense that it is no longer enough to say ‘we are Western’ or ‘we are 
against communism’. Three features of postwesternization appear from further 
examples: first, with the end of the Cold War and the accelerated European 
integration process Romania has moved beyond the East/West division. Secondly, 
Romania is increasingly seeing itself as having a global orientation, which exceeds 
the immediate European context. Thirdly, Romania has started to interact more 
openly with the potential ‘new East’ (i.e. former Soviet republics), no longer afraid 
that this will cause others to identify it as an Eastern-oriented country.   
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4.6.1. Romania’s Transformation on the Basis of ‘Multiple Modernities’ 
Current thinking on the nature of modernity conceives modernities as multiple, 
overlapping, and contested (Therborn, 2003). The way in which postwesternization is 
approached inevitably involves conceptions drawn from non-Western settings for 
cultural integration is not a complete (uniquely western) process, but a reflexive and 
open-ended process. Postwestern Europe “is a Europe that is no longer based on 
singular, western modernity, but multiple modernities” (Delanty and Rumford, 2005: 
49). The commonality of Europe marks the end of the notion of the West and “the 
emergence of in its place of a multiplicity of geopolitics and with these new models 
of modernity” (Delanty and Rumford, 2005: 43). If Europe no longer is imagined in 
terms of the West, then the East too has been reconfigured. The argument in favour of 
a postwestern Europe is premised upon the assumption that the enlargement is about 
“transformation of Europe, the relativization of Western Europe and an awareness of 
many Europes shaped by multiple modernities”214. As an alternative to western 
modernity, there is not only one modernity, but multiple modernities open to 
contention and alternative understandings. This is not the same with saying that 
Romania amounts to an alternative modernity as such. I rather regard its modernity as 
the result of the encounter with other modernities. Romania’s modernity rests on the 
particular trajectory emerging from the encounter with other modernities. Rather than 
understanding Romania’s experience with modernity as ‘failed modernization’ or 
incapacity of convergence with Western modernity, its diversity should be 
acknowledged.  
In Romania modernization (i.e. openness towards Europe and western 
ideas and practices) has often been seen as opposed to traditionalism/autochtonism 
(Verdery, 1991; Hitchins, 1994). This dichotomy rests on a rather singular idea of 
modernity. In the modernist approach, traditional and modern societies are conceives 
as two different societal systems, each with an entirely different set of features. In a 
broad sense, modern society was opposed to particularism and a religious world view 
that was local and based on Eastern-oriented traditions and values. Modern attributes 
involved rationalism, universalism, and individualism. From this perspective 
modernity and tradition were seen as negating each other, as if the traditional form of 
society (the East) would always represent the anomaly - a residual. “As social change 
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is understood as the transition of traditional societies into modern ones, traditional 
attributes must necessarily give way to modern ones” (Blokker, 2004: 33). The end of 
communism deligitimised the conception of a state-socialist society and made the 
political elites – as least in the beginning – appeal to “the apparently neutral idea of 
rejoining the Western project of modernity” (Blokker, 2004: 40). However, what 
occurred in Romania after communism was not a replication of Western liberalism 
and democracy. This monochrom explanation of transformation falls into various 
problems. First, by overlooking the historical diversity, this interpretation ignores the 
dynamics and internal conflicts inherent to the process of transformation. Second, this 
view fails to lead to meaningful insights in empirical research. Third, by taking the 
ideal idea of Western society, it assigns this model as a normative project on 
Romania. Instead of similar outcomes imposed by above, a potential diversity of 
outcomes and diverging paths are presumed. As clearly indicated in the analysis of 
Romania’s post-1989 politics, diversity in the paths of development taken but also 
continuity is the outcome of agency.    
However appealing it is to associate Westernization and nationalism with 
pro- and anti-modernism, it is rather suggested that these trends represent different 
but not automatically mutually restrictive conceptions of modernization. A 
perspective that admits ‘multiple modernities’ is thus more adequate to analyse the 
plural forms that postwesternization can take in the case of Romania. Against this 
background, nationalism should be understood as both reaction and alternative to 
postwesternization. Put differently, the concept of ‘multiple modernities’ places 
Romania beyond East and West and at the same time considers the outcome of 
current transformations as ‘an open question’ (Eyal et al., 1998: 39).       
As mentioned earlier, the postwestern dimension of integration marks the 
meeting point where Romania and Europe convene at the end of the East-West 
division. One assumption for this integration dynamic is that a postwestern Romania 
meets a postwestern Europe built on ‘multiple modernities’. First, postwestern 
integration relates to the integration of Romanian society within wider 
transformations in Europe. Second, the postwestern dimension of integration also 
concerns the transformative dimension of Europe affected itself by Eastern 
transformations (Wagner, 2004). In other words postwestern integration has 
transcended the boundaries of the Romanian society and has had a long-term impact 
not only on the Romanian transformation but also on wider European 
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transformations. Not only had the fall of communism produced a rebordering process 
(Rumford, 2006a), but the main borderline that divided Europe has ceased to exist 
and Boia’s interpretation of Romania as ‘borderland of Europe’ (Boia, 2001b) has 
lost its significance (i.e. Romania becoming a crucial actor in the EU’s 
Neighbourhood Policy). 
Looking at postwestern Romania in a postwestern Europe suggests the 
idea that Europe is changing at the same time Romania is changing. Thus, by 
postwesternization I understand both Romania’s undergoing changes and the changes 
that Europe itself experiences as it enlarges. Postwesternization is the logic result of 
the end of the East-West division in Europe. This division has been mostly used to 
define politically the Cold War division between the communist Eastern Europe (‘the 
East’), including Romania, and the capitalist Western Europe (‘the West’). For 
Herslund, “[t]he names ‘East’ and ‘West’ thus became purely political labels, 
everything to the East of the Iron Curtain becoming Eastern Europe” (Herslund, 
2005: 18). After the end of the Cold War the term ‘European’ came to replace what 
before was termed ‘Western’ with reference to values, culture and civilization. As 
such, the concepts of East and West have lost their meanings in Europe. Europe 
needed an expression of its own (Therborn, 2006).  
But postwesternization is more, and also implies a transformation of the 
relations between Romania and Europe, as Europe is no longer a synonym of the 
West. Indeed, Eastern Europe has become an ‘indispensable’ part of the ‘West’ and 
Western culture, values and civilization. Beyond the prospect of enlargement, divided 
Europe becomes not only one Europe, but multiple Europes. According to Therborn, 
“the commonality of Europe is by no means a cultural emanation, but a commonality 
of conflict, of war, as well as of bargaining, truces, and compromise. […] Also in this 
way ‘Europe’ has become post-Western” (Therborn, 2006: 3). This means that not 
only the East is being shaped by the West but also the other way around. In 
accordance with the ideas of multiple modernities and multiple identities also the 
coexistence of multiple ‘Europes’ or interpretations of what is Europe is possible. 
Romania going postwestern does not mean becoming a member of the 
European and Euro-Atlantic order, which itself is going through continuous changes, 
but that the Romanian internal transformation (i.e., ‘Eigendynamik’ as used by 
Wagner, 2004: 59) is part of transformations taking place on overall European level, 
as Europe becomes postwestern (see also Delanty and Rumford, 2005). The first 
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wave of enlargement has already transformed the EU and contributed to questioning 
basic assumptions in the community (the debates around the Convention leading to 
the French and Dutch ‘no’ votes in 2005 illustrate this point). This will continue with 
the perspective of Romania becoming an EU member in 2007/2008. Instead of seeing 
the EU in the bipolar terms of centre versus periphery, in an enlarging Europe there 
are in fact various centres where agents may wish to position themselves in different 
ways, in order to seek out the niche positions most suitable.  Rumford (2006b) uses 
the notion of ‘polycentricity’ to describe the decentred and dynamic nature of Europe.  
If Europe is gradually becoming postwestern (Delanty and Rumford 
2005), so is Romania. Indeed, with the incorporation into NATO and EU, a historic 
milestone in Romania’s history has been marked. Not only has Romania escaped the 
fears of being a ‘periphery’ and a grey zone between a European core and a Russian 
dominated-east, but Romania has also changed its course of action in new directions. 
Both Europe and Romania are being reinvented. Creating postwestern Romania does 
not necessarily imply identification with a common European identity. For Romania, 
Europe is no longer perceived as the West. There are subtexts of recognition, 
particularly when confronted with EU enlargement (see also Törnquist-Plewa 2002). 
According to Delanty, the contemporary idea of Europe “has lost its traditional 
referents in the institutions and processes of modernity – in history, ethnicity, 
religion, geography – and is becoming a free-floating term” (Delanty, 2003c: 21). 
Postwesternization suggests the idea that Romania is moving beyond the 
East-West distinction. As argued in Chapter 3, section 3.5.1., Romania and Europe 
get closer as they become postwestern. Europe is no longer made of separate cultural 
worlds upon which the idea of a unique East depends. Not situating Romania beyond 
East can lead to isolating elements of difference. And since east and west are no 
longer separate, but rather merged or inseparately intertwined under a postwestern 
condition, Romania and Europe share as basic element the openness towards 
‘multiple belonging’ (Rumford, 2006a). While it can not be denied that the EU has a 
role in shaping Romania, the idea that the EU is actually able to inflict a unitary 
societal model on Romania is highly questionable. As other dynamics are at work, 
“new and different models of modernity take shape” (Delanty and Rumford, 2005: 
49). Exactly what kind of orientation has Romania developed will be discussed in the 
next two sections.    
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4.6.2. Reconstructing Self-Images beyond East and West  
The general postwestern trends and Romania’s place herein depicted at the beginning 
of this section – a move beyond the East/West division, a shift away from a situation 
where Romania looks simply West and the interaction with the new East – will be 
illustrated in the following by two concrete examples. First, the Romanian state has 
started to develop a more proactive international role. For instance, Romania’s 
participation in the US-led invasion of Iraq and its possible complicity in CIA 
‘Rendition Flights’ sustain my argument about Romania’s exhibition of multiple 
belonging, as the European reality is not in the way of a global vocation. Second, an 
analysis of Romania’s relations with the new borderland of Europe, namely with 
Ukraine, provides evidence of a changing attitude towards the East. Whereas the first 
example is a clear illustration of postwesternization, the case of Romania’s relation 
with Ukraine may be read also as a symptom of the parallel impact of 
postnationalism. Postwestern because Romania has started to look ‘East’ without 
fearing that this undermines its hard-fought-for image as increasingly belonging to 
the ‘West’. The example has a postnational side in that it demonstrates that 
contentious ‘high politics’ issues – earlier belonging solely to the national realm - 
increasingly acquired a postnational character.  
 Any reflection on the relation between Romania and postwestern Europe 
actualises Chris Rumford’s concept of ‘multiple belonging’ (Rumford, 2006a). After 
the end of communism, the impact of this reality has altered the orientation of 
Romania’s successive governments. A more ‘fluid’ Europe and world has opened the 
possibility to seek self-identification on a more ad-hoc basis. In particular, more 
recent governments (Năstase and Tăriceanu) have become progressively influenced 
by these dynamics. These governments seem to have been convinced that a global 
orientation is both central and indispensable to the country’s long-term development. 
Especially in the wake of 11 September 2001, Năstase government was eager to 
maximize the benefits from this new orientation. One consequence of these shifts has 
been that the ‘door’ of entry into NATO began to open wide. 
From the early spring of 2002 the rapprochement between Romania and 
the US has had clear advantages for Romania. The events of 11 September enlarged 
Romania’s strategic importance to the US which swiftly needed countries in the 
Black Sea region to provide military infrastructure and troops. The move was meant 
to present Romania as a stable and reliable partner in transatlantic relations (at a 
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moment when the already existing NATO members, Greece and Turkey, were 
reserved and reluctant). This can be seen as an attempt at reconstructing society by 
interpreting Romania as playing the role of a defender of democracy and freedom in 
the world. Many Romanians believed that if Romania helped to build democracy in 
the world, Romania would irrewokably cut the link to its communist past. This can be 
interpreted as an attempt to reconstruct Romanian society on the basis of a ‘globally 
oriented’ strategy. Romania has also allied itself closely with the US over 
Afghanistan and Iraq and in its ‘war on terror’ more generally. 
 Indeed, since 2002 Romania has become increasingly absorbed into more 
global relations. This growing attention towards supraterritorial interests has been 
especially apparent in Romania’s readiness to participate in the US-led war against 
Iraq. Partly to convince its NATO allies that Romania is not a potential weak link vis-
à-vis radical Middle East regimes (i.e. a legacy from the communist era intelligence 
operatives)215, partly to create a new image for Romania, Năstase government 
appeared in 2002 a strong supporter of Romania’s involvement in the Iraq War. In 
August 2002, Romania became the first country (in the world) to sign a bilateral 
agreement with the US that offered American soldiers and diplomats immunity from 
prosecution by the International Criminal Court (ICC). The strongest critics came 
from the European Commission that stated: “We would have expected a future 
member-state to have at least coordinated with us such an important issue”216. This 
was indicative of later events.   
 In early 2003 the Romanian parliament voted in favour of Romania’s 
participation as de facto NATO ally in the Iraq War. The support included US access 
to Romanian airbases and airspace, as well as active deployment of ground troops. 
The decision was strongly criticised by many key European players. Indeed, 
Romania’s closeness of the US raised concerns within the EU about the country’s 
foreing policy priorities. Not least from France whom otherwise had been 
instrumental in convincing its European partners that Romania should be welcomed 
in the EU. Also EU Commissioner for Enlargement, Günter Verheugen, declared 
himself ‘disappointed’ by the decision. French president Jacques Chirac’s 
disapproval of Romania’s participation generated a strong response from Romanian 
politicians. “Romania and Bulgaria were particularly irresponsible. If they wanted to 
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diminish their chances of joining Europe they could not have found a better way”, 
Chirac said217. According to Gallagher, Chirac “sounded as if it might be ready to 
veto Romanian and Bulgarian entry” (Gallagher, 2005: 327). The then Romanian 
President Ion Iliescu stated that “Jacques Chirac should regret such expressions, 
which are not in the spirit of friendship and democratic relationships”218. Chirac’s 
reaction prompted US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to differentiate between 
what he named ‘old Europe’ and ‘new Europe’. Caught between core Europe’s 
mistrust vis-à-vis Bush’s diplomacy and the United States, Romania has since been 
trying to balance two identities (i.e. ‘multiple belonging’). 
The significance of this event is not so much that France continued to 
consider Eastern European countries as subordinated European juniors (accusing 
them of ‘childish and irresponsible behaviour’), whereas established EU members 
such as UK, Denmark, and Italy who also adopted a pro-US policy were not 
criticized as openly. This only illustrates that mental barriers are persistent even in a 
significantly changing Europe. The importance is rather that Eastern European views 
by now have become an unavoidable presence in the set of values that the expanding 
EU represents – not least seen from the outside world (in this case from across the 
Atlantic). The west of Europe no longer holds a monopoly on defining Europe’s view 
of the world. East is part of West. For Charles Maier (2003), the division issue of 
‘old’ versus ‘new’ Europe is not about a new and an old Europe. In Maier’s words, “I 
would call the East Europeans not new Europeans but ‘new West’ Europeans”219. 
Such a development implicitly makes obsolete the East-West distinction, and hence 
places us in a postwestern situation, where neither the label ‘West’, nor the label 
‘East’ is any longer meaningful.  
In June 2006, against the backround of decreasing public approval of the 
Iraq operations (particularly since the kidnapping of three Romanian journalists in 
2005 and casualties among Romanian soldiers in both Iraq and Afghanistan), Prime 
Minister Tăriceanu  requested the withdrawal of Romania’s peacekeeping troops 
from Iraq stating security concerns and financial reasons220. Yet, the president of 
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Romania and other leading political figures from the coalition parties replied that 
Romania had to assume its global responsibility as a NATO member and continue to 
contribute to the military operations in Iraq. Băsescu called the proposal 
‘unacceptable’ and accused Tăriceanu of damaging Romania’s credibility abroad. 
Moreover, the internal split over the Iraq War was more than a proof of Prime 
Minister’s office incapacity of institutional cooperation with the president office and 
inside his own party. Only two parties from the broad coalition, the Conservative 
Party and the UDMR, said they supported the withdrawal of troops from Iraq. In 
recent public opinion polls over 60 percent are for the withdrawal of Romanian 
troops221 while only 23 percent are for maintaining the troops. This encouraged the 
Liberals to suggest a referendum on the issue of the Romania’s present in Iraq. Less 
surprising in a European context, Tăriceanu’s declaration was waited for a long time 
by the European Union where the collaboration between Romania and the US 
continues to be perceived as a form of negligence of European priorities. It seems that 
in his fight of political survival, Tăriceanu is searching for a European legitimacy 
against a pro-US president. Opposing his prime minister, Băsescu stated that the EU 
security policy was not enough for Romania222.  
The case for Romania’s growing identification with a postwestern Europe 
can be further sustained by the case of possible complicity in the alledged CIA 
‘rendition’ flights. Although this could have turned out to be an obstable in 
Romania’s EU orientation, it has actually created new forms of solidarity. As 
Therborn has pointed out, “the American war has both undermined Europe, and, 
unintendly, reinforced it” (Therborn, 2006: 4). The East-West distinction has been 
deconstructed. In this sense, both Romania and Europe have moved in a postwestern 
direction. Closely related to the issue of Romania’s involvement in the Iraq War, the 
affair of the secret detentions (elaborated below) has a postwestern significance. The 
examples underline Romania’s development towards a postwestern order through a 
‘global’ commitment rather than just a European. Even at the price of damaging its 
(still somehow fragile) image among core European partners. 
 As mentioned earlier, after 9/11 the United States has had publicly known 
agreements with Romania to use its air space and strategically located military 
airports near the Black Sea and Timişoara. Yet, according to a controversial front 
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page on the Washington Post on 2 November 2005, the Romanian government had 
provided support which went far beyond mere logistics. Allegedly, on the said 
facilities Romania had established, in close cooperation with the CIA, secret prisons 
where detainees could be made subject to torture and other unlawful treatment223.  
Romanian top officials have consequently rejected all accusations 
regarding the secret detentions and qualified them as ‘pure speculation’. As to 
Romania providing general support to the US, President Băsescu said: ‘You can’t be 
a partner of the United States only when you need the advantage and support of their 
alliance. Sometimes the United States needs your support and this is what we are 
doing’224. However, no matter how strongly President Băsescu and others have 
refused any accusation that Romania has hosted secret CIA detention centres, the 
suspicion remains and the press kept referring to Romania as an ‘American gulag’.  
The Council of Europe immediately decided to inquire further into the 
matter. If the accusations were true, the existence of such detention centres would be 
a serious violation of the European Convention on Human Rights to which Romania 
is signatory. And hence, a graver derailing of Romania’s credibility as defender of 
European values. In June 2006, rapporteur Dick Marty, a Swiss member of the 
Council’s Parliamentary Assembly, released an in-depth report stating that since the 
9/11 attacks captured terrorist suspects had been detained indefinitely without any 
human rights protection225. Senator Marty accused Romania and several other 
countries of responsibility ‘at varying degrees, which [is] not always settled 
definitively’ for violating the rights of named ‘rendered’ individuals. As a reply to the 
report, the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe, Mr. Terry Davis, was quoted 
as saying: ‘On the basis of the information I have received so far, I am now in a 
position to say that we no longer need to speak about ‘alleged’ cases of rendition’226.  
Despite growing public disenchantment with the country’s involvement in 
Iraq and although Romanians do not favour the use of inhuman methods and non 
respect of human rights, they remain committed to the United States. In contrast to 
other European countries accused of harbouring CIA’s ‘ghost flights’, where the 
topic has raised considerable public protests, in Romania the issue has not caused 
large public debate. Romanians still remember the US’ role in bringing communism 
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to a fall and pushing NATO expansion eastward. Whereas many ’Old Europe’ 
countries mistrust the American idea of exporting democracy to the Middle East and 
elsewhere, Europeans in former communist countries are less sceptical due to their 
historical experience. A divergence eagerly sustained by the US president: “some of 
the most important support for Iraqis is coming from European democracies with 
recent memories of tyranny: Poland and Hungary and Romania and Bulgaria and the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia, Georgia, Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. 
Others in Europe have had disagreements with our decisions on Iraq”227 . Bush’s 
rhetoric has in itself a postwestern element. It is contributing to redefining the West, 
by indirectly characterising ‘New Europe’ as more Western in its political action than 
‘Old Europe’. When East is regarded by an important external actor like the United 
States as more “Western than West”, then the East-West distinction is fundamentally 
challenged. Yet, Romanian commitment to the US does not make EU membership 
less important. Simply, for Romania, isolated from the West during communism, it is 
just not enough to be Western – in the sense of west European - in the same way as it 
was not enough to be Eastern.  
The transatlantic link is seen as the key guarantor of Romania’s security. 
Yet, Romania’s involvement in Iraq represents more than mere paying back to the US 
for NATO – and indeed EU membership (Gallagher, 2005: 324-327). Romania’s 
political class generally admires the US for its prosperity as much as for its 
determined stance against communism and other forms of totalitarianism. What ‘old 
Europe’ regards as an American simplification of complex international relations 
issues, “new Europeans tend to see as principled stances reminiscent of those that 
helped bring down the Soviet empire in the late 1980s” (Pehe, 2003: 33). Although 
most Romanians philosophically oppose the idea of war, their experiences under 
Ceauşescu taught them that the existence of dictators like Saddam Hussein in some 
cases can justify armed action. In a postwestern perspective, it is highly indicative 
that a European state like Romania is seeking inspiration and guidance outside 
Europe.  
By joining the ‘coalition of the willing’, Romania made a choice between 
the view of core-EU countries like France and Germany and the ideological (and 
pragmatic) interest in developing close ties with the United States. In the case of the 
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Iraq war, Romania looked beyond the EU and sought to embrace a global role rather 
than simply thinking narrowly in terms of return to the ‘West’ (i.e. the EU). Even at 
the cost of risking delaying EU membership. This has allowed Romania to construct 
a new independent identity. Romania is becoming increasingly postwestern not only 
because Europe has become postwestern, but also because Romania no longer feels 
constrained. This has entailed an orientation towards a new political agenda. The 
stated objective of this agenda is to enhance Romania’s role in the world since being 
anticommunist or simply Western is not enough. With its participation in the Iraq 
war, Romania demonstrated an interest in redefining itself in global terms, rather than 
as an ‘add-on’ to the west of Europe.  
According to Therborn, “Europe became a ‘dispensable’ part of the West, 
to which only the United States was the ‘indispensable nation’” (Therborn 2006: 5). 
With the recent political disagreement over secret American rendition centres on its 
territory, “Europe is no longer meaningfully part of a common North Atlantic 
West”228. Expressed in more general terms, we can say that the concern with the 
global in Romanian politics (not imposed by the EU) has added a postwestern 
dimension to Romania’s transformation which was not previously evident. With the 
on-going reconstruction and remanifestation of the state after the dismantling of the 
communist system, the Romanian state has reasserted itself in a postwestern 
direction. The state is less dependent on the traditional ‘return to Europe’ rhetoric. 
Thus a major dimension to Romania’s transformation is the openness towards new 
frames of reference. These new frames of reference are becoming more and more 
important in the shaping of Romania today. The tendency until recently was to 
concentrate on Western/nationalists forms of identification. The above examples 
illustrated the need to think about Romania in postwestern terms and hence move 
beyond the traditional Western-nationalist duality.  
If back in 1989 Romania’s ‘one eyed’ focus on becoming part of Europe - 
and ‘Western’ - was easy to understand, Romania is increasingly coming to terms 
with a Europe less Western than it used to be. Less Western in the sense that Europe 
has been redefined by the interaction with the East. This was obvious in the lack of 
unity over the Iraq question. Given the diverging stances towards a common ‘other’ 
now that the ‘East’ has ceased to exist, the idea of Western has lost its meaning. The 
lack of a firm Western identity which previously countries like Romania could 
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identify with is disappearing. There is no border between Western and Eastern 
Europe. In the same line of thinking, Delanty and Rumford suggest that non-
establishment of East-West border is basic to all definitions of Europe. Delanty and 
Rumford propose, to see both Europe and its borders as ‘discursive constructions’ 
(Delanty and Rumford, 2005: 36). As Balibar has pointed out, it would be a mistake 
to consider Eastern Europe’s ‘border of democracy’ a separation. According to 
Balibar, “in today’s world, it has not the slightest chance of being maintained, and no 
one would to rebuild the Wall a little further east” (Balibar, 2004: 99).  
A further point needs to be made in the discussion on borders which 
includes Romania. During communism the East and West distinction referred to the 
eastern border as a ‘frontier’. The East marked the border of Europe. Romania was 
then part of the East. From a historical perspective, the Eastern frontier can be 
perceived as a ‘troubled’ boundary defining “a space open to a variety of narratives 
the West produces about itself” (Eder, 2006: 11). The eastern border has been subject 
to a dynamic process of reconstruction. As a result of the EU expansion the interstate 
borders between Romania and the EU will become increasingly irrelevant. If there is 
going to be a border then this will not be limited to the (traditionalist) inter-state 
divisions. It would rather be the product of socially constructed narratives that does 
impact our daily life practices beyond the border, delineated in the traditional jargon 
(Newman, 2006) by mental borders.  
I have argued that the idea of postwestern Romania requires a rethinking 
of the relation between Romania and the rest of the world. There are two dimensions 
to this. First, this has meant a shifting relation between inside and outside Europe. 
This alone necessitates a new understanding of how both European and Romanian 
spaces are reorganized. Second, Romania’s special relationship with the US does not 
create a border between Romania and the EU. It rather reinforces the idea according 
to which both Europe and Romania are becoming postwestern. In sum, a new global 
dimension to studying Romania, currently not developed, is the necessary 
concomitant of the idea of Romania as postwestern.  
It is noteworthy that this development has taken place at a time when 
Romania is also redefining its relations to the ‘new east’, i.e. with those countries that 
have been at the potential new dividing line between East and West. As I will 
illustrate below, Romania’s relations with Ukraine contribute to the further shaping 
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of a postwestern identity for Romania and actively contributes to blurring a potential 
new dividing line in Europe before it gets the chance to seettle.  
4.6.3. Dynamics of Openness towards the New Borderlands of Europe  
As already argued in Chapter 3, section 3.5.1., Romania does not develop 
postwestern tendencies alone. One aspect of these developments is that the distinction 
between what is Europe, what is outside/external and what is domestic has become 
less rigid than before. Whereas previously to westernize for Romania meant that it 
had to orientate itself exclusively to the West, now Romania ‘dares’ to look East as 
well. There was a time immediately after the revolution, when Romanians would feel 
uncomfortable about looking eastwards, afraid that it would imply that Romania was 
not Western enough - that it would compromise its Westerness. Recent developments 
show some evidence that Romania is becoming more ‘relaxed’ about a parallel 
eastern orientation than it used to be. And this is clearly a postwestern feature. 
Extending these points further, I will relate the discussion of a postwestern Romania 
in the making to Rumford’s idea of the borderland not only as ‘the spatiality’ of 
borders themselves, but also as a new spatiality of politics. As such, borders create 
their own spaces. However, as Rumford suggests “[b]orderlands should not be 
thought of as simply a development of Europe’s borders” (Rumford, 2006b: 162). I 
will return to this post-territorial aspect below. 
Following the recent enlargement, the EU’s formal external border has 
shifted eastward. As the EU’s external boundaries gradually alter, political 
transformations occur ‘at the border’. These transformations refer to the creation of 
‘integrative borderland landscapes’ (Newman, 2006: 181) that produces new 
dynamics of openness and closure. As Romania will become part of the EU’s internal 
space, the EU has sought to ameliorate the problematic nature of borders. In the case 
of Romania, the EU’s concern with its borders has improved Romania’s relationship 
with Ukraine. It has made Romania less divided from Ukraine. The reconfiguration 
of Romania’s position vis-à-vis Ukraine in certain ways is illustrative for the general 
ideas of this thesis. First, it sustains the argument of postwesternization seen in a 
change of attitude towards Ukraine. Second, it has a postnational element in that it 
has created an awareness of the meaning of spatial borders: contested territorial 
issues are no longer national questions but European. Both aspects will be developed 
below.     
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The EU has put a lot of efforts into creating the so-called ‘soft borders’ 
(Rumford 2006b) through trans-boundary activity spaces. These spaces, previously 
closed, are reconstructed as frontier zones of interaction. The purpose of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), an initiative put in place by the EU in 2004, 
has been to strengthen links with the countries that are becoming new immediate 
neighbours as a consequence of the enlargement. The ENP is in a way a continuation 
of Romania’s efforts of the last decade. Beyond doubt, Romania’s post-1989 
objective of acquiring membership of NATO and the EU has had a positive impact 
on the relations with its neighbouring states, as good regional relations is a 
conditionality for membership. Notably, this has meant an improvement of the 
relationship with a third country like Ukraine.  
Since Ukraine’s independence, bilateral relations between Romania and 
Ukraine have had their ups and downs. Periods of more intense cooperation and 
dialogue have been followed by periods of stagnation. Namely three controversies 
have been framing the periodic tensions between the two neighbours: delimitation of 
the continental shelf in the Black Sea, Ukraine’s intensions to restore a shipping canal 
in the Ukrainian part of the Danube Delta, and the question of migration. Let me 
briefly introduce these sources of disagreement in turn. 
The status of Serpent Island has been at the heart of the maritime border 
dispute. This tiny Black Sea Island is symbolic of the larger issues at stake. The 
small, rocky island, which is located in an area with major proven oil and natural gas 
reserves, was annexed by the Soviet Union in 1947 and later inherited by Ukraine, 
despite Romania continuously claiming its historical rights. The second dispute 
concerns the restoration of the shipping canal in the Ukrainian part of the Danube 
Delta. Romania opposes Ukraine’s construction of a navigation canal through the 
Danube Delta meant to aid the shipping industry and improve the employment 
situation in the area. While Romania officially opposes the canal for environmental 
reasons (the delta’s biosphere is declared UNESCO world heritage), Ukraine 
maintains that Romania is trying to ensure its monopoly in terms of shipping services 
in the area. Romania’s official position has backing from the EU, which in October 
2005 urged Kiev to postpone the completion of the canal, likewise citing 
environmental concerns. A third persistent issue has concerned migrant workers. 
Notably, Romanian nationalists have been concerned by the flow of Ukrainian 
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labourers to Romania as well as by the threat posed to Romanian industries by their 
cheaper Ukrainian competitors. 
Recent political developments - Ukraine’s ‘Orange Revolution’ and the 
election of Băsescu in Romania - have had a positive impact on the two countries’ 
relations. From the first days of his presidency, Băsescu has attached particular 
importance to relations with Romania’s immediate neighbours. The long-standing 
cases of the Black Sea continental platform and the ownership of Serpent Island have 
finally been brought before the International Court of Justice in the Hague, which 
have been asked to help the two countries draw the demarcation line. A decision from 
The Hague is expected by 2008. Similarly, Romania has signed in Odessa a protocol 
that stipulates that both parties are to follow the recommendations of a UN 
Committee regarding the Bastroe canal project. In July 2006 international experts 
have supported Romania’s position on the Bastroe canal, pointing out it will have 
devastating effects on the biotope of the region. According to the Investigation 
Commission, the Bastroe canal ‘would likely have a negative effect on the border 
environment’ in the Danube Delta situated at Romania’s border with Ukraine.  
Intensified dialogue between Romania and Ukraine has also been driven 
by shared interest to find solutions to the problems of their national minorities living 
within the counterpart’s territory. An open dialogue on human and minority rights 
within the framework of international conventions and the laws of the two states is 
new. This means that now decision-making regarding minority rights and the legal 
structure of Romania is not purely taking place at national level but European. In 
other words the state cannot do what it pleases with its minorities. It has to abide to 
certain international conventions and agreements.  
The changes in the relations between Romania and Ukraine have been 
significant in the past five years. Whereas previously the focus was on the negative 
consequences of coexistence, now there is a belief that both Romania and Ukraine 
will benefit from more and closer cooperation. Furthermore, both parties agree to 
look for multilateral assistance in disputes where each country’s subjectivity 
represents barriers to finding common solutions. For Romania itself, relations with 
eastern neighbours are vital from the point of view of its reforms and integration into 
European and Euro-Atlantic institutions. It is hoped that stronger bilateral relations 
with Ukraine, as well as multilateral regional cooperation, will help to avoid the 
emergence of a new dividing line on Romania’s eastern border. Hereby, Romania has 
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been pulled out of its ‘East complex’ – in the sense of not any longer avoiding to look 
East in order not to be identified herewith by the ‘West’. This is in some way a 
postwestern development, where attempts of Westernization actually bring Romania 
beyond the East-West distinction. Further, whereas previously Romania would make 
unilateral territorial claims, now it is letting differences between Romania and 
Ukraine to be solved by international instances. In other words, Romania seems 
moreover influenced by a postnational order where national disputes are solved 
beyond the nation-state under influence from transnational norms and cultural 
patterns.  
At first glance, the term ‘postwestern’ can appear to be of little use. Like 
yet another case of academic over consumption of the ‘post’ prefix. However, as the 
above sections have illustrated, the term covers much more than simply the formal 
end to the East-West division as symbolised by the dismantling of the Berlin Wall or 
the EU enlargement. Europe in general and Romania in particular is currently 
undergoing a development, where the interaction and integration of the two formerly 
separate regions have reached a degree of intensity, where distinction between East 
and West looses relevance. A convergence is taking place, where the West – under 
influence from the East - gradually becomes less Western, and vice versa. The West 
ceases to be the West and – as a consequence – the East is not any longer exclusively 
Eastern. A new, postwestern logic, with far-reaching consequences for political 
decision making and perception, is imposing itself. Like there is no light without 
darkness, talking about ‘West’ makes little sense, when East no longer implies the 
same connotation. Not least, because the constructed idea of an Eastern Europe and a 
Western Europe was strongly enforced by the bipolar logic of the Cold War, where 
the two were mutually constituted. Hence, the term postwestern. 
To sum-up, the preceding sections point to the idea that Romania is 
increasingly becoming postwestern. As a relapse to Easterness is regarded as highly 
unlikely, Romania feels ‘on the safe side’ to an extent that it has started to act more 
independently in its external relations. The given examples of Romania’s 
involvement in the second Iraq war and possible complicity with regard to the alleged 
CIA detention centres have illustrated how Romania constructs its self-image beyond 
simple compliance with what is considered comme il faut among determinant 
European partners. The example of Romania’s improved relations to neighbouring 
Ukraine, likewise demonstrates a Romania, which is not any longer afraid to be 
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‘recreated’ as Eastern by cooperating with its eastern neighbours, and which therefore 
acts more pragmatically. These three examples, by inductive reasoning, have overall 
provided support to the idea that Romania and Europe are moving in a postwestern 
direction. I will now turn to examine the reconstruction of the Romanian identity in 
terms of postwesternization.  
4.6.4. Becoming ‘more’ European 
We cannot discuss postwestern Romania without considering changing features in the 
societal identity. As noted in Chapter 3, Section 3.5., the idea of postwestern identity 
takes as point of departure embedness in “pluralized cultural models of societal 
identity” (Delanty and Rumford, 2005: 23). As it has already been hinted, 
postwesternization raises new questions concerning the very identity of Romania. 
The construction of societal identity has become open to new interpretations. Instead 
of the old one-dimensional identity, based on resistance to external influence, the new 
societal identity has acquired new, additional dimensions without losing the old one. 
It would be an illusion to believe that i.a. the totalitarian system has not had an 
impact on the Romanian identity and that the old Romanianess has disappeared. 
Romania has been a country where former communist political figures remained in 
power and dealt with an ideology which no longer existed. In this sense, the result 
may have been the reconstruction of a more normal societal identity (Kennedy, 
1994).  
 Romania’s identity is certainly not antiwestern. As depicted earlier, this 
was already visible during the events of December 1989. These events represented a 
high point in the national self-awareness. At the same time, however, the slogan ‘We 
are returning to Europe’ expressed the wish to rejoin the wider community of Europe, 
from which Romanians have been cut off some half a decade earlier. This definition 
of the new societal identity not separate from a shared identity with Europe 
accentuated the elites’ awareness for change in the paradigm of identity, by bringing 
to light the project of modernization inspired by western democratic Europe. The 
wish to ‘return to Europe’ and to join pan-European structures, particularly the EU 
and NATO, has dominated the domestic political programs in the mid 1990s. Since 
Romania took the first formal steps towards EU membership in June 1995, the main 
goal has been to integrate into Europe’s formal institutions and to become fully 
European. Social and economic problems and the difficulties related to the current 
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accession to the EU did not exhaust the interest for becoming European. As I write 
these lines, Romania is still outside the door of a relatively mistrustful EU, waiting 
for full formal membership in 2007/2008. For Romanian political elites this was not 
only a question of security and stability guarantees but also had a symbolic meaning: 
going Western meant belonging to Europe. For half a century Romanians have 
thought in terms of East and West and now the East as such does not exist anymore. 
The main axis of their identity has disappeared. With the end of East-West division 
and the ‘annihilation’ of the East, the normal societal identity (i.e. non-imposed) was 
confronted with an ‘identity vacuum’. 
The definition of what is distinctively European asks for reflection on 
fundamental features of the Romanian society. There is even today according to the 
Hungarian sociologist Elemer Hankiss a “neurosis of backwardness”229, that some 
might call the Eastern European (inferiority) complex (Törnquist-Plewa, 2002). The 
main dilemma for the Romanian society has often had its origin in the gap between 
an identification with the Western culture and its economic and social backwardness. 
In this context the process of cultural integration legitimates their hope of becoming 
‘more European’. This dream started with the Yalta Conference (February 1945), an 
event seen as a founding myth of the artificial East-West division. This is also why 
the communist history of Eastern Europe is perceived as one having external causes.  
 Postwesternization has started to reshape Romania’s identity in different 
ways. First, postwestern identity has involved a rethinking of the relations between 
Romania and Europe. As a consequence of postwesternization, Romania has moved 
closer to the new East. Romania’s close relationship with the new borderlands of 
Europe has overcome the traditional identity-crisis about the East. Second, the new 
conditions of openness have redefined societal identity by reference to the global. 
Part of the postwestern perspective is seeing Romania as a part of Europe in the 
world, as a global player. It is suggested that the meaningful construction of a 
postwestern identity has been a means for Romania to both acquire recognition and 
thereby escape the historical complex of inferiority.      
In the Romanian society in-depth changes took place under the mutual 
impact of tradition and the different types of adaptation to the new context. Existing 
cultural patterns of transformation have been in a continuous synchronicity with the 
on-going transformations of Europe. In some cases these external influences have not 
                                           
229 quoted in Rupnik, 1988: 11. 
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just maintained the old patterns of political transformation or dynamics. They have 
also reconstructed primordial tendencies and still create, in different ways and in 
different settings, the shaping of the Romanian society in a postwestern direction.  
4.7. Placing Romania in a Postnational Europe 
Cultural integration as discussed in the previous sections related to the making of 
postwestern Romania. I shall now examine a parallel form of cultural integration, 
postnationalism. Part of the postnationalist perspective is no longer seeing Romania 
as a nation-state in a world of nation-states but or as a part of a civilizational cluster 
(Delanty, 2003c).  The issues raised in this section can be seen as advocations of 
postnationalism in Romania. These issues will help illustrate the complex relationship 
between Romania and postnational Europe: Romania is both being influenced by a 
postnational Europe and contributing to the postnationalization of Europe. First, I 
deal with postnationalism as emerged around the changing nature of borders, 
minority rights, and interethnic relations (which have affected the spatiality of 
politics in Romania). The first example concerns Romania’s relations with another 
neighbouring country in EU’s new borderland, namely Moldova. Recent 
developments in the relationship between Romania and Moldova are illustrative of 
Romania becoming increasingly postnational. As I will illustrate below, the new and 
changing relations between Romanian and Moldova have been influenced by the 
wider European context. At the same time, the postnational dimension includes 
loyalty towards pan European forms of solidarity and guarantees of security rather 
than those relying upon the nation-state. The second example confirms Soysal’s 
thesis that postnational rights are being legitimized by a supranational discourse of 
universal human rights. The case of Hungarians in Romania provides a salient 
example of how minority rights in Romania have started to be redefined on the basis 
of cultural diversity and general human rights norms, rather than being another 
attempt to deal with Hungarians as a societal problem. The third example is taken 
from the demands of territorial autonomy made by the Szekler region in March 2006. 
This example of postnationalism illuminates how Romania under external influences 
has changed its approach to interethnic relations. After these elaborate examples, I 
will analyse main features of civil society in post-1989 Romania. Finally, I will look 
at the societal identity of Romania, which, it is argued, is gradually going in a 
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postnational direction, as a result of the changing nature of the relations between 
Romania and Europe.     
4.7.1. Romania’s Changing Relations with Moldova 
A first way in which postnationalism has affected Romania is through the context of 
its (forthcoming) EU membership and the changing nature of the EU’s borders. The 
vision of a postnational Romania is related to the shift in the post-1989 relationship 
with Moldova, the EU’s new borderland. There is an increasing identification with 
issues beyond national borders which is reinforcing the general trend towards 
postnationalism.  
 In the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse, unification of culturally 
related Moldova230 and Romania was not an unlikely development, supported by 
various forces in Chişinau. The Romanian language (called ‘Moldavian’ during the 
Soviet period) was declared the state language, the Moldovan state chose a new flag 
based on the Romanian tricolour, and the Romanian national anthem was adopted as 
its own. Demonstrations in 1989 denounced the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, the basis 
for the Soviet annexation of Moldova from Romania. In 1992 the speaker of the 
Moldavian Parliament, Alexandru Mosnau, said ‘Moldova is preparing for unification 
with Romania’231. On both sides, the border was perceived not as a natural border but 
as a result of the historical contingent situation from 1940 when Moldova was 
annexed from Romania by the USSR. The end of communism and the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union brought about a new situation with far-reaching implications for 
Moldova-Romanian relations: for the first time in fifty years, Romania could 
normalize the bilateral relations with Moldova. This normalization has been slow 
mainly because of the complex nature of historical legacy. The aspirations of 
unification were strongly encouraged in Romania during the early 1990s. Not least 
during the first Iliescu presidency (1990-1996), when Moldova’s newly won 
independence was treated with some arrogance by Romania. Having previously been 
dominated by the Soviet Union, Moldova had good reasons to criticize Iliescu’s 
attitude of superiority. According to Boia, there were several factors that contributed 
                                           
230 Moldova (that more or less corresponds to the former Romanian province of Bessarabia) was 
annexed from Romania by the Soviet Union in 1940 and has a population of 60% ethnic Romanian. 
Until World War II Romania controlled all of Moldova except Transnistria. Moldova’s language is 
simply Romanian with a regional accent and Russian neologisms.  
231 quoted in Holman, 1992: 4.  
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to the failure of reintegration after 1989: anti-Romanian propaganda during 
communism, the presence of a large Russian-Ukrainian minority in Moldova, and not 
least, Russia’s direct opposition (Boia, 2001b: 23). 
 Later, several events altered the character of the bilateral relationship. On 
the one hand, Romania gradually changed its attitude. As Romania was approaching 
NATO and EU membership, a unilateral improvement occurred in Romanian-
Moldovan relations based on recognition of the existence of two equal states. This 
included Romania supporting Moldova’s independence, sovereignty, and integrity. 
This has also applied to the Transnistria232 conflict, possibly the most complicated 
issue in EU’s borderland after enlargement as the separatist region has emerged into a 
hub for illicit trafficking in arms, people and drugs, organised crime, money-
laundering and smuggling. Calm in appearance only, the security situation is far from 
stable and could deteriorate at any moment. Romania has closely coordinated its 
actions with the EU not only as part of Romania’s wish to play a significant role in 
regional politics, but also as part of Romania’s concerns with stability, security, 
human rights, and democracy in Moldova as pointed out by then Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, Mircea Geoană233. 
On the other hand, the return to power in Moldova by the communist 
party (CPM) in 2001 temporarily deteriorated the bilateral relations. Not least when 
Moldova’s Justice Minister later that year at a Council of Europe session in 
Strasbourg accused Romania of expansionist tendencies and interference in domestic 
affairs. A position confirmed in 2003 by Moldovan president, Vladimir Voronin, 
when during a televised speech he named the western neighbour ‘the only empire left 
in Europe, made of Moldova, Dobrogea, and Transylvania’234. However, after re-
election in 2005, Voronin has adopted a far more balanced approach and made closer 
cooperation with Romania a central foreign policy objective.  
Despite remaining tensions over long lasting issues, overall relations 
between the two states have developed in a positive direction after 2004. Băsescu 
said after being elected in December 2004 that Romania would have what he called a 
                                           
232 The separatist Transnistria region (Russian speaking province), comprising the area between the 
Nistru (Dnistrep) River and Ukraine, has its own government, dominated by Russia. The conflict 
started in 1991 after the Soviet collapsed.  
233 ‘Romanian foreign minister urges Moldova to stay on European path’, BBC Monitoring Former 
Soviet Union, January 21, 2004. 
234 ‘Moldovan president says ready to improve Romanian ties’, BBC News, September 25, 2004. 
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‘policy of partnership’ for its neighbour, Moldova. He said Moldovans would be 
treated as ‘good Romanians’235. Băsescu added, ‘I hope very soon, the relations 
between Bucharest and Chişinau will become relations between two states who have 
the same people on their territory’. As Moldova is not likely to join the EU at least in 
the next few years, a constructive opening in bilateral relations has been in line with 
the European Neighbourhood Policy and other EU policy instruments. With the 
prospect of joining the EU, Romania promised Moldova to be its advocate in the 
European integration process. A basic treaty and a draft border treaty between 
Moldova and Romania as well as negotiations on the visa regime have been discussed 
in April 2006. President Voronin stressed that the signing of these treaties would 
become a landmark in strengthening the foreign policy immunity of the Moldovan 
statehood but also in consolidating regional security in the Black Sea region. Partly, 
the establishment of a basic legal framework regulating the political status of the 
relations between Romania and Moldova, as well as the border regime between the 
two states, is among the criteria which Romania has to comply with before joining 
the EU. Yet, the settlement of these treaties is more than examples of Romania’s 
modernization. These are noteworthy moves away from (nationalist) stereotypes by 
starting to respect each others sovereignty, existing borders, and historic features.  
 For the record, it is worth noting that recently the bilateral relations have 
again been challenged. This time in a somehow paradoxical way, as it is Romania’s 
upcoming EU membership which have contributed to reopening the otherwise 
already (postnationally) settled border question: ’The Republic of Moldova has no 
intention to re-unite with Romania, now and not even after Romania and Moldova 
becoming EU members. The union will never take place’236, declared on 6th of July 
2006 Moldova’s president. The declaration came as a sharp reply to president 
Băsescu’s press statement, that ‘Romania offered to the Republic of Moldova the 
choice of entering the EU together and that although they were the only separated 
country (after the re-unified Germany), the union will be accomplished only inside 
the EU in very near future, and not differently’. Seeking reunification in a 
postnational framework represents a new dynamic in the relations between Romania 
and Moldova. Acceptance of Moldova’s sovereignty by Romania marks a 
postnational development, where Romania has put aside any remaining 
                                           
235 Tomiuc, 2004. 
236 Adevărul, July 12, 2006. 
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‘imperialism’. As noted earlier, in particular, right after the end of communism 
Moldova was very reserved vis-à-vis Romania, fearing Romanian expansionism. 
Lately, well integrated within European and not least transatlantic frameworks, 
Romania has adopted a more open approach. Whereas earlier the past – where 
Moldova belonged to Romania - was more important than the future, current 
developments indicate that Romania has moved in a postnational direction in its 
relations with Moldova. 
 This leads me to the notion of border. From a postnational perspective the 
border between the two countries has aquired a new significance, that of an on-going 
process of openness characterised by moments of closure (Delanty, 2006b). If during 
communism the border between Romania and Moldova allowed for limited contact, 
now the border has become much more open. In other words, the border between 
Romania and Moldova is becoming increasingly shaped by the postnational context. 
But societies do not change alone; their borders change as well. It is no longer a 
border which divides two separate states sharing the same ideology (i.e. 
communism). It has become a border where ethnic Moldovans are considered as 
‘good Romanians’. Also with the growing importance of the EU integration context, 
Romania’s borders take on a postnational form. From such a perspective, the new EU 
members “provide a policing role to the rest of the EU, which provides subsidies for 
such policing controls” (Delanty, 2006b: 193). This is also linked to the changing 
relation of the centre to the periphery in Europe. A new mode of governance emerges 
as “the EU expands its governance beyond the member states to neighbouring 
regions” (Delanty, 2006b: 193-194).   
Romania is undergoing a process of transformation towards a postnational 
society in the sense that it is becoming increasingly transnationalized. This is linked 
to idea that the EU’s borders are being reconstructed into less hard borders than 
before. Indeed, with the end of the Cold War the hard border that divided East and 
West Europe has been withdrawn and “the EU has expanded into a potentially open – 
and some would say – limitless territory” (Delanty, 2006b: 185). This is to prevent 
some of the problems that could emerge for both Romania and the EU. According to 
Chris Rumford, “[t]he development of this this new neighbourhood policy is seen as 
a very positive foreign policy tool by the EU and offering access to EU markets and 
other networking opportunities is viewed as a means of encouraging democratization 
and the restructuring of economies according to market principles” (Rumford, 2006b: 
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161). Rumford sees this development as a sign that the EU has started to practise 
integration without enlargement (i.e. expansion of the EU governance to non-EU 
spaces). But there is another aspect to it. Through the emergence of supra-national 
governance, Romania-Moldova relations are being affected by the ‘changing 
spatiality of politics’ (Rumford, 2006b). In particular, the context of transformation 
of the EU’s external borders has led to a rethinking of the nature of the border 
between Romania and Moldova. This signifies that “political space can no longer be 
equated with that of the nation-state” (Rumford, 2006b: 160). This came as a result of 
the expansion of the EU space. Moldova has become an EU borderland, and as such 
has been included in the EU ‘ring of friends’ (Rumford, 2006b). Under the process of 
rebordering of Europe, the relationship between Romania and Moldova has been 
changed. More importantly, if previously this border was disputed, now as a result of 
the EU enlargement, the border ceased to be contested. As a central mediator of EU’s 
neighbourhood policy, it is worth emphasising the double synchronicity of the 
transformation. Not only is Romania influenced by Europe’s development in a 
postnational direction. Romania is itself contributing to pulling Europe towards 
postnationalism.                                                                                                                                                                                     
4.7.2. Minorities and Postnational Rights 
The second illustration of a postnational development in Romania and Europe 
concerns Romania’s Hungarian minority. As sustained by the historic analysis, the 
presence of a large Hungarian minority has frequently been the source of dispute 
since the foundation of modern Romania. The example illustrates the way Romania 
in recent years, under influence from integration into pan-European structures and the 
appearance of new forms of transnational politics has altered its approach to minority 
issues. The rights of minorities are increasingly being incorporated into the 
legislation via international human rights conventions that Romania has signed. 
Legislation concerning the Hungarian minority has significant impact both for 
Romania’s democratic consolidation, its relations with Hungary, and by contribution 
to regional stability.  
 
Influence from Integration into pan-European Structures  
Language rights have been high on the agenda of the Hungarian minority since the 
discussion was relaunched in 1989. In particular, Hungarians have strongly criticized 
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the Romanian government and the Education Law because of restrictions on teaching 
in Hungarian and on establishing a Hungarian university. As expressed by a 
Hungarian-language newspaper, “the legislature adopted, and continues to adopt laws 
that gravely violate fundamental human and civil rights. . . . The law on education 
takes first place among these measures” (Gazda, 1994: 3). Former Prime Minister 
Victor Ciorbea called the Education Law one of the “urgent issues” of Romanian 
society because of its important implications for minority and language rights 
(Rompres, 1997). Only after applying for EU membership and in order to prevent 
criticism from the EU, the Romanian parliament passed a new Education Law (July 
1995). The new Law was described in an English (promotional) booklet  
to be modern, to combine the most democratic provisions that exist in similar 
laws of European nations with the tradition and specific traits of the Romanian 
school, considering the existing situation in Romania. It is in accordance with all 
the international documents Romania has signed (Romania, 1995: 1). 
Notwithstanding the difficulties of overcoming decades of prejudice, 
Romania has made progress in the area of protection and integration of its ethnic 
minorities. Pushed by the Council of Europe, the UN, UNESCO, the EU, and the 
Hungarian government, Romania has ratified most international conventions 
protecting minorities and minority languages in the early nineties237 although it only 
started to implement them later238. Inter alia fifteen seats are reserved for minorities 
in the Chamber of Deputies, and both houses of Parliament have a Standing 
Committee on human rights and minorities. A Council for National Minorities and 
Minority Protection Office, which has initiated a number of legal regulations aiming 
to improve the situation of minorities, has been formed. And the Hungarian minority 
party, UDMR, has been included in government - to mention the more important 
steps which have been taken.  
The UDMR regards Romania’s ethnic Hungarians as integral part of the 
Hungarian nation and defines them as a ‘co-nation’, or ‘a state-building nation in 
Romania’239. At the international level, the UDMR required to be considered as the 
official representative of the Hungarian minority in Romania and as such to 
                                           
237 For a detailed analysis of the issue of minorities in Romania and a list of agreements and treaties 
signed by Romania see Wagner, 2002: 257-274 and 281-282. 
238 For a detailed description of the legal regulations concerning minorities in Romania see 
Romanian Academic Society (2006). 
239 See the Programme of the UDMR, http://www.rmdsz.ro/. 
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participate in every bilateral agreement on the status of the Hungarian minority. At 
the same time Hungarian government officials have lobbied at Council of Europe, the 
EU, and the OSCE on behalf of the Hungarian minority parties. This may also be 
read as an attempt to create virtual borders. In this picture, states are no longer fully 
sovereign within their frontiers; these frontiers have become more permeable. The 
issue of minority rights reverses the conventional norms associated with modern 
citizenship. National citizenship becomes thus not the only way to acquire rights and 
identity.   
In 2004 the leader of UDMR, Béla Markó, was elected Minister in charge 
of coordination in the field of culture, education and European integration. From this 
strategic portfolio Markó directly initiated the work on a minority law based on 
international norms of minority protection and human rights. A key element was the 
establishment of a legal framework for the practice of cultural autonomy. The draft 
law regulates the right to study in native language at all levels of education and states 
that authorities do not have the right to undertake legislative or administrative 
measures to change the ethnic mixture of an area. Moreover, the law defines those 
national minorities that can be regarded as traditional and historical minorities in 
Romania due to their long-lasting co-existence with the Romanian majority. The 
partaking of the UDMR in the governmental coalition has been perceived by the 
external world as a positive development in the recognition of the Hungarian 
community’s status. As Bárdi points out, it shows “the beginning of the political 
integration of the minority elite” (Bárdi, 2004: 58). In its influential 2005 annual 
progress report on Romania's EU bid, the European Commission pointed out that the 
Hungarian minority situation ‘has continued to improve’ since the UDMR joint the 
governing coalition.  
Whereas previous governments were considered to be ‘anti-Hungarian’, 
since 1996 the successive governments turned out much more responsive to their 
demands. In the second half of the 1990s after signing the Hungarian-Romanian basic 
agreements, significant changes occurred in the minority policies as European 
integration became a clear priority. Under both external and internal pressure the 
draft law on national minorities was approved by the Romanian government in 2005 
and is currently (July 2006) being discussed in the Romanian parliament. With the 
recent changes in the law on minority rights, individuals belonging to different ethnic 
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groups in Romania will benefit from this postnational development in terms of rights 
of the individual. 
There is little doubt that in Romania the treatment of minorities with 
regard to language or citizenship law has been more pluralist than it likely would 
have been in the absence of EU and NATO membership. In December 2005, the 
Romanian prime minister said that “Romania has all the interest to adopt European 
standards in terms of minorities”240. This discourse has been influential in the 
expansion of minority rights in Romania. Advocates of the proposal of the new law 
on minorities have clearly been influenced by the “universal right to ‘one’s own 
culture’” (Soysal, 2004: 3). As Yasemin Soysal has pointed out, the fact that minority 
rights are being linked to the work of international institutions, means that “collective 
identity starts to be redefined as a category of human rights” (Soysal, 2004: 3). 
Romania’s increasing postnational orientation is not only that its legal framework 
requires Romania to share sovereignty with the EU (i.e. in October 2003 the 
Romanian Constitution was amended in order to facilitate legal harmonization with 
the EU), but also that with Romania becoming an EU member the guarantees for 
minority rights will move beyond Romania’s national boundaries. The Hungarian 
minority (and other ethnic minorities) has started to see the guarantee of human rights 
as promised by the European institutions to be increasingly important. When 
Romanian courts do not produce results, Hungarians can turn to the European Court 
of Human Rights where cases are brought under the European Convention of Human 
Rights241. Hence new forms of mobilizations emerge beyond the framework of the 
nation-state. Increasingly demands of ethnic collective groups connect their demands 
to transnational institutionalized discourses of “equality, emancipation and individual 
rights” (Soysal, 2004: 4). For instance when the UDMR-leader, Béla Markó, insists 
on education and culture in mother tongue, he does so based on a discourse which 
appeals to the rights of the individual.  
The assertion of Hungarian rights has increasingly converged with 
Romania’s postnational development. An important step towards coming to terms 
with an increasingly postnational reality has been to recognize that the governing 
elites could not control other groups as easily as they could in a national setting. Now 
there is obviously a postnational dimension in that Hungarian and other minorities in 
                                           
240 Rompres, December 5, 2005. 
241 A treaty signed by Romania in 1994. 
 243 
Romania have started to feel more secure as they see minority and human rights as 
guaranteed by the EU to be increasingly important. Significant changes in the legal 
structure of Romania where to a growing extend decision making is not taken purely 
at national level but European has certainly improved the status and recognition of 
minorities. Romania’s accelerated process of European and Euro-Atlantic integration 
offers indirectly the prospect of improved legal protection for the Hungarian and 
other minorities. Public opinion in Romania perceives European integration not as a 
mere political decision but as a positive step in the process of social change. There 
are good reasons to believe that minority rights in Romania have become postnational 
in the sense that they have become a discourse that is able to challenge national 
sovereignty. The discourse of minority rights is no longer confined to international 
law but has entered the Romanian national legal system. As it was the case in the 
Moldova example, it is worth restating the double sidedness of this development. As 
a large country in the Balkans, notoriously known for centuries of interethnic 
conflicts and minorities problem, Romania in a way serves as a ‘test’ case, if not for 
the entire continent’s transformation, then at least for this critical region.    
 
The Emergence of New Forms of Transnational Politics  
New forms of so-called transnational politics have also affected Romania’s approach 
towards minorities. To illustrate this point, I will refer to the referendum that took 
place in Hungary on dual citizenship for non-national Hungarians. In 2004 the 
citizens of Hungary were called to decide through referendum if ethnic Hungarians 
living in the neighbouring countries should be granted non-resident citizenship 
preferentially by lifting all residency requirements from among the pre-conditions of 
obtaining a Hungarian second citizenship. A majority of voted ‘yes’, but the 
referendum failed because of insufficient turnout242. The outcome disappointed most 
Hungarians living in Romania. The referendum as well as the so-called Hungarian 
Status Law243, which grants certain rights other than citizenship to ethnic Hungarians 
                                           
242 National Election Office Hungary 2005, http://www.valasztas.hu/main_en.html. 
243 The name given to the Act on Hungarians living in Neighbouring Countries LXII/2001 
established by the Hungarian government in 1999, adopted by the Hungarian Parliament in 2001, 
and set in application since January 2002. The Status Law created a form of state membership (i.e. 
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outside the motherland, generated a lot of debate in Romania. Hungary was accused 
by Romania of irredentist nationalism and of explicit nationalist-revisionism. Seen 
from Romanian government’s point of view the relation between Hungary and its 
national minorities challenged the sovereignty of the Romanian state. The EU also 
criticized Hungary for the lack of consultation with neighboring countries before its 
adoption and “for the fact that the law provided for a set of extraterritorial rights for 
ethnic Hungarians” (Kovács, 2005: 57). The position of UDMR (Democratic 
Alliance of Hungarians in Romania), part of the coalition government between 1996 
and 2000 and again from 2004, was that the Hungarian minority in Romania should 
support the Status Law and decline the claim of full Hungarian citizenship. A gesture 
which suggests that also national minorities – and not only governments - 
increasingly base their actions on a postnational pragmatism.  
The Status Law is based on two main assumptions. First, it is the 
conception of a nation in ethno-cultural terms, i.e. that a group of people that has 
once formed a nation and developed a strong sense of national identity  - regardless 
of the present borders – has something meaningful in common. The second 
assumption is the fear that the home state does not protect the rights of kin minorities. 
According to Brigid Fowler, the Status Law moves beyond the modern norms of 
statehood which have been linked to “absolute territorial sovereignty, singular 
national identities and an exclusive citizenship as the only possible legal and political 
relationship between states and individuals” (Fowler, 2004: 182). From a postnational 
perspective states are no longer sovereign, borders are becoming more and more 
open, and postnational phenomena challenge states’ position as the only actors. 
Hungary is thus acting as a defender of minority rights by pointing to perceived 
deficiencies in Romania’s treatment of its minorities.  
Romania has criticised the law itself mainly in terms of ‘modern’ norms 
of territorial sovereignty and equal treatment element of state citizenship. The official 
position of the Romanian government on the Statute Law was submitted to the 
Council of Europe’s ‘Venice Commission’ in 2001: “a person cannot have several 
identities. A person can have several citizenships but not dual identity”244. Moreover, 
it was noted that “free choice does not suppose supplementary confirmation from any 
organization or authority”245. The report of the Venice Commission maintained the 
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importance of bilateral and multilateral treaties, intergovernmental agreements, 
domestic legislation stipulating their implementation when dealing with the status of 
minorities and recognition of minorities246. Still in office, the then Romanian Prime 
Minister Adrian Năstase was quoted for saying: “the idea that citizenship can be 
granted to compact ethnic groups, the way one spreads chemical fertilizers over a 
field, is totally incompatible with the provisions of constitutional law (…) citizenship 
is granted to individuals” (Stoica, 2004). Romania has also complained against 
Hungary’s passing the Status Law unilaterally, thus depriving Bucharest of the 
opportunity to negotiate its way to the expansion of similar privileges to the 
Romanian minority in Hungary.  
In addressing the need for more effective minority protection, the policies 
of dual citizenship have brought about the revival of national and ethnic policies in 
Eastern Europe. The granting of dual membership to external kin populations is an 
external attempt to overcome the inherent and inevitably minority problems by 
proposing non-territorial solutions. The Hungarian Status Law offers a kind of a 
‘fuzzy citizenship’ (Fowler, 2004). It is also a form of institutionalization among 
members of the Hungarian nation across state boundaries. Placing minorities in a 
‘Europe of communities’ implicitly opens the way to some of the constituting 
elements of postnationalism, i.e. attenuated sovereignty, multiple identities, multiple 
belongings, and non-citizenship relationships between states and individuals. 
According to Soysal, these relationships primarily express and accommodate the 
rights of individuals and specifically migrant individuals, whereas the kin-state role is 
based on the idea of the nation as a cultural collectivity (Soysal, 1996: 23-24). 
Even if Romania perceived the Hungarian referendum as an (offensive) 
way for Hungary to increase its influence in Romania, Romanian politicians have 
recently started to reformulate the topic of minorities in terms of international 
agreements and conventions. Actually Romania also enacted similar legislation for its 
co-ethnics living in other states. Most important in this context is the way in which 
Romania has asserted its kin-state role vis-à-vis Moldova while rejecting Hungary’s 
assumption of a kin-state role vis-à-vis the Hungarian minority in Romania. 
According to the constitution, Romania ‘shall support the strengthening of links with 
the Romanians living abroad and shall act accordingly for the preservation, 
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development and expression of their ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity’ 
(Article 7).  
As exemplified in this case, the Hungarian minority’s claims for rights are 
affirmed in universalistic terms. These new forms of demands acquire a transnational 
character in the sense that they expand beyond the boundaries of the Hungarian 
ethnic community and link transnationally different public spheres. In the case of the 
Hungarian minority we find groups, organizations, and community associations 
which operate at local levels but this does not mean that their claims remain local. 
During the last elections in Romania minority rights issues have played an important 
role. In pursuing their claims, minority groups entail national and transnational 
institutions. The emerging forms of making the demands for minority rights in 
Romania are less and less nationally defined minority projects. Hungarians pushed 
for more demands for rights. These rights are activated within and at the same time 
without the nation-state. In other words, the discourses of rights are no longer limited 
by national constellations even if these rights continue to be organized within the 
nation-state.  
Yasemin Soysal argues that “in postwar Europe the national no longer has 
the primacy but it coexists with the transnational mutually reinforcing and 
reconfiguring each other” (Soysal, 2004: 6). This confirms that the intensification of 
debate on minority rights, a novel development in post-1989 Romania indeed 
accentuates the development of postnational Romania. The definition and redefinition 
of postnational rights is not necessarily free of conflict. As Soysal puts it,  
like any set of rights postnational rights are also results of struggles, negotiations, 
and arbitrations by actors at local, national and transnational levels and 
contingent upon issues of distribution and equity. And like any set of rights, they 
are subject to retraction and negation (Soysal, 2004: 7).  
The Hungarian community will soon be able to make demands on the Romanian 
government as a result of the incorporation of international law on minorities into the 
national law. These goups can also appeal to the EU or Council of Europe directly, 
thus undercuting national law. This is also a result of the emergence of 
deterritorialized rights under postnationalism.   
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4.7.3. Solving the Szekler Question: Postnational Pragmatism  
My last example that will help to outline the relation between ‘postnationalism’ in 
Romania and postnational Europe refers to the Szekler Region. Recent events in 
Romania indicate an important shift from nationalist politics to a more ‘pragmatic’ 
approach that builds on the increased rationalization of society as a solution to 
conflict. Retrospectively, these trends indicate also the coexistence of different 
expressions of nationalism and postnationalism.  
It received considerable media attention, when in March 2006, the 
Szekler National Council (CNS), a Hungarian community organization, asked the 
involvement of the UN Security Council and the EU in obtaining the statute of 
territorial autonomy for the Hungarian dominated Szekler247 region in 
Transylvania248. The CNS aimed for the region to have its own president and 
government, as well as its own police force and education system. According to 
Csapo Jozsef, leader of the CNS, the Szeklers wanted the international forums to call 
on Romania to put in place a law that would assure the autonomy of Szekler County. 
Csapo pointed out that CNS's initiative resulted from Romania's inability to solve this 
problem by itself. 
This incident led to a strong debate between the nationalist parties and the 
representatives of the CNS in the media. Corneliu Vadim Tudor, leader of the 
nationalist Greater Romania Party (PRM), claimed that he would send 100,000 
Romanians to Odorheiu Secuiesc, the city where on 15th of March 2006249 the self-
proclamation of this territorial autonomy was expected to take place. PRM senator, 
Gheorghe Funar claimed in The Diplomat magazine (April 2006): ‘The source of the 
problem is that Hungary and UDMR work continuously for the dismemberment of 
Romania’250. Eventually, events developed peacefully, although ethnic inspired 
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confrontations were expected between the Romanian majority and the ethnic-
Hungarian minority.  
Romanian president Trăian Băsescu met in early March 2006 with leaders 
of CSN, UDMR, and the Hungarian National Council of Transylvania and other 
representatives to discuss the issue. The outcome of these discussions was that the 
ethnic-Hungarian leaders decided to replace their proclamation with a proposal that 
simply expressed their wish for autonomy at a later stage. ‘We are convinced that 
Romania’s accession to the EU will create the conditions for the founding of the 
Szekler region’, said the CNS leader in a statement that seemed to suggest that the 
idea of a unilateral proclamation of autonomy had been buried for the time being. But 
also a statement which indicates that the Hungarian minority now directs its loyalty 
towards Brussels rather than to the States, be it Romania or Hungary. Indeed, a 
postnational development. 
In the Romanian context, postnationalism does provide an answer to the 
Szekler region’s claims of preservation of cultural self-identity. Although the extent 
of postnationalism in Romania should not be exaggerated, the above events have 
pulled Romania out of previous era of nationalism turned over endangered national 
sovereignty. Romania’ present government under the formal project of European 
integration discursively tries to construct a model of ‘constitutionalism’. Here the 
political project of constitutionalization imposed ‘from above’ has encountered the 
national concerns in terms of local autonomy and cultural diversity. This does not 
mean however, that nationalism disappeared, but rather it is a more latent 
phenomenon than it previously was.  
One of the contradictions of Eastern Europe consists in the fact that 
nationalism “re-mobilized old symbolic markings and designs new symbolic borders” 
(Eder, 2001: 233). Old national symbols have acquired new socially constructed 
meanings. Postnational integration is based on diversity and continuous conciliation 
of conflicts. Society-wide and transnational, the postnationalism has emerged as an 
adaptive pattern necessary to cope with the openness of transformation. 
Fundamentally, as Wagner has noted, Romanian politics ‘are not nationalistic’ 
(Wagner, 2002: 249). Even if it can be argued that the 1989 revolution was to a 
certain extent nationalistic. The main issue is not so much related to nationalism, but 
to postnational attitudes concerning national minorities251. The example of these 
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recent events illustrates two points in particular. First, a postnational pattern is 
emergent in present-day Romania. This pattern shows that ethnic nationalism does 
not need to be aggressive252 and that actually a set of values can accommodate the 
other. In a postnational order, minority groups can enjoy rights beyond the nation-
state. The second point is that the end of the East-West division has also had an 
impact on nationalism. Once Romania’s political elites believed in the project of 
integrating Romania into Europe (indeed the goal of EU and NATO memberships has 
been an important stimulus to this), the space of postnationalism has opened for 
abolition of internal ethnic conflicts.  
 As noted in Chapter 3, section 3.2.3. Habermas’s conception of a 
postnational Europe is about creating a transnational European democracy. 
Constitutional patriotism is meant to transcend the exclusive nationalism and endow 
with for an alternative way of social cohesion. Constitutional patriotism is 
constructed on a shared political culture of the liberal-democratic state based on 
popular sovereignty, individual rights, and association with civil society. Habermas 
(2001) further adds that the constitutional patriotism is also based on the “use of 
values of social welfare and mutual recognition among the existing varieties of forms 
of life”. While some might fear that such a vision of a democratic and constitutionally 
based European polity could increase the so-called democratic deficit and that “a big 
state would not be able to deepen democracy” (Delanty 2006b: 195), the debate on 
Romania’s transformation is related to this idea of a postnational Europe.  
According to Habermas (1998), as a response to wider transformations at 
global and transnational level and as a result of the declining significance of the 
nation-state, postnationalism places nationalism beyond the nation-state. Habermas 
argues that postnationalism is essential in achieving identification with democratic or 
constitutional norms (i.e. ‘constitutional patriotism’) and in defining the new Europe 
after the end of the Cold War. From this perspective, postnationalism has led to 
recognition of diversity and reconciliation of conflicts.  
 As I have argued in section 4.4.2., nationalism in the case of Romania has 
been reinterpreted to meet the demands and the needs of the present (i.e. 
postnationalism). This is to suggest that nationalism is not a threat to the development 
of a postnational Romania. Instead, recent developments suggest that postnationalism 
is gaining momentum and marks the point where postnational Romania encounters a 
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postnational Europe. In spite of the ethnic conflicts that have occurred in the past, the 
worst forecast with regard to the influence of extreme nationalism is not likely to be 
fulfilled. Furthermore, in Romania, the latest period has seen the transformation of a 
number of previous ethnic conflicts and certain recognition of the status of minorities. 
Ethnic conflicts have been transcended. Hot national issues such as the reunification 
with Moldova have either been frozen or melted down. Other controversial questions 
(i.e. border delimitation in the Black Sea) are being solved beyond the nation-state.  
Fundamental to my understanding of postnationalism in Romania is the 
idea that postnational Romania is encountering postnational Europe. With Romania 
becoming an EU and NATO member (after having adopted minority rights and 
constitutional guarantees of pluralism and freedom) these tendencies are ‘under 
control’ as it is hard to believe that they will break up into violence and dictatorship. 
As I have already argued, there are signs to believe that Romania’s going 
postnational could be praised with good chances of slow but constant improvement. 
There is a potential for nationalist parties to accommodate their Euro-sceptic rhetoric 
to broadly pro-EU political discourses. Likewise, Andrzej Walicki concludes,  
that nations could be constructed to a certain extent only, that modern nations, 
like it or not, need a firm ethnic basis, and that ethnic conflict could not be 
exorcised by inventing or imaging a nonethnic, purely political (let alone 
spiritual) definition of a nation (Walicki, 1999: 252).  
Walicki’s conclusions emphasise that the past does somehow confine nationalism. 
But it does not mean that the coexistence of postnational elements with traditional 
nationalism is excluded.    
The above contemporary issues within Romania sustain the need for a 
new framework to understand developments in Romania that would be difficult to 
understand through the traditional approaches to European integration and 
Europeanization. To sum-up, the preceding sections have examined how both 
domestic and external influences have contributed to the development of Romania in 
a postnational direction. The discussion on the dynamics of postnational integration 
reveals two aspects in particular: first, the empirical analysis of Romania’s political 
transformation reveals that Romania has had its own experience with 
postnationalism. As Romania entered Europe, domestic transformation has involved a 
gradual cutting off from communism and adaptation to postnational demands (respect 
for minorities, democratic institutions, and human rights, to name just a few). The 
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existence of such developments are significant enough to say that postnationalism is 
self-evident in Romania. Particularly against understanding Romania’s 
transformation as a linear evolution encouraged me to pay more attention to the 
‘double synchronicity’ of transformation. Let me now return to the question of civil 
society.   
4.7.4. Civil Society in Post-1989 Romania  
So far I have stressed how postnationalism is instantiated in different ways in 
Romania. In the following, postnationalism will be linked to the issue of civil society 
in post-1989 Romania. Another way of reading postnational Europe is that this idea 
of Europe has become a reference for prosperity and model of civil and political 
rights. Europe then becomes a symbol for rupture with a (dividing) past, for 
democracy, civil society, and human rights. As Delanty and Rumford (2005) put it, 
since the end of communism in Eastern Europe, the current ‘return to Europe’ 
discourse features an effort to place questions of civil society at the forefront. This 
has important implication for identity formation.  
 For Hegel, civil society as a process is divided between ethical life and 
particular interests. Hegel differentiated between civil and political society253. It is 
suggested that Hegel’s conception of civil society – focused on the market – is well 
suited to depict civil society in Romania. For Hegel, recognition of rights is realised 
first and foremost through property. In the context of civil society in Romania, 
Pralong argues that “foreign support created a ‘market’ (of funds for democratic 
assistance) which allowed the emergence of a non-governmental sector and the 
mutual recognition of civil society actors, but not yet their cooperative association” 
(Pralong, 2004: 231).  
 Criticizing Hegel’s state-centred conception of civil society, Habermas 
(1990) envisions civil society within the communicative structure of ordinary people 
in daily practices. In his own words, civil society’s “institutional core comprises 
those non-governmental and non-economic connections and voluntary associations 
that anchor the communication structures of the public sphere in the society 
component of the lifeworld” (Habermas, 1996: 366-367). Habermas’s definition 
focuses on the individual as the gradual embodiment of moral principles. For 
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Habermas, civil society issues have to do with the ‘quality of life, equal rights, 
individual self-realisation, participation, and human rights’ (Habermas, 1987: 140).  
 For Habermas (1994), the 1989 Revolutions offered Europe a second 
chance to construct a communicative civil society. The democratic West, he added, 
would be thus able to ‘catch-up with the East’ where the leading ideas were against 
the state and democratic, of civil society, anti-political politics, and the self-limiting 
revolution (Habermas, 1994: 72). The idea of civil society becomes then closely 
linked to the concept of active public sphere where citizens actively engage. In 
Habermasian terms, the active public space is about morality, rational debate, and an 
active citizenship. Habermas points out that, essential to civil society is a mature 
post-traditional ethics, in which public debate is confined by procedural rules. 
However, when surveying civil society in Romania after 1989, no clear and well 
defined picture of civil society as defined by Habermas emerges (as yet). There is still 
little collective action and public engagement that would justify such a conception of 
civil society. As Pralong pointed out, “people do experience solidarity and collective 
responsibility; however, this happens in the state, not in civil society” (Pralong, 2004: 
230).  
  After 1989 civil society in Romania re-emerged as the subject of the 
public discourse that appealed to the necessity of its reconstruction. The difficulties in 
creating a civil society in Romania were to a great extent generated by the fact that 
Romania was a former communist society. But also here it is necessary to 
acknowledge the long historic perspective, as we have seen, civil society even before 
communism was relatively weak. Touraine (1990) described the context for civil 
society in 1990: “in the countries coming out of communist regimes society is weak, 
the economy is in crisis and institutions emptied by real content. It is not about 
liberating the social actors of the burden of an unfair and inefficient Ancien regime; it 
is about inventing a society”.  
Touraine emphasizes that it is unrealistic to expect that once the communist regime 
removed, one can introduce a Western-type society: “how to produce society from 
non-society, democracy from totalitarianism, rationality from arbitrary, liberty from 
the police-state?” (Touraine, 1990). 
Indeed, in the early 1990s all visible sources of (re)constructing a civil 
society were unstable and contradictory. One could register the discrepancy between 
the violent tone of revolts and the real needs of constructing civil society. According 
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to Outhwaite and Ray, after communism, the relationship between state and civil 
society “often involved a one-dimensional polarization of authoritarian state power 
against the resistance of civil society” (Outhwaite and Ray, 2005: 157). The popular 
acclamation during these revolts, ‘Down with Iliescu’, is indicative in this case. This 
made Gail Kligman note: “[i]t is one thing to overthrow a dictatorship; it is another to 
participate in the establishment of a democratic public sphere and of civil society” 
(Kligman, 1990: 411). As we have seen, against his prowestern rhetoric, Iliescu was 
strongly opposed to democratic and market-driven reforms. This left little political 
space to democratic elites’s engagement. Pralong points out that Iliescu and his allies 
both “colonized the ‘democratic’ terrain” while at the same time they “secured the 
space on the left, the home of the former nomenklatura, of which they were a part” 
(Pralong, 2004. 232). The remained space was taken by the revived historical parties 
that formed the democratic opposition.      
Definitive in creating democratic practices are “tolerance, effort, 
attention, and the patience to achieve and maintain them”254. These features were 
hard to be found back then in the Romanian political culture. Given the experience of 
an oppressive communist regime, “the establishment of public life, is prerequisite to 
constituting a civil society and a democratic public sphere”255. Not surprisingly, it is 
in this sphere that “Romanians must learn the ‘art of association’, and unlearn the 
dynamics of fear that foster atomization”256. According to Kligman, the fact that 
Romanians have accomplished in ten days what Poland did in ten years (i.e. the 
overthrown of the communist regime), proved the inexistence of some elementary 
form of civil society. She concludes,  
[t]he difference between ten years and ten days – Poland and Romania – 
accentuates the very absence in Romania of any functioning of the basic kernels 
of civil society. Disabling in every day to almost its entire population, the former 
regime left a set of deeply embedded behaviours that will not be easily 
abandoned. In Romania today, civil society is, and can only be, in an elementary 
form (Kligman, 1990: 427). 
By promoting the primacy of the individual, the CRD centre-right 
government emphasised a strong distinction between the state and the civil society. 
Civil society was defined as “the exercise of individual and collective liberties, the 
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unrestricted exercise of human rights, the opening of democracy to public life, the 
encouragement of private property, the accelerated privatization of state property, 
[and] all elements necessary for the insurance of a profitable economy, of the 
prosperity of every citizen and every family”257. Thus for the government the new 
society required placing the individual within the civil sphere that needed to be 
sheltered from the intervention of the state. Civil society could then stimulate the 
performance of the individual and resolve its own crisis, perceived in the apathy and 
lack of participation of the citizen to societal matters (Voicu and Voicu, 1999: 623). 
Simplified, but linked to the parallel shift towards a more pro-European line, one 
could say that in terms of Europeanization and identity, ‘becoming European’ 
equated becoming a citizen in the liberal, democratic sense.     
Unlike earlier interpretations in which the state had an interventionist role 
in all spheres of society, now the main aim was the emancipation of the individual. 
Such an orientation on civil society offered an alternative construction of societal 
order based on neoliberalism. “In both an economic and political sense, the coalition 
proposed the rebuilding of societal order on the basis of legal, rational, procedural 
norms as the most effective means to counter the collectivism, state repression 
alleged illusions of the malleability of society and inefficiency” (Blokker, 2004: 313). 
This outcome is significant for several reasons: first, it brought a new perspective on 
the state-society relations by the concern of a (civil) society as a condition for a 
thriving transformation. Second, the removal of state from society was an essential 
condition for the society to function accurately. The expected heightening of human 
and civil rights and on the formation of a civic sphere has strengthened the 
identification of civil society with economic and political arguments. This kind of 
development corresponded to a guarantee of private property (its benefits) and a 
limitation to the state interference in the economy.  
However, it was not only discontinuity that made the emergence of civil 
society not easy. Other factors have contributed to the slow materialization of civil 
society in the first one and a half decade after communism: nationalism, the 
intellectuals’ incapacity to instate a ‘social dialogue’, the persistence of a certain 
social atomization, and the unfamiliarity with the concept of civic awareness for the 
majority of the Romanian electorate. Civic awareness needed to be restored. It is not 
enough to complain (individually) that winter conditions in cities are tough or that 
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you still need to pay ‘extra’ (in Romanian mită) for public health services, for 
example; a public reaction would be a more efficient way to blame the local 
authorities. Even more critical, Alina Mungiu argued that, by 1995, “there is only a 
program to create civil society supported by a group of intellectuals, but this can not 
substitute a spontaneous social emergence”258.  
A focus on the day-to-day realities in Romania reveals a series of 
dysfunctions that have affected the constitution of strong civil society. The low level 
of participation to a political party (between 3 and 8 percent)259 comes from the 
excessive fragmentation of political culture which discourages cooperation between 
the political elites and the masses and civic engagement. Aurelian CrăiuŃu (1994) 
explores the idea of ‘apolitical familism’ to characterize the situation in Romania 
where political cooperation is reduces to the restrained circle of family and friends. 
This implies passivity, resignation as well as isolation of civil society. Political 
clientelism is another feature in today’s Romanian society. Political clientelism 
(based on ‘invisible’ inter-relations) as well as populist nationalism sustain mainly a 
passive political culture where the civic participatory values are still missing and the 
state authority is weakened (Tănase, 1996). In a society based on consanguinity, 
mainly of kinship, the dynamic, the evolution and the reconstruction of civil society 
are delayed. Under such conditions the authority of the state is undermined by the 
existence of interpersonal relationships where one of the sides is represented by the 
public authority.   
Indeed since 1989 the issue of corruption came to the fore. This 
phenomenon is one of the elements of continuity from communism where corruption 
functioned at the level of the gift by combining the leftovers of the patriarchal society 
with a bureaucratic society. As a matter of fact the very notion of ‘corruption’ was 
introduced in people’s vocabulary only after 1989; before 1989 people spoke of 
string-pulling, privileges, human relationships to label services in ways which 
depended on the status of the individual. For Ditchev,  
[i]t is difficult to compare the statutory corruption under Communism with the 
monetarized corruption which succeeded it; but although the second produced 
greater moral anguish, it was also because of the feeling unsophisticated people 
experienced of losing their social place in a system of exchange that had become 
at once anonymous and deterritorialized (Ditchev, 2002: 92).  
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The expansion of the number of NGOs in recent years does not equal that 
there is a strong civil society in urban Romania260. The same applies to the 
countryside where the political elites did not want to change “their authoritarian and 
collectivist political attitudes”261. Yet, civil society remains artificial, although more 
democratic attitudes are on rise (Mungiu, 1999: 147). Last, but not least the 
nationalism affirmed by some political elites who promote the values of a closed 
society, has negative effects on civil society. As mentioned earlier, nationalism has 
been used by some political parties to manipulate the electorate in the name of the 
‘national interest’ and even to stimulate ethnic intolerance by reference to historical 
reconstructions in the name of the protection of national identity. This nationalist 
discourse which represents a continuity element with the communist regime in 
Romania is an obstacle to the modernization of the social sphere. As Verdery wrote 
soon after December 1989, “[i]t is unlikely that the national idea will disappear from 
Romanian culture in the post-Ceauşescu era. (…) The discourse on the Nation can 
also be expected to enter powerfully into party politics, fortified by its earlier 
confrontation with Marxism” (Verdery, 1991: 318). 
Câmpeanu noted that the prominence of the ‘national’ was visible from 
the first moments of the instauration of new political power both rhetorically and at 
action level. For instance, the text of the National Salvation Front Declaration 
towards Romania, the term ‘national’ recurred twelve times whereas the notion of 
‘social’ appears only once (1994: 185). His main explanation is that, by using the 
‘national’, the new political rule was trying to legitimate itself as representing the 
national interests of Romania. Another example is that almost all parties include the 
term ‘national’ in their title, including for instance the internationally oriented liberal 
party. The same observation can be made about the overwhelming presence of the 
term ‘national’ in the 1991 Constitution (Preda, 1998: 186). In the same line of 
thinking, Barbu notes that “as long as the state itself is defined by the Constitution as 
being a ‘national’ state, it means that, despite all legal guarantees, Romanian citizens 
of other ethnic origin than the majority, become stateless persons” (Barbu, 1999: 
142). Thus, as suggested by the Constitution, Romanian nationality is defined in 
ethnic terms, and not civic. In other words, it is as if as long as we have a people, we 
don’t need a society. These few examples on the prominence of the ‘national’ 
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illustrate a certain pattern of thinking inherited from communism, that is ignorance of 
the ‘civic’. 
It was not only liberty of expression and a multi-party system that people 
hoped for in 1989. The majority wished for material benefits and a high level of 
consumption that would equal that of the EU countries. Politically there was a hope 
of 'coming-back' to the political conditions before the Second World 
War. Unfortunately Romanian politics has disappointed its electorate, through the 
lack of action and initiative, corruption, poor corporate governance, lack of 
transparency, and unclear political agendas. At the same time, there is no link 
between political parties and large social groups. The national space becomes 
more and more subject to the European and international context in terms of political 
and economic decision-making. There is almost an undisputed support for integrating 
Romania into the European and Euro-Atlantic structures. This is not to say that those 
keen to see Romania entering the EU knows actually what this implies. For Mungiu, 
Romanians’ eagerness to join and share Europe simply shows “that anti-Western and 
anti-capitalistic attitudes exist mainly when supported or induced by the authorities” 
(Mungiu, 1999: 147).   
Moreover, the ‘ownership vacuum’ experienced during communism 
(Câmpeanu, 2002) had at least two consequences: the first upon the individual’s 
attitude towards society, the second, upon the individual’s conception of work, in 
other words, the symbolic valorization of work. The Romanian imaginary has lots of 
examples to prove that Romanians do not evaluate work as a mean to social 
promotion or legal accumulation. There is a certain inclination towards fatalism, luck 
or negotiation that determines the individual’s behavior. This is not very encouraging 
for civic engagement either. 
Voter absenteeism can be explained by the fact that people have ceased to 
believe in the wealth promised by the political elite. The explanation is two-fold. 
First, the unemployment has risen drastically since 1993. It is mostly concentrated in 
the eastern part of the country. The differentiation between North-East/South-West 
regions is higher than during communism due to the shutting down of inefficient 
heavy industry. This inequality is moving towards the extremes: the 
indigenous economic and political elites are getting richer and richer while the rest of 
the population is becoming poorer. The most problematic aspect of the social 
structure is the failure to strengthen the middle class that could have guaranteed 
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social stabilization both at economic and political level. The agricultural sector is 
impecunious and besieged by competition from (sponsored) imports. Second, the 
atmosphere of omnipresent corruption which cases are regularly revealed in the 
media. What is shrinking is the more overall indifference of the voters who do not 
believe in better life conditions promised in the eve of political elections. This lack of 
interest is to be compared with the pre-1989 lethargy when the communist political 
class was perceived as ‘them’. The feeling of suspicion is strengthened when people 
see that a good part of the political and economic elite which had important positions 
during communism control present Romania. 
The post-1989 coalitions after 1989 have been receiving less and less 
support. A common feature of Romania’s post-1989 politics is that political leaders 
have failed to obtain support from masses. They are accused of indulgence, 
corruption, and promotion of personal interests (Offe, 1999). But distrust is also 
oriented towards the state institutions, the ones that activate for the members of the 
Romanian society. The shared opinion is the state institutions are influenced by 
political and economic games.       
Europe of the East-West division was raised on the basis of powerful 
myths and forgetting created by yet attachment to another, now dysfunctional myth, 
‘communism’. As Wagner points out, the West “had signified the ‘other’ for 
Communism and after the moment of 1989 was the only system or alternative 
remaining” (Wagner, 2002: 240). By ‘returning to Europe’, Romanians (and their 
neighbors) thought not only that they could overcome the economic backwardness of 
their society but also find the force to overcome their national traditions.      
A number of factors work in the direction of a division of politics from 
identity. One and a half decade after the eventful winter of 1989, there is a feeling of 
disillusionment and frustration. The standard of living has not improved for most of 
Romanians, democratic participation is hesitant, and almost 42 percent of the 
electorate chose not to vote at the last 2004 parliamentary and presidential elections262. 
This low electoral turn-out shows political demobilization, indifference and apathy. 
The reconstruction of the Romanian society that has involved the building of the very 
foundations of economic and political order has been done from above by political 
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elites that are not yet clearly constituted nor socially legitimized, but definitely 
committed to the political game (Staniszkis, 1991: 34). The reconstruction of the 
economy brought about hardships and deprivations for significant parts of the 
population.  
While by now formal institutions, economic and political changes at 
national level are in place, nobody can guarantee that they will work properly as they 
need social and cultural preconditions (i.e. social interest, political and administrative 
culture), or one of the problems is what Sztompka (1993) called ‘civilizational 
incompetence’. In my view, the accurate running of these institutions has been 
jeopardized partly by the lack of ‘civilizational competence’ which did not occur 
automatically after the end of communism.  
Notions such as authority, relations between state and civil society, the 
construction of meanings, their understandings of the meaning of Europe, and their 
ambivalent attitudes towards the Western centre differs from country to country. As 
Rumford put it, “[n]owadays former Eastern bloc countries are more firmly 
embedded in the architecture of the emerging European Union order” (Rumford, 
2006b: 3). Romania’s transformation is merely a fragment of broader processes and 
as such it influences and it is seriously influenced by wider developments within 
Europe (i.e. Constitutionalization, New Neighbourhood Policy, to name just a few). 
Romania’s indigenous transformation has had consequences on other ex-communist 
countries from Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Moldova, and Ukraine).  
The deepest level of transformation, the reconstruction of civil society - 
what Dahrendorf (1990) calls ‘the hour of the citizen’ is still to come. At the moment, 
one encounters an unsynchronized transformation, when politics came first (Wagner, 
2002), the economic transformation followed, whereas civil society is still in 
embryonic form. ‘Social vacuum’, ‘communist mentality’, and social consciousness, 
that have been deeply affected by communism, are highly resistant to change even 
under postnationalism. Sztompka refers to these features as to a particular 
‘personality syndrome’ in Eastern Europe. Its main components are: “passivism, 
avoidance of responsibility, conformism, and opportunism, learned helplessness, 
prolonged infantilism, disinterested envy and primitive egalitarianism” (Sztompka, 
1992: 19).  
The dream of changing the societal fundamentals through adherence to a 
postnational order still seems distant in this perspective.    
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4.7.5. Changing Cultural Patterns: The Postnational Identity of 
Romania 
Moving from the question of civil society, I will elaborate on the postnational identity 
of Romania. As noted in section 4.2.2. a large majority of Romanians are in favour of 
closer unity with the EU. The popular support for unification with Europe in 
Romania raises issues about the support for a postnational identity. Such an identity 
emphasises the importance of universal values, such as civil and human rights, and 
individual claims of self-determination. Identification with these transnational issues 
makes identity postnational. 
 The 1989 changes within the Romanian society powerfully questioned the 
communist imposed societal identity. This identity was a combination between a 
Romanian ethnic identity and the communist understanding of the individual. The 
new post Cold War order has opened for alternative visions. Although in the early 
1990’s Iliescu’s rule restated the ethno-cultural conception of societal identity and 
emphasised a national identity against possible ‘alien’ elements (e.g. Hungarian or 
European) the context of change has at least left the debate on identity open to 
criticism. The FSN brought about the reconstitution of the new societal identity in 
more ‘local’ terms where Europe was perceived as threatening the national identity. 
Other groups manifested their opposition to this ‘local’ understanding of 
reconstruction arguing that “the ideal of our revolution has been and remains a return 
to genuine values of democracy and European civilization” (Timişoara Declaration 
1990). In spite of the 22 December Declaration that instituted “a democratic and 
pluralist system of government” (Iliescu, 1995), the period 1990-1996 was 
determined by an effort to define the new societal identity through the concept of 
‘original democracy’, that is in ethnic terms (i.e. shared language and culture).  
This limited perception of identity had definitely marginalized the identity 
of minorities. Moreover, it brought about criticisms from the EU and external 
pressure arose against limiting the possibility of expression of minorities. This ethno-
cultural understanding of community (through the emphasis on ‘national interest’ and 
‘national community’) meant in reality denial of national minorities’ demands for 
collective rights (i.e. local autonomy and cultural rights). For instance, the 1991 
Constitution referred to the ‘unity of the Romanian people’ (article 4.1.) and the state 
sovereignty is based on the ‘majority ethno-nation’. Article 4. 2. refers to the 
Romanian citizenship: ‘Romania is the common and indivisible homeland of all its 
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citizens without any discrimination on account of race, nationality, ethnic origin, 
language, religion, sex, opinion, political adherence, property or social origin’.  
Barbu (1999) writes critically of this double view on citizenship: on the 
one hand, a pre-political vision on citizenship based on ethnic identity and on the 
other a political citizenship, according to which those who have the residence on the 
Romanian territory enjoy some rights and have some obligations. As the identity 
rights are considered insufficient by the Hungarian minority, in particular, this 
interpretation of Romanian citizenship has led to conflict over minority rights. 
Nationalist parties such as the PRM and the PUNR had at several occasions 
manifested their disapproval over the UDMR’s proposal for autonomous education 
and usage of the minority language. 
As we have seen, the centre-right opposition which came to power in 
1996 called for a radical break with the communist past and identity (Tismăneanu, 
1997). Generally the discourse could fairly be perceived as pro-European. As noted 
earlier, the coalition’s political program emphasised the development of the civil 
society separated from the state, democracy, and market economy. All in all, the 
reconstruction of a different societal order than the precedent one. This societal order 
was meant to function in full accord with wider European reference points. The 
concepts now operative in the political space were essentially those of an ‘authentic 
democracy’. As early as in 1997 the government chose a strategy of swift integration 
into NATO in the first wave of enlargement together with Poland, Hungary and 
Czech Republic. Committed to Euro-Atlantic integration, Ciorbea government 
delayed the indigenous economic reforms announced before the 1996 elections. The 
government could not deliver on their project of building an ‘authentic democracy’ 
which was translated by many as the reconstruction of Romanian society by getting 
rid of its communist elements in order to smooth the progress of integration into the 
new political reality. Romania’s NATO membership was finally postponed for a later 
stage. 
From 2000 onwards due to the general understanding that Romania could 
not do without recognition on the European level, an awareness of the Romanian 
identity was reasserted in integrational terms. This is an awareness of Romanian 
European identity rather than simply Romanian identity, in other words, bringing 
Romania in a closer relationship with Europe and its neighbours. The particular 
support for democratic institutions and EU membership may be understood as the 
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most significant achievement of the Romanian transformation. The reconstruction of 
the Romanian society has involved a process of renunciation to the particularism of 
the communist past. In this sense, the new societal identity is going in a postnational 
direction, based on abstract procedures and principles. Rather it has to be understood 
as the precursor of a much broader tendency towards postnationalism.  
Postnational integration, with its socio-cultural implications, has 
extended to Eastern Europe after the end of the Cold War. This form of integration is 
giving rise to constantly changing cultural patterns that constitute different responses 
to wider transformations of Europe. This also implies that ‘going postnational’ is 
understood as a process of adaptation around democratic principles. Postnationalism 
supposes that the state “have lost its monopoly on collective identity”263. As 
illustrated in my previous sections, postnationalism relates to a move towards new 
reference points beyond the ‘nation code’ (Delanty, 2000a). These new reference 
points extend beyond the nation-state and may be designated as postnational. 
Postnational identity is a loose collection of civic ideals, such as 
democracy, progress, equality and human rights (Soysal, 2002: 274). It develops a 
new basic component of national identities – the civil one. As such, Eastern Europe 
represents a ‘transnational normativity’ (Therborn, 2001). Anyone respecting these 
principles can be simply European. “We increasingly observe a normalization of 
national canons, by which I mean a standardization process that removes the 
mythical, the extraordinary and the charismatic from its accounts of nationhood” 
(Soysal, 2002: 275).  
Delanty perceives European identity not only as a collective identity that 
legitimates the EU but also as an emerging cultural model. The connotation of this is 
that “a future European post-national and constitutional order will have to reconcile 
itself with the fact that the identity of Europe is not easily codified in a cultural 
package” (Delanty, 2003a: 85-86). Indeed it is difficult to argue that the nation-state 
still dominates ‘the meaning of belonging’ (Delanty and Rumford, 2005).  
The main implications of postnationalism on societal identities after the 
collapse of communism included, on the one hand, reinvention of a new societal 
identity by eliminating its communist features, break-up with the ‘communist 
imagination’, and construction of a European Romanian identity. On the other hand, 
within only one and a half decade Romania has been more successful in what 
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systemic transformation is concerned than it is commonly admitted. Communist rule 
ended, a market economy has replaced a state planned economy, a multi-party 
political competition has replaced the mono-party political system, NATO 
membership was a reality in 2004 and preparations to become EU member in 2007 
are almost accomplished. Members of the Romanian society welcomed the re-
opening of borders, the access to global trade, travel and study abroad.  
There is no doubt that the integration into the EU offers a positive 
economic, political and legal environment for the Romanian society. In my view this 
process is the key difference between the situation in Romania today and its unhappy 
experience through history. “The prospect of institutionalised ‘return to Europe’ also 
makes them different from other democratic transitions outside Europe” (Fowler, 
2001). The appropriation of the EU institutional patterns in Romania did not mean 
acceptance in the original outward appearance. It rather meant a constant 
reinterpretation, and reconstruction of these patterns. From a postnational 
perspective, European norms and values create a new kind of society and a distinctive 
European identity in Romania. When so many things are European, the question is 
why should societal identity stay national? Europeanization plays of course a big role 
in the postnational type of integration where the local no longer defines communities.  
Yet, the debate on postnational identity is linked to a wider European 
cultural identity, distinct from EU politics and policy. For Delanty and Rumford, this 
identity is defined “by an orientation to a broad cultural conception of Europe” 
(Delanty and Rumford, 2005: 55). With Eastern European societies being gradually 
integrated into the EU, a postnational identity will be defined by the greater 
“interpenetration of European societies and from a certain ‘liquidification’ of national 
identities” (Delanty and Rumford, 2005: 55). Together with the emergence of this 
openness, the issue of recognition comes to the fore. As a cultural imaginary, 
postnationalism is also a process of recognition. Romanians today aspire to some 
‘space for recognition’ (Jawlowska and Kempny, 2002) which can only be granted in 
a postnational Europe.    
Habermas (1998) argues that the sources for a postnational identity come 
from cultural forms of cohesion based on certain principles: procedural rules, 
reconciliation of conflicts, limited patriotism, identification with the principles of the 
constitution, rather than on territory and cultural traditions. Habermas sees the critical 
and reflexive forces that such an identity requires at work in all societies. In my own 
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view, these so-called civic values have acquired a dimension of practicality in the 
case of Romania. As I have illustrated earlier with the example of the Szekler 
region’s demands of territorial autonomy, the postnational dimension of the Romania 
identity has been acquired through a form of pragmatic discourse of evaluation. In 
many ways it is a postnational development and the fact that it has become articulated 
in Romanian politics is particularly interesting. Although driven by pragmatism and 
administrative necessity (vis-a-vis the EU), the approach to the question of minorities 
has wider meanings. The principle of recognition of minorities and their rights is now 
being placed on a postnational level. This development replaces earlier conception of 
diversity when minorities were considered as an alien to the Romanian nation and 
culture. This is not to say that such a postnational position does not challenge 
nationalism. As mentioned ealier, postnationalism and nationalism do not exclude 
each other: they are coexisting expressions and overlapping tendencies inside each 
society.  
 In sum, the reconstruction and representation of societal identities within 
the political reality of Romania correspond to a shift from the communist 
interpretation of identity to the postnational definition of identity. The loss of 
reference points from communism has implied an identity crisis. This mechanism has 
encouraged members of society to accept discourses of identity based on ethnicity 
(i.e. ultranationalist). Such discourses legitimized in exclusivist terms have alternated 
with the current trend of reorganization of identities in postnational terms (through a 
strong attachment to Europe and democratic principles). This gave way to 
replacement of patriotism with postnationalism which distinguishes national from 
ethnic identities, thus recreating an inclusive form of social relations between 
different ethnic groups. Within this framework, the new societal identities 
represented both a mode of reconstructing power and an adaptation to postnational 
Europe (i.e. recognition of minorities). This leads me to conclude the ambivalence of 
manifestations in reconstructing the societal identities which may carry different and 
sometimes opposing political messages, with no deviation but simply a different 
content.      
4.8. Final Remarks on Cultural Integration and Romania  
After 1989 Romania’s politics can best be understood within the framework of an 
analysis which sees Romania becoming postwestern and postnational. The definition 
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of cultural integration used in this chapter – as the process of reorganization caused 
by social agents who seek to reconstruct an existing societal order on the basis of 
their specific understandings – led me to the empirical analysis of Romania’s 
encounter with cultural integration. It should have become evident that first of all, 
any particular encounter with cultural integration is delineated by the particular 
historical context in which it takes place. Secondly, cultural integration and the 
interpretation of cultural integration is less of a homogenous encounter than 
suggested in the classical notions of integration, transition, and Europeanization. 
Thus, the Romanian case suggests a more critical perspective on the traditional 
approaches to study transformation. The vocabulary of the old debate can confine 
neither the dynamics of the integration process, nor its open structure. As Delanty 
pointed out, integration is merely “a self-creating process based on the constant 
negotiation with inside and outside relations” (Delanty, 2003c: 14). Another 
conclusion is self-evident. To the extent that Romania’s reconstruction has emerged 
as the outcome of political agents, the internal drive for this reconstruction of societal 
order has come from wider transformations in Europe. The empirical analysis of 
Romania’s political transformation came to support the idea that Romania is 
becoming increasingly postwestern and postnational.  
In the case of Romania, an open-ended social constructivist approach on 
cultural integration has revealed that the political agents have left a distinctive stain 
on the process of cultural integration of the country. Two conclusions can be drained 
from this proposition. First, the analysis of cultural integration requires a meeting 
point between Romania and Europe and an acknowledgement of the diversity of 
social agents and their meaningful proposals of modernization. Second, existing 
theory on integration needs to be reassessed in its focus on the outcome of 
transformation towards a focus on the dynamics and unforeseen consequences of 
cultural integration.  
As it looks now, Romania is going both postwestern and postnational. 
The analysis has not touched upon all features of transformation in Romania – more 
could have been mentioned (i.a. cosmopolitan Romania and about the emergence of 
‘network society’ as a new form of civil society) - but I have concentrated to those 
features that concern most the reorganization process pursued by social agents. This 
chapter was meant to draw attention to those features of cultural integration that, 
although emerging vaguely in the first phase of post-1989 transformation, were 
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obvious in its later stage. Awareness of the complexity of the open-endedness 
transformation, of the ties linking them with the recent as well as the more distant 
history of Romania, as well as of its uneven and unequal course in the different 
regions, and of the importance of wider European transformations for Romania’s 
development, should all contribute to a more objective and realistic analysis of the 
assessment of what is happening in Romania. As Bauman (1994) put it, it is still too 
soon to make ultimate conclusions as cultural integration process is still going on and 






his thesis was set in the context of the current debate in social theory around 
the emergence of a so-called postwestern and postnational Europe. It has 
sought to develop a framework by which transformation of the Eastern 
European countries can be investigated and to examine that framework in light of 
‘evidence’ presented by the case of Romania. The perspective of cultural integration 
suggests that Eastern European transformation can no longer be read simply through 
an ‘enlargement’ or ‘transition’ framework. It is proposed that a more rewarding line 
of examination is to consider how Eastern European societies are responding to the 
transformation of Europe, at the same time as they are dealing with their own internal 
transformation. Thus, it was argued that complex dynamics of transformation 
occurring in Europe point to a broadening of the idea of integration. This thesis 
maintained that postwesternization and postnationalism are main dynamics for 
societies in transformation from Eastern Europe after the end of the Cold War. And 
that these dynamics are far from being mere the outcome of the EU enlargement or 
transition.   
5.1. A Brief Summary 
The study has aimed to investigate the constitutive dynamics of cultural integration in 
Europe after the end of communism. Cultural integration has been understood as the 
process of reorganization caused by social agents who seek to reconstruct an existing 
societal order on the basis of their specific understandings. 
Chapter 2 sat out to present a critical analysis of the major approaches to 
the contemporary processes of transformation in Europe, from the traditional 
‘integration theories’ to the discursive, social change, nationalist approaches to 
European integration, and ‘Europeanization’ in the sense of adaptation caused by the 
EU. On the one hand, these theories were considered useful in understanding 
systemic aspects of integration. On the other hand, it was argued that notably the 
traditional theories of European integration fall short of grasping the normative 
dimension of the transformations in contemporary Europe. In particular the logic of 
T 
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integration linked to wider processes of transformation - beyond the EU’s institutions 
– leaves insufficient the conventional theories of European integration. The thesis 
then turns to an alternative, social-constructivist interpretation of ‘Europeanization’, 
now understood as a process of adaptation around conceptions of Europe, whereby 
societal identities are being redefined. It was suggested that the current socio-cultural 
forms of transformation in Europe are better depicted within the analytical framework 
of ‘cultural integration’. The reshaping of former communist societies and key 
aspects of their societal identity were highlighted through a social constructivist 
perspective. By applying a social constructivist perspective, the emphasis came on 
the on-going process of social construction and the capacity of change of European 
societies.   
Chapter 3 outlined the conceptual framework for the study of cultural 
integration and presented a model of cultural integration. In providing a framework 
for exploring further the nature of change, the model emphasised the need to 
conceptualise the current dynamics in terms of ‘postwesternisation’ and 
‘postnationalism’ as in later years we are witnessing not just a convergence process 
towards ‘more of the West in the East’, but rather the emergence of a fundamentally 
different Europe, beyond East and West. This also implied that the internal dynamics 
of integration could not depicted simply in terms of Westernization and nationalism 
as forces that respectively promote and hold back the interaction with the external. 
Drawing on theoretically insights from Delanty and Rumford, F. Peter Wagner, and 
Habermas and placing cultural integration in a social constructivist perspective, the 
chapter stressed the following as essential elements of a model of cultural integration: 
the importance of continuity and context, integration as open-ended transformation, 
double synchronicity, impact of external influences or ‘diffusion’, multiple 
modernities, postwestern and postnational Europe. 
In Chapter 4 the thesis then went on to apply the general cultural 
integration model to Romania, commonly regarded as a ‘problematic’ case in 
transition studies. Initial the thesis analyses key aspects of Romania’s political 
development during pre-communist and communist eras. Emphasis is given to the 
interplay between internal political developments and Romania’s relationship to 
Europe. Important elements of continuity were observed. Starting out from the 
historical continuities, the chapter then analysed the impact of cultural integration in 
post-1989 Romania through the framework of postwesternization and 
 269 
postnationalism. In the case of Romania, the on-going transformation in the context 
of cultural integration implied a fundamental rethinking of the existing societal order 
and societal identity. A number of concrete examples served to illustrate the general 
(theoretical) findings, including how Romania’s transformation is both influencing 
and being influenced by the appearance of a postwestern and postnational Europe. 
5.2. Answering to the Research Question 
The research question posed in the introduction asked: how to analyse the 
transformation of Eastern Europe in the context of the wider transformations taking 
place in Europe? The question entailed the supposition that internal transformations 
cannot be observed isolated from changes taking place in the rest of Europe, a widely 
accepted assumption regardless of theoretical approach. However, by indicating 
‘wider transformations’ the research question presumed that the influences cannot be 
deduced uniquely from EU integration, i.e. the East’s adaptation to standards set by 
the ‘West’. This latter interpretation suggests that integration is a relatively linear 
transition process of which the complexity can be condensed to ‘stop’ and ‘go’ – or in 
more ideological terms: nationalism and Westernization.  By contrast, the present 
author understands integration as a multilayered and polychronic process. Thus, as an 
answer to the above research question the thesis proposes to apply cultural 
integration as a complementary approach to the study of European integration. 
‘Complementary’ in the sense that I find that existing approaches only provide a 
partial understanding of integration. A cultural integration perspective focuses on the 
interplay between internal transformation and European integration. At the same time 
it opens for a fundamental rethinking of the conceptual framework for understanding 
this interplay. The following ‘tools’ have proven essential in analysing the 
transformation in Romania in the context of the wider transformations taking place in 
Europe: 
A first element, which the thesis has sustained as vital, is the importance 
of understanding integration from a postnational perspective. Thereby one attaches 
importance both to the transfer of norms beyond legal rules, and to other actors than 
the state. Admittedly, the analysis has focused on social agents mainly in terms of 
political actors operating at national level. Nonetheless, for instance the significant 
role played by minorities in Romania supports the idea that transformation is more 
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adequately understood, when perceiving Europe as gradually shifting towards a ‘post-
Westphalian’ order.  
The idea of an emerging postwestern Europe has proven another useful 
steppingstone in analyzing transformations in Eastern Europe. This perspective puts 
the observer in a position to appreciate the impact that enlargement has not only on 
the acceding member states, but also on the idea of Europe as such. The idea of 
understanding integration from a postwestern perspective proved particularly 
relevant, as it was shown that with Romania increasingly integrated into Europe, its 
international behaviour contributed to redefining the entire continent in terms 
borders, values, and common identity. 
This links up to the importance of acknowledging the concept of ‘multiple 
modernities’. The development of a postwestern Europe implies that ‘modernity’ 
does not refer to a distinctive Western scheme. But that several norms for societal 
organisation can coexist within a multi-centred Europe subject to local 
interpretations. In the case of Romania, it is not feasible to identify the specificities of 
a possible ‘Romanian modernity’. Yet, the already noted continuity of pre-
revolutionary elements anticipates that Romanian society will remain distinctive 
despite adaptation to various foreign influences, including systemic integration. 
Moreover, the thesis of ‘double synchronicity’, which states that changes 
are taking place simultaneously in Romania and in the rest of Europe, must be taken 
into account. This induces a different logic into the integration process than if the 
relationship is perceived primarily as a one-sided convergence. The consequence is 
that the researcher will have to look further into the interplay of these parallel and 
intertwined processes, but also the synergy which implies that both Romania and the 
rest of Europe changes through the interaction. Mathematically speaking, 
enlargement is not a simple addition, but rather a multiplication with several 
unknown variables. For instance, with the eastern enlargement the EU as such is 
becoming more culturally diversified. This adds a new dimension to the question of 
European unity.  
Furthermore, it is important to recognize the significance of continuity 
and context. Contrary to transition theory that regards transition as a fundamental 
break with the past, the framework proposed by this thesis, insists on the necessity to 
take into account societal legacy. A revolution does not come out of nothing, nor 
does it create a tabula rasa. Traditions, habits, and patterns of identity are persistent 
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and constitute an indispensable basis for the construction of a new societal order. The 
surviving elements are often redefined in a new context, but as the example of 
nationalism showed in the case of Romania, it continues to play an important role in 
shaping national identities. 
Another critical element of a cultural integration approach derives from 
the need to stress the open-ended character of large-scale processes of social change. 
In the same way as the starting point of transformation cannot be defined 
independently of the past, the outcome of integration is not fixed, either in time, or in 
content. Cultural integration is not a process which eventually leads to an integrated 
European society or to uniformity of cultures and identities. The intensions and 
aspirations of integration are continuously redefined and subject to many parallel and 
often conflicting interpretations. The emerging Romanian society is neither just a late 
comer to the EU family, nor a reproduction of the Western liberal capitalist states or a 
return to precommunist Romania.  
Finally, one must consider the impact of ‘diffusion’. This may seem self-
evident, as integration per se is traditionally understood as the adaptation to external 
influences. However, diffusion in a cultural integration approach means more than 
adaptation of legislation, but refers to spread and reembedding of ideas and values in 
new contexts. When, for example, Iliescu in the early 1990s formally adopted a 
‘social democratic’ agenda, neither the ‘social’ component, nor the ‘democratic’ 
component necessarily reflected the European mainstream of moderate leftism. 
Instead, the societal project put forward by the ex-communists stood on the shoulders 
of five decades of social engineering, more than a century of nationalism, and a very 
embryonic conception of public participation.   
 These above points review the main insights produced by this thesis, 
hereby summarizing, what I regard as essential elements, when analysing the 
transformation of Eastern Europe in the context of the wider transformations taking 
place in Europe. 
5.3. Implications for Further Research 
Theoretically the foremost contribution of the thesis is a substantiation of the concept 
of ‘cultural integration’, as a complementary approach to the study of integration and 
societal change in Europe.  
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Besides the specific points that constitute the answer to the research question, I will 
draw attention to three more general implications for further research, which arise out 
of the present study.  
A first point concerns the very nature of transformation. The study has 
restated the importance of seeing transformation not only as changes in structures but 
also as changes in local meanings and identities. Furthermore, the double-sided 
nature of transformation – i.e. that local transformations transform the meaning 
attributed to Europe and vice versa – is another general point, which may have 
potential implications for further research. 
Secondly, the thesis prescribes a more central role to ‘culture’ in social 
theory in general and in integration studies in particular. In most current research, 
culture - although admitted as an important dimension of integration - is treated only 
rudimentarily. However, as sustained by the thesis, culture – here defined as a 
socially constructed reality based on ‘social imaginary’ significations - is not only a 
factor that explains the different points of departure for societies under 
transformation, but also a crucial variable in determining and understanding the path 
that each society chooses to pursue.   
A third general implication relates to the possibilities opened by using 
social constructivism to study cultural integration. This thesis has made the case for 
the application of social constructivism. It follows that social constructivism should 
continue to lend itself to the study of the cultural dimension of integration, 
characterised by the reconstruction of an existing societal order and identities and a 
clearly articulated reflexive dimension. The re-shaping of European societies in a 
postwestern and postnational direction also suggests a place for constructivist 
theorizing.      
5.4. Elements of a Future Research Agenda 
A study like the present, which explores relatively new theoretical and empirical 
frontiers, necessarily leaves a number of open ends as well as it sets out the direction 
for further research. I will indicate four areas, which I expect to be particularly 
rewarding to inquire further into. 
First, recent research has proposed to see Europe in a cosmopolitan 
perspective (Delanty and Rumford, 2005). In a way, this is the natural next step from 
a postnational order, which ultimately does imply the development of some sort of 
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complementary pan-European identity. But also a step beyond postwesternization as 
such, as the cosmopolitan perspective does not entail a merger of cultures into one 
unitary Western culture, but rather the coexistence of multiple identities, including 
also minorities of non-Christian, non-European origin. 
Second, this thesis has explored multiple axes of the post-1989 
relationship between Eastern Europe – in particular Romania – and the rest of 
Europe. However, one cannot ignore that current transformations take place under the 
condition of globalization, which imposes its own logic. To place cultural integration 
in a global perspective would open new insights. As already hinted by the case-study 
on Romania, actors and forces outside Europe do play a crucial role in defining 
borders – mental or ‘real’ – as well as patterns of identification.  
Third, in my opinion this study also encourages further rediscovery and 
rethinking of Eastern Europe by using a historical-contextual approach and moving 
away from integration theories and transition studies. Seeing transformation in a 
longer perspective raises sensitivity towards the societal problematic, here understood 
as the creation of well functioning, inclusive communities. At the end of the day, 
applied social science cannot escape its ultimate normative raison d’être: the search 
for ‘the good society’.  
A final aspect, which deserves far more attention, but which the main 
focus of this study has left only limited space for, is the question of how external 
discourses influence and empower local understandings and identities. This could be 
made subject to an extensive empirical study. The cooperative position assumed by 
the minorities in Romania after the revolution and the quasi-independent links they 
have nurtured to the European supranational structures, are indicative for this matter. 
At the same time, minorities are well-suited objects of study in this regard, as 
quantitatively they represent relatively few individuals. Moreover, due to their special 
situation they are likely to be relatively overexposed to the influence of external 
discourses. 
5.5. Concluding remarks  
As already explained, Romania has generally been regarded as a ‘problematic’ case 
for integration studies, since Romania’s trajectory has in many aspects been deviant 
from the ‘transition mainstream’. For a number of reasons, summarised in the 
introduction, I chose nonetheless to work with Romania in the application of my 
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cultural integration model. In hinder sight, one may legitimately question if this was a 
prudent choice, when it comes to the general applicability of the findings. However, 
by constructing an analytical framework, which emphasized the wider 
transformations of cultural integration in Europe, I partly accommodate this potential 
critique. Despite differences in internal composition and local constitution of 
identities, all societies of Eastern Europe are subject to the dynamics of 
postwesternization and postnationalism, which by definition exceed the national 
order. Against this background, I believe that the findings regarding how to approach 
the study of integration can serve as a guideline also outside the Romanian case.  
This having been said, a short epistemological closing remark seems 
appropriate at this point. This thesis has built on a social constructivist epistemology. 
This represents a conscious choice, as I have found that such an approach would be 
helpful in overcoming conventional understandings of what constitutes central terms 
like integration, transformation, and identity. The analysis has sustained the 
usefulness of social constructivism for my purpose: it has made possible the 
construction of connected theoretical statements on cultural integration; it has helped 
me to identify main cultural dynamics in Eastern European societies; it has provided 
the ground for inferring testable hypotheses from theoretical statements; and it has 
made available some additional clarity to the apparently confusing societal 
developments. However, any choice of epistemology also to a large extent lays the 
ground for what kind of findings will later be derived. Hence, I do not ignore that 
another (essentialist) epistemology would have shed light on other aspects of my 
subject. This is why I insist that the proposed model to analyse the transformation of 
Eastern Europe in the context of the wider transformations taking place in Europe is 
complementary to existing approaches. 
 This leads me to my next point. Since 1989 the former communist countries 
of Eastern Europe have undergone significant changes and have been subject to 
various internal and external forces of influence. Cultural integration as an academic 
approach is one path to pursue which reveals its version of a multifaceted reality. 
‘Postwesternization’ and ‘postnationalism’ are far from being immediately 
observable in all aspects of Romania’s everyday life. Wagner, for example, argues 
that “the process of economic reform is not getting off the ground and is continually 
getting bogged down in a mix of frantic doing and undoing” (Wagner, 2002: 277). 
Less optimistic living conditions are seen as “highly problematic with most people 
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living in a grey zone between actual poverty and a stable socio-economic existence 
by simply making- ends-meet each and every month” (Wagner, 2002: 277). A 
Bukovinean pensioner receiving a monthly paycheque of 70 euros certainly would 
have another version of reality to contribute than the one revealed by a cultural 
integration approach. This, however, does not undermine the general relevance of the 
proposed analytical tools, but basically sustains the thesis regarding multiple realities 
and identities. 
Finally, the central notions of ‘postwestern’ and ‘postnational’ are open to 
critique: they are neither fixed concepts within current research, nor easy to observe 
empirically. Yet, for the purpose of this thesis they have proven useful to express the 
dynamic and sui generis elements of cultural integration: how Eastern European 
countries in the aftermath of communism are responding to the transformations of 
Europe while at the same time dealing with their own transformations. In the end, 
whatever aspiration one may have for a work of this sort, if it has contributed to 
broaden the perspective on European integration in general and on Romania’s 
transformation in particular, and if it represents even a minor step in the direction 
beyond the persistent academic East/West dichotomy, it has fulfilled its most 








uropa undergår fundamentale forandringer i kølvandet på den Kolde Krigs 
afslutning. En afgørende begivenhed er udvidelsen af den Europæisk Union 
(EU), der indebærer, at de tidligere kommunistiske lande i Østeuropa bliver 
del af et samlet Europa. Samspillet mellem ydre og indre faktorer i disse samfund 
bevirker, at det i stigende grad er nødvendigt at befatte sig på en ny måde med studiet 
af europæisk forandring og integration. Svaret i denne afhandling er ’kulturel 
integration’. 
Afhandling tager sit afsæt i den aktuelle sociologiske debat vedrørende 
fremvæksten af et såkaldt postvestligt og postnationalt Europa. Denne indebærer, at 
ikke alene de østeuropæiske lande forandrer sig, men at hele Europa er genstand for 
grundlæggende refortolkning i takt med at landegrænser opblødes og Øst/vest-
delingen af kontinentet gradvist ophæves. En sådan ’dobbelt synkronicitet’ (double 
syncronicity) står i modsætning til hovedparten af eksisterende teorier om europæisk 
integration, der forklarer Østeuropas integration i det øvrige Europa som ’transition’. 
Transitologien hviler på to grundantagelser: Dels at de østeuropæiske lande bevæger 
sig entydigt i retning af en vestlig model (konvergens), dels at integration alene 
udspiller sig indenfor rammerne af EU’s formelle institutionelle struktur 
(singularitet). I modsætning hertil er det opfattelsen hos denne afhandlings forfatter, 
at de aktuelle forandringsprocesser i de tidligere kommunistiske lande i Østeuropa 
ikke kan begribes fyldestgørende inden for rammen af disse traditionelle 
integrationsteorier. På denne baggrund spørger afhandlingens problemformulering: 
”hvordan analyserer man forandringsprocesserne i Østeuropa i sammenhæng med de 
overordnede forandringer, der finder sted i Europa?” 
Besvarelsen falder i tre hovedafsnit. Indledningsvist foretages en kritisk 
analyse af de væsentligste eksisterende teorier om europæisk integration. Analysen 
blotlægger, at bestående teorier, der navnlig befatter sig med systemisk integration, 
ikke i tilstrækkelig grad kan begrebsliggøre de igangværende sociokulturelle 
forandringer. Afsnittet vender sig i stedet mod Europæisering (Europeanization), som 
en socialkonstruktivistisk tilgang, der lægger vægt på tilpasningen omkring 
forskellige opfattelser af begrebet Europa, hvorigennem kollektive/samfundsmæssige 
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identiteter bliver redefineret. Dette leder frem til den delkonklusion, at de aktuelle 
forandringsdynamikker mere adækvat begribes inden for rammerne af begrebet 
’kulturel integration’ (cultural integration).  
I afhandlingens andet hovedafsnit etableres et begrebsapparat for studiet 
af kulturel integration. Dernæst fremlægges en teoretisk model for kulturel 
integration, baseret på bidrag fra Gerard Delanty og Chris Rumford, F. Peter Wagner 
samt Jürgen Habermas. I modellen betones nødvendigheden af at forstå de aktuelle 
forandringsdynamikker ved hjælp af begreberne ’postvestliggørelse’ 
(postwesternization) og ’postnationalisme’ (postnationalism), idet vi i de senere år er 
vidner til fremkomsten af et grundlæggende anderledes Europa, hvor integration og 
forandring ikke lader sig dækkende forklare alene indenfor rammerne af 
’vestliggørelse’ (Westernization) og nationalisme, som to kræfter, der hhv. fremmer 
og begrænser integration.  Modellen lægger tillige vægt på, at samfundsmæssige 
forandringer må iagttages i historisk sammenhæng, idet disse i høj grad er afhængige 
af videreførte dynamikker. 
I afhandlingens tredje hovedafsnit anvendes modellen til at belyse 
udvalgte aspekter af den forandringsproces, som Rumænien har været genstand for 
siden omstyrtelsen af Ceauşescu-regimet i 1989. Udgangspunktet tages i en analyse 
af Rumænien før og under kommunismen med særlig vægt på samspillet mellem den 
interne politiske udvikling og forholdet til Europa. Baseret på identifikationen af 
væsentlige elementer af historisk kontinuitet, analyseres Rumæniens aktuelle 
forandring indenfor rammerne af modellen for kulturel integration. Analysen 
understøttes af en række konkrete eksempler, der illustrerer, hvordan udviklingen af 
et postvestligt og postnationalt Europa indvirker på identitets- og 
samfunds(om)dannelse i Rumænien. 
På baggrund af det gennemførte empiriske studie og som svar på 
problemformuleringen fremhæver afhandlingen en række ’redskaber’ som væsentlige 
for en analyse af kulturel integration: ideen om ’multiple identiteter’ (multiple 
modernities), tesen om dobbelt synkronicitet, betydningen af at anskue forandring i 
en historisk sammenhæng, vigtigheden af at opfatte sociokulturelle 
forandringsprocesser som ’åbne’ og uden et fastlagt endemål, samt ’diffusion’, dvs. 
eksterne påvirkninger som genindlejres i lokale strukturer og identiteter. Hertil 
lægger sig naturligvis ideerne om fremkomsten af et postvestligt og postnationalt 
Europa. 
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Teoretisk er afhandlingens væsentligste bidrag en substantiering af 
begrebet ’kulturel integration’, der udgør en komplementær tilgang til studiet af 
integration og samfundsmæssige forandringer. Afhandlingens konklusioner antages 
at være generelliserbare også uden for det umiddelbare empiriske område belyst i 
afhandlingen (Rumænien). Endvidere tilskynder afhandling til at give kultur en mere 
central placering som forklaringsfaktor indenfor socialteorien. Empirisk bidrager 
afhandlingen til belysning af samspillet mellem integration og sociokulturelle 
forandringsprocesser i Rumænien, der – endskønt den næststørste af EU’s nye og 
kommende medlemsstater – kun i meget ringe grad har været genstand for 
systematisk analyse. Konkret skal nævnes illustrationen af, hvordan Rumænien både 
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